Translation Services Qualify as “Material Support” Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B: The Sixth Circuit’s Published Holding in United States v. Carpenter

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Recommended for Publication)

Case: United States v. Benjamin Alan Carpenter (aka Abu Hamza), No. 24-5656

Date: October 31, 2025

Panel: Chief Judge Sutton; Judges Gibbons and Clay

Disposition: Conviction and sentence affirmed

Introduction

This published decision addresses the scope of federal “material support” liability when a defendant provides translation services to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Benjamin Carpenter founded Ahlud-Tawhid Publications (ATP) to translate and disseminate ISIS propaganda. After engaging with a covert FBI agent posing as an ISIS contact on Telegram, Carpenter helped translate two ISIS videos into English, one of which he had recommended that ISIS prioritize for translation. A jury convicted him of attempting to provide “material support or resources” to an FTO in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, and the district court imposed a 240-month prison term plus 20 years of supervised release.

On appeal, Carpenter mounted a wide-ranging challenge to his conviction and sentence, arguing principally that translation work does not fall within § 2339B’s prohibition on providing “any…service” to an FTO. He also raised vagueness objections, attacked several evidentiary rulings, objected to a protective order permitting the undercover agent to testify under a pseudonym, challenged the jury instructions (including an Allen charge), and disputed the application of the terrorism enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board.

Summary of the Opinion

Statutory holding: Translation services provided to ISIS meet § 2339B’s prohibition on “knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources” in the form of “any…service.” The court reads “service” in light of the enumerated examples and the Supreme Court’s definition in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project as “concerted activity” in support of another. Translation is akin to “expert” or “professional” services and plainly fits the statute’s scope.
Vagueness challenge rejected: The statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to translation; a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that coordinated translation work for ISIS is prohibited “service.”
Evidentiary rulings affirmed: Evidence of Carpenter’s ATP role and related ISIS/ATP work product was intrinsic, not Rule 404(b) character evidence; WhatsApp messages about ISIS beheadings were admissible as predisposition evidence under Rule 405 once Carpenter raised entrapment; a lay opinion identifying “JJ” as “Jihadi John” caused no reversible error; a screenshot showing Syrian U.S. base locations was properly admitted under Rule 403; and the court correctly refused Carpenter’s stipulation on ISIS’s terrorist status under Old Chief’s limits.
Protective order affirmed: The undercover agent’s pseudonym was justified under Rule 16(d)(1), CIPA § 4, and Roviaro balancing where Carpenter offered only speculation that disclosure might help impeachment.
Jury instructions: The district court properly declined a Rule 404(b) instruction because the challenged material came in under Rule 405 on predisposition; the court’s use of the Sixth Circuit pattern Allen charge after a deadlock was not coercive.
Sentencing: The terrorism enhancement under § 3A1.4 applied because Carpenter’s conduct was calculated to influence or retaliate against the Egyptian government via ISIS’s “Bleeding Campaigns” video; the standard of proof is preponderance (Layne). The 240-month term and 20 years of supervised release were within-Guidelines/statutory and substantively reasonable.

Analysis

I. Scope of “Material Support” — Translation as a Prohibited “Service”

Precedents Cited and How They Matter

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010): The Supreme Court construed the same statute to cover “service” as “concerted activity” carried out in coordination with or at the direction of an FTO. Holder also emphasized the statute’s listing of “expert advice or assistance” and “financial services,” showing Congress’s intent to include professional and intellectual support. The Sixth Circuit leans on Holder to conclude that coordinated translation is squarely “service.”
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923): Invoked for noscitur a sociis—interpreting a term by the company it keeps. “Translation services” fit comfortably with the enumerated examples of “service,” especially “expert advice or assistance” and “financial services.”
Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024): The court distinguishes Fischer, which dealt with reading a “general or collective term at the end of a list,” from § 2339A(b)(1)’s use of “including,” an expansive lead-in to examples. Thus, Fischer’s limiting approach does not constrain § 2339B’s “any…service.”
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008): The general vagueness standard—statutes must give fair notice and avoid arbitrary enforcement. Together with Holder, Williams underpins the as-applied vagueness rejection.

Legal Reasoning

Textual anchor: § 2339B prohibits knowingly providing “material support or resources” to an FTO, and § 2339A(b)(1) defines that phrase to include “any…service,” preceded by “including,” which signals an expansive, non-exhaustive list.
Noscitur a sociis: The surrounding examples—“financial services,” “expert advice or assistance,” “training,” “personnel”—show that Congress contemplated professional, skilled, and intellectual contributions. Translation, often requiring linguistic expertise, is “cut from the same cloth.”
Holder’s “concerted activity” limit: By tying “service” to coordinated activity, the court ensures it covers translation performed for or at the direction of the FTO (or someone the defendant believes is acting for the FTO), not independent advocacy.
Vagueness rejected: Because “service” retains its ordinary meaning, and because the statute’s examples indicate professional assistance is within scope, the law is neither standardless nor surprising in application to coordinated translation for ISIS.
Fact fit: Carpenter believed he was assisting ISIS through an agent who claimed to speak for the “diwan,” accepted translation assignments, and transmitted completed work. Those facts embody the “concerted activity” Holder describes.
Fischer’s inapplicability: The court clarifies that it is not using a sweeping general term at the end of a list; instead, “including” launches a list of examples that help illuminate “service,” consistent with Fischer’s admonition to read general terms in context.

Impact

Translator/mediator exposure: Individuals who translate or facilitate dissemination of FTO content at the direction of (or in coordination with) FTOs—or those believed to be FTO emissaries—face direct § 2339B liability in the Sixth Circuit.
First Amendment guardrail preserved: Although not squarely a First Amendment case, the opinion’s reliance on Holder’s “concerted activity” concept implicitly preserves the line between coordinated services (criminalized) and independent advocacy/analysis (generally protected). The opinion does not criminalize independent translation absent coordination.
Statutory interpretation clarity: The court resolves uncertainty post-Fischer by emphasizing “including” as expansive and by using the enumerated examples to clarify, rather than restrict, “service.”
Vagueness challenges narrowed: As-applied vagueness arguments will likely fail where defendants have clear, coordinated contact with FTO-linked actors and perform professional tasks to advance the FTO’s messaging.

II. Evidence Rulings

Intrinsic Evidence vs. Rule 404(b)

Precedents: United States v. Churn; United States v. Hardy; United States v. Gibbs. These cases distinguish intrinsic acts—“inextricably intertwined” with the charged conduct or necessary to complete the story—from “other acts” under Rule 404(b).
Holding: Evidence of Carpenter’s ATP role, ATP’s and ISIS’s work product, and Carpenter’s interactions with those materials was intrinsic. It provided the narrative context showing knowledge and intent, completed the story of the charged offense, and established the nexus among participants.
Rule 403 balancing: Highly probative on knowledge and intent; not unfairly prejudicial merely because it was powerful. The district court invited cumulative-objection renewals at trial; Carpenter did not renew, undercutting his cumulative-prejudice claim.

Entrapment, Predisposition, and Rule 405

Precedents: United States v. Roper; United States v. Ambrose; United States v. McMahan. Once a defendant raises entrapment, predisposition becomes an “essential element” for the government, opening the door to character/predisposition proof under Rule 405(b), without Rule 404(b)(3)’s notice requirement.
Application: WhatsApp screenshots of Carpenter’s enthusiastic discussion of ISIS beheadings were admissible predisposition evidence. The district court still applied Rule 403 safeguards exhibit-by-exhibit.
Takeaway: Invoking entrapment invites broader predisposition proof under Rule 405; defendants should anticipate, and pre-litigate, the scope and limits of such evidence through 403 arguments.

Lay Opinion Identification

Precedent: United States v. Kilpatrick. To challenge lay identification, a defendant must show the identification was faulty or debatable and that the answer was prejudicial.
Application: The FBI agent’s testimony that “JJ” likely referred to “Jihadi John” was not shown to be inaccurate or unfairly prejudicial. Even if error, it was harmless in light of the record (Kotteakos standard).

Screenshot of Syrian U.S. Base Locations (Exhibit 17)

Rule 403 analysis: The exhibit was relevant to show Carpenter’s belief that the agent was an ISIS “operator” or affiliate, bearing on the “knowing” provision of support. The district court reasonably minimized prejudice given the exhibit’s nature and context.

Refusal to Accept Stipulation on ISIS’s Status

Precedents: Old Chief v. United States; United States v. Luck. The government is entitled to present its narrative proof, subject to a narrow Old Chief exception for prior-conviction elements. The Sixth Circuit has declined to extend that exception beyond prior convictions.
Application: Carpenter’s long-running engagement with ISIS propaganda did more than check the “knowledge-of-FTO” box; it had narrative and probative force. The court properly allowed the government to prove that element its own way.

III. Protective Order and Agent Pseudonym

Authorities: Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1); CIPA § 4; Roviaro v. United States; United States v. Ray; United States v. Moore; United States v. Sharp; United States v. Doxey.
Balancing test: Courts weigh the public interest in protecting information sources and national security against the defendant’s right to prepare a defense. The defendant bears the burden to show the requested disclosure would materially assist the defense.
Application: Carpenter offered only conjecture that learning the agent’s identity might help impeach credibility. The court credited safety risks to the agent/family and confirmed the government’s Brady/Giglio compliance. The Confrontation Clause permits reasonable limits on cross-examination for safety and relevance (Delaware v. Van Arsdall; United States v. Phillips). The pseudonym order stood.

IV. Jury Instructions

Refusal to Give a Rule 404(b) Instruction

Standard: A requested instruction must (1) correctly state the law, (2) not be substantially covered elsewhere, and (3) concern a point so important that failing to give it substantially impairs the defense (United States v. Maddux).
Application: Because the challenged materials were admitted under Rule 405(b) (predisposition), not Rule 404(b), a 404(b) instruction risked confusing jurors (United States v. Franco). The refusal was within discretion.

Allen Charge

Precedents: United States v. Clinton (requirements for a balanced charge); United States v. Roach (pattern instruction is generally safe); United States v. Tines (typically given upon deadlock).
Application: The court used the Sixth Circuit pattern Allen charge, admonished both majority and minority jurors, and emphasized not surrendering honest beliefs. Timing—soon after the jury reported deadlock—reduced coercion risk. No error.

V. Sentencing

Procedural Reasonableness

Standards: Gall v. United States (procedural pitfalls); United States v. Rayyan (abuse-of-discretion review).
Terrorism Enhancement (§ 3A1.4): The enhancement applies if the offense is a “federal crime of terrorism,” meaning it was calculated to influence or retaliate against a government’s conduct, and the underlying offense is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g). The court found Carpenter specifically intended to influence or retaliate against the Egyptian government through ISIS’s “Bleeding Campaigns” video. Providing material support to an FTO qualifies as a listed offense.
Burden of proof: Preponderance of the evidence (United States v. Layne), not clear and convincing.
§ 3553(a)(6) disparities: The district court considered disparity concerns and explained its conclusion.

Substantive Reasonableness

Within-Guidelines presumption: A within-Guidelines term is presumptively reasonable (United States v. Vonner).
Application: The 240-month sentence and 20 years’ supervised release (authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(j)) reflected the seriousness of the offense, Carpenter’s lack of repentance, and a high recidivism risk. No abuse of discretion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Material support statute (§ 2339B): Criminalizes knowingly providing “material support or resources” to FTOs; includes “any…service,” a broad category covering coordinated professional or technical help.
“Service” under Holder: Means coordinated or concerted activity in support of an FTO. Independent advocacy is generally outside this category.
Intrinsic evidence vs. Rule 404(b): Intrinsic evidence directly completes the story of the charged crime; Rule 404(b) covers other acts offered for limited purposes and comes with notice/limiting instruction considerations.
Entrapment and predisposition (Rule 405): When a defendant claims entrapment, the government can prove predisposition, including by using character or conduct evidence, without Rule 404(b) notice.
Rule 403 balancing: Courts exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion, or cumulativeness.
Allen charge: A supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating while not surrendering honest convictions.
CIPA and protective orders: Courts can restrict disclosure of sensitive/classified information and permit pseudonyms when safety and national security outweigh speculative defense gains.
Terrorism enhancement (§ 3A1.4): Dramatically increases offense level and criminal history if the offense was calculated to influence government conduct; proof by a preponderance at sentencing.
Vagueness doctrine: A law is vague if it fails to give fair notice or invites arbitrary enforcement. Here, “service” with enumerated examples and Holder’s definition provided ample notice.
Brady/Giglio: The government must disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence; compliance can mitigate disclosure limits on identities.

Broader Implications and Practice Pointers

For Translators, Researchers, and Media Professionals

Coordination is key: Translating or amplifying FTO content at the request of, in concert with, or for the benefit of an FTO (or someone reasonably believed to be an FTO agent) can be prosecuted as “service” under § 2339B.
Independent work distinction: The opinion, anchored in Holder, suggests independent analysis, journalism, or translation not coordinated with an FTO remains outside “service.” Scrupulously avoid communications or arrangements with FTOs or their emissaries.
Risk management: Document independent purposes; maintain clear non-coordination policies; avoid “tasking” relationships; seek legal guidance when working with sensitive materials.

For Defense Counsel

Entrapment strategy trade-offs: Raising entrapment opens the door to potent predisposition evidence under Rule 405. Plan tailored 403 objections and be ready for lay/expert opinion disputes.
Preserve objections: Accept court invitations to renew cumulative 403 objections as the government’s case unfolds; develop concrete prejudice arguments.
Protective order challenges: Offer specific theories of material assistance from disclosure (beyond impeachment speculation). Propose narrower alternatives (e.g., in camera review, counsel-only access) to overcome safety concerns.
Sentencing focus: Counter § 3A1.4 by contesting “calculated to influence” intent and the linkage between the defendant’s specific conduct and governmental coercion/retaliation. Prepare comparative data for § 3553(a)(6) disparities.

For Prosecutors

Frame “service” through coordination: Emphasize tasking, direction, and reciprocal communications to fit Holder’s “concerted activity” rubric.
Predisposition proof: When entrapment is raised, build a Rule 405(b) record with careful 403 vetting to withstand appellate scrutiny.
Protecting identities: Support pseudonym requests with detailed safety and national security proffers; verify Brady/Giglio compliance on the record.

For Trial Courts

Clarity on intrinsic evidence: Explain the narrative function of evidence completing the story and conduct granular 403 analyses to avoid 404(b) pitfalls.
Allen charge best practices: Use the pattern instruction, balance both sides, and deliver promptly upon deadlock to reduce coercion claims.

Conclusion

United States v. Carpenter establishes a clear, precedential rule in the Sixth Circuit: providing translation services to an FTO, when done in coordination with or at the direction of that organization (or its emissaries), is a prohibited “service” and thus “material support” under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The court harmonizes textual interpretation with Holder’s “concerted activity” concept, rejects vagueness challenges as applied, and clarifies several important trial and sentencing doctrines: the boundary between intrinsic evidence and Rule 404(b); the government’s ability to introduce predisposition evidence under Rule 405 after an entrapment defense; the permissibility of protective pseudonyms for undercover agents under CIPA and Roviaro balancing; the safety of the Sixth Circuit pattern Allen charge; and the application of the terrorism enhancement under § 3A1.4 on a preponderance standard.

Beyond its immediate holding, Carpenter offers practical guidance for cases at the intersection of speech and security. It delineates the legal significance of coordination with an FTO, signaling that professionalized, goal-advancing contributions—even linguistic ones—carry criminal exposure when provided to terrorist entities. At the same time, by anchoring the analysis in Holder’s “concerted activity,” the decision preserves space for independent expression. For litigants and courts alike, Carpenter provides a comprehensive roadmap for evidentiary management, protective orders, jury guidance, and sentencing in material-support prosecutions.