True‑but‑Selective Reports, Honest Belief, and Cat’s Paw Liability in ADA Retaliation: Commentary on Monica Gray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

I. Introduction

This published Sixth Circuit decision substantially refines how ADA retaliation claims may proceed where a biased supervisor initiates discipline that is formally decided by neutral higher‑ups. The court holds that:

Helping a coworker obtain or preserve an ADA accommodation is protected activity under the ADA’s anti‑retaliation provision and its Ohio analogue.
A plaintiff may proceed under a cat’s paw (vicarious liability) theory even when:
- the ultimate decisionmakers are unbiased, and
- the employer’s internal investigation confirms real rule violations.
The “honest belief” doctrine does not insulate an employer from liability where the adverse action flows from a biased supervisor’s true but selective report that singled the plaintiff out from similarly situated coworkers.
An independent investigation breaks the chain of causation only if it uncovers a superseding, unrelated reason for the adverse action, not merely additional instances of the same kind of misconduct the biased supervisor set in motion.
For cat’s paw temporal proximity, courts look to the biased actor’s first opportunity to retaliate, not merely the timing of the formal termination.

The majority (Judge Bloomekatz, joined by Judge Gilman) reverses summary judgment for State Farm and remands. Judge Readler dissents at length, and later adds an addendum after panel rehearing, sharply contesting both the procedural legitimacy and the doctrinal correctness of the majority’s approach.

II. Background of the Case

A. Parties and Workplace Setting

Plaintiff: Monica Gray, a 15‑year State Farm employee working as a claim specialist, supervised by Chris Martin.
Colleague: Sonya Mauter, a long‑term employee supervised by Joe Kyle, with an ADA accommodation exempting her from overtime.
Defendants:
- State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (employer), and
- Joe Kyle (Mauter’s supervisor, alleged retaliator and key “biased subordinate”).

B. The ADA Accommodation Dispute

In August 2017, Kyle informed Mauter that her no‑overtime accommodation would no longer be honored. He:

placed her on leave unless she agreed to work overtime,
threatened eventual termination if she refused, and
told her (incorrectly) she had no remaining FMLA leave.

Mauter turned to Gray for help. Gray:

researched ADA law and State Farm policies;
contacted HR for information;
lodged an internal complaint against Kyle;
coached Mauter on self‑advocacy; and
advised Mauter to retain counsel and file an EEOC charge (which she did).

Mauter repeatedly told Kyle that Gray was assisting her. Kyle then intensified his scrutiny of Mauter, warning her against discussing accommodations and threatening discipline “up to and including termination.” State Farm investigated Mauter’s retaliation allegations and ultimately moved her to a different team.

C. Timekeeping Practices and Kyle’s Scrutiny of Gray

In November 2017, Chris Martin (Gray’s supervisor) went on vacation. Joe Kyle, whose own managerial style was stricter, temporarily covered Martin’s team.

State Farm had written timekeeping rules requiring:

adherence to scheduled shifts and prescribed meal periods;
recording time to the minute; and
immediate reporting of any timekeeping violations.

Martin, however, was “relaxed” about timecards. He:

did not monitor or verify time sheets, and
tolerated or at least did not question rounding practices by some team members.

While covering for Martin, Kyle meticulously reviewed Gray’s timesheets against her computer usage data and identified three instances where she reported working time but was logged off her computer.

Kyle:

reported these discrepancies to his and Martin’s supervisor, Denise Hensley;
was instructed (per policy) to notify HR;
told HR that Gray had manually adjusted her time to hide long lunches/early departures;
falsely asserted she had been coached before for similar conduct; and
suggested an expanded investigation would find more discrepancies.

HR representative Geri Keeling, after a joint meeting with Kyle, Martin, and Hensley, launched an investigation into Gray’s timekeeping. By reviewing timesheets, computer activity, and building entry records, she identified additional discrepancies, including seven instances where Gray reported returning from lunch before her badge reflected re‑entry into the building.

D. Gray’s Response and Termination

Keeling and Martin interviewed Gray, who:

denied wrongdoing,
asserted that Kyle was targeting her for assisting Mauter with ADA rights,
pointed out the suspicious timing, and
asked whether other employees’ timesheets were being audited.

Keeling relayed Gray’s retaliation allegation to Hensley. No one at State Farm investigated whether Kyle’s report was itself retaliatory or whether other employees were treated similarly.

Within approximately a week:

Martin and Hensley recommended termination to upper management, and
unaware of that recommendation, Gray filed an EEOC retaliation charge.

Shortly thereafter, State Farm terminated Gray for “falsifying” timecards.

E. Litigation and District Court Ruling

Gray sued State Farm and Kyle for retaliation under:

the ADA’s anti‑retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and
Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02 (Ohio’s employment‑discrimination statute).

She alleged Kyle singled her out for conduct common within the agency because she had supported Mauter’s ADA efforts. State Farm moved for summary judgment, asserting:

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason: timecard falsification, and
protection under the honest belief doctrine: it honestly believed Gray had engaged in misconduct based on its investigation.

The district court accepted State Farm’s position and granted summary judgment, holding Gray could not show pretext. Gray appealed.

III. Summary of the Sixth Circuit’s Amended Opinion

A. Standard of Review and Framework

Reviewing summary judgment de novo, the Sixth Circuit applied the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework because Gray relied on circumstantial evidence:

Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Employer must articulate a legitimate, non‑retaliatory reason for the adverse action.
Plaintiff must show that reason is pretext for retaliation.

The court emphasized two parallel liability theories:

Direct liability: focusing on the motives of the ultimate decisionmakers (e.g., Martin, Hensley, upper management).
Vicarious (cat’s paw) liability: where a neutral decisionmaker acts based on input from a biased subordinate (here, Kyle), the focus shifts to the subordinate’s motives and causal role.

B. Prima Facie Case

The court found that Gray raised triable issues on all elements:

Protected activity: Helping a coworker secure an ADA accommodation (researching the law, contacting HR, filing internal complaints, encouraging EEOC filing) is protected opposition/assistance activity.
Employer knowledge: Evidence that:
- Mauter told Kyle and Hensley that Gray was assisting her;
- Gray told Keeling and Martin that she believed Kyle was retaliating against her.
Adverse action: Termination is indisputably adverse.
Causation (prima facie stage):
- For direct liability: increased scrutiny followed by termination shortly after the protected activity can show causation.
- For cat’s paw: the relevant timing is when Kyle had his first opportunity to retaliate (when he temporarily supervised Gray in November 2017); he immediately scrutinized and reported her timekeeping. That proximity sufficed at the prima facie stage.

C. Pretext and Direct Liability

State Farm’s proffered reason—timecard falsification—was deemed legitimate and non‑retaliatory. As to direct liability:

The record showed multiple discrepancies between Gray’s time entries and her computer and badge records.
Gray could not offer concrete explanations during the HR interview.
Even if Gray had plausible exculpatory explanations (helping colleagues, phone calls, etc.), the records reasonably pointed toward falsification.

The majority held that Gray failed to create a genuine dispute that State Farm itself acted pretextually; its honest belief based on the investigation sufficed for direct‑liability purposes. That portion of her case “fails at this stage.”

D. Pretext and Cat’s Paw (Kyle‑Focused) Theory

For vicarious liability, the focus shifts to Kyle’s motives and consistency. The majority reasoned:

Even if Kyle honestly believed Gray’s entries showed violations, a biased supervisor can still be liable if he uses a legal, legitimate reason as cover for retaliation, especially by selectively enforcing rules.
Gray presented evidence that:
- Another claims specialist on Martin’s team, Diane Parker, had similar discrepancies—manual entries ending lunch at a time inconsistent with the start of her computer activity; and
- Kyle knew about Parker’s discrepancies yet treated them as mere “performance” issues and “coached” her informally, while treating Gray’s same‑type conduct as an “integrity” issue warranting HR referral.
Other employees clocked in, then socialized or visited the cafeteria while being paid, yet were not reported or disciplined for “falsification.” State Farm’s written policy treated “inaccurately report[ing] time” and “falsify[ing] a timesheet” as violations without a built‑in severity distinction.

Thus, a jury could infer that:

Kyle singled out Gray for otherwise common or comparable behavior; and
His proffered reason (integrity concern over timekeeping) was pretext masking retaliation for her ADA‑related assistance to Mauter.

The majority accordingly found a genuine dispute as to whether Kyle’s stated reason was pretextual, satisfying the “biased subordinate” component of cat’s paw liability.

E. Causal Nexus and Proximate Cause

Because Kyle was not a decisionmaker in Gray’s termination, the majority applied Staub v. Proctor Hospital to require:

A biased supervisor’s act intended to cause an adverse employment action; and
That act was a proximate cause of the ultimate adverse decision.

On proximate cause, the majority held:

Proximate cause requires “some direct relation” between Kyle’s biased action (the selective report) and Gray’s termination; it need not be the sole cause.
Kyle’s report triggered the HR investigation; absent his report, State Farm admitted it would not have scrutinized Gray’s time records.
The investigation found additional instances of the same type of misconduct (alleged over‑reporting of working time), including out‑of‑building discrepancies. State Farm claimed it fired Gray based on these “more serious” badge‑entry discrepancies.
However, Kyle had:
- flagged Gray for “manually changing” time, and
- told HR there were likely more problems to find.
The investigation “did nothing more than confirm” and expand upon the exact kind of problem Kyle reported, rather than uncovering a wholly independent cause (e.g., embezzlement, criminality) unrelated to timekeeping.

The majority emphasized:

“An employer can still negate causation by establishing that the employer’s investigation resulted in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action… a superseding ‘cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.’”

Here, because:

Kyle specifically predicted further time problems;
the entire investigation remained confined to Gray’s timekeeping; and
the termination recommendation itself referenced “over‑reported time” without distinguishing in‑building versus out‑of‑building discrepancies,

the majority held that:

a jury could reasonably find Kyle’s report to be a proximate cause of Gray’s termination, and
State Farm’s investigation did not introduce a superseding, unrelated cause as a matter of law.

F. But‑For Causation Under the ADA

The ADA retaliation standard requires but‑for causation. State Farm argued that because the investigation uncovered additional discrepancies that independently justified termination, Kyle’s report could not be a but‑for cause.

The majority rejected this narrow view:

State Farm conceded that Martin never previously scrutinized his team’s time entries.
It also admitted that it only investigated Gray because Kyle reported her.

In the majority’s view, a reasonable jury could find that:

“but for” Kyle’s biased report, Gray would not have been investigated,
and consequently would not have been fired.

Therefore, both proximate cause and but‑for causation requirements were satisfied for purposes of surviving summary judgment.

G. Disposition

The court:

Affirmed summary judgment on Gray’s direct liability theory (insufficient evidence of pretext by the ultimate decisionmakers themselves), but
Reversed summary judgment on the cat’s paw (vicarious liability) theory and remanded for further proceedings.

IV. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Key Precedents and How They Are Used

1. Staub v. Proctor Hospital (U.S. Supreme Court)

Staub is the foundational cat’s paw case. It held that an employer can be liable under USERRA where:

a supervisor performs an act motivated by animus,
intended to cause an adverse employment action, and
that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate decision.

Key aspects adopted and elaborated in Gray:

Proximate cause requires only “some direct relation” between the biased act and the adverse outcome.
There can be multiple proximate causes; the biased subordinate need not be the sole driver.
An employer’s independent investigation can break the causal chain only if it results in an adverse action “for reasons unrelated to” the biased action—i.e., it uncovers a superseding cause of independent origin not foreseeable from the subordinate’s conduct.

The majority reads Staub to reject any automatic safe harbor where an employer simply confirms the truth of a biased report. That reading drives the conclusion that confirming further timekeeping errors does not, without more, absolve State Farm.

2. Sixth Circuit Cat’s Paw Cases: Marshall, Madden, Chattman

Marshall v. Rawlings Co. LLC:
- Emphasized that cat’s paw liability is an application of agency principles.
- Clarified that an employer can sometimes break the chain through an “in‑depth and truly independent investigation.”
- But also stressed that the honest belief doctrine does not defeat a cat’s paw theory where a biased subordinate uses true but selectively presented facts to trigger discipline.
Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dep’t:
- Supervisor reported an employee for setting off firecrackers but ignored identical misconduct by others.
- Higher‑ups investigated and confirmed the reported misconduct; still, the court found potential liability because the report was selectively targeted.
- Used as a model for the idea of a “true yet selective” report being a vehicle for discrimination or retaliation.
Chattman v. Toho Tenax America, Inc.:
- Biased supervisor reported a single incident of horseplay; investigation confirmed the facts.
- Employer still potentially liable because management could have served as a conduit for the supervisor’s bias by reacting only to his selective report.

The majority uses these cases to show that:

a biased supervisor need not lie; selecting which true violations to report can itself be discriminatory; and
an internal investigation that merely confirms those selectively presented facts does not automatically break causation.

3. Romans v. Michigan Department of Human Services and the Addendum Debate

Although not detailed in the majority text provided, Romans is central to Judge Readler’s dissent and addendum:

Romans applied Staub and found no cat’s paw liability where:
- an independent decisionmaker investigated beyond a biased tip,
- discovered multiple work rule violations, only one of which related to the biased report, and
- each violation would “individually support” termination.
The dissent views Romans as establishing a circuit rule: when a truly independent investigation finds additional, sufficient grounds for termination, the biased report is not the proximate cause.
The majority limits Romans to its facts, treating it as a particular application of Staub where the later‑discovered rule violations were deemed “unrelated” to the biased report.

The addendum underscores an ongoing intra‑circuit tension: how broadly or narrowly Romans should be read in cat’s paw cases involving independent investigations.

4. Honest Belief Doctrine Cases

Several cases frame the honest belief doctrine, including Miles v. Southern Central Human Resources Agency, Michael v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corp., and Chen v. Dow Chemical Co. (all cited in the opinion).

Core principle:

Even if an investigation reaches an incorrect conclusion about what happened, an employer is not liable for discrimination/retaliation if it honestly believed the proffered reason for its decision, based on reasonable reliance on particularized facts known at the time.

The majority:

applies honest belief to uphold State Farm’s direct‑liability defense (precluding a jury from second‑guessing the decisionmakers’ good‑faith assessment of the evidence), but
declines to extend the doctrine to bar cat’s paw liability where a biased subordinate uses true but selective reporting to instigate the process.

5. Temporal Proximity and Heightened Scrutiny Cases

Cases like Hamilton v. General Electric Co., Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., and EEOC v. New Breed Logistics recognize that:

Retaliation often manifests as heightened scrutiny post‑protected activity,
followed by discipline based on violations not previously enforced or monitored.

The majority analogizes Gray’s experience—no timesheet review under Martin for years, followed by immediate and intensive review under Kyle shortly after her advocacy for Mauter—to these patterns of retaliatory scrutiny.

B. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning in Depth

1. Protected Activity: Assisting a Coworker’s ADA Rights

The court straightforwardly holds that Gray’s actions in supporting Mauter’s accommodation efforts constitute ADA‑protected activity:

The ADA protects employees who “oppose” disability discrimination or who “assist” others in asserting their ADA rights.
Gray’s research, internal complaint, HR inquiries, and advice to pursue legal and EEOC remedies all fall comfortably within that zone.

This reinforces and extends prior Sixth Circuit recognition (e.g., Rorrer v. City of Stow) that advocacy on behalf of others can be protected, not just self‑advocacy.

2. Causation at the Prima Facie Stage

The prima facie causation burden is “minimal.” The majority finds it satisfied by two main threads:

Temporal proximity and new scrutiny:
- Gray was subjected to unprecedented scrutiny of her timekeeping shortly after assisting Mauter.
- Under prior cases, the sequence “protected activity → sudden intensified scrutiny → discipline” can support an inference of causation at this stage.
First opportunity to retaliate in a cat’s paw context:
- Kyle’s window to retaliate opened when he temporarily supervised Gray.
- He promptly reviewed her time entries, found discrepancies, and reported her to HR without consulting Martin.
- This “first opportunity” sequencing is particularly important in cat’s paw analyses (Kirilenko‑Ison is cited on this timing approach).

3. Pretext via Differential Scrutiny and Comparator Evidence

For Kyle’s actions, the court emphasizes that “pretext is about causation”: whether the proffered reason actually motivated the challenged action.

Key evidence:

Parker as comparator:
- Parker’s time records, carefully bullet‑pointed in Gray’s opposition, show discrepancies of similar magnitude (15–16 minutes) between manual lunch‑end entries and computer log‑ins:
- Both Gray and Parker frequently “adjusted” their lunch times to fall at or just under the maximum permitted break length.
- Kyle knew of Parker’s discrepancies during the same review period yet:
  - characterized her issue as a “performance” problem, subject to coaching; while
  - cast Gray’s comparable conduct as a serious “integrity” problem, worthy of HR investigation.
Broader culture of lax timekeeping:
- Gray alleged, and State Farm acknowledged to some degree, that employees sometimes clocked in but then socialized or went to the cafeteria.
- State Farm treated many such incidents as minor performance issues, not falsification or integrity failures.
Policy language:
- The written policy groups “inaccurate time reporting” and “falsification” under the same heading; it does not embed the sharp severity distinction that Kyle and State Farm retroactively asserted.

From these facts, a reasonable jury could find that:

Kyle selectively escalated Gray’s conduct to HR while treating others more leniently,
this selectivity correlated with Gray’s protected activity, and
his “integrity” rationale was therefore pretextual.

4. Honest Belief Doctrine and Its Limits

The majority draws a clear line:

As to State Farm’s decisionmakers, the honest belief doctrine applies:
- They had an investigation, documentary records, and Gray’s weak explanations.
- No reasonable jury could find they did not honestly believe she violated the timekeeping rules.
- Hence direct‑liability pretext fails.
As to Kyle, honest belief does not immunize him because:
- The question is not whether he correctly perceived discrepancies but whether his choice to report Gray (rather than others) was driven by retaliation.
- A biased supervisor can hold an honest belief about facts yet selectively deploy that belief against a particular employee.

This distinction is a key doctrinal clarification: honest belief is a shield for neutral decisionmakers’ state of mind, but it does not foreclose cat’s paw liability based on a biased subordinate’s selective initiation of the process.

5. Proximate Cause and Independent Investigations

The majority frames proximate cause in line with Staub:

Multiple causes can coexist; the biased report need not be the only reason for termination.
The causal chain remains intact unless:
- the independent investigation results in a decision on grounds “unrelated” to the biased act, or
- a superseding cause of independent origin—unforeseeable from the biased act—intervenes.

Applied here:

Kyle’s report concerned Gray’s manual edits and their inconsistency with computer usage.
He suggested there were more such issues to find.
The investigation discovered additional time‑entry discrepancies of the same kind (over‑reporting work), plus the “out‑of‑building” fact pattern.
The termination recommendation itself did not distinctly rely on the “out‑of‑building” aspect; it characterized the problem broadly as “over‑reported time worked.”

The majority concludes that:

The “out‑of‑building versus in‑building” distinction raised by State Farm may be persuasive to a jury, but it is not so dispositive that it breaks the causal chain as a matter of law.
Given Kyle’s own suggestion that further investigation would reveal more timekeeping errors, it was reasonably foreseeable that HR would uncover the very kinds of discrepancies that became the formal basis for termination.

Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that the investigation did not introduce a superseding, unrelated reason for firing Gray; rather, it extended the very concern Kyle set in motion.

C. The Dissent’s Perspective

1. Party‑Presentation and Procedural Objections

Judge Readler devotes substantial effort to a party‑presentation critique:

He contends Gray never clearly advanced a cat’s paw / vicarious‑liability theory as her primary claim.
In his reading:
- Gray’s briefs framed the case as one of direct liability by State Farm, focusing on its own motives in firing her.
- References to cat’s paw theory appeared only late in briefing, and only as a rebuttal to State Farm’s honest‑belief argument.
He criticizes the majority for “rewriting” Gray’s case, elevating an “afterthought” into the central theory of liability, contrary to the adversarial system.
He emphasizes that:
- State Farm was not on fair notice that it needed to defend a full‑blown cat’s paw claim, and
- the district court (Judge Marbley) understandably addressed only State Farm’s motives, not Kyle’s.

On this view, the majority’s decision:

unfairly prejudices State Farm,
disrespects the district court’s efforts, and
contravenes settled rules about forfeiture and issue‑preservation on appeal.

2. Merits: Pretext and Comparator Analysis

On substance, the dissent argues that even on a reframed cat’s paw theory:

Gray’s pretext evidence is insufficient:
- He views the timesheet/badge evidence as showing a “calculated pattern” of fraudulent entries—eight occasions where Gray claimed to have returned from lunch while not even badged into the building, almost always at 49 or 50 minutes.
- He contends no reasonable juror could see this as anything but deliberate deception.
Comparator evidence fails:
- Gray failed to prove that Parker or others were outside Gray’s “protected class” (employees engaging in ADA‑protected activity), a requirement the dissent sees as necessary for comparator use in this context.
- The dissent also emphasizes that Parker did not:
  - claim to be working while outside the building, or
  - systematically report exactly‑49/50 minute breaks to avoid discipline.
Accordingly, Parker’s conduct is too dissimilar, and the claimed “differential scrutiny” is not probative of pretext.

3. Causation and Romans

The dissent takes the position that:

Romans and other precedents require summary judgment for State Farm where:
- a neutral decisionmaker independently investigates,
- uncovers additional violations separate from the biased report, and
- those violations themselves fully justify termination.
Because:
- State Farm’s HR uncovered eight more time‑entry violations, many involving out‑of‑building discrepancies that Kyle could not have known about, and
- the decisionmakers relied on this stronger integrity concern (lying about being present at work),
the causal chain between Kyle’s initial report and the termination was broken as a matter of law.

In the dissent’s view, the majority misapplies Staub by:

over‑emphasizing foreseeability and the “true but selective report” concept,
implicitly collapsing proximate cause into a lenient but‑for standard (“set in motion” liability), and
effectively neutering the protective role of independent investigations recognized in Romans and similar cases.

4. Additional Cat’s Paw Elements (Supervisor Status and Specific Intent)

In his later addendum, Judge Readler notes further unresolved issues:

Whether Kyle qualifies as a “supervisor” for cat’s paw purposes (under Vance v. Ball State University–style definitions), given his lack of direct authority over Gray’s hiring/firing.
Whether Gray has shown Kyle’s specific intent to cause her termination, as distinct from merely reporting concerns to his superior and HR.

These points underscore the dissent’s view that, even if cat’s paw were squarely presented, the record is insufficient under a strict reading of Staub.

D. Net Doctrinal Takeaways

Despite the dissent’s concerns, the majority’s holdings are binding circuit law unless and until abrogated by the en banc court or Supreme Court. Key doctrinal points include:

Protected ADA activity includes robust, behind‑the‑scenes advocacy for a coworker’s accommodation.
Cat’s paw retaliation claims are viable even where:
- the biased actor is not part of the final decision;
- the report is factually accurate; and
- the employer conducts an investigation that confirms additional violations of the same type.
Honest belief doctrine remains potent for direct‑liability claims but does not bar cat’s paw theories resting on selective enforcement.
Independent investigations:
- do not automatically break proximate cause;
- rebut cat’s paw liability only when they uncover a superseding, “unrelated” reason for discipline.
Comparator & differential scrutiny evidence can show pretext where a biased subordinate escalates only the plaintiff’s violations to HR while treating similar conduct by others informally.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Employers and HR Professionals

Selective enforcement risk:
- Supervisors cannot safely decide whose violations to report and whose to handle informally if their choices are tainted by retaliatory or discriminatory motives.
- Employers must be alert to patterns where one employee is singled out for aggressive enforcement while others receive coaching for similar behavior.
Design of internal investigations:
- An investigation that simply confirms the facts flagged by a potentially biased supervisor will not, by itself, shield the employer.
- To break the causal chain, the investigation should:
  - probe beyond the subordinate’s narrative;
  - consider whether others engaged in similar conduct; and
  - explicitly evaluate and document any retaliation/discrimination allegations raised during the process.
Responding to retaliation complaints raised during discipline:
- Gray complained during the HR interview that she was being targeted for helping with an ADA accommodation.
- State Farm’s failure to evaluate that allegation separately became an important fact supporting cat’s paw causation.
- Best practice: open a parallel, documented retaliation inquiry when such allegations are made.
Supervisor training:
- Train supervisors that:
  - Assisting or advising colleagues about accommodations and EEOC filings is protected.
  - Retaliation includes heightened scrutiny, selective reporting, or disproportionate discipline following such activity.

B. For Employees and Plaintiffs’ Counsel

Documenting advocacy:
- Helping coworkers with disability accommodations now has strong recognition as protected activity; plaintiffs should document these efforts and who knew about them.
Building cat’s paw evidence:
- Focus discovery on:
  - which employees engaged in similar rule‑violating conduct;
  - how their cases were handled (coaching vs. formal discipline vs. no action);
  - what the allegedly biased supervisor knew and when; and
  - whether the employer seriously probed any retaliation allegations raised during the internal process.
- Identify and highlight “true but selective” patterns of reporting.
Overcoming honest belief:
- Gray shows that even where the employer’s belief in misconduct is genuinely held, plaintiffs can still prevail under a cat’s paw theory by:
  - shifting focus to the subordinate’s selectivity and motive, and
  - showing the investigation did not truly purge the taint of the biased report.

C. For Courts and Litigators: Presentation Matters

The opinion and dissent collectively signal:

Litigants must be explicit about whether they are advancing:
- direct liability,
- cat’s paw vicarious liability, or
- both, and how each theory fits into McDonnell Douglas and proximate/but‑for causation analysis.
Future panels may scrutinize whether cat’s paw theories were fully preserved below, especially in light of the dissent’s strong party‑presentation critique.

As a practical matter, counsel in the Sixth Circuit should:

plead and brief cat’s paw claims explicitly, listing:
- biased supervisor status;
- act(s) taken,
- retaliatory motive,
- specific intent to cause an adverse action; and
- proximate and but‑for causation;
build record evidence around each element to survive summary judgment.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. ADA Retaliation vs. Discrimination

Discrimination: Adverse action because of an employee’s disability (e.g., denying a reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee).
Retaliation: Adverse action because an employee engaged in protected activity related to ADA rights (complaining, filing charges, assisting others).

Gray’s case is about retaliation, not direct disability discrimination against her.

B. McDonnell Douglas Burden‑Shifting

Prima facie case: Employee shows basic elements (protected activity, employer knowledge, adverse action, causal link).
Employer’s reason: Employer articulates a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason (e.g., timecard falsification).
Pretext: Employee must show that reason is not the real reason, but a cover for retaliation (e.g., by proving it:
- has no factual basis;
- did not actually motivate the decision; or
- was insufficient to motivate the decision when compared to how others were treated.

C. Honest Belief Doctrine

Even if an employer’s conclusion about an employee’s misconduct is mistaken, it is not liable if:

it honestly believed the employee did what it accuses them of, based on
reasonable reliance on specific facts gathered in an investigation.

Courts do not sit as “super‑personnel departments” re‑trying whether misconduct really occurred; they look at the employer’s state of mind and process.

D. Cat’s Paw / Vicarious Liability

“Cat’s paw” liability arises where:

a lower‑level supervisor harbors discriminatory/retaliatory bias;
that supervisor takes an action (such as reporting alleged misconduct) intended to cause an adverse action; and
a neutral decisionmaker relies, at least in part, on this biased input in deciding to discipline or fire the employee.

Under Staub and Gray, the employer can be held liable if the biased supervisor’s act is a proximate cause and a but‑for cause of the adverse employment action, even if:

the formal decisionmaker does not share the bias, and
the report’s allegations are factually accurate.

E. Proximate Cause, Superseding Cause, and Foreseeability

Proximate cause: A legal concept that limits liability to injuries that have a sufficiently direct relationship to the defendant’s conduct.
Superseding cause: An independent event that breaks the causal chain; it must be of independent origin and not reasonably foreseeable from the prior act.

In cat’s paw cases:

A biased supervisor’s report is a proximate cause if there is a “direct relation” between that report and the ultimate firing.
An employer’s investigation can be a superseding cause only if it results in termination for reasons unrelated to what the biased supervisor set in motion (e.g., uncovering a completely different, unforeseeable kind of serious misconduct).

F. Comparator Evidence and Differential Treatment

Plaintiffs often show pretext by pointing to comparators—employees similarly situated in all relevant respects:

same supervisor or decisionmaker;
similar job duties and performance history; and
similar misconduct or rule violations.

If the employer treats the plaintiff more harshly than comparators, that disparity can support an inference that the plaintiff’s protected activity (not the stated reason) drove the decision.

VII. Conclusion

Monica Gray v. State Farm significantly elaborates the contours of ADA retaliation and cat’s paw liability in the Sixth Circuit. The decision:

confirms that vigorous assistance to a coworker in securing ADA accommodations is fully protected activity;
clarifies that an honest belief and an internal investigation do not automatically insulate employers where a biased supervisor’s selective report triggered the process; and
strengthens employees’ ability to prove pretext through evidence of differential scrutiny and selective enforcement of rules.

At the same time, the lengthy dissent highlights deep concerns about adherence to the party‑presentation principle and the role of independent investigations in cabining cat’s paw liability. The resulting opinions collectively mark Gray as a pivotal, and likely often‑cited, case in Sixth Circuit employment law:

for employers, a caution to treat internal retaliation allegations and comparator evidence with heightened care during investigations; and
for employees, a roadmap to framing and proving cat’s paw retaliation claims when biased supervisors selectively weaponize workplace rules.

Going forward, litigants and courts in the Sixth Circuit will need to navigate the tension between Gray and Romans regarding the effect of independent investigations, but the core principle emerging from this case is clear: truthful but selectively deployed accusations can still be the vehicle of unlawful retaliation, and internal reviews that simply confirm those accusations cannot automatically erase the subordinate’s bias from the causal story.