A. Precedents Cited

1) State v. Scott, No. SC100916, _ S.W.3d _, slip op. (Mo. banc July 22, 2025)

Scott is the decision that does most of the work in Mack. The Court treated Scott as controlling on two key propositions: (i) the mandatory time limits in Rules 24.035 and 29.15 must be enforced, and (ii) the abandonment doctrine cannot be invoked when postconviction counsel was not appointed by the motion court.

Applying Scott, the Court reasoned that because Mack’s public defender entered an appearance without appointment, the doctrinal mechanism that sometimes excuses late amended filings—“abandonment”—was unavailable. That conclusion eliminated the amended motion as a valid basis for relief and refocused the case on the pro se motion as the only timely filing.

2) State v. Mack, 560 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. App. 2018)

This is Mack’s direct appeal. The Court used it not for substantive Fourth/Fifth Amendment analysis, but for procedural preclusion: the pro se Rule 29.15 claim reasserted the same suppression issue already decided against Mack on direct appeal. That identity of issues became the decisive reason Mack could not obtain postconviction relief.

3) Mack v. State, 635 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. App. 2021)

The court of appeals previously reversed and remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law and for an abandonment inquiry. The Supreme Court’s later analysis shows the risk of remand orders built on an incorrect assumption that abandonment doctrine can apply: once Scott clarified the appointment limitation, the abandonment inquiry (and the merits litigation of the amended motion) became legally irrelevant.

4) State v. Woolery, 687 S.W.3d 652 (Mo. banc 2024) and Rule 84.13(a)

Mack attempted, for the first time in the Supreme Court, to argue the motion court clearly erred by failing to appoint counsel under Rule 29.15(e). Citing Rule 84.13(a) and State v. Woolery, the Court treated this as an unpreserved claim. The preservation holding underscores that even in postconviction proceedings—where procedural rules can be complex—appellate review remains constrained by preservation requirements.

5) Creighton v. State, 520 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2017) and Green v. State, 494 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. banc 2016)

Creighton and Green stand for the proposition that a postconviction judgment is not final and appealable if it fails to “acknowledge, adjudicate, or dispose” all claims asserted in the postconviction motion. Typically, that finality defect requires dismissal and remand so the motion court can adjudicate all claims.

Mack distinguishes these cases on posture. In Green, for example, the amended motion was timely and (as then permitted) incorporated pro se claims; the problem was that the judgment did not resolve all incorporated claims. Mack, by contrast, involved a motion court that believed it was adjudicating the operative (amended) motion and issuing a final judgment—but the Supreme Court later determined the amended motion was untimely and therefore not operative. That distinction mattered because it changed which pleading the system treats as the controlling motion.

6) Hopkins v. State, 519 S.W.3d 433 (Mo. banc 2017)

Hopkins supplies an important doctrinal contrast: when a timely amended motion is filed, it is the “operative pleading,” and the motion court does not err by declining to adjudicate separate pro se claims not incorporated into the amended motion. Mack invokes Hopkins to explain why, had the amended motion been timely, the motion court would have had no obligation to address Mack’s standalone pro se claim.

But because the amended motion was untimely, the analytical framework flips: the pro se motion becomes the operative motion as the only timely filing.

7) Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. banc 2009) and Voss v. State, 570 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. App. 2019)

Zink provides the controlling rule that postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal or a “second appeal,” and that the Court will not review the same underlying claim for a second time. Voss is cited as consistent appellate authority declining to reach postconviction points when the same issues were raised and resolved on direct appeal.

These cases are the basis for the Court’s refusal to send the case back to the motion court to adjudicate a claim that postconviction law treats as procedurally foreclosed.

8) Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015)

The Court cited Moore as a comparator for when remand is appropriate: Moore involved pro se claims that had not been adjudicated either by the motion court or on direct appeal, and the Court emphasized the need for “the process that justice requires.” Mack uses Moore to highlight the opposite situation—Mack’s sole pro se claim had already been adjudicated on direct appeal—so the “process” concern did not justify remand.

9) Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. banc 2019)

Hosier supplies the affirmance principle: a trial court’s judgment will be affirmed if it is correct under any theory, even if the trial court’s reasoning was wrong or insufficient. Mack relies on Hosier to affirm the denial of relief despite the procedural confusion created by litigation of an untimely amended motion and the prior remand for abandonment and findings.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 29.15’s mandatory structure and time limits control. The Court framed Rule 29.15 as the “exclusive procedure” for enumerated postconviction claims and emphasized the rule’s prohibition on successive motions (Rule 29.15(l)). Consistent with Scott, the Court treated timeliness under Rule 29.15(g) as mandatory and outcome-determinative.
2. The amended motion was untimely, and “abandonment” could not cure the defect. The parties agreed—and the Court held—that the amended motion was not timely under the version of Rule 29.15(g) in effect at sentencing. Under Scott, because counsel entered an appearance without being appointed, the abandonment doctrine was inapplicable; therefore the late amended motion could not be treated as the operative pleading.
3. The operative pleading became the pro se motion, but its sole claim was barred by prior direct-appeal adjudication. Once the amended motion was excluded, Mack’s pro se motion was the only timely motion. But that pro se motion alleged only that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress—an issue already presented and rejected on direct appeal in State v. Mack. Applying Zink (and consistent with Voss), the Court treated the claim as non-cognizable in postconviction because it attempted to relitigate the direct-appeal issue.
4. No third remand was required despite the usual finality/findings framework. The Court acknowledged the usual rule from Creighton/Green: if a postconviction judgment fails to adjudicate all claims in the operative motion, the appeal is typically dismissed and remanded, and Rule 29.15(j) contemplates findings and conclusions on all issues presented. But the Court declined to apply that default remand remedy because it would require ignoring that Mack’s only timely pro se claim had already been fully adjudicated on direct appeal. In other words, remand would serve form over substance where no legally available relief could follow.
5. Preservation principles foreclosed a late-raised appointment argument. Mack’s argument that the motion court should have appointed counsel under Rule 29.15(e) was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court and therefore unpreserved under Rule 84.13(a) and Woolery; additionally, the Court observed that counsel’s entry of appearance “obviated the need” for appointment.

C. Impact

• Clarifies the limits of “abandonment” after Scott: Mack operationalizes Scott’s appointment-based limitation on abandonment. In practice, litigants and courts must now treat “who appointed counsel” as a threshold fact that can determine whether a late amended motion is even eligible for abandonment-based excusal.
• Reduces serial remands in procedurally exhausted cases: Mack signals that appellate courts need not insist on further remand proceedings (e.g., for findings on an operative pro se motion) when the only timely claim is plainly barred because it was already decided on direct appeal. This is a pragmatic limiting principle on the otherwise strict remand practice associated with Creighton/Green finality issues.
• Reinforces postconviction’s non-appellate function: By relying on Zink’s “no second appeal” doctrine, Mack reemphasizes that Rule 29.15 is not designed to re-try direct-appeal claims, but to address distinct postconviction grounds (commonly ineffective assistance, jurisdictional defects, or unconstitutional sentences) that were not and could not be finally resolved on direct appeal.