Trotter v. Loden: No Constitutional Right to Vacatur Before a Miller-Compliant Juvenile LWOP Hearing

Trotter v. Loden: No Constitutional Right to Vacatur Before a Miller-Compliant Juvenile LWOP Hearing

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in Trotter v. Loden, No. 24‑60456 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025), addresses how states may remedy unconstitutional mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences imposed on juvenile offenders after the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Miller v. Alabama. The case sits at the intersection of three major strands of doctrine:

  • the Supreme Court’s evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on juvenile sentencing (Miller, Montgomery, Jones v. Mississippi),
  • state post-conviction procedures implementing those rulings (especially Mississippi’s approach under Parker, Jones v. State, and Wharton), and
  • the constraints of federal habeas review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Leon Lamar Trotter, convicted of murder for an offense committed at age 17, received a mandatory LWOP sentence under Mississippi law. After Miller declared such mandatory schemes unconstitutional for juveniles, he sought relief. Mississippi’s trial court gave him a combined evidentiary and resentencing-type hearing in his post-conviction proceedings, considered the Miller/Parker factors, and declined to convert his sentence to one with parole eligibility. State appellate courts affirmed.

On federal habeas review, Trotter argued that:

  1. because his original sentence was mandatory LWOP and thus unconstitutional, it had to be vacated, followed by a true de novo discretionary sentencing;
  2. Mississippi courts improperly held him to a remedial procedure (recognized in Wharton v. State) that did not yet exist at the time of his 2018 hearing; and
  3. the 2018 proceeding was not, in substance, the kind of individualized, discretionary sentencing process that Miller requires.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief. The court’s key contribution is its clear statement—grounded in Montgomery and Jones v. Mississippi—that the federal Constitution does not require a prior vacatur of the original sentence or a formal “resentencing hearing” label. What is required is a meaningful opportunity, through some discretionary procedure, for the sentencer to consider “youth and its attendant characteristics” and then decide whether LWOP remains appropriate.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying offense and original sentencing

  • In 2004, a jury convicted Leon Lamar Trotter of murder for fatally shooting Ricky Hill, who later died after being left in his doorway for 17 hours.
  • Trotter was 17 years old at the time of the offense.
  • Under then-applicable Mississippi law (Miss. Code §§ 47‑7‑3(1)(h), 97‑3‑21), the only available sentence for his offense was life without the possibility of parole.
  • The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2008.

B. Post-conviction litigation in Mississippi

  1. 2012 – Initial post-conviction application. Trotter sought permission from the Mississippi Supreme Court to file a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting ineffective assistance of counsel and a witness recantation. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted leave in July 2012.
  2. 2013 – Supplemental Miller claim. After the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama (2012), Trotter—through counsel Jane Tucker—filed a supplemental PCR application seeking to add a Miller claim. He asked either:
    • for relief “as a matter of law” on the existing record, or
    • in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing with discovery to prove his claims.
    The Mississippi Supreme Court summarized his request as one to vacate his life sentence and obtain a new sentencing hearing, or, alternatively, to be allowed to file a PCR motion in the circuit court. The court granted leave to file in the Circuit Court of Humphreys County.
  3. 2016–2017 – PCR filings and appearance of pro bono counsel.
    • In 2016, Trotter filed a pro se PCR motion.
    • Counsel Tucker then filed a second PCR motion, arguing that under Miller he should be resentenced to life with parole.
    • In 2017, new pro bono counsel entered and took over representation.
  4. 2018 – Motion for evidentiary and/or resentencing hearing.
    • Pro bono counsel filed a “Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearing And/Or Resentencing Hearing,” raising three grounds: ineffective assistance, a new trial based on recantation by witness Alvin Pittman, and resentencing under Miller.
    • The detailed request for an evidentiary hearing primarily addressed the first two grounds; the Miller claim was framed more as a legal question. The conclusion, however, asked the court to grant limited discovery and then order an evidentiary hearing on the PCR motion as a whole.
    • On May 30, 2018, the circuit court granted the motion for an “evidentiary and/or resentencing hearing” on ineffective assistance, new trial, and “resentencing under Miller,” explicitly stating that “considering Miller and Parker” Trotter was “entitled to a new sentencing hearing in which the consideration of all circumstances required by Miller are weighed as factors in determining his sentence.”
  5. 2018 – The September hearing.
    • The court held the hearing on September 24 and 28, 2018.
    • In opening statements, Trotter’s counsel argued that resentencing under Miller was purely a matter of law that did not require additional evidence: his mandatory LWOP sentence was unconstitutional, and therefore the court had to vacate it and impose life with parole.
    • During the hearing, counsel did not present additional evidence specifically tailored to the Miller youth factors. The focus was largely on ineffective assistance and recantation issues.
    • In closing, counsel reiterated that:
      • the prior LWOP sentence must be vacated,
      • a new sentence of life with parole must be imposed, and
      • no additional factual development was necessary to decide this constitutional issue.
    • The prosecution, by contrast, argued that life without parole remained reasonable and constitutionally permissible under existing case law.
    • Counsel for Trotter characterized LWOP for juveniles as appropriate only in “extremely, extremely, extremely rare circumstances,” and argued that Mississippi trial courts were “overturning these sentences left and right,” typically vacating and imposing life with parole.
  6. 2018 – Circuit court order denying relief.
    • On November 21, 2018, the circuit court denied post-conviction relief.
    • It recited the Parker/Miller factors that Mississippi courts must consider when sentencing juveniles and explained why, in its judgment, Trotter did not qualify for a parole-eligible sentence.
    • It concluded that “having considered the Miller factors, [Trotter] does not qualify as a juvenile entitled to a sentence making him eligible for parole consideration” and denied his request to be resentenced.
  7. 2022 – Mississippi Court of Appeals decision.
    • The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. See Trotter v. State, 353 So. 3d 484 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).
    • Relying in particular on Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013), the court noted that LWOP can constitutionally be imposed on juveniles who fail to convince the sentencing authority that Miller considerations bar its application.
    • The appellate court concluded that Trotter had, in fact, received a Miller hearing and had not carried his burden to show he merited a parole-eligible sentence.
    • The Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 4, 2023.

C. Federal habeas proceedings

  1. § 2254 petition in federal district court.
    • Trotter filed a habeas petition in the Northern District of Mississippi under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
    • He argued that:
      1. Mississippi violated his constitutional rights by failing to vacate his sentence and then provide a de novo discretionary sentencing procedure as required by Miller and Montgomery;
      2. Mississippi courts violated his rights by applying a procedural approach rooted in Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 927 (Miss. 2019)—which was decided after his 2018 hearing;
      3. the 2018 hearing was not, in fact, a Miller-compliant discretionary sentencing hearing.
  2. Magistrate judge’s recommendation and district court ruling.
    • A magistrate judge recommended denial of relief, concluding:
      • the circuit court was not required to vacate the sentence before conducting a Miller hearing;
      • Trotter did receive a discretionary sentencing hearing under Miller at the 2018 proceeding; and
      • his rights were not violated by the application of later-decided state law.
    • The district court adopted the recommendation, denied the petition, and declined to grant a certificate of appealability (COA) on August 2, 2024.
    • The district court emphasized that Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) had, by the time of the 2018 hearing, already clarified that states need not “relitigate sentences” to remedy a Miller violation; they may instead provide parole eligibility or an opportunity for a hearing where youth is considered.
  3. Certificate of appealability and Fifth Circuit appeal.
    • The Fifth Circuit granted Trotter’s motion for a COA. Although the order’s brief summary emphasized his first argument (vacatur vs. hearing), the court ultimately held that the COA encompassed all three issues presented in his motion and appeal brief.
    • The appeal proceeded on all three grounds and culminated in the Fifth Circuit’s December 5, 2025 opinion affirming the denial of habeas relief.

III. Summary of the Fifth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fifth Circuit framed the case under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review and divided its analysis into three substantive issues:

  1. Whether the Constitution required vacatur plus a new discretionary sentencing proceeding.
    The court held that Miller and Montgomery do not require states to vacate existing sentences and conduct a formal resentencing. Instead, states need only provide a discretionary procedure in which the sentencer can consider youth and its attendant characteristics before deciding whether LWOP remains appropriate. Thus, Mississippi’s choice to address Trotter’s Miller claim through a combined post-conviction evidentiary and sentencing-type hearing, without first vacating the sentence, did not violate clearly established federal law.
  2. Whether applying a remedial approach associated with later state case law (Wharton) violated Trotter’s rights.
    The court rejected the contention that Mississippi impermissibly retroactively applied a “new” procedure first set out in Wharton v. State (2019). The Mississippi Court of Appeals had expressly relied on Jones v. State (2013), a pre-existing case, and the federal district court did not cite Wharton at all. Moreover, Montgomery (2016) had already authorized the use of parole eligibility or a discretionary hearing without vacatur to cure Miller violations. No clearly established federal law barred Mississippi from using the procedural path it chose.
  3. Whether the 2018 hearing was a meaningful discretionary Miller hearing.
    Trotter argued that because he and his counsel assumed they were entitled to automatic resentencing, they chose not to present youth-related mitigating evidence. He further contended that the court’s discussion of the Miller factors improperly focused on whether he had “youthful characteristics” rather than on how those characteristics mitigated culpability. The Fifth Circuit held that:
    • the circuit court clearly signaled that it would consider the Miller factors as part of a discretionary decision whether to grant a parole-eligible sentence;
    • Trotter was afforded an opportunity to present evidence pertinent to those factors, and any failure to do so was attributable to his strategic decisions, not to the absence of an appropriate procedure; and
    • the court in fact applied the Parker/Miller factors and exercised discretion in concluding that LWOP remained appropriate.
    Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Mississippi courts and the federal district court that Trotter received a constitutionally sufficient discretionary hearing.

Concluding that Trotter had not shown that the state courts’ adjudication was either “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor based on an unreasonable factual determination, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing trilogy

1. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)

Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing schemes that mandate life without parole for juvenile offenders. The core reasoning:

  • Youth is constitutionally relevant: children are less mature, more susceptible to outside pressures, and more capable of change than adults.
  • Mandatory LWOP schemes prevent sentencers from considering “the mitigating qualities of youth.”
  • While Miller did not categorically bar juvenile LWOP, it required individualized sentencing: a sentencer must have discretion and must consider how youth and its attendant characteristics bear on culpability and punishment before imposing LWOP.

Key language quoted by the Fifth Circuit:

  • Miller “does not foreclose a sentencer’s ability” to impose LWOP, but requires the sentencer “to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”

2. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016)

Montgomery extended Miller retroactively and clarified States’ remedial obligations. Crucially for Trotter:

  • Miller announced a substantive rule (very limited availability of LWOP for juveniles) that must be applied retroactively.
  • But “giving Miller retroactive effect does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole.”
  • A state “may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”
  • Procedurally, Montgomery described the minimal requirement as “a hearing where ‘youth and its attendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing factors … to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not.”
  • It repeated that prisoners must be given an “opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.”

The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on this remedial language to reject the notion that vacatur and formal resentencing are constitutionally required.

3. Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021)

Decided after Trotter’s 2018 hearing but before much of the federal habeas litigation, Jones v. Mississippi clarified what Miller and Montgomery require procedurally:

  • There is no requirement for the sentencer to make a separate factual finding that the juvenile is “permanently incorrigible” before imposing LWOP.
  • What matters is that the sentencer has discretion to impose a lesser sentence and the ability to consider youth as a mitigating factor.
  • A “discretionary sentencing procedure suffices to ensure individualized consideration of a defendant’s youth.”

The Fifth Circuit cites Jones to strengthen the view that:

  • the Constitution requires a discretionary, individualized process,
  • not any particular formal structure (vacatur vs. resentencing vs. PCR hearing), and
  • not any specific verbal formula or factual findings about “permanent incorrigibility.”

B. Mississippi juvenile-sentencing cases

1. Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 (Miss. 2013)

Parker is Mississippi’s foundational case implementing Miller. The Mississippi Supreme Court:

  • adopted the Miller factors for juvenile sentencing,
  • required Mississippi courts to consider a set of youth-related factors (background, home environment, circumstances of the offense, capacity for change, etc.) when sentencing juveniles in homicide cases, and
  • prescribed procedures for resentencing individuals who had previously received mandatory LWOP as juveniles.

In Trotter, the Humphreys County circuit court explicitly invoked Parker and recited these factors when ruling on Trotter’s resentencing request.

2. Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 (Miss. 2013)

In Jones v. State (not to be confused with Jones v. Mississippi), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that:

  • Life without parole “can be applied constitutionally to juveniles who fail to convince the sentencing authority that Miller considerations are sufficient to prohibit its application.”

This language, quoted by the Mississippi Court of Appeals in Trotter, reflects the state’s view that:

  • juvenile LWOP is constitutionally permissible after an individualized Miller hearing, and
  • the burden effectively rests on the juvenile to persuade the sentencer that youth-based mitigating factors counsel against LWOP.

3. Wharton v. State, 298 So. 3d 927 (Miss. 2019)

Although Wharton post-dates Trotter’s hearing, Trotter argued it introduced a new procedural model: satisfying Miller by holding an evidentiary hearing in the context of post-conviction proceedings, without first vacating the sentence and convening a separate resentencing proceeding. He claimed Mississippi courts improperly applied this “new” procedure retroactively to him.

The Fifth Circuit rejected the premise:

  • The Mississippi Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the relevant governing rule was established in Jones v. State—a 2013 case predating Trotter’s 2018 hearing.
  • Moreover, after Montgomery, it was clear as a matter of federal law that states could choose flexible remedies, including parole eligibility and non-resentencing hearings, to address prior Miller violations.
  • Nothing in Mississippi precedent required vacatur as a precondition to a Miller-compliant hearing.

4. Other Mississippi appellate decisions

The Fifth Circuit also references:

  • Hudspeth v. State, 179 So. 3d 1226 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), and
  • Thomas v. State, 130 So. 3d 157 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014),

as examples of earlier cases in which courts vacated juvenile LWOP sentences and held resentencing hearings. Importantly, the Fifth Circuit emphasizes that:

  • these cases did not hold that vacatur plus resentencing is the only permissible procedure;
  • they were decided before Montgomery clarified that states are not required to relitigate all sentences; and
  • thus they did not create a binding state-law entitlement to a particular remedial structure.

C. Federal habeas framework and other authorities

1. AEDPA: 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

The Fifth Circuit applies the familiar AEDPA standard:

  • Federal habeas relief may not be granted for claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court” unless the state decision:
    1. was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or
    2. was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”

Citing Moore v. Vannoy, 968 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2020), the court reiterates:

  • factual findings are reviewed for clear error;
  • legal questions are reviewed de novo, but within AEDPA’s highly deferential framework.

2. Deference and fairminded disagreement

The opinion invokes:

  • Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011): § 2254(d) preserves federal habeas relief for cases in which there is “no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court’s decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
  • Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002): the federal court must give the state court decision “the benefit of the doubt.”

These cases underscore how demanding AEDPA’s standard is; it is not enough that the federal court would decide differently. The state court’s result must be objectively unreasonable under clearly established Supreme Court law.

3. Cognizable habeas claims and state-law errors

In addressing the second issue, the court references Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1989), emphasizing that:

  • mere violations of state procedural rules, without more, do not constitute federal constitutional violations and are not cognizable on habeas;
  • however, if the alleged procedural misstep effectively deprives a petitioner of a federal right (here, the Eighth Amendment protections as articulated in Miller and Montgomery), then the claim is properly framed as federal constitutional in nature and is cognizable.

On that basis, the court holds that Trotter’s second claim is indeed cognizable and within the scope of the COA, because he framed it as a deprivation of the Miller-mandated discretionary procedure, not merely as an error under Mississippi procedural law.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Issue One – Is vacatur required before a Miller-compliant hearing?

Trotter’s core premise was that because his initial LWOP sentence was imposed under a mandatory scheme and is therefore unconstitutional under Miller, the Constitution obliged Mississippi courts to:

  1. formally vacate that sentence, and
  2. hold a de novo sentencing proceeding in which a sentencer with full discretion would decide between LWOP and a parole-eligible sentence, giving full weight to youth-based mitigation.

The Fifth Circuit rejected this as a matter of clearly established federal law:

  1. Miller’s violation lies in mandatory sentencing, not in LWOP per se.
    Miller invalidates sentencing schemes that LWOP for juveniles without allowing consideration of youth. It does not hold that all juvenile LWOP sentences are unconstitutional, nor does it prescribe a specific remedial format when such sentences were imposed pre-Miller.
  2. Montgomery clarifies remedial flexibility.
    The court emphasizes Montgomery’s statement that giving Miller retroactive effect does not compel states to “relitigate sentences” and that a state “may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” This affirms that:
    • states can choose among multiple remedial tools (parole eligibility, hearings, etc.), and
    • the Constitution does not demand formal vacatur and resentencing as the only acceptable remedy.
  3. Jones v. Mississippi reinforces that a discretionary procedure is enough.
    Drawing on Jones, the Fifth Circuit underscores that what Miller and Montgomery require is a discretionary sentencing procedure that allows individualized consideration of youth, not an additional layer of formalism (such as a new jury sentencing phase or explicit findings of permanent incorrigibility).
  4. Mississippi’s approach satisfied the constitutional minimum.
    The circuit court expressly convened a hearing to consider the Miller/Parker factors and decide whether to alter Trotter’s sentence to one with parole eligibility. Trotter had:
    • notice that the court would consider whether he should be resentenced under Miller, and
    • an opportunity to present evidence bearing on youth and its attendant characteristics.
    Even if his counsel chose not to exploit that opportunity fully (based on a belief in automatic entitlement to resentencing), the availability of the discretionary process itself satisfies Miller and Montgomery as understood through Jones.

The bottom line: under AEDPA, it is not unreasonable for a state court to conclude that a juvenile’s LWOP sentence becomes constitutionally permissible once he has received a proper, individualized, discretionary hearing—even if the original sentence was mandatory and even if the state does not formally “vacate” the earlier judgment.

B. Issue Two – Alleged retroactive application of Wharton and “new” procedures

Trotter argued that he was forced to navigate a remedial structure that only became explicit in Wharton v. State (2019)—a year after his 2018 hearing. He claimed that:

  • before Wharton, Mississippi appellate decisions addressing Miller uniformly vacated mandatory LWOP sentences and ordered full resentencing hearings;
  • Wharton introduced the notion that an evidentiary hearing in PCR proceedings, without vacatur, could satisfy Miller’s procedural requirements;
  • by retroactively applying this new model, the state courts deprived him of the process he was entitled to under then-existing Mississippi law and federal precedent.

The Fifth Circuit dismantled this argument on multiple levels:

  1. COA scope and cognizability.
    The State argued that this “procedural” claim was outside the COA and not cognizable under habeas as it concerned only state law. The Fifth Circuit held:
    • the COA, which granted Trotter’s motion without qualification, encompassed all the issues raised in that motion, including the Wharton-based claim;
    • the claim is cognizable because Trotter framed it as a deprivation of his federal right to the Miller/Montgomery procedural protections—not as a stand‑alone complaint about noncompliance with state procedural law.
  2. State courts did not in fact rely on Wharton.
    The Mississippi Court of Appeals explicitly noted that Wharton post-dated Trotter’s hearing and declared that the guiding rule was found in Jones v. State (2013). The federal district court likewise made no reference to Wharton.
  3. Pre‑Wharton Mississippi practice did not create a binding right to vacatur.
    Although earlier Mississippi cases often used vacatur and resentencing as the remedial path, none declared this method to be the exclusive or mandatory remedy. They were permissive illustrations, not binding mandates.
  4. Montgomery had already opened the door to flexible remedies.
    By 2016, Montgomery had clearly authorized states to address Miller violations through parole eligibility or other forms of review without full resentencing. Counsel, the Fifth Circuit notes, “should have been on notice” that the remedial landscape might change after Montgomery.
  5. No conflict with clearly established federal law.
    Under AEDPA, what matters is not the consistency of state practice with prior state cases, but the consistency of the state court’s final judgment with Supreme Court precedent. Because Montgomery affirmatively permitted the type of post-conviction, non-vacatur remedy Mississippi used, there is no basis to say the state court’s approach was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

C. Issue Three – Was the 2018 hearing actually a meaningful discretionary Miller hearing?

Trotter’s final argument targeted the quality, not just the form, of the 2018 hearing. He raised two points:

  1. Lack of youth-based evidence.
    Trotter contended that because he believed he had already satisfied the legal prerequisites for vacatur under Mississippi precedent, he and his counsel did not present meaningful evidence on the mitigating qualities of his youth. As a result, the court lacked sufficient information to conduct the individualized assessment Miller requires.
  2. Alleged misapplication of the Miller factors.
    He also argued that the circuit court applied the Parker/Miller factors incorrectly, focusing too much on whether he had “youthful characteristics” and too little on how those characteristics made him less culpable. In essence, he insisted that the trial court did not genuinely treat youth as a mitigating factor.

The Fifth Circuit responded as follows:

  1. Opportunity vs. outcome.
    The constitutional inquiry under Miller, Montgomery, and Jones focuses on whether the sentencer:
    • had discretion to impose a lesser sentence, and
    • had the opportunity to consider youth and its attendant characteristics.
    The record shows that:
    • the circuit court’s order setting the hearing explicitly stated that it would be an evidentiary and/or resentencing hearing, considering all Miller circumstances;
    • Trotter could have presented youth-related mitigating evidence at that hearing; and
    • his counsel’s decision not to do so, based on a mistaken legal theory, does not render the hearing constitutionally inadequate.
    In the court’s view, Trotter’s strategic choices “do not negate” the fact that he had the procedural opportunity required by Miller.
  2. Discretionary evaluation of mitigation.
    Miller requires opportunity to present mitigation; it does not dictate how much weight a sentencer must assign to those factors. Citing Jones v. Mississippi and Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Fifth Circuit reiterates that sentencers have “wide discretion in determining the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence.”
  3. The trial court did apply Miller/Parker factors.
    The circuit court’s order recited the Parker/Miller factors and explained why it believed Trotter “does not qualify as a juvenile entitled to a sentence making him eligible for parole consideration.” On habeas, federal courts do not reweigh those factors; they simply check whether the state court’s process satisfied the minimal constitutional requirements and whether any factual findings were unreasonably made.
  4. Under AEDPA, disagreements about emphasis are insufficient.
    Even if another court might have weighed the factors differently or framed the analysis in more youth-centered terms, that does not suffice to show an “unreasonable” application of Miller and Montgomery. On this deferential standard, the Fifth Circuit concludes that Trotter received a sufficiently individualized, discretionary hearing.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Mandatory vs. discretionary life without parole for juveniles

  • Mandatory LWOP: The law forces the judge to impose life without parole upon conviction; the judge may not consider the defendant’s youth or other mitigating factors in choosing a lesser sentence.
  • Discretionary LWOP: The judge may consider youth and mitigating evidence and then decide between LWOP and a lesser sentence (such as life with parole or a term of years).

Miller held that mandatory juvenile LWOP schemes are unconstitutional. But Miller left open the possibility that a juvenile may still receive LWOP after an individualized, discretionary sentencing process.

B. The “Miller factors” / “Parker factors”

These are the types of considerations a court must examine when sentencing a juvenile in a homicide case:

  • the defendant’s chronological age and its hallmark features (immaturity, impetuosity, failure to appreciate risks and consequences);
  • family and home environment;
  • circumstances of the offense, including the juvenile’s degree of participation;
  • the possibility of rehabilitation;
  • any prior history of abuse, trauma, or other mitigating experiences.

Mississippi’s Parker case formalized these factors and requires courts to document their consideration.

C. “Permanent incorrigibility” after Jones v. Mississippi

Earlier readings of Miller and Montgomery suggested that juvenile LWOP might be reserved only for juveniles found to be “permanently incorrigible” or “irreparably corrupt.” Jones v. Mississippi clarified:

  • the Constitution does not require a separate explicit finding of permanent incorrigibility;
  • it suffices that the sentencer considered youth and had discretion to impose a lesser sentence.

In other words, “irreparable corruption” is a substantive concept guiding the sentencer’s moral judgment; it is not a separate procedural box courts must formally check.

D. AEDPA / § 2254(d) “clearly established federal law” and deference

Under AEDPA:

  • “Clearly established federal law” means holdings (not dicta) of U.S. Supreme Court decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudication.
  • A state decision is “contrary to” such law if it applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and nevertheless arrives at a different result.
  • It is an “unreasonable application” if the state court correctly identifies the governing rule but applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Importantly, an incorrect application is not necessarily an unreasonable one; the bar is high. Federal courts ask whether no fairminded jurist could agree with the state court’s result.

E. Cognizable habeas claims vs. state-law errors

  • Federal habeas relief is available only for violations of the U.S. Constitution, federal laws, or treaties.
  • Errors of state law, including state procedural rulings, generally do not provide a basis for federal habeas relief.
  • However, if a state procedural choice results in the denial of a federal right (e.g., the Eighth Amendment protections as interpreted in Miller/Montgomery), the petitioner may challenge that as a federal constitutional violation.

F. Certificates of appealability (COAs)

In § 2254 cases, an appeal cannot proceed unless a COA is granted. A COA is:

  • granted by a circuit judge or justice,
  • only if the petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and
  • sometimes limited to specified issues.

In Trotter, the Fifth Circuit interpreted its earlier order granting Trotter’s COA as covering all issues he raised in his motion, not merely those summarized in a short explanatory parenthetical.

VII. Potential Impact and Broader Significance

A. For Mississippi juvenile offenders with pre-Miller LWOP sentences

The decision signals several important points for similarly situated prisoners:

  • No federal right to vacatur plus resentencing. Juveniles previously sentenced to mandatory LWOP in Mississippi cannot insist, as a matter of federal constitutional law, on formal vacatur and a full resentencing hearing. A post-conviction evidentiary hearing that applies the Miller/Parker factors and allows the court to exercise sentencing discretion can suffice.
  • Parole eligibility or equivalent review may be adequate. Consistent with Montgomery, the state may choose to make certain juveniles parole-eligible without full resentencing or may use individualized hearings like Trotter’s to decide who remains LWOP.
  • Burden effectively on the juvenile to present mitigation. Under Jones v. State, if the juvenile fails to “convince” the sentencing authority that Miller considerations bar LWOP, a life-without-parole sentence may constitutionally be reimposed.

B. For defense strategy in Miller litigation

From a defense perspective, Trotter carries practical lessons:

  • Do not assume automatic relief from Miller. Counsel must not treat a Miller claim as purely a question of law automatically entitling the client to resentencing. Once notice is given that a court will consider the Miller factors, counsel should present extensive, tailored mitigation evidence on youth and rehabilitation.
  • Frame PCR hearings as full mitigation opportunities. Where states handle Miller claims in post-conviction rather than traditional sentencing proceedings, defense teams should treat those hearings as functionally equivalent to capital or serious noncapital mitigation hearings, including expert testimony, social history evidence, and evidence of post-offense growth.
  • Consider parallel ineffective assistance claims. If counsel’s strategic misjudgments lead to a threadbare presentation of youth factors, the appropriate vehicle may be a separate ineffective assistance claim, rather than a Miller-process challenge. (That claim was raised earlier in Trotter’s PCR proceeding but is not the subject of the Fifth Circuit’s constitutional holding here.)

C. For federal habeas courts in the Fifth Circuit

Although unpublished and non-precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, Trotter offers persuasive guidance likely to influence similar cases:

  • Remedial flexibility is constitutionally acceptable. Federal courts will likely uphold a range of state procedures used to remedy pre-Miller LWOP sentences so long as they provide a discretionary hearing and an opportunity to present youth-related mitigation.
  • High bar under AEDPA. Given Harrington v. Richter and Jones v. Mississippi, petitioners challenging the adequacy of their Miller hearings must show that no reasonable jurist could conclude that:
    • the procedure was discretionary, and
    • youth was meaningfully considered.
  • Focus on opportunity, not completeness. Deficiencies attributable to defense choices (e.g., failure to call expert witnesses) are unlikely to be recast successfully as Miller violations; they must be litigated, if at all, as separate ineffective assistance claims.

D. Normative and policy considerations

On a policy level, Trotter continues a broader shift in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence:

  • From bright-line rules to discretionary frameworks. The Supreme Court’s trilogy builds a regime where juvenile LWOP is disfavored but not categorically barred, and the primary safeguard is individualized discretion.
  • Risk of underdeveloped records. When relief is channeled through post-conviction hearings rather than full resentencing, there is a heightened risk that juvenile mitigation will be underdeveloped—particularly if counsel erroneously believes the law guarantees a particular outcome. This may affect the quality of justice delivered, even if it does not violate constitutional minima under AEDPA.
  • Importance of effective counsel and resources. The outcome in Trotter implicitly highlights the centrality of well-prepared defense teams capable of presenting rich social-history and psychological evidence. The constitutional adequacy of procedures will often rise or fall, in practice, on counsel’s performance, not only on formal procedural design.

VIII. Conclusion

Trotter v. Loden solidifies, within the Fifth Circuit’s habeas jurisprudence, a crucial reading of the Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing decisions: the Eighth Amendment does not require states to vacate pre-Miller mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences and conduct de novo resentencing hearings. Instead, states may cure the constitutional defect by providing a discretionary hearing—such as in post-conviction proceedings—where the sentencer considers “youth and its attendant characteristics” and decides whether LWOP remains appropriate.

The decision also confirms that:

  • state courts may, consistent with Montgomery, adopt flexible remedial structures, including parole eligibility and evidentiary hearings without vacatur;
  • federal habeas courts will give substantial leeway to such state choices under AEDPA’s deferential standard; and
  • petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that no fairminded jurist could view a given procedure as Miller-compliant.

For practitioners, Trotter underscores the imperative to treat any Miller-related hearing—whether labeled resentencing, evidentiary, or post-conviction—as a full-scale opportunity to present comprehensive mitigation rooted in youth. The constitutional guarantee is an opportunity and a discretionary decision-maker; what happens within that opportunity depends, to a significant degree, on the advocacy brought to bear.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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