Undisputed Medical Evidence Can Defeat Manslaughter Instructions; Delusional Claims Alone Do Not Mandate Mid‑Trial Competency Hearings

Case: Elvis Anderson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky

Date: March 20, 2025

Disposition: Convictions affirmed (murder; two counts of second-degree assault); sentence of 20 years upheld.

Publication status: Not to be published under RAP 40(D) (nonbinding; may be cited post‑2003 if no published opinion adequately addresses the point).

Introduction

This memorandum opinion addresses two recurring trial issues in Kentucky criminal practice: when a defendant is entitled to lesser‑included offense (LIO) instructions—specifically first-degree manslaughter (both “intent-to-injure” and Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED) variants)—and when a trial court must interrupt proceedings to order a competency examination or hold a competency hearing mid‑trial.

Elvis Anderson was convicted of murdering his neighbor, Davon Banks, and assaulting Banks’s wife and mother-in-law. On appeal, Anderson argued (1) the trial court erred by denying LIO instructions on first-degree manslaughter and assault under EED; and (2) the court violated due process by not holding a competency hearing after Anderson’s mid‑trial outbursts, including a claim that the videos shown depicted a “clone.” The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the instructional rulings and no constitutional or statutory error in the handling of competency.

Although designated “Not to be Published,” the Court’s analysis provides clear guidance about (a) the evidentiary threshold for EED and “intent‑to‑injure” manslaughter instructions in homicide and assault cases, and (b) how trial courts should assess mid‑trial competency concerns under a totality‑of‑the‑evidence framework.

Summary of the Opinion

• First‑degree manslaughter (KRS 507.030(1)(a), “intent to injure”): The Court held the undisputed medical evidence—ten machete wounds, including multiple independently fatal wounds, with injuries to the victim’s back and abrasions on his knees indicating continued blows as he tried to crawl away—foreclosed a reasonable inference that Anderson intended only serious physical injury rather than death. No LIO instruction was warranted.
• First‑degree manslaughter and assault under EED (KRS 507.030(1)(b), 508.040(1)): The Court found no “specific and identifiable” triggering event to support EED. Anderson’s unsubstantiated beliefs about neighbors “messing with” his dogs and perceived “taunting” with a machete did not meet the EED standard; nor did his own statements (including that he did not “go off with some kind of rage”). Thus, EED-based LIO instructions were properly refused for both homicide and assault counts.
• Competency mid‑trial: Applying the constitutional and statutory frameworks, the Court concluded there were not even “reasonable grounds” to order an examination, let alone “substantial evidence” to require a hearing. Anderson’s “clone” claim was offset by contemporaneous evidence of orientation, coherent participation, and apparent strategic motivations, plus the absence of any mental health history. Under Woolfolk’s “reasonable judge” standard, no competency hearing was required.

Dissent: One Justice would have reversed for failure to instruct on EED, emphasizing Kentucky’s “subjective reasonableness” lens and the principle that triggers may “fester.” In his view, Anderson’s stated perceptions (neighbors threatening him with blades, harming his dogs) sufficed to warrant the jury’s consideration of EED.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 2, 2022, during a neighbor’s moving day, Anderson called LMPD about “crack smokers” across the street. Minutes later, he moved his truck, approached the neighbor’s porch with a stick, struck Davon Banks, wrested a machete, and delivered ten cuts, including to Banks’s back, while Banks tried to crawl away. Banks died at the scene. Francis Alexander and Jessica (Banks’s wife) suffered serious head injuries.

Anderson did not testify, but in a recorded interview he said he intended only to “whoop” Banks to “send a message,” denied acting in a rage, yet also told police he “lost it.” He claimed he believed neighbors had entered his home and affected his dogs’ eating. No evidence corroborated those beliefs.

On the second trial day, after video evidence was played, Anderson became agitated, asked to leave, alleged corruption, insisted the trial videos were “doctored,” and claimed a “clone” appeared in them. The court advised him of his right to be present; he voluntarily absented himself for subsequent days (a point not challenged on appeal). After a short break day that had already been scheduled, the court held a hearing to decide whether to order a competency exam. A jail nurse contractor testified Anderson was oriented, coherent, and excited about a potential mistrial and “going home.” A recorded pre‑trial call also captured Anderson discussing trial attire and projecting a “good outcome.” The court found no reasonable grounds to doubt competency and declined to order an exam.

At the close of proof, the court refused instructions on (a) first‑degree manslaughter under KRS 507.030(1)(a) (intent to injure) and (b) first‑degree manslaughter and second‑degree assault under EED. The jury returned guilty verdicts on murder and two second-degree assaults and recommended a total of 20 years (20 for murder, and concurrent five‑year terms for the assaults). The Supreme Court affirmed.

Standards Applied

• Jury instructions (lesser‑included offenses): Abuse of discretion. An LIO instruction is warranted only if the evidence would allow a reasonable juror to entertain reasonable doubt about the greater offense while finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the lesser. See Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Ky. 2018); Allen v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Ky. 2011); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234, 244 (Ky. 2001).
• Competency (constitutional and statutory):
  • Constitutional due process requires a hearing if there is “substantial evidence” of incompetency. Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336, 347 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Filiaggi v. Bagley, 445 F.3d 851, 858 (6th Cir. 2006)).
  • Statutory KRS 504.100(3) requires a hearing only after an exam/report has been ordered on “reasonable grounds.”
  • Appellate review asks whether a reasonable judge in the trial court’s position “should have experienced doubt” about competency. Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411, 423 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Ky. 2001)).

Detailed Analysis

A. First‑Degree Manslaughter as a Lesser‑Included Offense

1) “Intent‑to‑injure” theory (KRS 507.030(1)(a))

Context: The murder instruction merged intentional and wanton murder into a single instruction without a verdict form requiring the jury to specify which theory it adopted—a practice the Court again discourages. See Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Ky. 1998). Anderson claimed entitlement to a first‑degree manslaughter instruction on the theory that he intended only serious physical injury, not death.

Unsettled LIO pairing for wanton murder: Kentucky has not definitively resolved whether first‑degree manslaughter is a proper LIO for wanton murder. See Allen, 338 S.W.3d at 256 (acknowledging the “conundrum”). The Court reiterated two important points from Allen: (a) ambiguity in charging/instructional posture should not let the Commonwealth use “artful pleading” to deprive a defendant of a colorable LIO; and (b) double‑jeopardy logic suggests first‑degree manslaughter may be subsumed within wanton murder. See Allen (citing Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).

Disposition without resolving the conundrum: The Court assumed, without deciding, that a first‑degree manslaughter instruction could be available despite the merged murder instruction. It denied the instruction on evidentiary grounds.

Medical evidence controlled: Relying on Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 668 (Ky. 2003), the Court held that undisputed medical evidence can be so compelling that no reasonable juror could find an “intent‑to‑injure” mental state in a fatal assault. Here, the medical examiner testified to ten machete wounds, three independently fatal, and injuries indicating continued blows while the victim crawled away. That pattern, the Court concluded, foreclosed a reasonable inference that Anderson intended only serious injury rather than death.

Court’s treatment of Anderson’s counter‑points: (i) His approach with a stick did not establish his ultimate homicidal intent, because malice can be “instantly formed” at the moment of killing. See Elliot v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Ky. 1941); Moss v. Commonwealth, 332 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Ky. 1959). (ii) His post‑attack statement (“B*tch, if I catch you up here again…”) did not meaningfully suggest ignorance of death or intent to injure; it could have been directed at other family members, and mere unawareness that death had already occurred is weak evidence of non‑homicidal intent. (iii) The law focuses the intent inquiry on “the state of mind with respect to the result of his act.” Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Ky. 1998). The “result” here was the fatal machete attack, not the initial approach with a stick.

2) EED theory (KRS 507.030(1)(b))

Governing principles: To merit an EED instruction, the evidence must permit a jury to find a temporary, overwhelming disturbance—“so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome judgment” and cause uncontrollable action—precipitated by a “specific and identifiable” triggering event. Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493, 503–04 (Ky. 2019) (citing McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468–69 (Ky. 1986)).

Application: The Court found no adequate trigger. Anderson’s belief that neighbors had broken into his house and affected his dogs lacked evidentiary support in the record. As for perceived “taunting” with a machete, the Court (citing Holland) viewed that, in context, as insufficient to constitute an EED trigger—particularly where Anderson armed himself, initiated the confrontation, and expressly told police he did not act in a rage but intended to “whoop” and “send a message.”

Resulting effect on assault counts: Because the same EED analysis governs assault mitigation, see Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Ky. 2005), the Court likewise rejected LIO instructions for second‑degree assault under KRS 508.040(1).

B. Competency: No Reasonable Grounds to Order an Examination or Hearing Mid‑Trial

Dual frameworks: The constitutional due process right requires a competency hearing upon “substantial evidence” of incompetence. The statutory scheme (KRS 504.100) makes a hearing mandatory only after the court has ordered an exam based on “reasonable grounds” and a report is filed. Padgett, 312 S.W.3d at 347. The “reasonable judge” standard governs appellate review. Woolfolk, 339 S.W.3d at 423.

Evidence considered: - Anderson’s August 30 outburst that the videos were “doctored,” staged, or used a “clone,” coupled with complaints about “corruption.” - His own assertions to the court that he was not under the influence and “not crazy.” - A jail nurse contractor’s observations the next day that he was oriented, coherent, and excited about a possible mistrial and “going home,” with normal vitals and appropriate responses (date, age, president). - A pre‑trial phone call in which Anderson discussed trial attire and predicted a “good outcome.” - No history of mental illness and no prior indications of incompetence.

Legal touchstone: Competence requires the ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993); see also Lawson & Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 5‑4(b) (defendant must be coherent enough to assist counsel, testify coherently, and follow evidence).

Holding: In totality, the court found Anderson’s “clone” claim insufficient to create reasonable grounds to doubt competency, particularly given the next‑day observations suggesting a strategic, not psychotic, motivation. On these facts, a reasonable judge would not have experienced doubt requiring a competency exam or hearing. No due process or statutory violation occurred.

C. The Dissent: A More Expansive View of EED Instructions

Justice Thompson would have reversed for failure to submit EED to the jury. Emphasizing KRS 507.020(1)(a)’s directive that the reasonableness of EED be judged from the defendant’s viewpoint “under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be,” the dissent invoked the “subjective reasonableness” rubric from Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775, 783 (Ky. 2008), and recognized that triggers may “fester” before erupting. Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 452 (Ky. 1999); Park v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Ky. App. 2012). On this view, Anderson’s statements about fear of neighbors brandishing blades and harming his dogs—regardless of corroboration—could allow a reasonable jury to find EED.

The dissent also noted the jury’s minimum murder sentence (20 years) as a potential indicator of mitigation sympathy, underscoring the policy preference to “let the jury sort it out” where the record provides a rational basis for a lesser instruction.

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

• Allen v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 252 (Ky. 2011): Sets the LIO standard; highlights the unresolved status of first‑degree manslaughter as an LIO of wanton murder; warns against “artful pleading” that deprives defendants of colorable LIO defenses.
• Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1998): Advises separate verdict forms when instructing both intentional and wanton murder; recognizes intent can be inferred from injury patterns but remains a jury question.
• Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003): Medical evidence of repeated, fatal blows can foreclose an “intent‑to‑injure” inference and thus defeat a first‑degree manslaughter instruction.
• Elliot v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.2d 633 (Ky. 1941) and Moss v. Commonwealth, 332 S.W.2d 650 (Ky. 1959): Malice/premeditation can be instantly formed; the focus is the state of mind at the moment of the homicidal act.
• Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1998): Intent inquiry centers on the defendant’s mental state regarding the result of his act.
• Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493 (Ky. 2019) and McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986): EED demands a “specific and identifiable” trigger and a temporary state that overwhelms judgment; context matters.
• Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2005): Applies EED mitigation principles to assault.
• Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010) and Filiaggi v. Bagley, 445 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2006): Clarify constitutional/substantial evidence vs statutory/reasonable grounds thresholds for competency proceedings.
• Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2011) and Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406 (Ky. 2001): Appellate test: would a reasonable judge have experienced doubt regarding competency.
• Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993): Federal competency standard: rational and factual understanding, and ability to consult with counsel.
• Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2008); Park v. Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 638 (Ky. App. 2012); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999): Dissent’s authorities for a more capacious, defendant‑perspective EED trigger analysis.

Legal Reasoning: Key Takeaways

• Instructional denials hinge on evidence, not labels. Even where intentional and wanton murder are merged in one instruction (a practice disfavored without a bifurcated verdict form), a defendant still gets an LIO instruction only if the record supplies a reasonable evidentiary pathway to the lesser. Here, the brutality and patterning of the wounds closed that path.
• EED remains demanding: trigger specificity and context control. Kentucky continues to insist on a “specific and identifiable” triggering event. Uncorroborated beliefs and generalized resentment—without more—are insufficient, especially when the defendant initiates the confrontation and disavows rage contemporaneously.
• Competency is a totality‑of‑evidence determination in real time. Outlandish claims (e.g., “clone” in a video) may flag a concern but do not compel a hearing if countervailed by immediate, credible observations of orientation, coherent communication, and apparent litigation strategy. Courts should document observation‑based reasons for finding no reasonable grounds.

Impact and Practice Implications

Note on precedential value: This decision is “Not to be Published” (RAP 40(D)) and is nonbinding. It may be cited for consideration if no published opinion adequately addresses the point.

• For prosecutors:
  • Use discrete verdict forms when charging both intentional and wanton murder, in line with Hudson, to avoid ambiguity on appeal.
  • Where medical evidence depicts multiple, lethal blows—especially to the back or while a victim is prone—develop those specifics. They can negate an “intent‑to‑injure” manslaughter instruction under Caudill.
  • Resisting EED: emphasize the absence of a specific, identifiable trigger and situate any alleged provocation in context (Holland).
  • Competency challenges: compile contemporaneous observations (orientation, coherent communication, strategic comments, jail calls) and any lack of mental health history to demonstrate no “reasonable grounds” for an exam.
• For defense counsel:
  • To secure EED instructions, build a record of concrete, identifiable triggers as the defendant perceived them. Offer corroboration where possible and explain the temporal “festering” of perceived threats or humiliations.
  • Consider early mental health evaluations if there are any red flags (even intermittent). Having something more than a mid‑trial outburst can help meet the “reasonable grounds” threshold.
  • Where murder instructions combine intentional and wanton theories, request separate verdict forms and preserve arguments that manslaughter instructions should be given regardless of artful pleading (Allen).
  • If the defendant makes unusual statements mid‑trial, document context, medication status, prior history, and any changes in presentation to support a finding that a genuine competency concern exists.
• For trial courts:
  • Continue to insist on “specific and identifiable” triggers for EED and explain contextual reasons for rejecting generalized or unsubstantiated provocations.
  • When competency is raised mid‑trial, make a clear, on‑the‑record totality assessment: defendant’s orientation, ability to consult, contemporaneous behavior, history, and any credible evidence of strategic motive.
  • When instructing on murder, heed Hudson’s recommendation to require the jury to specify whether guilt is based on intentional or wanton murder.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Lesser‑Included Offense (LIO): A less serious crime that is necessarily included within a charged offense. A jury may convict on the lesser if the evidence supports it and creates reasonable doubt on the greater offense.
• First‑Degree Manslaughter (two relevant paths):
  • Intent‑to‑injure path (KRS 507.030(1)(a)): Defendant intended only serious physical injury, but death resulted.
  • EED path (KRS 507.030(1)(b)): Defendant intentionally caused death while under Extreme Emotional Disturbance.
• Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED): A short‑lived but overwhelming emotional state that overcomes judgment, triggered by a specific event or series of events, judged for “reasonableness” from the defendant’s perspective under the circumstances as he believed them. It reduces murder to first‑degree manslaughter and mitigates certain assaults.
• Intentional vs. Wanton Murder: Intentional murder requires intent to cause death. Wanton murder requires extreme indifference to human life and a wanton state of mind. Kentucky’s law treats aggravated wantonness as comparably culpable to intent to kill for murder purposes.
• Competency to Stand Trial: A defendant must have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and be able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Outbursts or unusual beliefs do not automatically equate to incompetency; the court looks at the totality of the circumstances.

Conclusion

This non‑published decision reinforces three practical teachings. First, where the medical proof demonstrates multiple, lethal wounds—especially delivered while a victim is incapacitated—Kentucky courts may find no evidentiary basis for an “intent‑to‑injure” manslaughter instruction. Second, EED retains a stringent, trigger‑focused threshold; uncorroborated beliefs and generalized provocations, in context, will not ordinarily suffice without a specific, identifiable precipitating event. Third, competency concerns arising mid‑trial must be evaluated holistically; absent reasonable grounds based on the totality of evidence, a trial court need not halt proceedings for an examination or hearing.

The dissent spotlights an enduring tension in Kentucky’s EED jurisprudence—between a strict “identifiable trigger” requirement and the statute’s directive to judge reasonableness from the defendant’s subjective vantage. Future published cases may further clarify that boundary. In the meantime, Anderson underscores the importance of building concrete factual records—on both EED and competency—and of using precise jury instructions and verdict forms to avoid ambiguity.