Introduction

In this important civil-forfeiture decision, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the Court of Civil Appeals and reinstated a Madison Circuit Court judgment condemning $6,646 in cash seized from Jeremy S. Mitchem. The case addresses two recurring issues in Alabama forfeiture jurisprudence:

• Whether the State must “trace” seized currency to a specific drug transaction to satisfy former § 20-2-93(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975 (pre-2022); and
• The scope and force of the ore tenus standard of review when a trial court hears live testimony in a bench trial.

The Court holds that tracing seized money to a particular, identifiable drug transaction is not a mandatory element under the former statute. Instead, it is one potentially persuasive factor among many. The Court also strongly reaffirms ore tenus deference: where a trial judge hears witnesses and evaluates credibility, appellate courts must not reweigh the evidence and should overturn only if the judgment is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

Parties: The State of Alabama, ex rel. District Attorney Robert Broussard (Twenty-Third Judicial Circuit), sought condemnation of the cash. Mitchem contested forfeiture, alleging lawful origin of the money.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court of Alabama granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Civil Appeals, and remanded.
• Key holding: Under former § 20-2-93(a)(4), the State is not required to connect seized currency to a specific drug transaction to prove a prima facie case by reasonable satisfaction.
• Ore tenus deference reaffirmed: The appellate court erred in overturning the trial court’s credibility-based findings absent a showing that the judgment was contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
• On the facts, the State’s case was supported by Mitchem’s detailed admissions about selling drugs (including quantities and pricing), possession of a variety of controlled substances contemporaneous with the seizure, and the trial court’s prerogative to disbelieve Mitchem’s explanation that the funds came from his father.

Factual Background and Procedural History

In November 2020, deputies attempted a traffic stop on a vehicle with an expired tag observed lingering at gas pumps. The driver, later identified as Mitchem, fled, leading officers on a 26-mile pursuit at speeds up to 100 mph, ending only after a collision with a law-enforcement vehicle. A search of the vehicle (not titled to Mitchem) revealed various controlled substances, including methamphetamine, pills (e.g., Xanax, Suboxone), “molly,” and GHB. The $6,646 in currency was found on Mitchem’s person.

After Miranda warnings, an investigator testified that Mitchem admitted he was the sole occupant, claimed the drugs as his, and stated he sells narcotics because “it’s hard out here,” specifying a pricing scheme (e.g., an ounce of methamphetamine for $600). Mitchem had a prior 2018 trafficking conviction and, more recently, a trafficking conviction in a controlled substance.

Mitchem denied possessing or knowing about the drugs in the vehicle, said he fled due to outstanding warrants, and claimed the money came from his father for a vehicle purchase. An after-judgment filing included a notarized but unsworn document purportedly from his father, which the trial court did not credit (unsworn materials lack probative value).

The trial court, applying former § 20-2-93(a)(4), found the State had, to its “reasonable satisfaction,” established a prima facie case that the currency was subject to forfeiture. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding the judgment was against the great weight of the evidence, essentially because the State did not tie the cash to a “specific drug transaction.” The Supreme Court reversed the CCA.

Statutory Framework and Standards

The case arises under former § 20-2-93(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975 (pre-2022 amendments), which subjected to forfeiture:

• Money furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange for controlled substances;
• Proceeds traceable to such an exchange; and
• Money used or intended to be used to facilitate violations of Alabama’s controlled substances laws.

The State’s burden was to make a prima facie showing by “reasonable satisfaction.” On appellate review where the trial court heard evidence ore tenus, the judgment is presumed correct unless contrary to the great weight of the evidence.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 2005).
  The CCA read McConathy to require a “specific transaction” nexus. The Supreme Court clarifies that McConathy did not impose a categorical tracing requirement. McConathy emphasizes that mere proximity of money to drugs is insufficient and that speculation cannot support forfeiture. There, neutral documentary evidence supported the claimant’s lawful-source explanation, and the State’s theory hinged on future purchases. The present case is different: Mitchem made detailed admissions about selling, the very substances he sold were present, and the trial court disbelieved his source story.
• Holloway v. State ex rel. Whetstone, 772 So. 2d 475 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000).
  Origin of the “specific drug transaction” phrasing. The Supreme Court explains that this factor may be probative, but it is not an element the State must prove in every case.
• Blackwell v. State ex rel. Snyder, 266 So. 3d 76 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018), and Wilson v. State, 296 So. 3d 321 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019).
  These decisions read McConathy as requiring a specific-transaction link. The Supreme Court signals that such a reading is too strict: while direct tracing can be compelling, it is not mandated if the totality of circumstances reasonably satisfies the statutory standard.
• Gatlin v. State, 846 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
  Catalogues non-exhaustive indicators of drug transactions (quantity of drugs, packaging, scales, implausible cash explanations). The Supreme Court embraces Gatlin’s multi-factor approach and rejects any single-factor litmus test (such as “specific transaction”).
• Wherry v. State ex rel. Brooks, 637 So. 2d 1353 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994).
  Example of compelling tracing: bills matched by serial number to a controlled buy. The Court cites Wherry to illustrate that direct tracing is powerful, but again, not mandatory.
• Johnson v. State, 667 So. 2d 105 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995), and Moynes v. State, 555 So. 2d 1086 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989).
  Uphold forfeiture based on circumstantial linkage among cash, drugs, and paraphernalia. These show that circumstantial constellations can satisfy the burden without matching bills to a particular sale.
• Winstead v. State, 375 So. 2d 1207 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
  Confirms that items associated with drug dealing found in a vehicle can support forfeiture (there, an automobile), reinforcing that the statute contemplates circumstantial proof.
• State v. Smith, 578 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991).
  Confirms the State’s burden: a prima facie case proven by “reasonable satisfaction.”
• Ore tenus authorities: Ex parte McConathy (standard articulated), Washington v. Johnson, 402 So. 3d 816 (Ala. 2024); Wells v. Wells, 69 So. 3d 192 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); Langley & Watters, LLP v. Gamble, 281 So. 3d 1228 (Ala. 2018) (Shaw, J., concurring specially).
  These cases reinforce deference to trial judges’ credibility assessments when they hear live testimony.
• $3,011 in U.S. Currency v. State, 845 So. 2d 810 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
  Appellate deference to factual findings does not extend to legal errors; however, the Supreme Court here finds no legal error and emphasizes factual deference.
• Ankor Energy, LLC v. Kelly, 271 So. 3d 798 (Ala. 2018).
  A notarized document is not a sworn affidavit absent an oath. The Court notes Mitchem’s father’s “affidavit” was unsworn and thus lacked evidentiary weight.
• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
  Establishes the necessity of warnings before custodial interrogation; relevant here to the admissibility and weight of Mitchem’s admissions.

Legal Reasoning

1. No categorical “specific transaction” requirement under former § 20-2-93(a)(4).
   The statute’s text condemns money “furnished or intended to be furnished” in a drug exchange, “proceeds traceable” to such exchanges, and money “used or intended to be used to facilitate” controlled-substances violations. The Court explains that while directly tying the cash to a specific buy/sale is powerfully probative (as in controlled-bill serial matches), it is not an element of the State’s proof. The better reading, reflected in Gatlin, is a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry allowing circumstantial evidence and commonsense inferences.
2. Recalibrating the use of McConathy and Holloway.
   The Court rejects a rigid gloss that emerged from later cases (e.g., Blackwell, Wilson), clarifying that McConathy’s “no speculation” principle does not transform into a tracing requirement. McConathy turns on the State’s failure to bridge suspicion to proof and the presence of neutral, corroborated lawful-source evidence. In contrast, Mitchem’s detailed admissions, contemporaneous possession of multiple drugs (some of the types he admitted selling), and his implausible source explanation support a reasonable, non-speculative inference that the seized currency was drug proceeds or funds used to facilitate sales.
3. Ore tenus deference controls appellate review.
   The trial court was entitled to disbelieve Mitchem’s testimony, including his narrative about the source of the funds and his denial of knowledge of the drugs. The Supreme Court underscores that appellate courts should not reweigh credibility or substitute their inferences for those of the trial judge absent a conclusion that the judgment is against the great weight of the evidence. Justice Shaw’s special concurrence reiterates this constraint as a structural feature of nonjury trials.
4. Applying the standards to the record.
   The Court emphasizes:
   • Mitchem possessed a variety of controlled substances,
   • Made detailed admissions about selling specific drugs and pricing,
   • Had prior trafficking convictions, and
   • Offered an explanation for the cash that the trial court could reasonably reject, especially given the unsworn “affidavit.”
   Taken together, these facts satisfy the State’s burden by reasonable satisfaction that the cash was proceeds of or intended for drug transactions, even without proof linking each bill to a particular sale.
5. No misapplication of law by the trial court.
   Because the trial court used the correct standard (reasonable satisfaction) and considered admissible evidence, its judgment was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The CCA’s contrary conclusion stemmed from overreading McConathy and underweighting ore tenus deference.

Impact and Prospective Significance

• Clarified evidentiary burden in forfeiture cases.
  Prosecutors need not prove a specific transaction nexus to prevail under former § 20-2-93. Robust circumstantial evidence—especially contemporaneous possession of multiple controlled substances, admissions of trafficking (including pricing, quantities, and motives), and credibility determinations against the claimant—can suffice.
• Reinforced ore tenus discipline on appeal.
  The decision is a reminder to appellate courts: it is error to overturn a trial court’s credibility-based factfinding merely because the record could support a different inference. The “great weight of the evidence” threshold remains high.
• Limiting the reach of Blackwell and Wilson.
  To the extent those cases suggested a categorical tracing requirement, this decision narrows their influence. Trial courts can consider tracing as a factor, but its absence is not dispositive where other indicia are strong.
• Practical guidance for litigants.
  Prosecutors: Document defendants’ admissions carefully (post-Miranda), inventory and photograph all substances and paraphernalia, and challenge unsworn or unsupported “lawful source” claims.
  Claimants: Provide sworn, documentary corroboration of lawful sources (e.g., sale contracts, bank records). Mere assertions or unsworn statements, especially contradicted by admissions and physical evidence, are unlikely to carry the day.
• Continuity across statutory regimes.
  Although this case applies the pre-2022 version of § 20-2-93, the Court’s evidentiary analysis and ore tenus guidance will likely inform trial and appellate courts adjudicating seizures governed by similar statutory language. Nothing in the opinion suggests a retrenchment from requiring more than “mere proximity,” but the Court plainly rejects an inflexible “specific transaction” rule.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Forfeiture/Condemnation: A civil process by which the State obtains ownership of property connected to criminal activity (here, drug activity) without needing a criminal conviction of the owner for the property to be forfeited.
• Former § 20-2-93(a)(4): Allowed forfeiture of money used in, intended for, or derived from controlled-substance exchanges, or used to facilitate such crimes.
• Prima facie case by “reasonable satisfaction”: The State need not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; it must present enough reliable evidence to reasonably convince the trial judge that the property is forfeitable.
• Ore tenus standard: When a judge hears live testimony in a bench trial, the judge’s factual findings, especially credibility judgments, receive strong deference on appeal and will not be reversed unless the judgment is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
• “Specific transaction” proof: Directly tying seized money to a particular buy/sale (e.g., matching serial numbers from a controlled buy). Helpful but not required; the court may rely on a constellation of circumstantial indicators.
• Proceeds vs. Facilitation: “Proceeds” are the profits or receipts from sales; “facilitation” covers money used or intended to be used to make sales easier or possible (e.g., funds for purchasing inventory or packaging).
• Miranda warnings: Advisements that a suspect has the right to remain silent and to counsel before custodial interrogation. Post-Miranda admissions can be highly probative.
• Unsworn affidavit: A notarized document not made under oath is not evidence in the legal sense. To carry weight, affidavits must be sworn (made under oath) or otherwise admissible.

Special Concurrence

Justice Shaw, author of the main opinion, specially concurs to stress that in nonjury trials, appellate courts are constrained by the ore tenus standard. He notes that in Ex parte McConathy the claimant’s testimony was also supported by neutral documentary evidence, but expresses no view on whether McConathy correctly applied ore tenus. The concurrence reinforces that in forfeiture cases, as in other bench trials, credibility determinations belong to the trial judge.

Key Takeaways and Conclusion

• The Alabama Supreme Court clarifies an important evidentiary rule in forfeiture law: proof that seized currency is tied to a specific, identifiable drug transaction is not a necessary element under former § 20-2-93(a)(4). It is one of many possible indicators.
• Trial courts may rely on circumstantial evidence and find the State’s burden met by reasonable satisfaction where the record shows admissions of drug dealing, contemporaneous possession of controlled substances, and implausible lawful-source explanations.
• Appellate courts must apply robust ore tenus deference and avoid displacing trial judges’ credibility findings unless the judgment is contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
• Practically, the decision curtails the more rigid reading of McConathy in later cases (e.g., Blackwell, Wilson), returning the focus to totality-of-the-circumstances assessments guided by Gatlin and related precedents.
• The outcome underscores the value of credible, sworn, documentary proof for claimants asserting lawful sources of funds and the persuasive power of detailed, corroborated admissions for the State.

In the broader legal context, this opinion recalibrates Alabama’s forfeiture jurisprudence toward a flexible, evidence-driven approach under the pre-2022 statute and solidifies the centrality of the ore tenus doctrine in preserving the integrity of trial-level factfinding. It will likely influence the handling of similar cases, both retrospectively (for pre-amendment seizures) and prospectively (as a guidepost in evaluating evidentiary sufficiency and appellate deference).