Uncorroborated Recantations Do Not Justify Coram Nobis: Second Circuit Affirms Denial Without Evidentiary Hearing in Nkansah v. United States

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order)

Date: September 19, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Denny Chin, William J. Nardini, and Maria Araújo Kahn

Docket: 24-2336-cr

Disposition: Affirmed (denial of writ of error coram nobis and denial of evidentiary hearing)

Note on precedential status: This is a Summary Order. Under FRAP 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but has no precedential effect.

Introduction

In Nkansah v. United States, the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s denial of Felix Nkansah’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis and rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing. The petition hinged on a post-conviction recantation by a cooperating co-defendant, David Dosoo, who had implicated Nkansah at trial in a stolen-identity tax refund scheme. The appeal required the Court to apply well-established standards governing coram nobis relief and claims that the government knowingly used false testimony (often referred to as Napue/Giglio claims), as well as the district court’s discretion to deny a collateral-review evidentiary hearing.

While the Court issued a non-precedential summary order, its analysis reinforces three core principles in this area of law: (1) coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly compelling cases; (2) recantation evidence—especially when uncorroborated, conclusory, or contradicted by independent proof—is viewed with deep skepticism and rarely suffices to establish a knowing use of false testimony; and (3) district courts have broad discretion to decline an evidentiary hearing where the petition’s allegations are insubstantial and the existing record decisively undermines them.

Summary of the Opinion

• Background: In 2009, Nkansah was indicted on five charges arising from an identity theft and tax fraud scheme. After a trial featuring fourteen government witnesses and extensive physical evidence, the jury convicted him on all counts. On direct appeal, the Second Circuit vacated two counts (bank fraud and aggravated identity theft), affirmed the rest, and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Nkansah, 699 F.3d 743 (2d Cir. 2012).
• Coram Nobis Petition: In 2024, Nkansah sought coram nobis relief based on “newly discovered” proof: a brief audio recording and a one-page affidavit in which co-defendant Dosoo broadly recanted his trial testimony and alleged government coercion.
• District Court Ruling: The district court (Rakoff, J.) denied the petition, finding that Nkansah failed to establish: (i) falsity of Dosoo’s trial testimony; (ii) the government’s knowledge (or constructive knowledge) of falsity; and (iii) any reasonable likelihood that the alleged false testimony affected the jury’s verdict. It also denied an evidentiary hearing.
• Second Circuit Holding: Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Court affirmed. It agreed Nkansah failed all three prongs required to set aside a conviction based on knowing use of false testimony and held that the district court appropriately rejected the need for an evidentiary hearing in light of the petition’s weaknesses and the trial record’s strength.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Doe v. United States, 915 F.3d 905 (2d Cir. 2019): Establishes the standard of review—abuse of discretion—for the denial of coram nobis relief. The Court’s deferential posture is key: unless the district court’s decision falls outside the range of permissible choices or rests on a legal error or clearly erroneous factfinding, it will be affirmed.
• United States v. Rutigliano, 887 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2018): Recites the demanding tripartite standard for coram nobis:
  1. Compelling circumstances are necessary to achieve justice;
  2. Sound reasons must explain the failure to seek earlier relief; and
  3. The petitioner continues to suffer legal consequences remediable by the writ.
  Rutigliano also underscores that proceedings are presumed correct and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. The Court invokes this framework to emphasize how extraordinary—and rare—coram nobis relief is.
• United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir. 1993): Supplies the three-part test for claims alleging the government’s knowing use of false testimony:
  1. There was false testimony;
  2. The government knew or should have known of its falsity; and
  3. There is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment.
  This test implements the constitutional principle derived from Napue v. Illinois and Giglio v. United States. The Court’s application of Helmsley is decisive here: Nkansah failed on all three elements.
• Haouari v. United States, 510 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2007): Warns courts to treat recantations with suspicion, especially when the recanting witness was involved in the same criminal scheme and is insulated from perjury prosecution (as here, where the witness is abroad). The Court cites Haouari to discount the credibility of Dosoo’s late-breaking, sweeping recantation.
• Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001): Affirms a district court’s discretion to “expand the record” and deny an evidentiary hearing in collateral proceedings where the paper record suffices to resolve the claim. The Court relies on Chang to uphold the district court’s reasoned decision to forgo a “full-blown testimonial hearing” given the petition’s conclusory assertions and the strong trial record.
• United States v. Nkansah, 699 F.3d 743 (2d Cir. 2012): The earlier direct appeal, where the Court vacated certain counts but affirmed others. The history matters to materiality: even after those vacaturs, extensive non-cooperator evidence remained supporting the sustained convictions.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two layers: first, applying the Helmsley test to the recantation-based Napue claim; second, assessing the denial of an evidentiary hearing under Chang.

1) Knowing use of false testimony (Helmsley)

• Falsity not shown: The only “new” evidence was a one-page affidavit and a three-minute audio clip in which co-defendant Dosoo purported to recant his trial testimony wholesale. The Court found these materials:
  • Conspicuously nonspecific—failing to identify what, in a detailed trial record, was allegedly false;
  • Internally inconsistent—asserting, for example, that he did not receive “checks or cash” from Nkansah, a point that did not mirror his trial testimony;
  • Externally contradicted—by “substantial physical evidence” linking Nkansah to the scheme, including bank records showing receipt of stolen funds, IRS mailings addressed to third parties at Nkansah’s residence, and a partially completed third-party return found on Nkansah’s laptop.
  Taken together, the recantation lacked the specificity and reliability required to overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to a final conviction.
• Government knowledge not shown: Dosoo claimed he lied “in exchange for [his] freedom” and that government coercion occurred in the presence of his attorney. Yet neither he nor Nkansah provided corroboration—no statement from trial counsel or any other witness. In the absence of evidence, the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct remained speculative and insufficient.
• Materiality not shown: Even under the comparatively lenient Napue materiality standard (“any reasonable likelihood” the falsehood affected the verdict), the independent evidence against Nkansah was overwhelming. Beyond Dosoo, thirteen other witnesses testified, including evidence tying Nkansah’s IP address to fraudulent filings and physical evidence seized from his home and vehicle. The Court concluded the jury had ample grounds to convict irrespective of Dosoo’s testimony.

The Court also underscored the inherent unreliability of recantations in this posture, echoing Haouari: credibility concerns are heightened where the recanting witness participated in the same scheme and faces little risk of perjury prosecution (here, because he is outside the United States). That credibility discount further undermined Nkansah’s showing on falsity and materiality.

2) Denial of evidentiary hearing (Chang)

The district court reviewed the petition, affidavit, and audio recording, and evaluated them against the trial transcripts and documentary proof. Given the “weakness of Nkansah’s petition and the strength of the Government’s evidence,” the court concluded a hearing was unwarranted. The Second Circuit affirmed, emphasizing:

• District courts have discretion to resolve collateral challenges without a hearing where the record convincingly refutes the claims or where allegations are conclusory;
• “Expanding the record” (via affidavits and documentary review) is a legitimate, cost-efficient alternative to live testimony, especially where credibility disputes can be resolved by objective contradictions in the record.

3) Coram nobis framework (Rutigliano)

The Court restated that coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy and that the petitioner bears the burden of overcoming a presumption of regularity in the underlying proceedings. Although the panel focused its merits analysis on the Helmsley/Napue claim (and found it wanting), that failure in effect foreclosed the first coram nobis requirement—“compelling circumstances to achieve justice.” Without a viable constitutional defect linked to the conviction, and given the strong, independent evidence of guilt, the extraordinary remedy was unavailable.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although non-precedential, the Court’s reasoning provides clear guidance in the Second Circuit on coram nobis petitions driven by late-breaking recantations:

• Recantations face steep skepticism: Conclusory, after-the-fact repudiations—especially from co-defendants with little to lose—will not overcome a trial record supported by physical and digital evidence. Petitioners must provide specific, internally consistent, and corroborated recantation details that directly contradict trial testimony.
• Proving government knowledge is essential: Allegations of prosecutorial coercion or complicity must be supported by evidence (e.g., affidavits from counsel, contemporaneous documents, or other witnesses). Bare assertions are insufficient.
• Materiality remains the fulcrum: Even if falsity and knowledge were arguable, the Court will ask whether the challenged testimony could have reasonably influenced the jury. Robust independent evidence—digital footprints (IP logs), financial trails, and seized documents—can defeat materiality.
• No automatic right to a hearing: Chang confirms district courts may resolve collateral claims on the paper record when the allegations are conclusory or flatly contradicted by objective evidence. Petitioners should expect to lose hearing requests unless they present detailed, credible, and corroborated facts that, if true, would warrant relief.
• Coram nobis remains extraordinary: Particularly for defendants no longer in custody, coram nobis is a narrow path. Petitioners must satisfy demanding threshold elements (compelling circumstances, sound reasons for delay, and continuing legal consequences) in addition to proving the underlying constitutional or fundamental error.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of error coram nobis: A rare post-conviction remedy for people no longer in custody. It allows a court to correct a fundamental error in a criminal case when no other remedy is available. The petitioner must show compelling reasons for relief, a justification for not raising the issue earlier, and ongoing legal consequences from the conviction.
• Knowing use of false testimony (Napue/Giglio principle): The government violates due process if it knowingly presents false testimony or fails to correct it. To overturn a conviction on this basis, a petitioner must prove: the testimony was false; the government knew or should have known it was false; and there’s any reasonable likelihood the falsehood affected the jury’s verdict.
• Materiality (Napue standard): A relatively lenient standard compared to some other contexts (like Brady). The question is whether there is any reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have influenced the jury’s judgment.
• Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. The appellate court will uphold the lower court’s decision unless it was based on an error of law, clearly erroneous factual findings, or fell outside the range of permissible choices.
• Recantation: When a witness later says their trial testimony was false. Courts treat recantations with suspicion, especially when they are broad, unsupported, inconsistent, or come from co-conspirators with little exposure to perjury liability.
• Evidentiary hearing in collateral review: Not automatic. District courts can “expand the record” (review affidavits, transcripts, exhibits) and deny a hearing if the allegations are conclusory, incredible on their face, or contradicted by the record.
• Summary Order (FRAP 32.1/Local Rule 32.1.1): A non-precedential disposition. It can be cited but does not bind future panels; citations must identify it as a “summary order” and be served on unrepresented parties.

Conclusion

Nkansah underscores a familiar but consequential message in post-conviction practice: extraordinary remedies demand extraordinary showings. A short, uncorroborated, and nonspecific recantation—especially one contradicted by substantial physical and digital evidence—cannot carry the petitioner’s burden to prove falsity, government knowledge, and materiality under the Helmsley/Napue framework. Nor will such a submission ordinarily justify the costs and delays of an evidentiary hearing, particularly where the district court can resolve the dispute by reference to the existing record, as Chang permits.

For defense counsel, the decision is a roadmap of what is required to make a viable recantation-based coram nobis claim: detailed identification of specific false statements, corroboration from independent sources (including prior counsel, where applicable), a plausible account of governmental knowledge or coercion, and a clear demonstration that the challenged testimony mattered in light of the entire trial record. For prosecutors and district courts, the order reaffirms the high bar for disturbing final convictions on the basis of late-arriving recantations and the broad discretion to deny hearings where the record already resolves the claim.

While non-precedential, this decision will be persuasive authority within the Second Circuit for the proposition that uncorroborated recantations seldom justify coram nobis relief and that evidentiary hearings are not required when the petition is conclusory and the trial evidence is strong.