Unauthorized Practice by Advice-and-Fee Acceptance During Suspension Warrants Suspension—Not Disbarment—Absent Direct Court Filings: In re Haley (La. 2025)

Case: In re: Ronald Sidney Haley, Jr., No. 2025-B-0478 (La. Sept. 10, 2025)

Court: Supreme Court of Louisiana

Disposition: Suspension for one year and one day; costs assessed with interest

Opinion: Per curiam; Hughes, J., dissents (too harsh); McCallum, J., and Cole, J., dissent (too lenient)

Introduction

In this attorney-disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court of Louisiana imposed a one-year-and-one-day suspension on attorney Ronald S. Haley, Jr., based on two clusters of misconduct: (1) neglect and poor communication in criminal-defense matters, and (2) the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) during a prior period of suspension. The case consolidates multiple client matters—Beasley, Scott, Edwards, and Clayton—and follows Mr. Haley’s earlier disciplinary history in 2016 and 2021. The court’s per curiam clarifies the sanction framework for UPL that consists of client advising and fee acceptance during suspension but does not involve direct court filings or appearances. It also underscores that even without clear proof of intentional deceit under Rule 8.4(c), negligent and knowing lapses in diligence and communication can warrant a substantial suspension—especially in the presence of a prior disciplinary record and a pattern of misconduct.

A procedural facet also frames the decision: although Mr. Haley attempted to object to the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation after the deadline prescribed by Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1), the court rejected the objection as untimely but still allowed the parties to brief the matter (without oral argument). The per curiam thus reflects both a merits resolution and a reminder of the importance of procedural compliance in disciplinary review.

Summary of the Opinion

The court accepted the Disciplinary Board’s determination that Mr. Haley violated duties of diligence and communication to his clients (Rules 1.3 and 1.4) in the Beasley and Scott matters. It also accepted that, in the Edwards and Clayton matters, Mr. Haley engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended (Rule 5.5(a)), as shown by advising a client and accepting compensation during the suspension. However, consistent with the Board’s assessment, the court did not endorse charges requiring proof of intentional dishonesty (Rule 8.4(c)) or knowingly false statements to the disciplinary authority (Rule 8.1(a)) on the record presented.

Weighing aggravating factors—prior discipline, pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience—and finding no mitigating factors, the court imposed a suspension of one year and one day. That duration triggers the formal reinstatement process under Louisiana’s disciplinary regime, ensuring that Mr. Haley must affirmatively prove fitness before resuming practice. The court noted that while UPL can, in severe forms, justify permanent disbarment, lesser sanctions are typically imposed when the practitioner, though suspended, does not directly engage in hallmark legal services such as drafting, filing pleadings, or appearing in court. The decision relies on In re Dowell to anchor that calibration.

Detailed Analysis

I. Procedural Posture and Framework

Formal charges were brought by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) and assigned to hearing committees. The Beasley/Scott and Edwards/Clayton matters were heard by separate committees; all charges were later consolidated at the Board stage.
The hearing committees found violations in the Beasley and Scott matters and identified UPL during suspension in the Edwards and Clayton matters (limited to Rule 5.5(a) and 8.4(a)).
The Disciplinary Board “accepted most” of the committees’ findings but rejected Rule 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) in the Beasley and Scott matters for lack of clear and convincing evidence of intentional falsehoods.
Neither party filed a timely objection; the respondent’s late objection was rejected as untimely, though the court accepted briefs. The court then conducted its review, ultimately imposing the Board-recommended one-year-and-one-day suspension.

Standard of proof in attorney discipline in Louisiana is clear and convincing evidence. The Board expressly applied that standard in rejecting the intentional dishonesty claims. The court’s opinion, while concise, adopts the Board’s key determinations and focuses sanction analysis on the proven neglect, communication failures, and UPL during suspension.

II. Facts and Rule Violations by Matter

A. The Beasley Matter

Mr. Haley represented a client facing significant drug charges (51 pounds of cocaine found in a vehicle). After an unsuccessful motion to suppress, the client questioned why a dashcam video was not submitted. Mr. Haley said he would file an appellate writ for review; the client later learned no writ was filed. When confronted again, Mr. Haley said a motion for extension had been filed—but the record as assessed at the Board stage did not sustain intentional dishonesty to the clear-and-convincing standard. The hearing committee found that Mr. Haley offered assurances but failed to perform the promised work.

Violations sustained: Rule 1.3 (diligence), Rule 1.4 (communication), and Rule 8.4(a) (derivative violation of the Rules). The Board did not find Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty) proven by clear and convincing evidence.

B. The Scott Matter

While incarcerated, Mr. Scott retained Mr. Haley for both possible civil claims and multiple pending criminal charges. After advice about plea consequences, Mr. Scott pled and was released, but later learned that charges had not been removed from his record as he believed would occur. After Mr. Haley was suspended (from the 2021 discipline), new counsel sought reconsideration, and the client learned he would need expungement filings to clear his record—something distinct from sentencing mechanisms under La. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 893/894. Mr. Scott completed probation early and tried unsuccessfully to contact Mr. Haley and other lawyers; he then hired new counsel for a further fee.

Violations sustained: Rule 1.3 and Rule 1.4(a)(3) breaches were sustained; allegations under Rule 8.1(a) (false statements in the disciplinary process) and Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty) were not proven by clear and convincing evidence on this record. The complaint also alleged Rule 8.4(d) (prejudice to the administration of justice), but the per curiam does not expressly revisit that; the Board stated it accepted most of the committee’s findings while eliminating 8.1(a) and 8.4(c).

C. The Edwards Matter

During the 12/7/2021–6/7/2022 suspension that followed Haley II, Mr. Haley met multiple times with the client’s father, discussed legal strategy, and agreed to represent the client on additional charges in another parish in exchange for a $10,000 fee—without disclosing his suspension. The hearing committee found UPL under Rule 5.5(a) and a derivative Rule 8.4(a) violation. Allegations of 3.4(c), 8.1(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) were not proven to the committee’s satisfaction.

D. The Clayton Matter

Text messages showed Mr. Haley advising a criminal client and accepting compensation while suspended in early 2022—including a barter arrangement in which the client purchased tires and rims for Mr. Haley’s vehicle totaling $3,168, accepted as partial legal fees—without disclosure of the suspension. Again, the committee found UPL (Rule 5.5(a)) and a derivative violation (Rule 8.4(a)), while other alleged violations were not proven.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

In re: Haley, 15-2285 (La. 2/19/16), 184 So. 3d 684 (“Haley I”): Joint consent discipline for two DWI arrests, resulting in a fully deferred one-year-and-one-day suspension conditioned on a JLAP recovery agreement. Relevance: establishes prior discipline and the court’s willingness to impose structured, remedial sanctions early in the respondent’s disciplinary history.
In re: Haley, 21-1466 (La. 12/7/21), 328 So. 3d 418 (“Haley II”): Joint consent discipline for neglect, failure to communicate, inappropriate attempt to settle a malpractice claim, and failure to return a file. Sanction: one year and one day with all but six months deferred, plus Ethics School. Relevance: sets a baseline for neglect/communication failures and becomes central because the current UPL overlapped with the Haley II suspension period.
In re: Dowell, 09-1419 (La. 12/18/09), 24 So. 3d 203: Lawyer received a one-year suspension for failures that included not sending client notices after disbarment, acting as a notary, and failing to cooperate with ODC. The court cites Dowell to reinforce that while UPL during a suspension can warrant permanent disbarment in aggravated cases, lesser sanctions are appropriate when the attorney’s prohibited activity does not involve direct court filings, appearances, or drafting/filing pleadings.
Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1): Governs timing for objections to the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation. The court enforced this rule by rejecting the respondent’s untimely objection yet allowed briefing without oral argument—underscoring strict adherence to procedural deadlines in disciplinary review.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in three steps: (1) it accepted the committees’ core factual determinations that Mr. Haley gave clients assurances but did not perform commensurate work; (2) it adopted the Board’s narrowing of the more serious dishonesty counts, distinguishing negligent or confused communication from intentional deceit; and (3) it calibrated sanction severity by aggregating the sustained violations across all matters and evaluating aggravating and mitigating factors.

Key reasoning points:

Neglect and communication failures warrant suspension as a baseline. The court highlighted that Mr. Haley’s conduct in Beasley/Scott was a continuation of the neglect and communication shortcomings addressed in Haley II.
UPL during a suspension is serious, but context matters. Because the record did not show direct courtroom practice or the drafting/filing of pleadings while suspended, the court treated the UPL as serious yet not at the highest end of sanction severity—relying on Dowell for proportionality.
Aggravating factors dominate; no mitigation. With prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience (admitted 2007), and no mitigating factors, the court concluded that a sanction requiring a formal reinstatement showing was appropriate.
One year and one day. This duration ensures that return to practice is not automatic. Instead, the respondent must satisfy reinstatement criteria, including demonstrating current fitness and compliance with conditions.
Deference to the Board on intent-based charges. The court did not disturb the Board’s determination that intentional dishonesty and Rule 8.1(a) violations were not proven by clear and convincing evidence in the Beasley and Scott matters.

V. Impact and Prospective Significance

The decision’s most notable contribution is its sanction calibration for UPL during a suspension when the conduct involves client advising and fee acceptance but does not include direct litigation acts. The court treats such conduct as serious, meriting suspension—especially when paired with a pattern of client-neglect violations—but reserves the most severe sanctions (including potential permanent disbarment) for cases where suspended lawyers cross into core courtroom or filing functions.

Likely effects:

Clearer boundary for suspended attorneys: Any client advising, negotiation of fees, or acceptance of payment during suspension is UPL. Even absent pleadings or appearances, it will draw substantial discipline.
Criminal-defense practice caution: Counsel must explain the limited effect of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 893/894 dispositions and the separate need for expungement filings. Overpromising or failing to clarify these distinctions can lead to Rule 1.4 violations.
Pattern-driven escalation: Repeated neglect and communication failures, especially after prior discipline, can quickly result in suspensions that require formal reinstatement, even when intentional dishonesty is not proven.
Procedural compliance reminder: Failure to timely object to a Board recommendation constrains avenues for review. The court may still consider briefs, but the objection deadline is enforced.

VI. Dissenting Views and What They Signal

Justice Hughes would have rejected the proposed discipline as too harsh, suggesting that some Justices viewed the sanction as excessive given the Board’s elimination of intentional dishonesty and the nature of the UPL here (no direct filings/appearances). By contrast, Justices McCallum and Cole dissented as too lenient, reflecting concern over repeated misconduct, UPL during suspension, and harm to vulnerable criminal defendants—factors that, in their view, could justify more severe discipline. The split highlights an enduring tension in sanctioning: how to proportion punishment for UPL during suspension when the activity is advisory and financial, not courtroom practice, but forms part of a pattern with prior discipline.

Complex Concepts Simplified

One year and one day: In Louisiana discipline, a suspension of “one year and one day” is intentionally set to require a formal reinstatement proceeding. The lawyer must affirmatively prove fitness and compliance before returning to practice.
Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) during suspension: A suspended lawyer cannot provide legal advice, negotiate, accept fees for legal services, or do anything that constitutes the practice of law—regardless of whether pleadings are filed or court appearances are made. Even “advisory” communications and fee acceptance constitute UPL.
Baseline sanction and calibration: Louisiana often uses the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to identify a baseline (e.g., reprimand, suspension, disbarment) based on duty, mental state, and harm, then adjusts up or down for aggravating and mitigating factors.
Aggravating vs. mitigating factors: Prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct, and substantial experience are aggravators that increase sanction severity. Mitigators (e.g., remorse, restitution, cooperation, personal or emotional problems) can reduce severity if present; here, none were found.
Rule 1.3 (diligence) and Rule 1.4 (communication): Lawyers must act promptly and diligently, keeping clients reasonably informed and explaining matters sufficiently for informed decisions. Assurances about next steps (e.g., filing a writ) must be accurate and timely implemented—or clearly corrected.
Rule 8.4(c) (dishonesty) and intent: Proving dishonesty requires clear and convincing evidence of intent to deceive. Miscommunications or negligent statements do not suffice; hence, those charges were pared back by the Board.
Rule 8.1(a): Prohibits knowingly false statements of material fact in a disciplinary investigation. The Board found the ODC did not meet the clear-and-convincing standard on this record in the Beasley/Scott matters.
Interim suspension “for threat of harm”: A temporary, protective measure the court can impose during investigation when a lawyer’s ongoing practice poses risk to the public. It is distinct from, and can precede, final discipline.
Costs and interest: Under Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, assessed costs accrue legal interest starting thirty days after finality of the judgment until paid.

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

If suspended, stop all legal services immediately: Do not advise clients, negotiate fees, accept compensation, or communicate as counsel. Provide required notices to clients, courts, and opposing counsel per Rule XIX (notice and wind-down obligations).
Document client communications: Confirm in writing the scope of representation, timelines (e.g., writ deadlines), and what will and will not occur, especially when discussing appellate writs or expungements.
Explain 893/894 vs. expungement: A suspended/delayed sentence or set-aside under arts. 893/894 does not automatically clear a criminal record; expungement requires separate proceedings. Avoid overpromising “record clearing.”
Avoid barter or in-kind payments with clients during suspension: Accepting value in exchange for legal services while suspended is prohibited and aggravates UPL exposure.
Address client protection before any suspension takes effect: Transfer files, obtain client consent for substitution, refund any unearned fees, and ensure successor counsel can meet deadlines.
Meet procedural deadlines in discipline cases: Timely object to Board recommendations under Rule XIX to preserve positions for court review.

Conclusion

In re Haley reinforces two core principles of Louisiana attorney discipline. First, repeated neglect and communication failures—especially after prior discipline—will escalate to a suspension that requires a formal reinstatement showing, even in the absence of proven intentional dishonesty. Second, advising clients and accepting fees during a suspension is UPL and will draw substantial sanctions, though the court will distinguish that conduct from the most aggravated forms of practicing law while suspended (e.g., appearing in court, filing pleadings), which can justify permanent disbarment.

The one-year-and-one-day suspension here reflects a calibrated response to a documented pattern of client harm and professional disregard during a suspension period, while the divergent dissents signal that the court sits at a contested boundary between proportionality and deterrence in sanctioning UPL during suspension. The decision stands as a clear warning: even “soft” forms of legal practice while suspended—text advice, strategy meetings, and accepting payment—are forbidden and will be sanctioned severely, particularly when layered atop a disciplinary history and client neglect.