Undercover Drug “Buy Money” Is Not Restitution: Narrowing “Money Advanced” and “Extraordinary Investigative Costs” and Overruling People v. Juanda

I. Introduction

People v. Hollis, 2025 CO 54, addresses whether Colorado’s criminal restitution statute permits law enforcement to recover unrecovered “buy money”—funds paid by undercover officers to purchase drugs during controlled buys—from the defendant as restitution.

The Petitioner, The People of the State of Colorado, sought restitution payable to the Weld County Drug Task Force (“Task Force”) after multiple undercover transactions in which officers paid the Respondent, Nathan Crawford Hollis, for drugs. When Hollis was arrested, law enforcement could not locate the buy money. After Hollis pleaded guilty to two distribution counts, the district court ordered $1,640 in restitution.

The Colorado Court of Appeals vacated that order in People v. Hollis, 2023 COA 91, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with People v. Juanda, 2012 COA 159, which had allowed recovery of buy money as restitution.

The key statutory questions were whether buy money fits within (1) “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” under § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), and/or (2) “extraordinary direct public . . . investigative costs” under § 18-1.3-602(3)(b).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and held that unrecovered buy money used in undercover drug transactions is not recoverable as restitution under either statutory route:

• § 18-1.3-602(3)(a): Buy money is not “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” because the Task Force did not “advance” money in the ordinary sense; it exchanged money for drugs as consideration in a purchase transaction.
• § 18-1.3-602(3)(b): Even if buy money is a “direct public . . . investigative cost,” it is not “extraordinary” in 2025 given the routine, budgeted, and customary nature of controlled buys.

The Court expressly overruled People v. Juanda, 2012 COA 159.

Justice Boatright, joined by Chief Justice Márquez, dissented, emphasizing restitution’s policy of “tak[ing] the profit out of crime” (citing People v. Borquez) and arguing buy money is “extraordinary” under a straightforward “but for the investigation” approach.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sanoff v. People, 187 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2008)

The Court reaffirmed restitution as “a creature of statute,” grounding its approach in statutory text rather than free-floating equitable or policy considerations. This framing constrained the analysis: the question was not whether it is fair for defendants to keep buy money, but whether the legislature authorized this category of recovery.

2. Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41 (Colo. 2009) and People v. Padilla-Lopez, 2012 CO 49

People v. Padilla-Lopez supplied the critical limiting principle the Court applied: law enforcement agencies are generally not “victims” for restitution purposes unless they “fall within the defining scope of the underlying criminal statute as a primary victim,” and their costs are typically not recoverable unless the legislature specifically includes them in the restitution statute. The Court also invoked Dubois v. People for the related proposition that “typically the legislature must specifically include law enforcement costs within the restitution statute.”

These authorities drove the Court to treat the “money advanced” and “extraordinary investigative costs” provisions as narrow, enumerated exceptions— not open-ended invitations to shift routine investigative expenditures onto defendants.

3. Teague v. People, 2017 CO 66

Teague v. People was the controlling interpretive guide for § 18-1.3-602(3)(b). There, the Court held SANE exam costs were “extraordinary” investigative costs based on the “hybrid,” “multifaceted,” and effectively “unique” nature of those exams. In Hollis, the Court used Teague’s dictionary-based definition of “extraordinary” (“not of the ordinary order,” “beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary”) and contrasted SANE exams with controlled buys to conclude buy money is ordinary in modern policing.

4. People v. Howell, 2024 CO 42; People v. Rau, 2022 CO 3; Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95

These cases contributed the Court’s interpretive method: read statutory words in context, follow grammar, harmonize the entire scheme, and avoid constructions producing superfluity or absurdity. Hollis relied on those principles to reject an interpretation of “money advanced” that would (in the Court’s view) swallow the statute’s more specific limits on recovering law-enforcement costs (for example, the “extraordinary” limitation in subsection (3)(b)).

5. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96; Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647 (Colo. 2005); Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2020 CO 12

These authorities supported the Court’s textual discipline: use dictionaries for undefined terms (Cowen v. People), respect what the statute does not say (Auman v. People), and avoid judicially adding language the legislature omitted (Mook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs). They were central to the Court’s conclusion that it could not transform “money advanced” into a synonym for “costs incurred” merely to reach a policy-appealing result.

6. People v. Juanda, 2012 COA 159 (Overruled)

People v. Juanda was the direct doctrinal foil. Juanda had treated buy money as “money advanced” and as an “extraordinary” investigative cost. Hollis rejected Juanda’s expansive reading, emphasizing that Juanda effectively allowed restitution for “any money advanced by law enforcement for any purpose.” The Supreme Court not only disagreed but formally overruled Juanda, eliminating it as support for buy-money restitution going forward.

7. Out-of-state and contextual authorities: People v. Crigler, 625 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1994)

The Court described People v. Crigler largely to explain why reliance on it was unhelpful in Colorado: Michigan’s restitution statute differs, particularly in how it defines “victim.” The Court also cited Gall v. United States as an example of longstanding skepticism toward treating government buy money as victim restitution and to contextualize how long controlled buys have been a regular investigative method.

8. Illustrative Colorado cases: People v. Williams, 2020 CO 78; People v. Ornelas-Licano, 2020 COA 62

These were not restitution decisions but examples showing routine investigative spending involving payments tied to investigations (paid informants, etc.). The Court invoked them to warn that treating unrecovered investigative payments as “extraordinary” risks “Pandora’s box”—potentially turning routine investigative expenditures into restitution claims.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Subsection (3)(a): “Money advanced by law enforcement agencies”

The Court’s holding turns on a concrete linguistic move: “advance” means furnishing money “before any consideration is received in return.” Applying that ordinary meaning, buy money is not “advanced” to a suspect because the money is paid as consideration in an immediate exchange for drugs—i.e., a purchase transaction, not a loan, gift, or pre-consideration outlay.

The People attempted to satisfy “money advanced” by arguing the agency advanced funds to its officers (who then used them). The Court rejected this as functionally automatic and therefore meaningless: agencies can act only through officers; under the People’s theory, virtually any spending by officers would become “money advanced,” collapsing the statutory term into a catch-all for law enforcement expenditures.

The Court reinforced this textual conclusion by contrasting subsection (3)(a)’s undefined “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” with the nearby, legislatively defined phrase “money advanced by a governmental agency for a service animal,” which the statute equates to “costs incurred” for treatment, disposal, and replacement. The Court treated that explicit definitional choice as evidence that the legislature knew how to expand “money advanced” to include “costs incurred” when it wished—and chose not to do so for law-enforcement buy money.

2. Subsection (3)(b): “Extraordinary direct public . . . investigative costs”

Under Teague v. People, “extraordinary” is a meaningful limiter: beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary. The Court acknowledged buy money is an investigative cost, but held it is not “extraordinary” in 2025.

The key factual predicates were institutional normalcy and routinization: the Task Force conducts five to ten controlled buys per month, budgets for buy money, has policies for its use, maintains secure storage, and uses tools to count and record it. The Court treated these facts as confirming that controlled buys are “run of the mill,” not unusual, and unlike the “complex and multifaceted” SANE exams in Teague.

The Court also rejected a “crime-profit” policy argument (“take the profit out of crime”) as an invitation to legislate from the bench. In the Court’s view, that goal—however compelling—must be accomplished by the General Assembly through restitution expansion, forfeiture tools, sentencing choices, or other mechanisms, not by stretching statutory text.

3. The dissent’s competing framework

The dissent would have classified buy money as “extraordinary” using a “but for the specific investigation” test, emphasizing the statute’s moral language in § 18-1.3-601 and the deterrence goal recognized in People v. Borquez. Hollis rejects that broader, purpose-driven approach as inconsistent with the word “extraordinary” and the statute’s overall structure limiting law-enforcement recovery.

C. Impact

1. Immediate doctrinal impact: buy-money restitution claims are barred

After Hollis, Colorado prosecutors cannot obtain restitution orders requiring defendants to repay unrecovered controlled-buy funds under either § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) (“money advanced”) or § 18-1.3-602(3)(b) (“extraordinary” investigative costs). Trial courts should treat such requests as foreclosed as a matter of law.

2. Overruling People v. Juanda stabilizes a narrower restitution scheme for governmental costs

By overruling People v. Juanda, the Court eliminates a key appellate foothold for expanding restitution to routine investigative expenses. Hollis signals that enumerated government-cost categories in § 18-1.3-602 will be read narrowly, and that courts will resist interpretations that functionally convert routine policing costs into restitution.

3. Boundary between restitution and other financial tools (forfeiture, fines, costs)

The decision implicitly channels “take the profit out of crime” concerns away from restitution and toward other statutory tools (e.g., contraband forfeiture, proceeds forfeiture where authorized, fines, or specific cost-recovery provisions). Hollis underscores that restitution remains, first and foremost, a victim-compensation mechanism, with only limited statutory openings for government recovery.

4. Legislative response is invited (but not compelled)

The dissent highlights an intuitive policy gap: controlled-buy funds may be unrecoverable even though the defendant has received them. Hollis leaves the legislature free to amend § 18-1.3-602 to expressly include buy money (or define “money advanced by law enforcement agencies” to include such expenditures), but makes clear that courts will not accomplish that result by interpretation alone.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Restitution: Money a criminal court orders a defendant to pay to compensate for legally recognized financial losses covered by statute. In Colorado, restitution exists only to the extent the legislature authorizes it.
• “Victim” and “pecuniary loss”: Restitution generally compensates the “pecuniary” (money-measurable) losses of a “victim.” Law enforcement is usually not treated as a victim unless the criminal statute makes it a primary target (per People v. Padilla-Lopez).
• “Money advanced” (ordinary meaning): Money provided before receiving anything in return (like a loan or prepayment), not money paid as the price in an immediate exchange.
• “Extraordinary investigative costs”: Investigative expenses that go beyond what is usual or customary. Under Teague v. People, the Court looks at whether the expense is meaningfully outside routine investigative practice, not merely whether it was incurred during an investigation.
• Overruling a precedent: When a higher court declares a prior decision is no longer good law. Hollis expressly overrules People v. Juanda.

V. Conclusion

People v. Hollis establishes a clear rule: unrecovered undercover drug “buy money” is not restitution under either § 18-1.3-602(3)(a) or § 18-1.3-602(3)(b). Textually, buy money is not “money advanced,” because it is paid as consideration in a purchase; and practically, controlled-buy expenditures are not “extraordinary” investigative costs in contemporary policing. By overruling People v. Juanda, the Court sharply limits restitution as a vehicle for law-enforcement cost recovery and signals that any expansion to recoup buy money must come from the legislature, not judicial interpretation.