A. Precedents Cited
1) State v. Scott, No. SC100916, _ S.W.3d _, slip op. (Mo. banc July 22, 2025)
Scott is the decision that does most of the work in Mack. The Court treated Scott as controlling on two key propositions:
(i) the mandatory time limits in Rules 24.035 and 29.15 must be enforced, and (ii) the abandonment doctrine cannot be invoked when postconviction
counsel was not appointed by the motion court.
Applying Scott, the Court reasoned that because Mack’s public defender entered an appearance without appointment, the doctrinal mechanism that
sometimes excuses late amended filings—“abandonment”—was unavailable. That conclusion eliminated the amended motion as a valid basis for relief and
refocused the case on the pro se motion as the only timely filing.
2) State v. Mack, 560 S.W.3d 29 (Mo. App. 2018)
This is Mack’s direct appeal. The Court used it not for substantive Fourth/Fifth Amendment analysis, but for procedural preclusion: the pro se Rule
29.15 claim reasserted the same suppression issue already decided against Mack on direct appeal. That identity of issues became the decisive reason
Mack could not obtain postconviction relief.
3) Mack v. State, 635 S.W.3d 607 (Mo. App. 2021)
The court of appeals previously reversed and remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law and for an abandonment inquiry. The Supreme
Court’s later analysis shows the risk of remand orders built on an incorrect assumption that abandonment doctrine can apply: once Scott clarified the
appointment limitation, the abandonment inquiry (and the merits litigation of the amended motion) became legally irrelevant.
4) State v. Woolery, 687 S.W.3d 652 (Mo. banc 2024) and Rule 84.13(a)
Mack attempted, for the first time in the Supreme Court, to argue the motion court clearly erred by failing to appoint counsel under Rule 29.15(e).
Citing Rule 84.13(a) and State v. Woolery, the Court treated this as an unpreserved claim. The preservation holding
underscores that even in postconviction proceedings—where procedural rules can be complex—appellate review remains constrained by preservation requirements.
5) Creighton v. State, 520 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2017) and Green v. State, 494 S.W.3d 525 (Mo. banc 2016)
Creighton and Green stand for the proposition that a postconviction judgment is not final and appealable if it fails
to “acknowledge, adjudicate, or dispose” all claims asserted in the postconviction motion. Typically, that finality defect requires dismissal and
remand so the motion court can adjudicate all claims.
Mack distinguishes these cases on posture. In Green, for example, the amended motion was timely and (as then permitted) incorporated pro se claims;
the problem was that the judgment did not resolve all incorporated claims. Mack, by contrast, involved a motion court that believed it was adjudicating
the operative (amended) motion and issuing a final judgment—but the Supreme Court later determined the amended motion was untimely and therefore not
operative. That distinction mattered because it changed which pleading the system treats as the controlling motion.
6) Hopkins v. State, 519 S.W.3d 433 (Mo. banc 2017)
Hopkins supplies an important doctrinal contrast: when a timely amended motion is filed, it is the “operative pleading,” and the motion
court does not err by declining to adjudicate separate pro se claims not incorporated into the amended motion. Mack invokes Hopkins to explain why, had
the amended motion been timely, the motion court would have had no obligation to address Mack’s standalone pro se claim.
But because the amended motion was untimely, the analytical framework flips: the pro se motion becomes the operative motion as the only timely filing.
7) Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. banc 2009) and Voss v. State, 570 S.W.3d 184 (Mo. App. 2019)
Zink provides the controlling rule that postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal or a “second appeal,”
and that the Court will not review the same underlying claim for a second time. Voss is cited as consistent appellate authority declining
to reach postconviction points when the same issues were raised and resolved on direct appeal.
These cases are the basis for the Court’s refusal to send the case back to the motion court to adjudicate a claim that postconviction law treats as
procedurally foreclosed.
8) Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015)
The Court cited Moore as a comparator for when remand is appropriate: Moore involved pro se claims that had not been adjudicated either
by the motion court or on direct appeal, and the Court emphasized the need for “the process that justice requires.” Mack uses Moore to highlight the
opposite situation—Mack’s sole pro se claim had already been adjudicated on direct appeal—so the “process” concern did not justify remand.
9) Hosier v. State, 593 S.W.3d 75 (Mo. banc 2019)
Hosier supplies the affirmance principle: a trial court’s judgment will be affirmed if it is correct under any theory, even if the trial
court’s reasoning was wrong or insufficient. Mack relies on Hosier to affirm the denial of relief despite the procedural confusion created by litigation
of an untimely amended motion and the prior remand for abandonment and findings.