Trial Court Discretion Over Pro Se Filings by Represented Parents in Vermont CHINS Proceedings: Commentary on In re G.B., Juvenile (2025)

Trial Court Discretion Over Pro Se Filings by Represented Parents in Vermont CHINS Proceedings
Commentary on In re G.B., Juvenile, Vt. Supreme Court, Entry Order (Dec. Term 2025)

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Vermont Supreme Court’s three-justice entry order in In re G.B., Juvenile (L.F., Parent), No. 25-AP-220 (Dec. Term 2025), arising from a children-in-need-of-care-or-supervision (CHINS) proceeding involving two young children, G.B. (born November 2020) and A.B. (born October 2023).

The order addresses a recurring and practically important procedural issue in family and juvenile practice: whether a trial court must accept pro se motions filed by a parent who is already represented by counsel, and whether such filings must be treated as an implied request for “hybrid representation” — that is, a combination of self-representation and representation by counsel.

Although decisions of a three-justice panel are expressly “not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal,” this entry order synthesizes existing authority and provides a clear roadmap for how Vermont trial courts may handle pro se filings by represented parents in CHINS cases, particularly where there are concerns about competency and significant delay in the proceedings.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 Substantive background: CHINS petitions

In May 2024, the State filed CHINS petitions concerning G.B. and A.B. The State alleged that the parent was experiencing a severe mental-health crisis that prevented adequate care or supervision of the children. Notable underlying facts as found by the trial court at the merits hearing included:

  • The family was living in the parent’s car at the time of the events preceding the petitions.
  • In late April 2024, the parent sat behind a parked vehicle while toddler G.B. ran unsupervised in a high-traffic area in front of the car; another vehicle had to stop to avoid hitting the child.
  • About a week later, the parent left both children unattended in the car for nearly twenty minutes while grocery shopping; the vehicle was in the sun, windows barely open, and the children were sweaty and at risk of overheating. The parent appeared unaware of the danger when confronted by police.
  • Several days after that, infant A.B. was hospitalized and found to be severely malnourished due to a lack of proper nutrition while in the parent’s care.

On this record, the family division court found both children to be CHINS at the time of the State’s petitions and placed them in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) under emergency and temporary-care orders.

2.2 Representation, competency concerns, and appointment of a guardian ad litem

The parent was represented by counsel from early in the proceedings, but there were ongoing communication and competency concerns:

  • October 2024: The contested merits hearing occurred. The parent did not appear, but counsel appeared and litigated the case.
  • December 2024: Trial counsel moved to withdraw, citing the parent’s request and a breakdown in communication. The court spoke with the parent, granted withdrawal, and appointed new counsel.
  • January 2025: At a hearing on the State’s motion to reduce the parent’s visitation (based on inconsistent attendance and communication), both the State and the parent’s new attorney requested a competency evaluation, pointing to increasingly erratic behavior. The court:
    • Ordered a competency evaluation; and
    • Reduced visitation frequency and granted DCF authority to cancel visits if the parent appeared emotionally dysregulated.
  • February 2025: A psychologist advised that the evaluation would not occur because the parent—through counsel—refused to participate. The court ordered the evaluation to be rescheduled and warned that if the parent again refused, a guardian ad litem (GAL) would be appointed for the parent.

The contested disposition hearing was set for March 2025. At that time:

  • The parent was involuntarily hospitalized at the Brattleboro Retreat and was therefore absent from court.
  • The parent attempted to call in but was unable to participate; the Retreat did not respond to the court’s calls back.
  • Counsel informed the court that the parent continued to refuse the competency evaluation.

Relying on In re T.A., No. 2010-019, 2010 WL 7798575 (Vt. June 16, 2010) (unpublished mem.), the court concluded that it had a duty to appoint a GAL where an incompetent litigant’s fundamental rights (here, custody of children) were at stake. It appointed a GAL for the parent and continued the disposition hearing.

A combined permanency and disposition hearing eventually occurred in May 2025 with the parent, counsel, and the parent’s GAL all present. The court heard testimony and, without objection, extended the case-plan goal to give the parent additional time—until September 2025—to complete required action steps.

2.3 The parent’s pro se motions and the order at issue

In June 2025, despite being represented by counsel and having a GAL, the parent filed several motions pro se:

  • June 11, 2025:
    • Motion to dismiss the proceedings;
    • Motion to remove the parent’s GAL; and
    • Motion to remove the children’s GAL.
  • June 13, 2025:
    • Motion to assign different DCF caseworkers; and
    • Motion for attorney reassignment.
  • June 16, 2025:
    • Motion to reconsider the CHINS merits order; and
    • Motion to remove the children’s foster parents and respite providers.

The family division issued a single written order denying all seven motions. The court:

  • Observed that the motions were difficult to understand;
  • Found that they did not identify any legal basis or supporting authority for the relief requested; and
  • Directed the parent to:
    • Consult with their attorney about the issues; and
    • If they still wished to pursue them, refile the motions through counsel and in compliance with Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 11 (applicable via Vermont Family Proceedings Rule 2(a)).

This denial—specifically, the trial court’s refusal to accept and act upon the parent’s self-represented filings while counsel remained on the case—is the order under review.

2.4 Appeal and scope

The parent filed a pro se notice of appeal, identifying the decision on their self-represented motions in the G.B. docket, without explicitly naming the separate A.B. docket. The Supreme Court therefore opened the appeal under G.B.’s case only.

On appeal, through counsel, the parent treated the matter as involving both children, and the State agreed that the issues and rulings were identical across both dockets. The Court declined to resolve whether the appeal technically encompassed both cases, noting that its analysis and result would be the same regardless.

The core appellate argument was that the family division abused its discretion by:

  • Denying the parent’s pro se motions outright; and
  • Requiring that any renewed filings be made through counsel, rather than treating them as an implied request for “hybrid representation” and ruling on the merits.

The Supreme Court affirmed.

3. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Entry Order

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division’s order, holding that:

  1. The trial court acted within its broad discretion in declining to entertain pro se motions filed by a represented parent and in directing that any renewed motions be filed through counsel and in compliance with Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure 7(b) and 11(a).
  2. Even assuming (without deciding) that parents in juvenile CHINS proceedings have a statutory or constitutional right to self-representation and that criminal law doctrines on “hybrid representation” apply, the parent failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion.
  3. The court’s concerns—about:
    • Orderly case management and coherent presentation of issues;
    • Compliance with procedural rules (including the requirement for legal grounds and proper signatures); and
    • The significant delay already present in the case, compared to statutory permanency timelines—
    justified its refusal to accept and act on pro se motions while counsel remained of record.
  4. Courts are not compelled to accept pro se filings from litigants who are already represented, especially where they have not waived counsel or made a clear and timely request to proceed pro se.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not withhold its discretion or exercise it on unreasonable grounds, and therefore there was no reversible error.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Legal Issues Presented

The order primarily raises three interrelated legal questions:

  1. Hybrid representation by parents in juvenile CHINS cases. Must a family division court treat self-represented filings by a represented parent as an implied request for “hybrid representation” (simultaneous pro se participation and representation by counsel)?
  2. Scope of trial court discretion over pro se filings by represented parties. To what extent can a trial court refuse to consider pro se motions from litigants who have counsel, and instead require that filings be made by the attorney of record?
  3. Interaction between parental rights and children’s interest in timely permanency. How should the court balance a parent’s desire to personally litigate or file motions against a child’s statutory and constitutional interest in a prompt, stable resolution of their status and permanency?

The Supreme Court does not resolve the threshold question of whether a parent has a constitutional or statutory right to self-representation in CHINS proceedings. Instead, it assumes the existence of such a right for purposes of the analysis and focuses on whether there was an abuse of discretion given the parent’s represented status and the nature of the pro se filings.

4.2 Precedents and Statutory Framework

4.2.1 Self-representation and hybrid representation in criminal cases

The parent’s argument was “predicated on criminal case law.” Two key criminal decisions are discussed:

  • State v. Sims, 158 Vt. 173 (1991).
    • In criminal cases, a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and the Vermont Constitution.
    • However, there is no absolute right to “hybrid representation” — the simultaneous right to both conduct portions of the case personally and be represented by counsel.
    • Whether to permit hybrid representation is left to “the sound discretion of the trial judge.”
    • Appellate review is deferential: the decision will be reversed only if discretion is “totally withheld” or exercised on “clearly untenable or unreasonable” grounds.
  • In re A.B., 2013 VT 66, 194 Vt. 279.
    • This was a juvenile case where a parent sought to represent herself.
    • The Court again assumed without deciding that a parent may have a right to self-representation in CHINS proceedings.
    • It held that, even under that assumption, the family division acted within its discretion in denying an untimely request to proceed pro se.
    • Notably, the Court emphasized that the risk of disruption or delay from self-representation is “even more compelling in the juvenile context” than in criminal cases because of:
      • Children’s significant interest in the timely resolution of their cases; and
      • The statutory directive that “timely permanency for children” is a paramount concern. See 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4).

In In re G.B., the Court again declines to resolve the existence or scope of a right to self-representation in CHINS cases, but imports the criminal hybrid-representation framework by analogy and assumes it applies for purposes of ruling.

4.2.2 Control of pro se filings by represented litigants

Two further precedents address trial courts’ authority to regulate pro se filings by parties who are already represented:

  • In re Morales, 2016 VT 85, 202 Vt. 549.
    • In a post-conviction context, the Court held that “an orderly presentation of a litigant’s case is important,” and that a trial court “may impose controls on the filing of pro se motions by represented litigants” to preserve that order.
    • This supports the idea that trial courts may insist that filings come through counsel or otherwise manage the flow of motions in the interest of clarity and efficiency.
  • State v. Crannell, 170 Vt. 387 (2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brillon, 2008 VT 35, 183 Vt. 475.
    • The Court affirmed a trial court’s refusal to consider a criminal defendant’s pro se motion when:
      • The defendant was represented by counsel;
      • He had not waived his right to counsel or requested to proceed pro se; and
      • Standard court procedure required motions to be filed by the attorney of record.
    • Although Crannell was later overruled on unrelated grounds (concerning speedy-trial/delay issues in Brillon), its holding regarding trial court authority over pro se motions by represented parties remains intact.

The Supreme Court in In re G.B. relies directly on Morales and Crannell to underline that:

Courts are not compelled to accept a pro se pleading filed by an individual when counsel of record has already entered an appearance.

4.2.3 Guardians ad litem for incompetent litigants

In re T.A., No. 2010-019, 2010 WL 7798575 (Vt. June 16, 2010) (unpublished memorandum), is cited for the principle that:

Courts have a duty to appoint a GAL for incompetent litigants when fundamental rights are involved, and retaining custody of a child is a fundamental right.

In G.B., the trial court’s appointment of a GAL for the parent at the disposition stage was grounded in this duty, in light of competency concerns and the parent’s refusal to undergo evaluation. While this GAL issue is not the subject of the appeal, it forms an important part of the context: the parent was simultaneously represented by counsel and protected by a GAL when filing the disputed pro se motions.

4.2.4 Juvenile statutes: permanency and disposition timelines

Two statutory provisions shape the Court’s analysis:

  • 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4).
    • Establishes that a paramount concern in juvenile proceedings is:
      “timely permanency for children.”
    • This policy underlies the Court’s repeated emphasis that juvenile cases cannot be allowed to sprawl indefinitely due to procedural complications, including those stemming from self-representation or hybrid representation.
  • 33 V.S.A. § 5317(a).
    • Provides that:
      “A disposition hearing shall be held no later than 35 days after a finding that a child is in need of care and supervision.”
    • In G.B., by the time the parent’s pro se motions were filed (June 2025), the case was already far beyond this statutory timeframe (the CHINS merits finding occurred in October 2024, and the combined permanency/disposition hearing in May 2025).
    • The Court cites this statutory delay to support the trial court’s decision to avoid further complication and potential postponements by filtering motions through counsel.

4.2.5 Civil and family procedural rules: motions and signatures

Because CHINS proceedings are governed in part by the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, procedural compliance matters:

  • V.R.F.P. 2(a).
    • Makes certain Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in CHINS proceedings, including Rules 7 and 11.
  • V.R.C.P. 7(b).
    • Requires that a motion:
      • “State with particularity the grounds therefor[e], including a concise statement of the facts and law relied on”; and
      • “Set forth the relief or order sought.”
    • Subsection (b)(3) further requires that motions be signed in accordance with Rule 11.
  • V.R.C.P. 11(a).
    • Provides that:
      • An attorney of record must sign written motions; or
      • If the party is unrepresented, the party must sign.
    • The signature certifies that the filing has a legal and factual basis and is not being presented for an improper purpose.

Because the parent in G.B. was represented at the time of filing, the trial court relied on Rules 7 and 11 to hold that pro se filings—unsigned by counsel of record and lacking articulated legal authority—did not meet procedural standards, and could therefore be rejected or redirected.

4.3 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.3.1 Standard of review: abuse of discretion

The Supreme Court frames the central question as whether the family division abused its discretion in:

  • Declining to accept the parent’s self-represented motions; and
  • Requiring the parent to work through counsel and comply with the civil rules if they wished to pursue those requests.

Under State v. Sims, a trial court’s decision on whether to permit hybrid representation is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed unless:

  • Discretion was “totally withheld”; or
  • The decision was grounded in considerations that are “clearly untenable or unreasonable.”

The Court applies this same standard by analogy in the CHINS context, assuming criminal hybrid-representation principles are relevant.

4.3.2 No obligation to infer or grant hybrid representation

The parent’s main argument was that the trial court should have:

  • Interpreted their pro se motions as an implied request for hybrid representation; and
  • Ruled on the merits of those motions, instead of insisting that they be channeled through counsel.

The Supreme Court rejects this argument implicitly by emphasizing that:

  • A litigant does not have an absolute right to both be represented and also simultaneously appear pro se;
  • Hybrid representation is not constitutionally required; and
  • Whether to permit such a practice is entirely within the trial court’s discretion.

In other words, even if one assumes a parent could proceed pro se in a CHINS case, the court still retains discretion to:

  • Require the parent to choose between:
    • Proceeding with counsel; or
    • Clearly and timely waiving counsel and proceeding alone;
  • Decline to accept a middle-ground arrangement where the parent files motions on their own while also retaining counsel.

Importantly, the Court does not say a trial court must always refuse hybrid representation; it simply holds that the trial court here acted within its discretion in declining to allow it, especially given the procedural posture and the parent’s prior conduct.

4.3.3 Procedural deficiencies in the pro se motions

The family division found the pro se motions:

  • “Difficult to understand”; and
  • Lacking a clear articulation of any legal basis or authority for the requested relief.

On appeal, the parent argued that the motions, read comprehensively, reflected serious concerns for the children’s safety and should therefore have been substantively considered. The Supreme Court responds by distinguishing:

  • Factual allegations about the children’s safety; from
  • Legal grounds and authority for granting the types of relief sought (e.g., dismissal of the CHINS case, removal of foster parents, replacement of GALs and DCF workers, reconsideration of the merits order).

Under Rule 7(b), a motion must state, with particularity:

  • The facts relied on; and
  • The law that provides a basis for the requested relief.

The Supreme Court agrees with the trial court that the motions failed this requirement: they did not identify any legal authority—statutes, rules, or case law—justifying the sweeping remedies requested. That procedural deficiency is itself a proper ground for the court to:

  • Decline to rule on the motions; and
  • Direct that any renewed motions be structured, supported, and filed through counsel.

4.3.4 Signature and representation under Rule 11(a)

Rule 11(a) requires motions to be signed by counsel if the party is represented, or by the party if unrepresented. Because:

  • The parent was represented by counsel at the time; and
  • The pro se motions were filed outside of the attorney-of-record structure;

the trial court correctly applied Rule 11(a) to treat the filings as not conforming to procedural rules. The Supreme Court reinforces that courts may insist on compliance with Rule 11 not just as a technicality, but as a way to ensure:

  • That filings are vetted for legal sufficiency and proper purpose by an officer of the court (counsel); and
  • That the record is not cluttered with confusing or unsupported claims that delay resolution of critical issues in a child’s life.

4.3.5 Case management and statutory permanency timelines

The Court places particular weight on the timing of the parent’s filings:

  • The CHINS merits decision was rendered in October 2024.
  • By statute (§ 5317(a)), disposition should ordinarily follow within 35 days.
  • By June 2025—when the pro se motions were filed—the case was already well beyond this time frame, and disposition plus a combined permanency hearing had just been held in May.

Allowing multiple, procedurally deficient pro se motions to proceed in parallel with counsel’s representation would have risked:

  • Further delay; and
  • More complicated, potentially contradictory litigation tracks (counsel’s strategy versus the parent’s filings).

The Supreme Court underscores that such concerns are especially acute in juvenile cases, where delay directly impacts a child’s permanency, stability, and emotional well-being. Quoting In re A.B., the Court notes that the dangers of disruption and delay from self-representation are “even more compelling” when children are involved than in criminal cases.

The trial court’s solution was measured:

  • It did not permanently bar the parent’s concerns from being raised;
  • It instructed the parent to consult with counsel; and
  • It invited refiling through counsel, in compliance with Rules 7 and 11.

The Supreme Court finds this an appropriate balancing of:

  • The parent’s interest in having their concerns heard; and
  • The child’s significant interest in orderly, timely proceedings and legally grounded decision-making.

4.3.6 Mootness and scope of the ruling

The State represented that the parent’s appellate counsel agreed that the motions for attorney reassignment and to remove the parent’s GAL were now moot, since by October 2025:

  • The parent appeared at a subsequent hearing with trial counsel; and
  • The trial court excused the GAL.

The Supreme Court notes this but expressly declines to rest its decision on mootness. Instead, it reasons that its analysis—that the trial court acted within its discretion to deny all seven self-represented motions and require refiling through counsel—applies uniformly, regardless of whether some have since become practically irrelevant.

Thus the Court’s ruling is broad in the sense that it validates the procedure the trial court used for all of the parent’s pro se motions, not the ultimate substantive disposition of any one motion’s subject matter.

4.4 Impact and Implications

4.4.1 Formal nonprecedential status but practical guidance

The order is explicitly issued by a three-justice panel and labeled as not precedential. Nonetheless, it:

  • Draws together several binding authorities (In re A.B., Morales, Sims, Crannell);
  • Applies them in a CHINS context; and
  • Speaks in broadly applicable terms about trial-court discretion and procedural requirements.

Trial judges, practitioners, and agencies can reasonably look to this entry order as persuasive authority and practical guidance on:

  • How to manage pro se filings by represented parents;
  • How to handle implied or partial requests for hybrid representation; and
  • How to integrate the child’s interest in permanency into these procedural rulings.

4.4.2 Reinforcement of gatekeeping over hybrid representation

The decision reinforces a consistent theme in Vermont law:

  • There is no automatic right to hybrid representation;
  • Courts may demand clarity — either the party proceeds with counsel or, where legally permissible and proper safeguards are met, they proceed pro se;
  • Trial courts can insist that issues be filtered through counsel, particularly where complex or sensitive interests are at stake.

This is significant in CHINS cases involving:

  • Parents who are mentally ill, traumatized, or otherwise vulnerable;
  • Multiple competing motions (e.g., about GALs, caseworkers, foster placements); and
  • Potentially high-conflict or destabilizing litigation strategies.

4.4.3 Emphasis on children’s interest in timely permanency

The order underscores that children’s interests in swift permanency are not just background policy; they actively inform procedural rulings. This means that:

  • Court tolerance for procedural experimentation (like hybrid representation) is more limited in juvenile cases than in criminal cases; and
  • Courts may legitimately use permanency timelines as part of their justification for tightening control over filings, particularly those that are confusing, unsupported, or duplicative.

In practice, this can:

  • Empower courts to focus hearings on concrete, well-supported issues; and
  • Discourage tactics that might prolong litigation without advancing the child’s best interests.

4.4.4 Procedural discipline and the role of counsel

The decision affirms a strong role for appointed counsel in CHINS cases:

  • Counsel is responsible for screening, structuring, and signing motions; and
  • Parents who wish to raise new concerns must largely work through their attorneys, absent a clear, granted shift to self-representation.

For practitioners, this suggests:

  • They must take client concerns seriously, but also must exercise judgment about which motions to pursue and how;
  • They should explain to clients that unsupervised pro se filings may not be accepted and can complicate their cases; and
  • They may have leverage to resist client pressure for frivolous or legally baseless filings, citing Rules 7, 11, and cases like G.B. and Morales.

4.4.5 Due process and access-to-justice considerations

The order also raises broader access-to-justice and due process questions:

  • Parents in CHINS proceedings often face serious mental-health and socio-economic challenges, which can make trust in counsel fragile.
  • Restricting pro se filings, especially where a parent feels poorly represented, may be experienced as silencing.
  • However, the appointment of a GAL (as in this case) and the opportunity to refile through counsel provide important due-process safeguards.

The Supreme Court’s approach suggests that, so long as:

  • Parents have appointed counsel (and, where needed, a GAL);
  • Counsel remains willing and able to file supported motions; and
  • Courts do not foreclose the parent’s issues but instead require them to be channeled appropriately;

restrictions on pro se filings will ordinarily be seen as a legitimate exercise of case-management discretion, rather than an infringement on due process.

5. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

5.1 CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision)

A child is adjudicated CHINS when the court finds that the child lacks proper parental care or supervision, or is abandoned, abused, or otherwise in need of state intervention to ensure safety and welfare. Once a CHINS finding is made:

  • The court can order DCF custody or supervision;
  • A case plan and disposition order are developed; and
  • The court must consider permanency options, ranging from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.

5.2 Disposition hearing and permanency hearing

  • Disposition hearing: The stage at which the court decides:
    • What services, restrictions, or placements are necessary for the child; and
    • What the initial case-plan goal should be (usually reunification, at least at the outset).
  • Permanency hearing: A later review (or combined hearing) where the court assesses whether the child’s permanency goal should remain reunification or be changed (e.g., to adoption, guardianship, or another permanent arrangement).

Statutes like 33 V.S.A. § 5317 exist to keep these decisions on a relatively rapid timeline, reflecting the developmental needs of children for stability.

5.3 Guardian ad litem (GAL)

A GAL is a person appointed by the court:

  • To represent and advocate for the best interests of an individual who is legally or functionally unable to protect their own interests effectively in the litigation.

In CHINS cases, there may be:

  • A GAL for the child, to represent the child’s best interests; and
  • A GAL for a parent, if there are serious competency concerns affecting the parent’s ability to participate meaningfully in the litigation. That is what happened in G.B., based on In re T.A..

5.4 Competency evaluation

When there are indications that a litigant may not understand the proceedings or cannot participate effectively (as with mental illness, cognitive impairment, or severe emotional dysregulation), the court may order a competency evaluation by a qualified professional.

If the individual refuses to participate, the court, especially when fundamental rights like custody are at stake, may respond by appointing a GAL to safeguard their interests—ensuring that critical decisions are not made without adequate advocacy.

5.5 Self-representation and hybrid representation

  • Self-representation (pro se): A party represents themselves in court, without a lawyer.
  • Hybrid representation: A party is represented by a lawyer but also acts as their own advocate in some respects—filing motions, examining witnesses, or speaking directly to the court.

Key points in Vermont law:

  • Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to choose self-representation (if they competently and knowingly waive counsel).
  • However, there is no absolute right to hybrid representation; it is allowed or forbidden at the trial court’s discretion (Sims).
  • In CHINS cases, the Supreme Court has consistently assumed, but not decided, that some right to self-representation may exist, while emphasizing the distinct and sometimes overriding interests of the child (In re A.B. and now In re G.B.).

5.6 Abuse of discretion

A trial court abuses its discretion if:

  • It fails to exercise discretion at all (“totally withheld”); or
  • It relies on reasons that are clearly untenable (e.g., based on a misunderstanding of the law or facts) or unreasonable.

In G.B., the Supreme Court found that the trial court:

  • Did exercise its discretion; and
  • Relied on reasonable grounds:
    • The need for orderly proceedings;
    • Compliance with procedural rules; and
    • Adherence, as much as practicable, to statutory timelines for children’s permanency.

6. Conclusion

In re G.B., Juvenile does not create new binding precedent, but it meaningfully clarifies and reinforces several important principles for Vermont juvenile practice:

  1. No entitlement to hybrid representation in CHINS proceedings. Even assuming a right to self-representation exists for parents, they have no automatic right to pursue hybrid representation. Trial courts retain broad discretion to require that represented parties act through counsel and to reject pro se filings as procedurally improper.
  2. Strict trial-court discretion over pro se filings by represented litigants. Drawing on Morales and Crannell, the Court confirms that family courts are not compelled to accept pro se motions from represented parents and may insist on motions being filed by counsel in compliance with Rules 7 and 11.
  3. Procedural requirements matter. Motions must clearly state their factual basis and cite relevant legal authority. Unsupported, confusing filings—especially in complex and high-stakes CHINS cases—can properly be denied, with the option to refile through counsel.
  4. Children’s interests in timely permanency remain central. The Court again emphasizes that children’s need for prompt, stable permanency justifies stricter control over procedures that risk delay or disorder, including hybrid representation and unmanaged pro se filings.
  5. Use of GALs and competency safeguards. When competency is in doubt, courts not only may, but must, act to protect fundamental rights by appointing GALs. That protective structure further justifies judicial gatekeeping over duplicative or confusing filings.

Taken together, the order provides a strong, though nonprecedential, endorsement of trial courts’ authority to manage CHINS proceedings in a way that protects children’s interests, maintains procedural regularity, and ensures that parents’ concerns are presented in a legally coherent and rule-compliant manner through counsel and, when needed, a GAL. For judges and practitioners alike, it offers a detailed blueprint for handling the procedural challenges posed by self-represented filings from represented parents in the juvenile system.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Vermont

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