Translating Out‑of‑State Public Reprimands into New York Public Censure: The Appellate Division’s Deference in Reciprocal Discipline

Introduction

Matter of Pantiliat is a reciprocal attorney discipline case in which the Appellate Division, Second Department, imposed a public censure on a New York-admitted lawyer following discipline previously imposed in Arizona. The decision affirms and operationalizes a core principle of New York reciprocal discipline: when an out-of-state sanction is not inconsistent with sanctions typically imposed for similar misconduct in New York, the New York court will generally impose the same (or the New York analogue of the) sanction, according significant weight to the foreign jurisdiction’s determination.

The underlying Arizona matter involved allegations that the respondent, representing a real estate brokerage and its principal, engaged in improper communications with an opposing party who was not consistently represented, sought to procure an affidavit tailored to his clients’ preferred narrative despite conflicts with the witness’s prior testimony, and failed to withdraw when a material personal-interest conflict crystallized. Arizona imposed a public reprimand and probation with a CLE condition. In New York, the Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District sought reciprocal discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13. The respondent opposed only as to measure of discipline, asking for public censure and offering mitigation; he did not assert any of the rule’s limited defenses to reciprocal discipline. The Second Department publicly censured him.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department held that reciprocal discipline was warranted based on the misconduct underpinning the Arizona judgment and order dated September 13, 2023. The court emphasized New York’s practice of giving “significant weight” to the sanction where the misconduct occurred and, absent inconsistency with New York sanctioning norms, imposing the same sanction. Applying that framework, the court imposed a public censure on the respondent, the New York analogue to Arizona’s public reprimand.

Key points:

• The respondent admitted to the Arizona violations of Rules 1.16(a), 4.3, and 8.4(d) of the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct.
• The Arizona court publicly reprimanded him and placed him on one year’s probation with a six-hour CLE requirement.
• In the New York reciprocal proceeding, the respondent did not assert any enumerated defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) and sought a public censure as reciprocal discipline, citing cooperation and remorse.
• The Second Department noted the respondent failed to report the Arizona discipline to the court as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d), learning of it from Arizona’s bar authorities.
• Relying on Matter of Sirkin and Matter of Esposito, the court publicly censured the respondent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s decision rests on established Second Department precedent defining the contours of reciprocal discipline:

• Matter of Sirkin, 77 AD3d 320 (2d Dept 2010): The court quoted Sirkin for the principle that New York generally accords “significant weight” to the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction because that jurisdiction “has the greatest interest in fashioning sanctions for misconduct perpetrated therein.” The opinion further reiterates that when the foreign sanction is “not inconsistent with the sanction for similar misconduct in this jurisdiction,” New York “should impose the same sanction.”
• Matter of Esposito, 126 AD3d 93 (2d Dept 2015): Cited in support of Sirkin’s deference framework; Esposito anchors the practice of aligning New York’s reciprocal sanction with the foreign sanction unless a disparity with New York norms would render the foreign sanction inconsistent.

Together, Sirkin and Esposito continue to anchor New York’s approach to reciprocal discipline: comity, consistency, and calibrated equivalency. The Second Department applied these precedents to translate Arizona’s public reprimand into New York’s functional equivalent—public censure.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning follows the structure mandated by 22 NYCRR 1240.13 and informed by Sirkin/Esposito:

• Threshold entitlement to reciprocal discipline: The court recognized the respondent’s Arizona discipline, the admitted misconduct, and the absence of any asserted enumerated defenses under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b) (such as lack of due process in the foreign proceeding, infirmity of proof, or that the conduct would not constitute misconduct in New York).
• Sanction selection by equivalency: The court employed the Sirkin principle of significant deference to the foreign sanction, checking for inconsistency with New York’s sanctioning patterns. Finding no inconsistency, the court imposed the same category of discipline in New York terms—public censure as the analogue to a public reprimand.
• Treatment of reporting failure: Although the respondent failed to notify the court of his Arizona discipline as required by 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d), the Second Department noted the lapse but did not enhance the sanction. The court treated the reporting failure as a procedural deficiency rather than a stand-alone aggravator in this reciprocal discipline order.

Functionally, the case exemplifies how New York converts sister-state sanctions into New York’s disciplinary taxonomy: a “public reprimand” elsewhere is typically implemented as “public censure” here. The court did not replicate Arizona’s probationary/CLE conditions, underscoring that equivalency centers on sanction type and consistency, not necessarily every collateral condition imposed elsewhere.

Factual Context and Ethical Rules Implicated

The Arizona record (adopted for purposes of reciprocal discipline) reflected that the respondent:

• Communicated directly with an opposing party (Daly) outside the presence of her previously limited-scope counsel, and sought cooperation conditioned on settlement benefits.
• Proposed an affidavit designed to support his client’s litigation position despite the witness’s stated view that the facts did not align and her concern that signing would contradict prior sworn testimony.
• Remained as counsel despite a developing conflict where he could be a witness and was under bar investigation, prompting his eventual disqualification by the trial court for a material personal-interest conflict.

The Arizona violations—Rules 1.16(a) (withdrawal when representation would violate rules), 4.3 (limits on giving advice to unrepresented persons with adverse interests), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice)—have close counterparts in New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct. This functional overlap supports the court’s observation that the foreign misconduct warrants discipline here.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Matter of Pantiliat reinforces several important points for multijurisdictional practitioners and New York disciplinary practice:

• Equivalency in sanctioning: A sister-state public reprimand will ordinarily result in a New York public censure, absent compelling reasons to depart. The court’s approach aids predictability in reciprocal discipline.
• Conditions may not travel: Arizona’s probation and CLE condition were not expressly replicated. New York’s focus is on sanction type and consistency, not automatic adoption of every foreign condition.
• Reporting duties matter: The court flagged the respondent’s failure to notify under 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d). While it did not enhance the sanction here, attorneys should expect that unreported foreign discipline can independently trigger scrutiny or separate charges; compliance avoids compounding exposure.
• Ethical boundaries with unrepresented opponents: The underlying Arizona misconduct illustrates the risk in negotiating with unrepresented adverse parties, particularly when proposing affidavits or testimony that align with a client narrative. Even if not the focus of the New York order, the factual backdrop signals that New York’s analogous rules would view similar conduct as serious.
• Conflicts and withdrawal: Persisting in representation amid a personal-interest conflict—especially where the lawyer’s conduct is under investigation and the lawyer may be a witness—invites disqualification and discipline. The case underscores the duty to assess and, when necessary, withdraw under Rule 1.16 equivalents.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reciprocal discipline (22 NYCRR 1240.13): When an attorney admitted in New York is disciplined elsewhere, New York can impose discipline based on that foreign order. The attorney has limited defenses (e.g., lack of due process, insufficient proof, conduct not misconduct in NY). If no defense applies, the court typically imposes an equivalent sanction.
• Public reprimand vs. public censure: Different labels in different jurisdictions for substantially similar public discipline. In New York, the analogue to another state’s public reprimand is generally public censure.
• Duty to report foreign discipline: New York-admitted attorneys must promptly inform the Appellate Division if they are disciplined in another jurisdiction (22 NYCRR 1240.13[d]).
• Rule 4.3 (unrepresented persons): Lawyers must avoid giving legal advice to an unrepresented person whose interests conflict with the lawyer’s client and must take care not to exploit the person’s lack of representation.
• Rule 1.16(a) (mandatory withdrawal): A lawyer must withdraw if continuing would violate ethical rules—such as where a personal-interest conflict materially limits representation.
• Rule 8.4(d) (prejudicial to the administration of justice): Broad prohibition on conduct that undermines the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings—e.g., pressing for statements that contradict prior sworn testimony to gain an improper advantage.
• Limited-scope representation: An attorney may appear for specific tasks (e.g., depositions, settlement). Opposing counsel should not exploit ambiguities in scope to bypass counsel; when in doubt, include the limited-scope lawyer in communications about the represented subject matter.
• Material personal-interest conflict: A conflict under which the lawyer’s own interests (e.g., reputational or disciplinary exposure) could materially limit loyalty or independent judgment for the client. This may require withdrawal and can lead to disqualification if ignored.

Conclusion

Matter of Pantiliat reaffirms the Second Department’s consistent approach to reciprocal discipline: deference to the foreign jurisdiction’s sanction and imposition of a New York-equivalent penalty where not inconsistent with local norms. The decision showcases how an out-of-state public reprimand converts to a New York public censure and illustrates that ancillary foreign conditions (probation/CLE) are not automatically mirrored. The court’s mention of the respondent’s failure to report the foreign discipline underscores the importance of compliance with 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d).

Substantively, the Arizona record serves as a cautionary narrative for practitioners: communications with unrepresented adversaries are fraught with ethical boundaries; crafting affidavits that diverge from sworn testimony invites sanctions; and personal-interest conflicts demand timely withdrawal. For lawyers practicing across jurisdictions, Pantiliat provides a clear, practical roadmap: expect reciprocal discipline, prepare for sanction equivalency, and promptly report foreign actions to avoid compounding professional risk.