Unconstitutional Implicit Consent in DUI Cases: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kohl and Danforth

Unconstitutional Implicit Consent in DUI Cases: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kohl and Danforth

Introduction

The landmark case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kohl and Danforth established significant legal precedents concerning the constitutionality of implied consent laws in DUI (Driving Under the Influence) scenarios. Decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on September 16, 1992, the case addressed whether chemical testing of breath, blood, or urine under the Motor Vehicle Code's implied consent provision violated constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The appellants, Bruce A. Kohl and Sharon Louise Danforth, were convicted of various DUI-related offenses following vehicular accidents that resulted in fatalities and injuries. Their convictions hinged on blood alcohol content (BAC) tests conducted without warrants or explicit consent, invoking the implied consent provision of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2).

This case primarily examined the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in the context of implied consent for chemical testing in DUI cases.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the chemical tests of breath, blood, or urine conducted pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2) violated both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court held that the implicit consent authorization under this statute was unconstitutional when no probable cause or individualized suspicion of intoxication existed prior to administering the tests.

As a result, the convictions of Bruce A. Kohl and Sharon L. Danforth, which were based on the blood alcohol content tests conducted without warrants or explicit consent, were overturned. The court mandated new trials, emphasizing that the evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches could not be admissible in criminal proceedings.

The majority opinion was penned by Justice Zappala, with dissenting opinions from Justices Larsen and Papadakos, who argued in favor of upholding the implied consent statute under the special needs exception.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The decision extensively referenced several pivotal cases that influenced its outcome:

  • SCHMERBER v. CALIFORNIA (384 U.S. 757, 1966): Established that blood tests are considered searches under the Fourth Amendment and must meet reasonableness standards.
  • Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association (489 U.S. 602, 1989): Introduced the "special needs" exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements.
  • Commonwealth v. Mikulan (504 Pa. 244, 1983): Addressed the motor vehicle code and implications of DUI laws under Pennsylvania law.
  • Commonwealth v. Quarles (229 Pa. Super. 363, 1974): Interpreted "reasonable grounds" in implied consent statutes to mean probable cause.

These precedents collectively underscored the necessity of probable cause for searches and the limited scope of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment protections.

Impact

The ruling in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kohl and Danforth has profound implications for DUI laws and constitutional protections in Pennsylvania and potentially other jurisdictions:

  • Legal Precedent: The decision sets a clear precedent that implied consent statutes cannot supersede constitutional rights against unreasonable searches without the presence of probable cause.
  • Law Enforcement Practices: Police departments may need to adjust their protocols for administering chemical tests, ensuring that tests are conducted only when probable cause exists or with explicit consent.
  • Criminal Proceedings: Evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches under similar implied consent provisions will likely be inadmissible, necessitating the exclusion of such evidence in trials.
  • Legislative Revisions: The Pennsylvania legislature may need to reevaluate and potentially amend implied consent laws to align with constitutional standards, possibly incorporating requirements for probable cause or clearer consent mechanisms.

Overall, the judgment reinforces the primacy of constitutional protections over statutory provisions, emphasizing that no legislative scheme can infringe upon fundamental rights without justifiable cause.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Implied Consent

Definition: Implied consent refers to the legal principle that by choosing to drive a vehicle, individuals implicitly agree to submit to certain procedures, such as chemical testing for alcohol or drugs, if suspected of impairment.

Context in DUI Laws: Under implied consent laws, drivers are deemed to have consented to BAC tests when accused of DUI, removing the need for explicit consent or probable cause in certain scenarios.

Fourth Amendment

Definition: The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, ensuring that any search or arrest is backed by probable cause and, in most cases, warrants issued by a judge.

Probable Cause

Definition: Probable cause is a reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances, that a person has committed a crime. It is a fundamental standard required for obtaining search warrants and making arrests.

Application in the Case: The court determined that in both cases, there was no probable cause or individualized suspicion that Kohl and Danforth were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of their respective accidents.

Special Needs Exception

Definition: An exception to the general warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, allowing certain searches without probable cause when there are compelling governmental interests beyond normal law enforcement, such as public safety or regulatory compliance.

Relevance: The Commonwealth argued that implied consent testing under § 1547(a)(2) fell under the special needs exception. The majority rejected this argument, stating that the purpose was criminal prosecution rather than regulatory oversight.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Kohl and Danforth serves as a critical affirmation of constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in DUI cases. By invalidating the implied consent provision under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2) without probable cause or explicit consent, the court reinforced the necessity of balancing individual privacy rights with governmental interests in public safety.

This judgment underscores the importance of adhering to constitutional standards in legislative frameworks, ensuring that laws do not overreach in ways that infringe upon fundamental rights. It also highlights the judiciary's role in scrutinizing statutory provisions to maintain the integrity of constitutional safeguards.

For legal practitioners and law enforcement agencies, this case emphasizes the need for robust evidence before administering chemical tests in DUI cases. Legislators may also need to revisit and potentially revise implied consent laws to ensure they withstand constitutional scrutiny, possibly by incorporating stricter criteria for when such tests can be conducted.

Ultimately, this case reaffirms the judiciary's commitment to upholding constitutional rights, ensuring that public safety measures do not come at the expense of individual liberties.

Case Details

Year: 1992
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Judge(s)

LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.

Attorney(S)

Robert A. Graci, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary Benefield Seiverling, Anthony Sarcione, Deputy Attys. Gen., William H. Platt, Dist. Atty., Richard R. Tomsho, Deputy Dist. Atty., Douglas G. Reichley, Asst. Dist. Atty., and E. David Christine, Dist. Atty., Gregory D. Anthony, Douglas G. Reichley, Asst. Dist. Attys., for the Com. of Pa. Mary Benefield Seiverling, Deputy Atty. Gen., for intervenor, Atty. Gen. Howard N. Stark and Michael E. Brunnabend, Allentown, for Bruce A. Kohl. David M. McGlaughlin, Philadelphia, for amicus curiae, Pa. Assoc. Crim. Defense Lawyers. James A. Swetz, Stroudsburg, for appellee Sharon L. Danforth.

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