U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 Upward Variances: Large Ammunition Quantities and Multiple (High-Capacity) Magazines as “Heartland” Aggravators, with Sentencing Rationale Inferable from the Record

I. Introduction

United States v. Del-Valle-Camacho (1st Cir. Jan. 14, 2026) addresses when a district court may impose, and how it must explain, an upward variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in a firearms case governed by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. The defendant, Christian Del-Valle-Camacho, pleaded guilty to (1) escaping from a court-ordered residential re-entry program, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751, and (2) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).

At arrest, marshals found a Glock pistol modified to shoot automatically, seven Glock magazines (five high-capacity), and 152 rounds of 9mm ammunition. The Guidelines range was 33–41 months. The district court imposed 60 months (a 19-month upward variance). On appeal, Del-Valle-Camacho argued the sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court allegedly failed to provide an adequate, case-specific explanation for the variance.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed. It held:

Procedural reasonableness: Because no specific procedural objection was made at sentencing, review was for plain error, and there was none. The district court sufficiently explained the upward variance—explicitly and by fair inference from the record—by repeatedly emphasizing the unusually large amount of ammunition and the number of magazines (including high-capacity magazines), distinguishing the case from an “average” § 2K2.1 firearms-possession case.
Substantive reasonableness: Under abuse-of-discretion review, the variance fell within the “universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes.” The court relied on a permissible rationale—excess ammunition and multiple/extended magazines—and reached a defensible result consistent with circuit precedent recognizing those facts as “heartland”-removing aggravators in § 2K2.1 cases.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is heavily precedent-driven, organizing its analysis around established First Circuit frameworks for sentencing review, preservation, and the adequacy of variance explanations.

1. The bifurcated review framework (procedural first, then substantive)

United States v. Flores-Quiñones and United States v. Reyes-Torres supply the foundational rule that appellate review is “bifurcated”: the court evaluates procedural reasonableness before substantive reasonableness. This structure matters because different standards of review (plain error vs. abuse of discretion) may apply depending on preservation.

2. Preservation and plain error in sentencing

United States v. Cordero-Velázquez (quoting United States v. Reyes-Correa) is used to define what it takes to preserve a procedural sentencing claim: an objection must be “sufficiently specific” to alert the district court to the alleged error. Del-Valle-Camacho’s general objection did not preserve a procedural-explanation claim.
United States v. Cruz-Ramos establishes that unpreserved procedural claims are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Rondón-García (quoting United States v. Cortés-Medina) provides the four-part plain-error test (error; clear/obvious; affects substantial rights; seriously impairs fairness/integrity/public reputation). This high bar is central to why the procedural challenge failed.

3. What constitutes an adequate explanation for a variance, and how it may be inferred

United States v. Pupo (quoting United States v. Díaz-Rivera) supplies the core procedural rule: it is procedural error to fail to adequately explain the sentence, including why it deviates from the Guidelines.
United States v. Flores-Nater (quoting United States v. Muñoz-Fontanez) is the cautionary counterexample: a major upward variance with essentially no explanation (and no inferable rationale) is reversible procedural error. Del-Valle-Camacho invokes it; the First Circuit distinguishes it.
United States v. Flores-Nater, United States v. Valle-Colón (quoting United States v. Díaz-Lugo), and United States v. Cordero-Velázquez (quoting United States v. Reyes-Correa) collectively anchor the requirement that when varying upward the court must identify the specific facts motivating the variance and explain why the case differs from the “norm”/“mine-run” contemplated by the Guidelines.
United States v. Montero-Montero provides the “fair inference” principle: an explanation may be drawn from the sentencing record as a whole, not only from a single, formulaic statement at the moment of pronouncing sentence.
The opinion illustrates inference by relying on:
- United States v. Muñoz-Fontanez (n.5) (rationale inferable from statements during the hearing),
- United States v. Colón-Cordero (quoting United States v. Carrasquillo-Sánchez) (rationale inferred by comparing party arguments with what the court did).
United States v. Polaco-Hance is used to confirm that the record need only contain “enough information” to allow meaningful appellate review of the sentencing rationale.
United States v. Turbides-Leonardo supplies a practical maxim: “brevity is not to be confused with inattention.” This reinforces that adequacy turns on substance and record context, not length.
United States v. Ortiz-Pérez is cited (via Flores-Nater) for the proposition that an appellate court cannot uphold a variance where the record is “empty” of meaningful insight into the court’s reasoning.
The court also distinguishes a line of cases where explanations were absent or nearly so for substantial variances: United States v. Muñoz-Fontanez, United States v. Mantha, Montero-Montero, and United States v. Rivera-Gonzalez. These cases serve as boundary markers: they show what a deficient record looks like, and why Del-Valle-Camacho’s record was sufficient.

4. Substantive reasonableness: the “universe of reasonable outcomes” and deference

United States v. Colón-De Jesús sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for preserved substantive challenges.
United States v. Burgos (quoting Polaco-Hance and United States v. Rivera-Morales) supplies the “universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes” concept: appellate review does not identify a single correct sentence, only whether the sentence is within a broad permissible range.
Colón-De Jesús (quoting United States v. De Jesús-Torres) provides the governing test: whether the court articulated a plausible rationale and reached a defensible result.
Polaco-Hance (citing United States v. Martin and quoting Flores-Nater) frames the requirement for above-Guidelines sentences: the district court must justify a variance of the magnitude in question, rooted in offense circumstances or offender characteristics.
Polaco-Hance (quoting United States v. Guzman-Fernandez) reiterates that the sentencing judge must explain why the defendant’s situation differs from the ordinary situation covered by the Guidelines calculation.
United States v. Contreras-Delgado emphasizes continued deference even when the sentence is outside the range.
United States v. Rivera-Morales (quoting United States v. Vargas-García) is used to reject the defendant’s invitation to reweigh sentencing factors—appellate courts do not substitute their judgment for the sentencing judge’s.

5. Ammunition and magazine quantity as valid aggravators under § 2K2.1

United States v. Rivera-Berríos is the key doctrinal pivot invoked by the defense. The First Circuit clarifies that Rivera-Berríos does not bar reliance on a factor already accounted for by the Guidelines; rather, a court may rely on such a factor if it explains why the case differs from the “mine-run” or why the factor deserves extra weight.
The opinion then situates Del-Valle-Camacho within a consistent line permitting upward variances based on ammunition and magazine quantity:
- United States v. Mercado-Cañizares (quoting Polaco-Hance) states that the amount of ammunition and the number of extended magazines “can be valid bases for an upward variance.”
- United States v. Bruno-Campos supports the “heartland” concept: these facts can remove a case from the heartland of the guideline.
- United States v. García-Mojica underscores that “extra ammunition” may be treated as aggravating because it increases lethality and may not be contemplated by the applicable guideline adjustments.
- United States v. Morales-Vélez is used for two linked propositions: (i) § 2K2.1(a)(3) assumes ammunition consistent with “simple possession of a machine gun,” but (ii) when the quantity exceeds that, courts may treat it as an aggravating factor not already accounted for.
- United States v. Rosario-Merced provides the precise justification relied on here: where the Guidelines “did not account” for the amount of ammunition involved, an upward variance is justified.
- United States v. Rivera-Santiago, Morales-Vélez, Polaco-Hance, and Mercado-Cañizares are cited as examples where variances were affirmed with comparable or even lower ammunition counts—supporting the proportionality/defensibility of the 60-month sentence in Del-Valle-Camacho.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural reasonableness: why the explanation was adequate

The First Circuit’s procedural holding turns on two linked determinations:

Standard of review (plain error): Because the defendant did not specifically object that the court failed to explain the variance, the procedural claim was unpreserved under United States v. Cordero-Velázquez and therefore subject to plain-error review under United States v. Cruz-Ramos and United States v. Rondón-García.
Record-based sufficiency of explanation: Applying United States v. Pupo and United States v. Flores-Nater, the panel held there was no failure to explain. The sentencing judge repeatedly identified the case-specific facts—“an altered pistol,” “152 rounds,” “seven magazines,” “five of which were high capacity”—and tied them to why the Guidelines range did not satisfy § 3553(a) goals (seriousness, respect for law, public protection, deterrence). Even if the court “could have said more” immediately before pronouncing the sentence, the rationale was recoverable “by fair inference” from the hearing as a whole under United States v. Montero-Montero, consistent with United States v. Polaco-Hance and United States v. Turbides-Leonardo.

A key move is the distinction from Flores-Nater and related cases (Muñoz-Fontanez, Mantha, Montero-Montero, Rivera-Gonzalez): those involved either far larger variances and/or records devoid of any meaningful rationale. Here, the court’s repeated emphasis on ammunition/magazines supplied a coherent, reviewable explanation.

2. Substantive reasonableness: why the result was defensible

Substantively, the First Circuit applied the abuse-of-discretion framework of United States v. Colón-De Jesús and the “universe of reasonable outcomes” concept from United States v. Burgos (and United States v. Rivera-Morales). The sentence was upheld because:

The district court articulated a plausible rationale (enhanced dangerousness reflected by 152 rounds and multiple magazines, including high-capacity) and reached a defensible result, satisfying Colón-De Jesús (quoting De Jesús-Torres).
The rationale was properly rooted in offense circumstances, aligning with Polaco-Hance (citing United States v. Martin) and consistent with the requirement to explain why this defendant is outside the ordinary guideline case, per Polaco-Hance (quoting United States v. Guzman-Fernandez).
The court rejected the defense’s reading of United States v. Rivera-Berríos. Rivera-Berríos permits reliance on a guideline-accounted factor if the judge explains why the case is different or the factor merits extra weight; and here, the panel emphasized that the Guidelines did not otherwise account for this ammunition quantity.
Consistency with prior approvals of ammunition/magazine-based variances—Mercado-Cañizares, Bruno-Campos, García-Mojica, Morales-Vélez, Rosario-Merced, Rivera-Santiago, and Polaco-Hance—made the 19-month variance particularly difficult to label an outlier.
Deference principles from United States v. Contreras-Delgado and the no-reweighing rule from Rivera-Morales (quoting United States v. Vargas-García) limited the appellate court’s role.

3. An additional but unresolved aggravator: “escape status”

The district court also noted that the defendant possessed the firearm and ammunition “while on escape status.” The panel acknowledged that this fact did not affect the offense level because the escape count was grouped and did not increase the combined offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(c). The First Circuit, however, declined to decide whether escape status independently supported the variance, holding instead that the ammunition and magazine facts were “independently sufficient” (citing United States v. Mercado-Cañizares).

C. Impact

Although the opinion is framed as an application of existing doctrine rather than an explicit doctrinal innovation, it meaningfully clarifies and consolidates First Circuit sentencing law in three practical ways:

Record-wide explanations are workable on appeal: Del-Valle-Camacho reinforces that an adequate explanation for an upward variance need not appear in a single “magic words” paragraph at the moment of sentencing. If the judge repeatedly identifies the aggravating facts and ties them to § 3553(a) objectives during the hearing, the rationale may be affirmed “by fair inference” under Montero-Montero.
Ammunition and magazine quantity remain robust aggravators in § 2K2.1 cases: The decision reaffirms a durable principle: large quantities of ammunition and multiple/extended magazines can remove a case from the guideline heartland and justify an upward variance, especially where no guideline enhancement accounts for that quantity (drawing on Morales-Vélez, Rosario-Merced, and Mercado-Cañizares).
Appellate posture matters (preservation): The case is also a cautionary lesson: failure to lodge a specific procedural objection to the sentencing explanation triggers plain-error review, which is rarely overcome. As a result, Del-Valle-Camacho will likely be cited by the government when defending variances supported by a record that contains repeated factual emphasis but a relatively brief formal pronouncement.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Guidelines range (advisory): The Sentencing Guidelines provide a recommended imprisonment range based on offense level and criminal history. After Booker, the range is advisory; judges may depart or vary if they justify the result under statutory sentencing factors.
Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory range based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors (e.g., seriousness, deterrence, public protection). This differs from a “departure,” which is a Guidelines-based adjustment mechanism.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
- Procedural asks whether the judge followed the right steps (correct range calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation).
- Substantive asks whether the length of the sentence is defensible given the reasons stated and the facts.
Plain error review: A highly deferential appellate standard used when an issue was not properly preserved. The defendant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
“Heartland” / “mine-run” cases: The “heartland” is the typical set of cases the guideline is meant to cover. A variance is easier to justify when facts make the case atypical (outside the “mine-run”), such as unusually large ammunition quantities.
“Fair inference” from the record: Appellate courts may uphold a sentence where the rationale is reasonably discernible from the full sentencing transcript and context, even if the judge did not deliver a long, formal explanation at the end.
Grouping under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(c): When multiple counts are grouped, a lower-level count may not increase the combined offense level, even though the conduct can still be relevant to where the final sentence should fall (or whether a variance is warranted).

V. Conclusion

United States v. Del-Valle-Camacho affirms a 19-month upward variance where the district court grounded its decision in unusually aggravating facts: a modified automatic-capable handgun paired with 152 rounds and seven magazines (including high-capacity magazines). The First Circuit confirms that (1) a sentencing explanation may be adequate when read across the full record and inferred from the hearing as a whole, and (2) excess ammunition and multiple/extended magazines can legitimately move a § 2K2.1 case outside the guideline heartland, supporting a defensible above-range sentence.