Introduction

In Retonya Screen v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a denial of Social Security disability benefits at step five of the sequential evaluation. The case centers on two recurring and practically significant issues in Social Security litigation: (1) whether a vocational expert’s (VE’s) unchallenged job-number testimony can constitute substantial evidence; and (2) whether an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) must independently verify a VE’s job-number methodology or sources absent a challenge or an apparent conflict in the record.

The claimant, Retonya Screen, alleged multiple impairments, including degenerative disc disease and mental health conditions. The ALJ found that, notwithstanding her limitations, she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform “light work” with additional limitations and, based on VE testimony, could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. On appeal, Screen argued that the VE vastly overstated job numbers and that the ALJ had an affirmative duty to independently verify the VE’s methodology. The Eleventh Circuit rejected both arguments and affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The ALJ did not err in relying on the VE’s unchallenged testimony to find that jobs exist in significant numbers that Screen can perform. The VE’s testimony, uncontradicted and not internally inconsistent, constitutes substantial evidence under Biestek v. Berryhill.
• No independent verification duty: The ALJ had no sua sponte duty to research or verify the VE’s job-number methodology or sources absent an apparent conflict or a timely challenge at the hearing. Goode v. Commissioner is inapplicable because the record here contained no internal inconsistency or methodological mismatch.
• Record on appeal constrained: Because the Appeals Council denied review and Screen did not challenge that denial, the court confined its substantial-evidence review to the evidence before the ALJ. New job-number analyses offered for the first time in court could not be considered. See Falge v. Apfel.
• Outcome: District court’s affirmance of the ALJ’s decision is affirmed.

Factual Background and Procedural Posture

Screen applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming limitations due to degenerative disc disease, chronic pain, lumbar radiculopathy, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. The SSA denied initially and on reconsideration. At the hearing, the ALJ found Screen capable of “light work” under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) with additional limitations. The VE—whose qualifications Screen stipulated to—opined that while Screen could not return to past work, she could perform jobs such as:

• Folder: approximately 23,000 jobs nationally
• Laundry sorter: approximately 22,000 jobs nationally
• Stock checker: approximately 25,000 jobs nationally

Screen did not cross-examine the VE on sources, methodology, or numbers. The ALJ found the VE’s testimony consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), concluded that jobs exist in significant numbers, and denied benefits at step five. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed, and Screen appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

Analytical Commentary

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019):

  The Supreme Court held that a VE’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence even without providing underlying data, depending on the context and whether the testimony is challenged or contradicted. The Eleventh Circuit applies this case-by-case approach, emphasizing that unchallenged VE testimony, if not internally inconsistent and not refuted by the record, can suffice to meet the Commissioner’s step-five burden.

• Goode v. Commissioner of Social Security, 966 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2020):

  In Goode, the VE’s job-number testimony was undermined by a methodological mismatch—specifically, the VE tied a particular DOT occupation to an incongruent Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) grouping, creating internal inconsistency. That defect was “so substantively fundamental and serious” that reliance on the testimony was improper. The present case distinguishes Goode: there was no mismatch, no described methodology to scrutinize, and no challenge creating a reason to probe.

• Washington v. Commissioner of Social Security, 906 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2018):

  The Eleventh Circuit requires ALJs to identify and resolve “apparent conflicts” between VE testimony and the DOT. Here, the ALJ expressly found the VE testimony consistent with the DOT, and the record revealed no apparent conflict. Thus, no further inquiry was required under Washington.

• Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1998), and Keeton v. HHS, 21 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 1994):

  Falge restricts appellate review to evidence presented to the ALJ when the Appeals Council denies review and that denial is not itself challenged. Although Keeton recognizes judicial review of an Appeals Council’s refusal to consider new evidence (an error of law if the evidence is new, material, and chronologically relevant), Screen did not appeal the Council’s denial. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit refused to consider new job-number analyses not presented to the ALJ.

• Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007 (11th Cir. 1987):

  Establishes the burden-shifting paradigm at step five and instructs courts to scrutinize the record as a whole for substantial evidence. This decision reinforces that once the Commissioner identifies jobs, the claimant must show she cannot perform them.

• Statutory and Regulatory Framework:
  • 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A): Defines “work which exists in the national economy” as existing in significant numbers either regionally or in several regions.
  • 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4): Sets out the five-step sequential evaluation framework.
  • 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b): Define “light work.”
  • 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a): Clarifies the “significant numbers” concept in national economy terms.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Substantial evidence and unchallenged VE testimony:

   Applying Biestek, the court emphasized that VE testimony can carry the Commissioner’s step-five burden even when the VE does not disclose methodology or data, provided there is no demand for such data, no internal inconsistency, and no contradiction elsewhere in the record. Here, Screen neither cross-examined the VE nor sought clarification on sources or methodology. The record revealed no inconsistencies. Thus, the ALJ’s reliance was permissible.

2. Rejection of a duty to independently verify job numbers:

   The court declined to impose an affirmative duty on ALJs to conduct independent research into the VE’s job-number sources or calculations. The contrary suggestion, derived from a misreading of Goode, was rejected because Goode addressed a situation where the VE’s testimony was internally inconsistent on its face due to a DOT/SOC mismatch. In Screen’s case, there was no such apparent error or conflict triggering further ALJ inquiry.

3. No consideration of post-hearing job-number evidence:

   Because the Appeals Council denied review and Screen did not contemporaneously challenge that denial for failure to consider new and material evidence, the Eleventh Circuit confined its review to the evidence before the ALJ. New job-number analyses tendered later could not undermine the ALJ’s step-five finding under Falge.

4. Burden-shifting applied:

   The Commissioner met the step-five burden via VE testimony identifying several jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy for an individual with Screen’s RFC, age, education, and experience. The burden then shifted back to Screen to show she could not perform those jobs. She did not do so at the hearing and could not cure that omission by presenting new job-number analyses on appeal.

5. Apparent conflict standard:

   Under Washington, the ALJ must resolve apparent conflicts between VE testimony and the DOT. The ALJ explicitly found consistency, and the record provided no indication to the contrary. Without an apparent conflict, the ALJ had no duty to press the VE further.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

The decision has significant practice-oriented consequences for claimants and counsel within the Eleventh Circuit:

• Hearing strategy is pivotal: If a claimant believes the VE’s job numbers are inflated or methodologically suspect, counsel must probe at the hearing—ask for the VE’s sources (e.g., Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics), crosswalk methods (DOT-to-SOC), and calculation steps; request the underlying data; and, if needed, seek to supplement with rebuttal reports or post-hearing briefs. Silence typically converts the VE’s testimony into substantial evidence under Biestek.
• Preservation of issues: Failure to object or cross-examine at the hearing severely limits post hoc challenges to VE numbers. The court will not consider new job-number analyses if the Appeals Council denies review and the claimant does not challenge that denial.
• Limits of Goode: Goode remains a powerful tool where the record itself shows an internal inconsistency—such as a DOT occupation being matched to an incongruent SOC group that inflates numbers. But absent obvious inconsistency, Goode does not create a free-standing obligation for ALJs to independently audit VE testimony.
• Apparent conflict doctrine remains bounded: ALJs must investigate only when the record reveals an “apparent” conflict with DOT data. Without such a signal, and absent a party challenge, no further duty exists.
• Significant numbers threshold: Although the court did not need to define “significant numbers” here, the aggregate of approximately 70,000 jobs nationally, spread across three occupations (folder, laundry sorter, stock checker), comfortably aligns with the statutory and regulatory framework. The key lesson is that numerical disputes should be joined and developed at the hearing, not after.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Step Five of the Sequential Evaluation: The SSA uses a five-step process to decide disability. At step five, the question is whether the claimant can adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. The burden at this step initially rests with the Commissioner.
• Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): The most the claimant can still do despite limitations. Here, the ALJ found RFC for “light work” with additional restrictions.
• Vocational Expert (VE): A specialist who testifies about job availability and requirements. VEs often rely on the DOT for job descriptions and use other sources (e.g., government labor statistics) for job-number estimates.
• Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) vs. Standard Occupational Classification (SOC): The DOT lists specific occupations and their requirements but lacks job-number data. SOC groupings are used in labor statistics and aggregate similar occupations. Translating from DOT to SOC (the “crosswalk”) is essential for deriving job numbers but can be error-prone if mismatched—this was the problem in Goode.
• Substantial Evidence: A deferential standard of review; it means “more than a mere scintilla”—relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Under Biestek, unchallenged VE testimony may meet this standard even without the VE producing underlying data.
• Apparent Conflict: A discrepancy between VE testimony and DOT job descriptions that is reasonably evident from the record. ALJs must identify and resolve such conflicts before relying on VE testimony.
• Appeals Council and the Record on Review: If the Appeals Council denies review and the claimant does not challenge that denial for failure to consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence, the reviewing court looks only to the evidence that was before the ALJ.

E. How This Decision Fits Within Existing Law

The decision coheres with Supreme Court guidance in Biestek and Eleventh Circuit precedents in Washington, Goode, and Falge:

• It endorses a pragmatic, record-specific approach to VE testimony, refusing to impose bright-line rules requiring disclosure of data absent a request or apparent flaw.
• It preserves the ALJ’s duty to resolve apparent DOT conflicts but clarifies that no duty exists to chase down methodology when the record appears sound and the claimant raises no challenge.
• It underscores the importance of the administrative record, the primacy of hearing-level issue preservation, and the limited scope of judicial review when the Appeals Council denies review.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Retonya Screen v. Acting Commissioner of Social Security reinforces several core principles of Social Security adjudication:

• Unchallenged and internally consistent VE testimony can constitute substantial evidence at step five.
• ALJs are not required to independently verify VE job-number methodology or sources absent an apparent conflict or a timely objection.
• Litigants must preserve methodological and numerical challenges at the hearing; later-introduced analyses will not be considered when the Appeals Council denies review and that denial is not itself appealed.
• Goode is limited to records showing clear methodological inconsistencies; it does not impose a generalized verification duty.

Practically, this case is a strong reminder that the hearing is the decisive battleground for vocational evidence. Counsel should proactively examine VE methods, request underlying data when appropriate, and ensure that any perceived conflicts or inflation in job numbers are made explicit on the record. Absent such steps, courts in the Eleventh Circuit are likely to uphold ALJ findings grounded in unchallenged VE testimony, consistent with Biestek and the deferential substantial-evidence standard.