Turner v. TD Bank: Conflicting Street Address and Book/Page in a Mortgage Creates an Ambiguity Requiring Extrinsic Evidence; Prior Quiet-Title Decree on Different Parcels Does Not Bar Later Litigation

1. Introduction

In Catherine Turner & a. v. TD Bank, N.A. (N.H. Dec. 30, 2025), the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated and remanded a superior court order that (1) enjoined TD Bank’s foreclosure and (2) quieted title to the Turners’ residential property (Lot 6C) in Catherine Turner, as executor and trustee, free and clear of the Bank’s mortgage claim.

The dispute arose from a 2006 mortgage whose property description conflicted: it identified the property by street address (“80 Old Route 11,” later “80 Tash Road,” the residence on Lot 6C) but also stated it was “more particularly described” by a deed recorded at a book and page that in fact described a different parcel—a small, unimproved .23-acre “sliver” on Route 11.

Key issues on appeal were: (a) whether the superior court erred by treating the book-and-page reference as controlling as a matter of law, rather than recognizing ambiguity and considering extrinsic evidence of intent; and (b) whether the Bank was barred (including by res judicata) from asserting that the mortgage encumbered Lot 6C given a prior 2017 quiet title default decree concerning different lots (Lots 7-0 and 7-1) subdivided from property including the sliver.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that when a mortgage describes the encumbered property by a street address and by a book-and-page reference that conflict, the description is ambiguous. That ambiguity permits resort to extrinsic evidence to determine what property the parties intended to encumber at the time of the 2006 mortgage.

The Court rejected the superior court’s approach of giving dispositive priority to the book-and-page reference over the street address. It also held that the 2017 quiet title default decree (quieting title to Lots 7-0 and 7-1) did not reform the mortgage and did not bar TD Bank from litigating, in a later case, whether the mortgage encumbered a different parcel (Lot 6C).

The judgment was vacated and the case remanded for the superior court to determine—using extrinsic evidence and surrounding circumstances— what property the parties intended to encumber in 2006. The Court emphasized that its decision addressed the interpretive error concerning ambiguity and did not foreclose other claims or defenses on remand.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Brentwood Volunteer Fireman's Assoc. v. Musso, 159 N.H. 461, 463 (2009).
Cited for the appellate standard of review in quiet title actions: the trial court’s determination is upheld unless erroneous as a matter of law or unsupported by the evidence. This framing matters because the Supreme Court treated the superior court’s “legal description always controls” approach as a legal error.
Pike v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 168 N.H. 40, 45 (2015).
Cited for the standard governing review of injunctions (error of law, unsustainable exercise of discretion, or clearly erroneous findings). Because the injunction rested on the superior court’s interpretive rule, the legal error warranted vacatur of injunctive relief as well.
Cucchi v. Town of Harrisville, 176 N.H. 629, 632 (2024), 2024 N.H. 29, ¶10.
The cornerstone interpretive authority. The Court relied on Cucchi for the proposition that if deed language is ambiguous, a court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions and circumstances to clarify the terms. This principle was extended to the mortgage description dispute: the conflict itself created ambiguity requiring an evidentiary inquiry, not a mechanical priority rule.
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Salzman, 129 N.H. 692, 696 (1987).
Used to reject the plaintiff’s argument that ambiguity should be construed against the Bank because it prepared the instrument. The Court emphasized that strict construction against the drafter is applied “only in the context of insurance contracts,” and that in non-insurance settings “no presumptions are to be indulged in either for or against” the drafter—except as a last resort when other tools fail. This directly undercut the plaintiff’s “drafting penalty” theory and reinforced the need to examine extrinsic evidence.
Smith v. Wedgewood Builders Corp., 134 N.H. 125, 129 (1991).
Cited for the sufficiency-of-description principle: a deed will be sufficiently definite if, by reasonable rules of construction and aided by extrinsic evidence, the intended property can be ascertained. The Court used Smith to support remand: the defect was not necessarily fatal; the task is to identify the intended encumbered parcel through evidence.
Osman v. Gagnon, 152 N.H. 359, 362 (2005).
Cited for the three-part test for res judicata. The plaintiff invoked Osman to argue TD Bank should have counterclaimed in 2017 to establish that the mortgage covered Lot 6C. The Court applied Osman but found the “same cause of action” element missing because the 2017 quiet title action concerned different parcels.
Fettig v. Estate of Fettig, 934 N.W.2d 547, 554 (N.D. 2019).
Quoted for the general proposition that judgments adjudicating rights to specific property typically bar only claims relating to that particular property, and do not extend to different property. This out-of-state authority supported the Court’s parcel-specific view of claim preclusion in the quiet-title context.
Sleeper v. Hoban Family P'ship, 157 N.H. 530, 535-36 (2008).
Used by analogy (cf.) to illustrate that prior litigation over a defined portion of property (e.g., a “shaded area” on a map) does not necessarily bar later claims concerning other portions outside that defined area. This bolstered the Court’s conclusion that the 2017 decree did not preclude litigation over Lot 6C.
Chao v. The Richey Co., Inc., 122 N.H. 1115, 1118 (1982).
Cited for the directive on remand: use extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent and the construction of the property description. Chao serves as an operational blueprint for how the superior court should proceed.
French v. Bank of New York Mellon, 729 F.3d 17, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2013).
Invoked to reject the plaintiff’s argument that “negligence and bad faith” should justify quieting title. The Court used French to distinguish moral criticism (“sloppy and cavalier”) from legally sufficient grounds for invalidating or extinguishing a mortgage interest. The takeaway: equitable displeasure alone is not a substitute for a cognizable doctrine.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The 2017 decree did not “amend” or reform the mortgage

TD Bank argued the 2017 quiet title decree effectively “struck off” the mortgage’s legal description, leaving a valid mortgage that still encumbered Lot 6C via the street address. The Supreme Court rejected this characterization: the 2017 decree, by its terms, only vested title to Lots 7-0 and 7-1 in Leslie Turner “free and clear of any interest of the Defendant.” It did not purport to rewrite the mortgage, reform its terms, or adjudicate TD Bank’s rights in other property.

B. Conflicting descriptions created ambiguity; extrinsic evidence is required

The superior court treated the mortgage’s book-and-page reference as conclusively identifying the encumbered property (the sliver), and held that the conflicting street address could not “override” the legal description. The Supreme Court held this was the wrong legal frame.

The Court redefined the question: not whether “legal descriptions control” or whether a street address is “general language,” but whether the conflict between two identifiers (street address vs. book-and-page deed reference) creates an ambiguity. It does—and once ambiguity exists, New Hampshire law permits consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine intent.

The Court pointed to record evidence consistent with the Bank’s view that the residence (Lot 6C) was intended collateral: the mortgage referenced “buildings and improvements,” while (according to the plaintiff) the sliver had none; and in 2017 Leslie Turner sought quiet title relief while representing that the Tash Road property was believed to be what the mortgage was intended to encumber. The Court faulted the superior court for failing to consider such evidence before reaching a definitive conclusion.

C. No automatic construction against the Bank as drafter

The plaintiff urged application of a contra proferentem-like principle against the Bank. The Court held that New Hampshire applies that strict rule only in insurance contracts (Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Salzman). For non-insurance instruments, there is no general presumption against the drafter; resolving doubts against the drafter is a last resort only after other methods of determining intent fail. Because the superior court did not examine other available evidence of intent, it was premature to resolve the ambiguity against TD Bank.

D. Res judicata did not bar litigation over Lot 6C

The plaintiff argued TD Bank waived or was precluded from asserting a lien on Lot 6C because it failed to counterclaim in the 2017 quiet title case. Applying Osman v. Gagnon, the Supreme Court held res judicata did not apply because the causes of action were not the same: the 2017 action quieted title to Lots 7-0 and 7-1, while the present action concerns foreclosure and title to a different parcel, Lot 6C. The Court adopted the property-specific view that quiet title judgments generally preclude only later claims about the same property in controversy, not other parcels (Fettig; supported by Sleeper by analogy).

E. Alleged negligence or bad faith was not a standalone basis to quiet title

The Court declined to affirm on the theory that TD Bank’s “extended negligence and bad faith” should be punished. Absent articulated legal grounds, such assertions could not sustain a judgment quieting title. The reference to French v. Bank of New York Mellon underscores that even serious sloppiness in mortgage practices does not automatically translate into extinguishment of secured interests without an applicable doctrine.

3.3. Impact

Mortgage and deed interpretation: Trial courts may not apply a categorical hierarchy that a recorded legal description always trumps other descriptors (like street address) when they conflict. The controlling move is the ambiguity determination and an intent-focused inquiry using extrinsic evidence.
Litigation strategy in quiet-title matters: Parties cannot assume that a quiet-title decree involving one set of parcels will preclude later litigation over different parcels—even if the disputes arise from the same mortgage instrument. Claim preclusion will turn on whether the same property (and thus the same cause of action) was in controversy.
Drafting and due diligence pressures: Lenders and closing professionals should treat mismatches between street address and record references as litigation-grade defects. This decision increases the likelihood that such conflicts will be resolved through fact-intensive proceedings (including testimony, course of dealing, physical characteristics of parcels, bankruptcy schedules, prior pleadings, and other surrounding circumstances).
Limits of “equitable outrage”: Allegations of sloppy conduct, without a tied legal doctrine and proof, will not by themselves justify quieting title free of a mortgage claim.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Quiet title action: A lawsuit asking the court to declare who owns property and whether others have enforceable interests in it (like mortgages or easements), so the title is “quiet” (cleared of disputes).
Injunction (against foreclosure): A court order stopping or preventing foreclosure while the legal rights are adjudicated.
Ambiguity in a deed/mortgage description: If the instrument points to two different properties (here, via street address vs. book-and-page reference), the court treats the description as unclear—meaning it must determine intent rather than apply a rigid textual priority.
Extrinsic evidence: Evidence outside the four corners of the instrument—such as the existence of buildings, how the parties described the collateral in other proceedings, or the circumstances of the transaction—used to resolve ambiguity.
Res judicata: A rule preventing re-litigation of the same cause of action after a final judgment. Here, it did not apply because the earlier judgment involved different parcels than the later litigation.
“Corrective mortgage” (as a practical matter): A later-recorded document attempting to “fix” an earlier description. This Opinion does not validate such a document; instead, it focuses on how to interpret the original 2006 mortgage given ambiguity and intent evidence.

5. Conclusion

Catherine Turner & a. v. TD Bank, N.A. establishes a clear interpretive directive for New Hampshire property and mortgage disputes: when a mortgage’s property identifiers conflict (street address versus book-and-page deed reference), the instrument is ambiguous and courts must consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intended collateral—rather than adopting a categorical rule that one descriptor controls. The Court also clarifies that a quiet-title decree concerning specific parcels generally does not preclude later litigation over different parcels, even if the same mortgage is involved.

On remand, the superior court must conduct the fact-intensive intent inquiry the initial judgment bypassed—an approach that will shape how lenders, property owners, and trial courts handle mistaken descriptions and competing signals within recorded instruments going forward.