Uncorroborated, Out-of-Court Co‑Conspirator Statements in a PSR Cannot Sustain Drug-Quantity Findings; Remand Limited to Existing Record

1. Introduction

This consolidated Sixth Circuit sentencing appeal arose from a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy in the Eastern District of Tennessee involving two defendants with different roles and sentencing postures:

• Julianna Hawkins pled guilty to a distribution count and was sentenced to 98 months after the district court accepted a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) drug-quantity estimate attributing to her 3,414.62 grams of methamphetamine (actual).
• Jimmy Crafton, Jr. pled guilty to a lesser included offense and received a 210-month within-Guidelines sentence (bottom of the range as capped by the statutory maximum).

The key issue was not whether drug-quantity estimation is permitted at sentencing—it is—but what kind of evidence can reliably support a large “ghost weight” attribution when the PSR’s calculation relies predominantly on a co-conspirator’s brief, out-of-court statement. The opinion also addresses familiar reasonableness review principles and clarifies the consequences of failing to preserve procedural objections at sentencing.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Appellate sentencing framework (abuse of discretion; procedural vs. substantive)

• Gall v. United States — Supplies the overarching standard: sentencing decisions (inside or outside the Guidelines) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and appellate review proceeds through procedural then substantive reasonableness.
• United States v. Ruiz — Confirms abuse-of-discretion review covers both procedural and substantive claims.
• United States v. Johnson (26 F.4th 726) — Describes procedural reasonableness as adequate process and consideration of § 3553(a).
• United States v. Nunley — Defines substantive reasonableness as the “too long” inquiry and emphasizes § 3553(a) weighing.
• United States v. Vonner — Establishes the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences and articulates plain-error elements in the sentencing context.
• United States v. Parrish — Critical classification point: challenges grounded in “unreasonable speculation” are treated as procedural error.
• United States v. Small and United States v. Miller — Clarify that reliance on erroneous information or assumptions is a procedural reasonableness problem, even if the procedural/substantive line can be “blurry.”

B. Drug-quantity findings at sentencing (reliability, corroboration, caution)

• United States v. Jeross — Confirms drug quantity is a factual finding reviewed for clear error.
• United States v. Warman — Treats drug-quantity disputes as procedural reasonableness challenges.
• United States v. Histed — Provides multiple controlling principles used here: (i) drug-quantity estimates must be supported by a preponderance, (ii) the government bears the burden, (iii) the district court may estimate but must ground its estimate in reliable evidence, and (iv) on remand the court should limit review to evidence already in the record.
• United States v. Simpson — Cited for the government’s burden and preponderance standard in sentencing factfinding.
• United States v. Tisdale and United States v. Treadway — Permit reasonable estimation based on evidence/testimony and stress the need for a reviewable record.
• United States v. Sandridge — The reliability touchstone: evidence must have a minimal level of reliability and courts should err on the side of caution.
• United States v. Moncivais — Key comparator: the “minimal reliability” standard still demands “some evidentiary basis beyond mere allegation,” and reliability may be supported by detail, internal/external consistency, and corroboration.
• United States v. Woodside, United States v. Henley, and United States v. Bradley — Illustrate when drug-quantity findings withstand review because they rest on ample (often corroborated) testimony and developed records.
• United States v. Swanberg — Notable because it upheld a PSR-reported co-conspirator statement, but only where the statement aligned with other evidence; the opinion uses Swanberg to show why Hawkins’s case lacked that reinforcement.
• United States v. Armstrong and United States v. Johnson (732 F.3d 577) — Emphasize corroboration and detail as hallmarks of reliability for out-of-court information used at sentencing.
• United States v. Anderson — Reinforces the “err on the side of caution” instruction in approximating drug quantity.
• United States v. Russell — Supplies the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed” articulation associated with clear-error review.
• United States v. Mosley and United States v. Hough — Exemplify the stronger footing of live testimony (credibility assessment; cross-examination) for quantity findings.

C. Remand limits; no “second bite”

• United States v. Mukes, United States v. Goodman, and United States v. Gill — Support the rule, applied via United States v. Histed, that when the government fails to carry its burden at the first sentencing, it ordinarily cannot reopen the record on remand to supply missing proof.

D. Preservation and plain error (Crafton)

• United States v. Jeter — Applies plain-error review when a defendant does not object to sentencing procedure after the district court’s invitation to do so.

E. Sentencing explanation adequacy

• United States v. Battaglia, United States v. Gapinski, and United States v. Moon — Set the requirement that the district court explain enough to show consideration of arguments and a reasoned basis for the decision.
• Rita v. United States and United States v. Madden — Recognize a district court’s discretion to give a brief explanation, especially where arguments are thin or the sentence is within the Guidelines.
• United States v. Brooks — Confirms that acknowledging § 3553(a) factors and addressing main points can suffice.

F. Substantive reasonableness: deference in § 3553(a) balancing

• United States v. Rayyan and United States v. Zabel — Frame substantive reasonableness as whether the sentence is too long/short and whether the district court properly weighed § 3553(a).
• United States v. Tristan-Madrigal — Articulates “greater than necessary” as the essence of substantive unreasonableness.
• United States v. Gardner — Permits dominance of one or two § 3553(a) factors; imbalance is not itself error.
• United States v. Robinson — Lists classic substantive error types (arbitrary sentence, impermissible factors, failure to consider, unreasonable weight).
• United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, United States v. Massey, and United States v. Petrus — Reinforce deference and the presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.

G. Age/recidivism materials and arguments not raised below

• United States v. Embry and United States v. Winfree — Support the proposition that a court does not err by failing to address mitigating theories or data not presented to it.
• United States v. Hymes and United States v. Bailey — Indicate district courts are not required to consult Sentencing Commission research as a mandatory sentencing input.

H. Peripheral citations that frame reviewability

• United States v. Skouteris — Reiterates that refusals to grant downward departures are generally unreviewable absent a mistaken belief about authority.
• United States v. Kerns and United States v. Boucher — Used to characterize disputes about the “weight” assigned to personal characteristics as substantive-reasonableness arguments.
• United States v. Ewing and United States v. Watson — Address the procedural/substantive labeling debate; the opinion reinforces that United States v. Parrish controls in the circuit.
• United States v. Herrera-Zuniga — Cited for reluctance to disturb departure-related determinations.
• United States v. Johnson (71 F.3d 539) — Distinguished: extraordinary-impairment findings were warranted there due to developed medical evidence, which Crafton did not provide.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Hawkins: a drug-quantity estimate cannot rest on “mere allegation”

The district court attributed the bulk of Hawkins’s drug quantity (3,306.12 grams “actual”) by multiplying Crafton’s claimed intake (ten ounces every two weeks) across seven months and then assigning Hawkins 85% of that amount based on Crafton’s statement that she bought “85 percent” of his supply. The Sixth Circuit treated Hawkins’s challenge as procedural because it attacked the factual basis and reliability of the drug-quantity finding, which drove the Guidelines calculation.

Applying the “minimal indicia of reliability” standard, the panel stressed two constraints:

• Low threshold, not no threshold: as explained in United States v. Moncivais, the government must supply “some evidentiary basis beyond mere allegation.”
• Caution in approximation: under United States v. Sandridge and United States v. Anderson, approximation must err on the side of caution.

The court then dismantled the government’s corroboration theories:

• Hawkins’s admissions were not consistent with Crafton’s claim. Hawkins said her maximum purchase was eight ounces but that she “normally purchased four-ounce-quantities” and did not state frequency—undercutting the leap to “85% of all supply for seven months.”
• Physical evidence did not corroborate the 85% assumption. The June 2022 seizure (108.5g ≈ 3.83 oz) aligned with four-ounce purchasing, not pervasive 85% capture of Crafton’s biweekly supply. Controlled buys tied to Hawkins totaled 20.04g, not the larger figures invoked by the government.

With no testimony, no detailed proffer, no agent testimony vouching for reliability, no internal detail in the statement itself, and no external corroboration, the panel held the PSR’s core input was “mere allegation.” Unlike United States v. Swanberg (statement consistent with other evidence) or United States v. Moncivais (detailed, consistent statement plus supporting testimony), Crafton’s statement here was “three-line,” out-of-court, and untested.

The result: the district court’s adoption of the estimate was clear error and made Hawkins’s sentence procedurally unreasonable.

B. Hawkins remand: the government does not get to rebuild the record

A major practical consequence of the opinion is remedial: relying on United States v. Histed (and its “second bite” line of cases), the court directed the district court to limit resentencing to the existing record. The government had the burden at the original sentencing; it cannot cure evidentiary insufficiency by presenting new corroboration after reversal.

C. Crafton: preserved-error doctrine matters, and thin mitigation yields thin required explanation

Crafton’s procedural claims ran into preservation: because he did not object after the district court asked for objections, review was for plain error under United States v. Jeter and United States v. Vonner.

The panel found no plain procedural error because:

• Several age/recidivism arguments and Sentencing Commission research points were raised for the first time on appeal; under United States v. Embry and United States v. Winfree, the district court cannot plainly err by failing to address arguments never presented.
• The district court did address the general “age” and “health issues” mitigation actually presented, noting the Bureau of Prisons could account for medical issues and issuing a medical-needs recommendation. Under Rita v. United States and United States v. Madden, the explanation was sufficient given the limited development of the arguments.

D. Crafton: within-Guidelines deference carried the day

On substantive reasonableness, the panel applied the within-Guidelines presumption from United States v. Vonner and emphasized § 3553(a) balancing deference under United States v. Perez-Rodriguez and United States v. Petrus. The district court was entitled to weigh seriousness of the offense and criminal history more heavily than age/health. Under United States v. Gardner, that dominance of a few factors is common and not inherently unreasonable.

3.3 Impact

• Raises the evidentiary bar for PSR-driven “ghost weight” based on brief co-conspirator assertions. The opinion signals that a co-conspirator’s out-of-court, non-detailed statement—standing alone—may fail the “minimal indicia of reliability” requirement when it drives a large quantity attribution.
• Encourages live testimony or robust corroboration when quantity is contested. The court repeatedly contrasted this record with cases involving testimony or detailed, corroborated proffers (United States v. Mosley, United States v. Woodside, United States v. Johnson (732 F.3d 577)).
• Makes remand strategy consequential. By enforcing the “no second bite” rule from United States v. Histed, the panel creates a strong incentive for the government to present corroboration at the first sentencing if quantity is disputed.
• Reinforces preservation discipline. Crafton’s affirmance underscores that failure to object after pronouncement sharply narrows appellate relief under plain-error review.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court used the right process (correct Guidelines calculation, reliable facts, adequate explanation). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence length is defensible under § 3553(a) (not greater than necessary).
• Drug “quantity estimate” / “ghost weight”: When drugs were not seized in the full amount distributed, courts estimate quantity using evidence like testimony, records, or reliable admissions. The “ghost” component is the unseized portion inferred from the evidence.
• “Minimal indicia of reliability”: Sentencing can use information that would not always be admissible at trial, but it must still be trustworthy enough to rely on—typically supported by detail, consistency, corroboration, or testimony subject to challenge.
• Clear error (factual finding review): The appellate court does not re-weigh evidence; it reverses only when it is left with a firm conviction the district court made a mistake.
• Plain error: When the defendant did not preserve an objection, he must show an obvious error that likely changed the outcome and seriously affected fairness or integrity of proceedings.
• “No second bite at the apple” on remand: If the government had the burden to prove a sentencing fact and failed, it generally cannot use remand to introduce new evidence it could have offered the first time.

5. Conclusion

This Sixth Circuit decision meaningfully tightens the practical application of the “minimal indicia of reliability” standard in drug-quantity sentencing disputes: a large PSR-driven attribution cannot be anchored primarily in a co-conspirator’s brief, uncorroborated, out-of-court claim. Just as importantly, the remedy is teeth-bearing—resentencing must proceed on the existing record, denying the government a post-reversal opportunity to supply missing corroboration. In contrast, the court’s affirmance of Crafton’s within-Guidelines sentence underscores two enduring themes: preservation matters (plain-error review is unforgiving), and § 3553(a) balancing is owed substantial deference when the district court shows it considered the parties’ arguments and the statutory factors.