Treatment Noncompliance and Post‑Release Disclosures Can Justify Tailored Internet, Contact, and Pornography Restrictions on Supervised Release

Case: United States v. Coy Christopher Klinger, No. 24-3228 (3d Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (non-precedential)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judges Hardiman, Freeman, and Chung; opinion by Judge Chung)

Disposition: Affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying supervised release conditions.

Introduction

This appeal concerns the boundary between individualized tailoring and overbreadth when modifying conditions of supervised release in a sex‑trafficking case. Coy Klinger pleaded guilty in 2015 to sex trafficking of a minor, served a 120‑month prison sentence, and began sex‑offender treatment upon release. After Klinger's therapist reported numerous treatment violations and worrying disclosures, the Probation Office sought three new special conditions: (1) no direct, unsupervised contact with minors absent approval, (2) restricted internet use limited to legitimate necessities with approval‑based exceptions, and (3) a ban on possessing visual depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256.

Klinger objected on three fronts: (a) procedural error (the district court allegedly relied on disputed Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) facts), (b) substantive unreasonableness (one‑size‑fits‑all conditions not tailored to his circumstances), and (c) First Amendment overbreadth. The Third Circuit rejected each challenge and affirmed, emphasizing the district court’s reliance on Klinger's post‑release conduct and treatment noncompliance, the presence of meaningful tailoring and exceptions, and a sufficient nexus between the conditions and the goals of supervised release.

At‑a‑Glance Holdings

• Abuse‑of‑discretion review governs procedural and substantive challenges to modified supervised release conditions.
• No procedural error: the district court did not rely on disputed PSR allegations; the record showed multiple, unrebutted treatment violations and new admissions that justified modification.
• Even if the court mentioned a failed “denial” polygraph, any error would be harmless given independent, adequate grounds for modification.
• Conditions were reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors and imposed no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)), due to exceptions, tailoring, and limited duration.
• First Amendment challenges failed because restrictions were narrowly tailored with a significant nexus to the offense conduct and treatment concerns.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s order adding three special conditions to Klinger's supervised release. Procedurally, the court held there was no improper reliance on disputed PSR facts; instead, the district court rested on unrebutted treatment evidence: Klinger's persistent noncompliance (e.g., pornography use, soliciting casual sex online), manipulative behavior with treatment staff, acknowledgment of viewing child pornography, and admissions of uncharged sexual conduct with minors. Substantively, the panel concluded that each condition was reasonably related to the nature of the offense, Klinger's post‑release conduct and characteristics, the need to protect the public, and the need for effective correctional treatment. The conditions were also narrowly tailored: they contained approval mechanisms, excluded incidental contact with minors, and were limited to the remaining term of supervised release. The court rejected the First Amendment overbreadth challenge for substantially the same reasons—narrow tailoring and a tight nexus to supervised release goals—drawing support from its own precedents upholding similar restrictions where appropriately tailored.

Analysis

Procedural Posture and Standard of Review

The district court modified Klinger's supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), which requires consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors and compliance with the “no greater deprivation” principle in § 3583(d)(2). On appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion, applying the framework for procedural and substantive reasonableness:

• Procedural reasonableness: whether the court relied on clearly erroneous facts or legal error.
• Substantive reasonableness: whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same [conditions]” for the reasons given.

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009): Provided the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for both procedural and substantive reasonableness and the “no reasonable sentencing court” formulation. The panel anchored its review in Tomko’s deferential approach.
• United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2012): Confirmed abuse‑of‑discretion review for special conditions and recognized that changed circumstances can justify modifying supervised release conditions. The court invoked Murray to emphasize that Klinger's post‑release conduct and new disclosures were a proper basis for modification.
• United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007): Struck down an absolute lifetime computer and internet ban with no exceptions, highlighting the need for tailoring. The panel distinguished Klinger's conditions, which included exceptions and were temporally limited.
• United States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2021): Addressed the importance of tailoring minor‑contact restrictions, including exceptions for incidental contact. The court noted Klinger's condition excluded incidental contact and had been narrowed by the district court.
• United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009): Upheld restrictions on sexually explicit materials where there is a significant nexus between the restriction and the goals of supervised release, and where the restriction is not overbroad or vague on the record. The panel found a similar nexus here.
• United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999): Upheld tailored limitations on employment and internet use against constitutional challenges when linked to § 3553(a) factors. The court relied on Crandon’s tailoring principle to reject Klinger's First Amendment claim.
• United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008): Provided the harmless‑error lens; the panel noted that even if reliance on the polygraph were erroneous, it would be harmless given numerous independent grounds supporting the modifications.

The panel also referenced Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) to frame the issue of disputed PSR facts, ultimately concluding the district court did not rely on contested PSR material, obviating the need to resolve those disputes at modification.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in three major steps.

1. No procedural error despite PSR disputes. Klinger argued the district court treated the PSR as establishing that he intentionally targeted multiple minors, and that his failed denial polygraph (built on that premise) tainted the conditions. The panel disagreed: unrebutted testimony from Klinger's therapist established numerous treatment violations and troubling admissions (viewing child pornography, uncharged sexual activity with minors, manipulation of staff, violations of treatment directives by soliciting casual sex online and viewing pornography). The district court explicitly grounded the new conditions in this post‑release record, not the disputed PSR characterizations. The mention of the failed polygraph did not drive the outcome; in any event, any reliance would be harmless in light of the remaining evidence.
2. Substantive reasonableness: conditions reasonably related to § 3553(a) and no greater than necessary. The court found a strong nexus between the conditions and:
   • Nature and circumstances of the offense: internet/social media were used to solicit at least one minor into prostitution, and Klinger's “business model” involved searching for, soliciting, photographing, and trafficking youthful‑looking women.
   • History and characteristics/post‑release conduct: violations of treatment directives, manipulative “triangulation” of staff, admissions regarding child pornography and uncharged minor sexual conduct.
   • Need to protect the public and provide effective treatment: the therapist warned of an impending unsuccessful discharge without additional structure; the conditions were designed to reduce risk and facilitate compliance and meaningful treatment.
   Tailoring mattered: the internet restrictions had both per se and approval‑based exceptions; the minor‑contact restriction excluded incidental contact and permitted supervised contact; and all conditions were limited to the remaining five‑year supervised release term. The district court narrowed Probation’s proposal after hearing argument, signaling individualized assessment rather than a “one‑size‑fits‑all” approach.
3. First Amendment challenge fails due to narrow tailoring and significant nexus. The panel relied on Thielemann and Crandon to hold that tailored restrictions on internet use and sexually explicit visual depictions can survive First Amendment scrutiny when closely tied to offense conduct, post‑release risks, and treatment goals. Given the record—particularly Klinger's online solicitation and pornography‑related treatment violations—the court concluded the conditions were not overbroad.

The “No Greater Deprivation” Requirement: Tailoring Features That Saved the Conditions

• Exceptions and approvals: Internet use permitted for legitimate necessities and additional uses with probation officer approval, avoiding the absolute ban condemned in Voelker.
• Scope of contact condition: Supervised contact with minors allowed; incidental interactions excluded; narrower than Probation initially requested and refined after defense objections, akin to tailoring endorsed in Senke.
• Temporal limitation: Conditions last only through the five‑year supervised release term, contrasting with lifetime restrictions criticized in Voelker and consistent with Thielemann.
• Record‑based nexus: Conditions tied to Klinger's actual post‑release conduct, treatment violations, and risk indicators—not imposed reflexively based solely on the original offense.

What the Court Did Not Decide

• The panel expressly declined to resolve whether the PSR properly characterized Klinger's conduct as intentionally targeting minors or whether he preserved that dispute at the modification hearings. It found these questions immaterial to the outcome because the modification rested on post‑release evidence.
• The panel did not need to address the Government’s assertion that Klinger's “relevant conduct” encompassed soliciting or attempting to solicit eight minors; again, the decision turned on treatment‑era facts.
• Although the court mentioned the denial polygraph, it avoided endorsing polygraph reliance as necessary, emphasizing instead that any effect was marginal and, at most, harmless.

Impact

While non‑precedential, this opinion offers practical guidance within the Third Circuit (and persuasive value elsewhere) on how to sustain modifications of supervised release conditions for sex‑offense‑related cases:

• Anchor modifications in post‑release conduct: District courts may rely on treatment noncompliance and new disclosures—so long as the record is clear and unrebutted—to justify additional restrictions under § 3583(e).
• Build a robust nexus: Demonstrate how each condition addresses concrete risks (e.g., online solicitation, pornography use) and advances supervision goals (public protection, effective treatment).
• Tailor with exceptions and duration limits: Approval mechanisms, incidental‑contact carve‑outs, and finite terms mitigate overbreadth and satisfy § 3583(d)(2)’s “no greater deprivation” requirement, avoiding Voelker‑type concerns.
• Polygraph references are not dispositive: Where abundant, independent evidence supports modification, incidental mentions of a failed “denial” polygraph will not necessarily trigger reversal; any error may be harmless under Langford.
• First Amendment scrutiny is fact‑dependent: Restrictions on internet use and sexually explicit materials can be sustained when narrowly tailored to the defendant’s conduct and treatment needs (Thielemann, Crandon), especially with approval processes and clear statutory definitions (e.g., § 2256).

Practically, the opinion equips probation officers and treatment providers with a pathway to recommend targeted modifications when treatment falters, while signaling to defense counsel that successful challenges will likely require demonstrating either reliance on clearly erroneous facts or an absence of meaningful tailoring to the defendant’s specific risk profile.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard. The appellate court will not disturb the district court’s decision unless it rests on clearly erroneous facts, an incorrect legal rule, or is outside the range of permissible choices.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness:
  • Procedural: Did the court follow proper steps and rely on accurate facts and correct law?
  • Substantive: Given the whole record, is the decision within the realm of reasonable outcomes?
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A report prepared for sentencing that summarizes offense conduct, criminal history, and other factors. Disputed PSR facts must be resolved if they affect sentencing. Here, the modification was sustained because it did not turn on disputed PSR assertions.
• “Denial” polygraph: A tool sometimes used in sex‑offender treatment to assess truthfulness about past conduct. Courts treat polygraph evidence cautiously; this opinion emphasizes that it was not determinative.
• “No greater deprivation than is reasonably necessary” (18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)): Conditions must be as narrow as feasible to accomplish supervision goals—often via exceptions, limited scope, and time limits.
• “Incidental contact” with minors: Brief, unavoidable interactions (e.g., passing a child at a grocery store). Many minor‑contact conditions explicitly exclude such incidental contact to avoid unrealistic compliance burdens.
• “Sexually explicit conduct” (18 U.S.C. § 2256): A statutory term defining sexual acts or simulations; using this definition helps make conditions clearer and less vulnerable to vagueness challenges.
• Changed circumstances (Murray): Post‑sentencing developments—like treatment violations or new admissions—can justify modifying supervised release conditions.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s non‑precedential decision in United States v. Klinger underscores a pragmatic, record‑driven approach to modifying supervised release conditions in sex‑offense‑related cases. The court affirmed three tailored restrictions—on unsupervised minor contact, internet use, and sexually explicit visual depictions—because they were:

• Grounded in unrebutted post‑release evidence of treatment noncompliance and new risk‑relevant disclosures;
• Reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, including public protection and effective treatment;
• Narrowly tailored with exceptions, carve‑outs for incidental contact, and limited duration; and
• Supported by Third Circuit precedent distinguishing absolute bans from tailored conditions (Voelker, Thielemann, Crandon, Senke).

While not binding precedent, Klinger offers clear guidance: when a district court carefully ties modified conditions to a defendant’s demonstrated post‑release risks and treatment failures, articulates an individualized rationale, and avoids overbroad, categorical bans, those conditions will likely withstand procedural and substantive reasonableness review—and First Amendment scrutiny—on appeal.