U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) Limits Acquitted-Conduct Use Only in Guideline Calculations; Concurrent Sentence Doctrine Applies Absent Concrete, Non-Speculative Collateral Consequences

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arose from two related federal matters involving Christopher Texidor (“Texidor”): (i) a jury conviction after a six-day trial for marijuana-trafficking and related firearm offenses tied to a conspiracy moving nearly 3,000 kilograms of marijuana from California to Pennsylvania via the U.S. Postal Service; and (ii) a separate guilty plea to wire fraud stemming from a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan scheme committed while Texidor was on pretrial release for the drug case.

At sentencing, the District Court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months (offense level 40; criminal history category I) and imposed a bottom-of-the-range 292-month aggregate sentence on the drug/firearm case and a concurrent 240-month sentence on the wire-fraud case.

Texidor’s appeal presented four central issues:

• Acquitted-conduct / PSR issue: Whether, after the addition of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (“Acquitted Conduct”), the court erred by refusing to strike remaining PSR references to cocaine and by allegedly considering cocaine conduct despite Texidor’s acquittal on a cocaine conspiracy count.
• Leadership enhancement: Whether a four-level organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) was clearly erroneous.
• Substantive reasonableness (drug/firearm aggregate): Whether 292 months was substantively unreasonable, including in light of proposed marijuana rescheduling to Schedule III.
• Substantive reasonableness (wire fraud): Whether the concurrent 240-month wire-fraud sentence should be reviewed or avoided under the concurrent sentence doctrine.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and sentencing review framework

• United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2020): cited for de novo review of Guidelines interpretation.
• United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2006): cited for abuse-of-discretion review of Guidelines application and clear-error review for factual findings.
• United States v. Thung Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018): emphasized that where the Guidelines employ a “predominantly fact-driven test” (like § 3B1.1(a)), clear-error review governs the enhancement determination.
• United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009): supplied the Third Circuit’s substantive reasonableness standard—affirm unless “no reasonable sentencing court” would have imposed the same sentence for the stated reasons.

2) Acquitted conduct at sentencing: statutory and guideline backdrop

• United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam): the cornerstone precedent recognizing that acquittal does not bar considering underlying conduct at sentencing if proven by a preponderance, grounded in broad sentencing-information principles (reflected in § 3661).
• United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2013): Third Circuit reliance on Watts to approve consideration of acquitted conduct where proven by a preponderance.
• United States v. Ware, 141 F.4th 970 (8th Cir. 2025): noted as the only circuit to address (even if briefly) the new § 1B1.3(c)’s scope, stating it does not bar considering acquitted conduct under § 3553(a).

3) Organizer/leader enhancement under § 3B1.1(a)

• United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341 (3d Cir. 2022): provided the Third Circuit’s definitions—an “organizer” generates a coherent functional structure; a “leader” wields high-level directive power or influence.
• United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1992): invoked by Texidor to argue lack of control over others; distinguished by the panel because Texidor’s enterprise was not a loose series of unrelated sales with mere suppliers/customers.

4) Concurrent sentence doctrine and collateral consequences

• United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 1997): cited for the doctrine’s basic application where resolving an issue would not change the overall time to be served.
• Duka v. United States, 27 F.4th 189 (3d Cir. 2022): articulated the doctrine’s resource-conservation rationale and discussed limits where collateral consequences exist.
• Ray v. United States, 481 U.S. 736 (1987) (per curiam): discussed (via Duka) for the proposition that the doctrine is generally unavailable to avoid review of challenged convictions on direct appeal where sentences are not truly “concurrent” (e.g., special assessments per count).
• United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2015): applied Ray and explained that per-count special assessments undermine “concurrency” for doctrine purposes when convictions are at issue.
• Kassir v. United States, 3 F.4th 556 (2d Cir. 2021), United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2011), and United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2012): cited to show continued use of the doctrine in direct appeals challenging only the length of one concurrent sentence.
• United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978): stated the doctrine should not be applied where there is a “significant risk” of greater adverse collateral consequences.
• Ruiz v. United States, 990 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2021), United States v. Sherifi, 107 F.4th 309 (4th Cir. 2024), United States v. Charles, 932 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2019), and Eason v. United States, 912 F.3d 1122 (8th Cir. 2019): used to refine “collateral consequences” analysis, culminating in the Third Circuit’s clarification that the risk must be “concrete” and “non-speculative.”

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The opinion’s central new interpretive move: cabining § 1B1.3(c) to Guidelines-range calculation

The panel treated U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) as a targeted amendment that redefines what counts as “relevant conduct” for the mechanical task of calculating the advisory Guidelines range. It did not read the amendment to silently repeal or narrow the longstanding breadth of sentencing information authorized by:

• 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed…”), and
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (permitting consideration of “any information” unless prohibited by law).

In practical terms, the court’s construction preserves a two-stage sentencing architecture:

• Stage 1 (Guidelines computation): § 1B1.3(c) removes acquitted conduct from “relevant conduct” inputs (unless it also establishes, in whole or in part, the offense of conviction).
• Stage 2 (selection of the sentence under § 3553(a)): the judge may still consider background, character, and conduct information—including acquitted conduct—subject to other legal constraints, because § 1B1.3(c) does not speak to (and therefore does not limit) that broader inquiry.

2) Application to the PSR dispute: the “no reliance” safety valve

Having articulated the legal boundary, the court also emphasized an evidentiary/practical one: the record did not show reliance on cocaine conduct at all. The District Court repeatedly stated cocaine conduct was excluded from the Guidelines calculation under § 1B1.3(c), and it did not reference cocaine in the § 3553(a) discussion or the sentence announcement. That dual finding (correct legal understanding + no factual reliance) drove affirmance on the acquitted-conduct claim.

3) Leadership enhancement: Adair’s functional approach and a Belletiere distinction

Applying United States v. Adair, the court framed leadership/organization as functional: creation of coordinated structure and exercise of directive influence. It then recited facts showing Texidor:

• recruited family members and others to receive drug parcels;
• used his business and home as operational bases to organize and conceal the trafficking;
• coordinated shipments, pickups, sales, debts, and payments;
• coordinated GPS tracking and orchestrated intimidation/violence against a postal employee suspected of stealing parcels; and
• received reports from co-conspirators and handled concealment of evidence (e.g., moving the vehicle used in a shooting).

The panel rejected Texidor’s reliance on United States v. Belletiere because the record reflected a structured enterprise with recruited participants, logistics, premises, tools, and violence—more than a mere pattern of discrete purchases and sales involving independent suppliers/customers.

4) Substantive reasonableness: marijuana rescheduling did not make a bottom-of-range sentence irrational

The court deferred to the District Court’s § 3553(a) weighing, emphasizing that the sentence was anchored in: the duration of the scheme, enormous quantity, threats and violence, firearm involvement, and the separate PPP fraud while on release. Proposed marijuana rescheduling did not render reliance on current law (Schedule I at sentencing time) unreasonable—especially where aggravating factors beyond drug type/quantity drove the offense level and the sentencing rationale.

5) Concurrent sentence doctrine: a clarified collateral-consequences threshold

The panel exercised discretion to avoid reviewing the wire-fraud sentence because any reduction there would not change time served given the longer concurrent 292-month sentence. Critically, the court tightened Third Circuit doctrine by clarifying that the “significant risk” of “unique cognizable collateral consequences” (from Duka v. United States and United States v. Lampley) must be concrete and non-speculative, adopting the approach of sister circuits (notably Ruiz v. United States).

Texidor’s asserted collateral consequence—future marijuana reforms potentially reducing the drug-case Guidelines range and thereby changing the overall combined range—was deemed speculative, particularly because the Guidelines already treat marijuana and unspecified Schedule III substances similarly via “Converted Drug Weight” rules in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), and because the availability of retroactive relief (e.g., via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)) was uncertain.

C. Impact

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• PSR (Presentence Investigation Report): a probation-prepared report summarizing the offense, the defendant’s background, and guideline calculations; courts rely on it heavily at sentencing.
• Acquitted conduct: behavior alleged in a charge for which the jury returned “not guilty.” The legal question is whether a judge may nonetheless consider that behavior at sentencing for other convictions.
• “Relevant conduct” (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3): a Guidelines term defining what conduct counts in the math used to compute the advisory sentencing range.
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c): the 2024 amendment excluding acquitted conduct from “relevant conduct” for the Guidelines calculation (with a limited exception where the conduct also establishes the offense of conviction).
• U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 / 18 U.S.C. § 3661: broad authorities allowing sentencing courts to consider wide-ranging information about the defendant when choosing the sentence—separate from computing the Guidelines range.
• Preponderance of the evidence: a lower proof standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt”; roughly “more likely than not.”
• Leadership enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a)): a four-level increase when the defendant organized/led criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive.
• § 3553(a) factors: the statutory considerations guiding the final sentence (e.g., seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, defendant history, and avoiding unwarranted disparities).
• Concurrent sentence doctrine: an appellate efficiency doctrine—if a defendant will serve the same total time regardless of an issue’s outcome (because another equal/longer sentence runs concurrently), the court may decline to decide that issue unless there are concrete collateral consequences.
• Converted Drug Weight (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1): a conversion method to compare drug quantities across different substances; the opinion notes marijuana and unspecified Schedule III substances can map similarly under this framework.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c): a mechanism that can allow sentence reductions in certain circumstances (e.g., retroactive Guidelines amendments), but it is not automatic and depends on several legal steps.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Christopher Texidor does two main pieces of doctrinal work for the Third Circuit. First, it construes the new U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) narrowly: acquitted conduct is removed from the “relevant conduct” calculus used to compute the advisory Guidelines range, but it remains potentially usable under the broader § 3553(a) sentencing inquiry via 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4. Second, it refines the circuit’s concurrent sentence doctrine by requiring that collateral consequences be concrete and non-speculative, thereby limiting appeals that seek review of a concurrent sentence based on uncertain future legal reforms.

On the facts, the court found no improper reliance on acquitted cocaine conduct, upheld the leadership enhancement under § 3B1.1(a), affirmed the bottom-of-range 292-month sentence as substantively reasonable in a large-scale, violent trafficking operation, and declined to review the concurrent wire-fraud sentence under the concurrent sentence doctrine.