Trump v. Clinton (11th Cir. 2025): No Special Tolling for Sitting Presidents and Robust Sanctions for Abusive Political Litigation

I. Introduction

This consolidated appeal from the Eleventh Circuit arises out of former President Donald J. Trump’s sprawling civil action against Hillary R. Clinton and dozens of other defendants, including the Democratic National Committee, campaign and law-firm entities, consultants, and former federal officials. The suit alleged a wide-ranging conspiracy to fabricate and disseminate the “Russia collusion” narrative during and after the 2016 election, framed principally as violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and various Florida torts.

The district court (Judge Donald M. Middlebrooks, S.D. Fla.) dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, found the claims legally defective and time-barred, and imposed substantial sanctions on Trump and his lawyers under both Rule 11 and the court’s inherent powers. While appeals were pending, Special Counsel John Durham released his report on the origins of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. Trump and his counsel then sought reconsideration and the judge’s disqualification based on that report.

Chief Judge William Pryor, writing for a unanimous Eleventh Circuit panel, affirmed almost all of the district court’s rulings, with one narrow exception: the court held that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis Limited (Christopher Steele’s firm) because it had been served abroad, and therefore the claims against Orbis had to be dismissed without prejudice rather than with prejudice.

The opinion is significant for at least four reasons:

• It firmly rejects the notion of any de facto “presidential tolling” of civil statutes of limitations based on the burdens of the presidency, holding that a president must file civil claims within the same time limits as anyone else.
• It clarifies the limits of statutory and equitable tolling for civil RICO claims in the Eleventh Circuit, particularly in relation to other federal investigations and proceedings.
• It strongly endorses the use of inherent powers and Rule 11 sanctions against abusive “shotgun” pleadings and politically motivated litigation, including reliance on a litigant’s pattern of similar conduct in other cases.
• It delineates the boundaries of district court jurisdiction to entertain judicial-disqualification motions once an appeal is pending and a limited Rule 62.1 remand has been granted.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture and Consolidated Appeals

The Eleventh Circuit consolidated four appeals arising from a single district court case:

1. Appeal of the dismissal of Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice.
2. Appeal of Rule 11 sanctions imposed on Trump’s counsel (focusing especially on allegations against Charles Dolan).
3. Appeal of inherent-authority sanctions (nearly $1 million in fees) imposed jointly and severally on Trump, attorney Alina Habba, and her firm.
4. Appeal from orders denying Rule 60(b) relief and denying a renewed motion to disqualify Judge Middlebrooks, brought after the Durham Report.

Two defendants (Orbis and Dolan) also moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, arguing that the appeal was frivolous.

B. Holdings in Brief

• Dismissal of Federal RICO Claims: Affirmed. The four-year statute of limitations had expired; neither statutory tolling via the Clayton Act nor equitable tolling applied.
• Dismissal of State-Law Claims (Injurious Falsehood, Conspiracy to Commit Injurious Falsehood, Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Prosecution): Affirmed. Trump forfeited key arguments on appeal and, substantively, the claims were defective under Florida law.
• Personal Jurisdiction:
  • As to Joffe and Dolan: Personal jurisdiction existed under RICO’s nationwide service provision; dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was erroneous, but the claims were properly dismissed on the merits.
  • As to Orbis: No personal jurisdiction, because Orbis was served in England and thus not within the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d); dismissal must therefore be without prejudice.
• Inherent-Power Sanctions: Affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding subjective bad faith and imposing nearly $1 million in fees.
• Rule 11 Sanctions: Affirmed. The factual allegations against Dolan and the legal theories advanced were objectively frivolous and unsupported by reasonable inquiry.
• Rule 60(b)/Durham Report: Affirmed. The Durham Report did not constitute newly discovered evidence or “extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
• Disqualification Motion: The district court correctly held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the renewed recusal motion while the case was on appeal and the limited remand under Rule 62.1 was pending.
• Appellate Sanctions under Rule 38: Denied. Although some arguments on appeal were frivolous, others (e.g., jurisdictional issues concerning Orbis and Dolan) had merit; the appeal as a whole was not frivolous.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Statute of Limitations and the Rejection of “Presidential Tolling”

1. Civil RICO Limitations Period

Civil RICO claims (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c)) carry a four-year limitations period, borrowed from the Clayton Act. The cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his injury. The panel cites Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2013), for this rule.

The district court determined, and Trump did not contest on appeal, that he knew of the injury and underlying conduct by October 2017 at the latest. He did not file suit until March 2022—about four years and five months later—rendering the claims facially time-barred.

2. Statutory Tolling via Clayton Act § 16(i)

RICO’s four-year limitations period is adopted from the Clayton Act, but the Supreme Court has never decided whether RICO also incorporates the Clayton Act’s separate tolling provision, 15 U.S.C. § 16(i). That provision pauses the limitations period when the United States brings certain antitrust actions:

“[W]henever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws … the running of the statute of limitations … shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter.”

The Eleventh Circuit carefully declines to decide the broader doctrinal question—whether § 16(i) applies to RICO at all. Instead, the court assumes arguendo that it might apply and shows that, even then, Trump would gain no benefit.

For statutory tolling under § 16(i), Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent require a “real relation” between the government’s proceeding and the private civil action:

• Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965): requires a “real relation” between the proceedings.
• Morton’s Market, Inc. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, Inc., 198 F.3d 823, 830–31 (11th Cir. 1999): demands that the facts alleged by the private plaintiff be “intertwined with and fundamentally the same as” those in the government action and that both proceedings allege an antitrust “conspiracy.”

Here, Trump pointed to:

• Federal Election Commission proceedings against the Clinton campaign and the DNC for misreporting opposition-research expenses;
• Durham’s prosecutions of Michael Sussmann, Igor Danchenko, and Kevin Clinesmith for false statements; and
• The existence of the Mueller and Durham investigations more generally.

The Eleventh Circuit held these proceedings lack the necessary “real relation” to Trump’s civil RICO case:

• They are not RICO or even antitrust prosecutions.
• They do not allege the same conspiracy that Trump alleges under RICO.
• At most, they touch on discrete factual episodes (false statements, FEC reporting issues) that Trump folds into a broader racketeering narrative; they do not themselves constitute the RICO conspiracy he alleges.

Thus, even if § 16(i) applied to RICO, these proceedings would not toll the statute of limitations. The court thereby reinforces a narrow reading of “real relation” and “intertwined” facts: mere factual overlap is insufficient; the governmental proceeding must prosecute substantially the same alleged wrong.

3. Equitable Tolling and the “Presidential Tolling” Argument

Equitable tolling is reserved for exceptional circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control that prevent timely filing, even with diligence. The panel relies on:

• Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 257 (2016): the obstacle must be beyond the litigant’s control.
• Fedance v. Harris, 1 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021): equitable tolling is a “rare remedy.”
• Examples where tolling has been allowed: fraudulent concealment, credible fear of death squads (NuVasive, Inc. v. Absolute Med., LLC, 71 F.4th 861; Jean v. Dorélien, 431 F.3d 776).

Trump advanced a novel theory: that his first presidential term (2017–2021) was an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting tolling, because:

1. The presidency is uniquely demanding and time-consuming; and
2. Filing such a civil action during the Mueller and Durham investigations would have appeared to interfere with law-enforcement functions, so he chose, as a matter of “presidential decision,” to prioritize official duties over litigation.

The Eleventh Circuit rejects this, treating it as an impermissible request for what is in substance a general “presidential tolling” rule:

• The court underscores that Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), held that a sitting president is not immune from private civil suits and can be subjected to judicial process even if it burdens his time and energy.
• If presidents can be “haled into court” as defendants despite the burdens of office, they likewise cannot be excused from filing suits to protect their own rights within the statute of limitations.
• Most critically, Trump’s own explanation shows this was a voluntary, strategic choice, not a circumstance “beyond his control.” The court repeatedly emphasizes his concession that he made a “presidential decision” to delay in order to avoid the appearance of interfering with investigations.

The key doctrinal point: a litigant who chooses not to sue for policy or political reasons does not satisfy the stringent standard for equitable tolling. The presidency, by itself, does not supply a new, special category of “extraordinary circumstance.”

This is the opinion’s clearest new precedent: within the Eleventh Circuit, there is no unique equitable-tolling regime for sitting presidents. Presidential duties do not, without more, justify suspending civil limitations periods.

4. Consequence: RICO Claims Dismissed as Untimely

Because neither statutory nor equitable tolling applied, Trump’s civil RICO and RICO-conspiracy claims were filed outside the four-year limitations period. The panel therefore affirms dismissal of those claims as time-barred under Rule 12(b)(6).

B. State-Law Tort Claims and the Consequences of Appellate Forfeiture

1. Injurious Falsehood under Florida Law

Trump asserted injurious falsehood (sometimes also called trade libel or disparagement), a tort distinct from defamation. Under Florida law, as summarized in Salit v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., 742 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the elements include:

• Publication of a false statement;
• Knowledge or reason to know that the statement will likely affect another’s economic relations;
• The statement plays a “material and substantial” part in causing third parties not to deal with the plaintiff; and
• Special damages—a specific, provable pecuniary loss proximately caused by the falsehood.

The district court found multiple defects, including most importantly the failure to adequately plead “special damages,” which it called a “crucial element.” It also held that many of the challenged statements were protected by the First Amendment.

On appeal, Trump did not meaningfully address some of these independent grounds for dismissal—particularly the “special damages” requirement and the derivative nature of the conspiracy claim. Applying its well-established rule from Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Insurance Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014), the Eleventh Circuit holds:

“To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.… If he fails to do so, the judgment is due to be affirmed.”

Because Trump did not contest every independent rationale for dismissal, the panel deems the arguments forfeited and affirms the injurious-falsehood and conspiracy-to-commit-injurious-falsehood dismissals without reaching every underlying merits issue.

2. Conspiracy to Commit Malicious Prosecution (Without a Prosecution)

Trump attempted to plead a conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution even though he did not successfully maintain an underlying malicious-prosecution claim in the district court. The district court relied on Florida law, which treats civil conspiracy as derivative:

• Balcor Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ahronovitz, 634 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994): conspiracy claim cannot exist independent of the underlying wrongful act.
• Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 206 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968): “The gist of a civil action for conspiracy is not conspiracy itself but a civil wrong which was done pursuant to the conspiracy.”

The Eleventh Circuit notes that Trump’s briefing does not seriously engage with these authorities or explain why a conspiracy-to-commit-malicious-prosecution claim can survive absent a viable malicious-prosecution tort. The court again applies Sapuppo and affirms based on forfeiture, adding that even on the merits this derivative-conspiracy theory fails under Florida law.

Collectively, these rulings are a strong reminder that in multi-ground dismissals, an appellant must attack each independent ground or risk automatic affirmance, regardless of potential weaknesses in other aspects of the district court’s reasoning.

C. Personal Jurisdiction and RICO’s Nationwide Service Provision

1. RICO’s Nationwide Service of Process (18 U.S.C. § 1965(d))

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), RICO authorizes nationwide service of process:

“[P]rocess … may be served in any judicial district of the United States in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs.”

In Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Lux.) S.A., 119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit held that:

• When a federal statute authorizes nationwide service, due process is satisfied if the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole.
• However, nationwide service jurisdiction assumes that the federal claim is not “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions … or otherwise devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”

This standard parallels the test for dismissing a federal claim on jurisdictional grounds under Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974).

2. Joffe and Dolan: Federal Claim Not “So Insubstantial”

Joffe and Dolan challenged personal jurisdiction. The district court had held it lacked personal jurisdiction as to them (as well as Orbis). On appeal, Trump invoked only the RICO nationwide service provision, abandoning reliance on Florida’s long-arm statute.

The Eleventh Circuit reasons:

• Trump’s statutory-tolling argument (via the Clayton Act) is weak and ultimately unsuccessful, but not “so insubstantial” or “foreclosed” as to fail to create a federal controversy.
• Therefore, the RICO claims—though ultimately untimely—are sufficient to support jurisdiction under § 1965(d) as to defendants properly served within the United States.

Accordingly, the district court did have personal jurisdiction over Joffe and Dolan. The error is harmless, however, because the court’s dismissal of the claims on limitations and other substantive grounds is affirmed.

3. Orbis: Defective Service Abroad and Dismissal Without Prejudice

Orbis (the UK-based firm associated with Christopher Steele) was served in England, not in any “judicial district of the United States.” Trump conceded this. The panel therefore holds that § 1965(d)’s nationwide service provision does not apply:

• The statutory text explicitly authorizes service within U.S. “judicial district[s]”; it does not extend to service abroad.
• Because no state long-arm statute argument was preserved on appeal and service occurred outside the United States, the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Orbis.

Citing Posner v. Essex Insurance Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit notes that dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction must be without prejudice. It therefore:

• Vacates the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis; and
• Remands with instructions to dismiss the claims against Orbis without prejudice.

This portion of the opinion clarifies that RICO’s nationwide service provision does not authorize service in foreign countries, and it underscores the procedural importance of correctly characterizing the basis for dismissal (jurisdictional vs. merits), since only the former should be without prejudice.

D. Shotgun Pleadings as Evidence of Bad Faith

1. What is a “Shotgun Pleading”?

The Eleventh Circuit has long criticized “shotgun pleadings,” a term referring to complaints that are so poorly organized and overinclusive that they obscure which facts support which claims. In Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015), the court identified four common types; one is particularly relevant here: a complaint that “adopts the allegations of all preceding counts” for each subsequent count.

Trump’s amended complaint:

• Ran to nearly 200 pages, incorporating over 600 paragraphs of allegations into later counts.
• Folded every prior paragraph into, for example, the injurious-falsehood count, leaving the court to sift through dozens of candidate statements to identify those purportedly actionable under that tort.

The district court labeled this a “quintessential shotgun pleading” and found that it imposed a heavy, unnecessary burden on the judiciary and defendants.

2. Using Shotgun Pleadings to Infer Bad Faith

Critically, the Eleventh Circuit does more than merely affirm dismissal of the complaint as a shotgun pleading. It treats the form and structure of the pleadings as evidence of subjective bad faith, supporting inherent-power sanctions:

• The complaint’s structure forced the court and defendants “to sift through the facts presented and decide for [themselves] which were material to the particular cause of action,” echoing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991).
• It concludes that the complaint was not merely sloppy, but an “abusive litigation tactic” filed “to harass,” amounting to obstruction of the orderly administration of justice.

Trump and Habba argued that RICO cases are inherently complex and that “every complaint” in such cases includes “some shotgun elements.” The panel rejects this:

• RICO plaintiffs are not exempt from the rules against shotgun pleadings (Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291).
• Complexity does not justify wholesale incorporation of hundreds of allegations into every count; plaintiffs must still specify which facts support which claims.

Doctrinally, the opinion reaffirmatively links shotgun pleading not only to dismissal, but also to the inference of bad faith that can support sanctions under a court’s inherent power.

E. Inherent-Power Sanctions: Bad Faith, Pattern of Abuse, and Fee Awards

1. Legal Framework

Federal courts possess inherent authority to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process, including by awarding attorneys’ fees. Key precedents:

• Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991): courts can fashion appropriate sanctions under their inherent powers for bad-faith conduct, including fees.
• Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962): inherent power arises from courts’ need to manage their own affairs.
• Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1224 (11th Cir. 2017): to “unlock” inherent powers, the court must find subjective bad faith.
• Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002): bad faith includes knowingly or recklessly raising frivolous arguments or using claims to harass.
• In re Evergreen Security, Ltd., 570 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009): a grossly inadequate factual inquiry can support a bad-faith finding.

Here, the district court imposed nearly $1 million in sanctions under its inherent power, jointly and severally against Trump, Habba, and Habba’s firm.

2. Forfeited Objections: Notice and Hearing

On appeal, Trump and Habba argued:

• They lacked adequate notice that inherent-power sanctions (without Rule 11’s safe harbor) were being considered; and
• The district court violated due process by not holding an evidentiary hearing.

The Eleventh Circuit holds both arguments forfeited, because:

• In opposing sanctions below, Trump and Habba mentioned only that sanctions should not be imposed “on shotgun pleading alone” and included a generalized quote about “fair notice,” without explaining how notice was lacking.
• Their request for a hearing was tied solely to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions, not to inherent-power sanctions; they never squarely asked for a hearing on the inherent-power basis.

Because parties must give the district court a fair opportunity to address alleged procedural defects, these arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

3. Substantive Bad-Faith Findings

The district court identified three pillars of bad faith:

1. Shotgun Pleading Filed for an Improper Political Purpose. As discussed, the complaint’s structure was not an innocent mistake but a deliberate tactic to harass and generate public narratives, not to vindicate legitimate legal rights.
2. Factually False or Reckless Allegations. The court had already found, in the Rule 11 context, that many of the allegations against Dolan were “knowingly false or made in reckless disregard for the truth” (e.g., misidentifying him as a former DNC chair, alleging connections and involvement unmoored from reality).
3. Patently Frivolous Legal Theories. Some examples the court flags:
   • A “malicious prosecution” claim without any underlying criminal or civil prosecution being initiated against Trump.
   • A “trade secret” claim without any well-pled trade secret.
   • Seven “counts” that did not plead any recognizable cause of action, described as the “high-water mark” of shotgun pleading.

Trump did not appeal 11 of the 16 dismissed claims, effectively conceding their lack of merit. The Eleventh Circuit concludes that the district court did not clearly err in finding subjective bad faith.

4. Considering Litigation Conduct in Other Cases

To bolster its bad-faith finding, the district court looked beyond this case, citing Trump’s “pattern of misusing the courts” through other “frivolous lawsuits.” Trump and Habba challenged this approach.

The Eleventh Circuit affirms, citing Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2021), where it upheld sanctions in part because the plaintiffs had filed similar suits in other cases. The panel notes:

• There is no rule barring a court from considering a party’s broader litigation history when assessing bad faith in the case before it.
• Trump and Habba offered only a conclusory assertion that these other cases were brought for “different, good faith reasons,” without explaining why they were irrelevant or dissimilar.

This is an important affirmation that a party’s pattern of abusive litigation can be relevant to a court’s assessment of subjective bad faith and the need for deterrent sanctions.

5. The Fee Award and Forfeited Reasonableness Challenge

The district court undertook a detailed review of the fee submissions, considered Trump and Habba’s line-by-line objections, and modestly reduced some hours. On appeal, Trump and Habba argued for the first time that:

• It was unreasonable for defense counsel to bill similar amounts of time on motions to dismiss the original and amended complaints, given their similarity.

The Eleventh Circuit treats this argument as forfeited because it was not raised below, where Trump and Habba limited themselves to generic assertions that fees were “excessive,” supported by line-by-line objections but not by the specific comparative billings argument they advanced on appeal.

Consequently, the substantial inherent-power fee award stands. The opinion therefore sends a clear message: when courts find subjective bad faith in politically charged, massively over-pleaded cases, they are willing to uphold very large fee awards so long as the district court reasonably reviews the submissions and any objections are properly preserved.

F. Rule 11 Sanctions Against Counsel

1. Rule 11 Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 imposes an “affirmative duty” on attorneys to:

• Ensure that pleadings are not being presented for any improper purpose (e.g., to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase costs);
• Ensure that legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for changing the law; and
• Ensure that factual contentions have or are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for investigation.

A pleading is sanctionable under Rule 11 if it:

• Has no reasonable factual basis;
• Is based on a legal theory with no reasonable chance of success and no plausible argument for modifying existing law; or
• Is filed for an improper purpose.

Relevant Eleventh Circuit authorities include:

• Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998);
• Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001);
• Gulisano v. Burlington, Inc., 34 F.4th 935, 942 (11th Cir. 2022).

2. Application to Trump’s Counsel

The Rule 11 sanctions at issue were prompted primarily by Charles Dolan’s motion. Dolan had sent a pre-motion letter specifically warning Trump’s counsel of factual inaccuracies:

• He was incorrectly described as a former DNC chair;
• His alleged role in the conspiracy was unsupported;
• His alleged contacts with other defendants (beyond Danchenko) were fictitious.

Despite this notice, the amended complaint continued to contain materially false characterizations of Dolan and other unsupported assertions, suggesting either knowing falsity or reckless disregard.

The Eleventh Circuit affirms the district court’s conclusion that:

• Trump’s attorneys failed to conduct a reasonable factual inquiry before filing and maintaining the pleadings;
• Some legal theories were so facially untenable as to be objectively frivolous; and
• The overall pattern corroborated an improper purpose of political theater and harassment rather than legitimate vindication of rights.

Given the overlap between the inherent-power analysis and the Rule 11 analysis, the panel sees no abuse of discretion. The opinion underscores that the absence of subjective good faith (or even the presence of it) does not save counsel from Rule 11 sanctions if the objective standard is met: a “good faith belief” is not enough if the inquiry is unreasonably superficial.

G. Rule 60(b) Relief and the Durham Report

1. The Rule 60(b)(6) “Catchall” Standard

The appellants sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b), relying primarily on Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief for “any other reason that justifies relief.” The Supreme Court has repeatedly cabined this provision to “extraordinary circumstances.” The panel cites BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 145 S. Ct. 1612 (2025), for the proposition that only extraordinary circumstances can justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

The Durham Report was the linchpin of Trump’s and his attorneys’ motion: they argued that it confirmed aspects of their factual allegations and showed a federal investigation was ongoing during Trump’s presidency, which they claimed should retroactively support their equitable-tolling theory.

2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Rejection

The Eleventh Circuit upholds the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief:

• The Durham Report was not “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(2); its existence was long expected, and appellants did not identify any material fact in the Report that was previously unknown and could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered earlier.
• The fact that an investigation existed was already known and expressly referenced in Trump’s amended complaint. The Report’s publication did not change the legal analysis of tolling or merits.
• The mere public issuance of a government report is not, by itself, an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule 60(b)(6).

The court notes that the equitable-tolling argument remains fundamentally flawed regardless of any further confirmation of investigative activity: knowing that an investigation existed did not prevent Trump from filing; it simply influenced his political judgment not to sue while in office.

This portion of the opinion cautions litigants against overreading the legal effect of post-judgment public reports or investigations. Absent a clear, previously unavailable, and material factual revelation, such reports rarely warrant reopening a final judgment.

H. Judicial Disqualification and Jurisdiction During Appeal

1. Duty to Recuse and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)

Section 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding where his impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Trump first sought Judge Middlebrooks’s disqualification at the outset because he had been appointed by President Bill Clinton. That motion was denied, and Trump did not obtain relief from that ruling on appeal.

After the Durham Report and after the Eleventh Circuit had already stayed the appeal to permit a Rule 60(b) indicative ruling under Rule 62.1, Trump and his attorneys filed a second disqualification motion, asking that all future proceedings be reassigned.

2. Limits on District Court Jurisdiction During Appeal (Griggs and Rule 62.1)

Under Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), the filing of a notice of appeal generally divests the district court of jurisdiction over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Rule 62.1 carves out a narrow exception: when a timely Rule 60(b) motion is made during an appeal, the district court may:

• Defer consideration;
• Deny the motion; or
• State that it would grant the motion or that it raises a substantial question if the Court of Appeals remands.

Here, the Eleventh Circuit had remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to consider whether it would grant Rule 60(b) relief in light of the Durham Report. The panel holds that:

• The district court correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to decide a free-standing new disqualification motion or to direct that future proceedings be reassigned to another judge.
• Rule 62.1 authorizes only consideration of the Rule 60(b) motion; it does not open the door to unrelated relief such as reassignment or disqualification for all future proceedings.

Trump and his attorneys relied on the Tenth Circuit’s United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993), for the idea that the duty to recuse can continue after a proceeding. The panel distinguishes Cooley: that case addressed post-trial motions in a criminal case where the district court retained plenary jurisdiction, not a situation—like here—where the case is on appeal and the district court’s jurisdiction is tightly limited by Rule 62.1.

The Eleventh Circuit adds that although recusal under § 455 is waivable and not “jurisdictional” in the technical sense, jurisdictional “formalities” still apply: district courts cannot act on matters that the appeal has placed beyond their authority.

I. Appellate Sanctions Under Rule 38

Finally, Orbis and Dolan moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which permits a court of appeals to award “just damages and single or double costs” if an appeal is “frivolous.” An appeal is frivolous if it lacks an underlying factual basis or if appellants ignore binding law and rely on clearly frivolous arguments.

The Eleventh Circuit declines to impose sanctions, emphasizing:

• Trump did present at least some non-frivolous arguments on appeal—for example, forcing clarification that Orbis could not be dismissed with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction, and that the district court actually had personal jurisdiction over Dolan.
• The court is unwilling to grant Rule 38 sanctions “every time one or two arguments in an appeal might arguably be deemed frivolous,” citing McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 769 F.3d 535, 538 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014).

This reinforces a balanced approach: while the court strongly condemns frivolous and abusive claims, it reserves appellate sanctions for appeals that are frivolous in their entirety, not merely in part.

IV. Key Legal Concepts Explained (Simplified)

For readers less familiar with U.S. federal civil procedure, the following brief explanations may help contextualize the opinion.

1. RICO and Its Civil Statute of Limitations

• RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) allows civil suits for treble damages when a person is injured by a “pattern” of certain specified crimes (predicate acts) committed through an “enterprise.”
• Civil RICO claims must be filed within four years of when the plaintiff discovers (or should discover) the injury, not necessarily when the wrongful acts first occurred.
• The Eleventh Circuit here says that Trump waited too long, and neither statutory tolling (via a related government antitrust-like case) nor equitable tolling (via extraordinary circumstances) applied.

2. Statutory vs. Equitable Tolling

• Statutory tolling is when Congress writes into a statute that the limitations period pauses under specified conditions (e.g., while the government pursues certain enforcement actions).
• Equitable tolling is a judge-made doctrine used sparingly when, despite diligent efforts, forces outside the plaintiff’s control prevent timely filing (e.g., fraudulent concealment of the claim).
• The Eleventh Circuit held that other proceedings (like the Sussmann and Danchenko prosecutions) did not qualify for statutory tolling and that Trump’s presidency did not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” outside his control.

3. Shotgun Pleadings

• A shotgun pleading is an overly long, confusing complaint that lumps together vast numbers of allegations and incorporates them wholesale into every count.
• This makes it hard for the court and defendants to figure out which specific facts support which specific legal claims.
• Courts in the Eleventh Circuit disfavor this practice and routinely dismiss shotgun complaints; in particularly egregious cases, they may also treat it as evidence of bad faith.

4. Inherent Powers vs. Rule 11 Sanctions

• Rule 11 is a codified rule requiring reasonable legal and factual inquiry before filing papers in court. Violations can lead to sanctions (e.g., fines, fee awards).
• Inherent powers are broader, judge-made powers to protect the integrity of the judicial process, including sanctioning bad-faith conduct that might not fit neatly under Rule 11 or other rules.
• Inherent-power sanctions require a finding of subjective bad faith. Rule 11 generally uses an objective reasonableness standard.

5. Rule 60(b) and Finality of Judgments

• Rule 60(b) allows a losing party, after judgment, to ask the court to reopen the case under limited circumstances (e.g., newly discovered evidence, fraud, or extraordinary circumstances).
• Courts are reluctant to disturb final judgments. The “catchall” provision, Rule 60(b)(6), is reserved for truly exceptional cases.
• The Eleventh Circuit found the Durham Report neither newly discovered evidence nor an extraordinary circumstance warranting reopening.

6. Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process

• Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to bind a particular defendant. It typically requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum (state or country) and that service of process be proper.
• RICO’s nationwide service provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d), allows service anywhere in the United States, and thus personal jurisdiction nationwide—but not abroad.
• Because Orbis was served in England, it fell outside § 1965(d); the court thus lacked personal jurisdiction and dismissed without prejudice.

7. Recusal and Rule 62.1

• Recusal (or disqualification) occurs when a judge steps aside because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
• Once a judgment is appealed, the district court generally loses authority over the case, except for narrow matters specifically allowed.
• Rule 62.1 lets a district court indicate whether it would grant a Rule 60(b) motion if the court of appeals remands—but does not empower the court to address broader issues (like disqualification for future proceedings) beyond that limited purpose.

8. Rule 38 Appellate Sanctions

• Rule 38 allows a court of appeals to penalize a party who brings a wholly frivolous appeal.
• The Eleventh Circuit here declined to impose sanctions, emphasizing that not every appeal containing some frivolous arguments is itself frivolous overall.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

1. No “Presidential Tolling” as a General Principle

The most broadly consequential doctrinal statement in this opinion is the explicit refusal to recognize any de facto “presidential tolling” of civil statutes of limitations. By anchoring its analysis in Clinton v. Jones, the Eleventh Circuit articulates a symmetrical principle:

• If presidents can be sued in their personal capacity during their terms, they can also be expected to sue to enforce their own rights within ordinary limitations periods.
• Strategic or political choices not to file suit—however understandable—are not “extraordinary circumstances” that justify equitable tolling.

Future litigants—presidential or otherwise—are thus warned that duties of office, high-profile investigations, or political optics will rarely, if ever, suffice to suspend filing deadlines in the Eleventh Circuit.

2. Reinforcement of Sanctions Against Politicized, Abusive Litigation

The opinion strongly endorses robust sanctions in high-profile political cases that misuse the courts as platforms for narrative-building rather than for legitimate legal redress. Key takeaways:

• Shotgun pleadings are not just a technical violation; they can be probative of bad faith, especially when layered atop frivolous claims and false factual assertions.
• Patterns of litigation abuse—even from other cases—may justify significant fee awards under inherent powers.
• Attorneys are personally at risk when they continue to advance allegations after being specifically put on notice of factual inaccuracies (as with Dolan’s warning letter).

For the bar, the case is a cautionary tale: representing a controversial or politically powerful client does not dilute professional obligations under Rule 11 or the court’s inherent powers; if anything, it raises the stakes.

3. Clarification of RICO Tolling and Jurisdictional Standards

Although the court avoids resolving whether the Clayton Act tolling provision applies to RICO, it:

• Confirms a strict view of what qualifies as a sufficiently related federal proceeding for tolling: antitrust-like or RICO-like prosecutions alleging substantially the same conspiracy, not just any investigation touching related facts.
• Reaffirms that a RICO claim must be more than “wholly insubstantial” to support nationwide personal jurisdiction under § 1965(d), even if the claim ultimately fails on limitations or merits grounds.
• Clarifies that RICO’s nationwide service does not extend overseas, emphasizing territorial limits and reinforcing the need for proper service.

4. Procedure During Appeals: Limited Remand and Recusal

The decision draws a firm procedural line around what district courts may do when an appeal is pending:

• Rule 62.1’s limited remand is exactly that—limited. It does not authorize the district court to entertain broader disqualification or reassignment motions beyond the scope of the Rule 60(b) issue remanded.
• Parties hoping to disqualify a judge after notice of appeal must do so through mechanisms that respect appellate jurisdiction, not by attempting to bootstrap recusal requests onto narrow limited remands.

5. Finality and “New” Government Reports

By refusing to treat the Durham Report as grounds for Rule 60(b) relief, the Eleventh Circuit signals skepticism toward efforts to reopen finalized civil judgments based on subsequent investigative reports or public documents that largely confirm what was already known. This promotes finality and discourages serial relitigation based on evolving public narratives.

VI. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Donald J. Trump v. Hillary R. Clinton is a comprehensive rejection of a far-reaching, politically charged civil suit and a strong endorsement of court authority to police abusive litigation.

On the merits, the court holds that Trump’s RICO claims were untimely and not rescued by statutory or equitable tolling; his state-law claims were either forfeited on appeal or fatally defective under Florida law. Procedurally, the court corrects a narrow jurisdictional misstep (as to Orbis) but otherwise affirms the district court’s handling of personal jurisdiction, sanctions, and post-judgment motions.

Most notably, the decision:

• Rejects any notion of a special limitations regime for sitting presidents;
• Affirms that courts may impose substantial sanctions—including large fee awards—when a litigant and his lawyers file shotgun, politically motivated, and frivolous complaints in bad faith;
• Clarifies the limited function of Rule 62.1 indicative rulings during appeal and the constraints on district court action while jurisdiction lies with the court of appeals; and
• Reiterates that appellate sanctions under Rule 38 are reserved for wholly frivolous appeals, not merely for appeals that contain some frivolous arguments.

In the broader legal landscape, the case underscores that even in the most politically sensitive disputes, ordinary procedural rules, professional responsibilities, and jurisdictional limits apply with full force. Courts will not relax statutes of limitations for presidents, nor will they tolerate the use of judicial processes primarily as tools of political messaging. The opinion thus stands as a significant precedent on presidential litigants, civil RICO timing, sanctions doctrine, and the disciplined management of complex, high-profile litigation.