Toward Adoption of the Admission Rule in Texas: Justice Young’s Concurrence in Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Blake

I. Introduction

This commentary examines Justice Evan A. Young’s concurring opinion in Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz A. Ali v. Jennifer Blake, et al., a 2025 decision of the Supreme Court of Texas. Although the Court’s majority opinion (not reproduced in the text provided) resolves the case on substantive tort grounds—holding that “tort liability may not be imposed as a matter of law” and thus rendering judgment for Werner—the concurrence focuses on a different, structurally important issue: the so‑called “admission rule.”

The parties are a commercial motor carrier and its driver (Werner Enterprises, Inc. and Shiraz Ali) on one side and members of the Blake family and a guardian on the other, arising from a tragic motor‑vehicle accident involving a Werner truck and another driver, Salinas. The plaintiffs sued not only the driver but also Werner on theories of vicarious liability (respondeat superior) and “derivative” corporate negligence—negligent hiring, training, and supervision, among others.

Werner admitted that its driver was acting in the “course and scope” of his employment at the time of the accident. Based on that admission, Werner argued that under the admission rule the plaintiffs could not also pursue derivative corporate‑negligence theories that added no compensatory damages but introduced extensive evidence of Werner’s hiring and training practices. The trial court rejected that argument, submitted both vicarious and derivative theories, and the jury apportioned fault in a way that, in Justice Young’s view, dramatically illustrates the mischief the admission rule is designed to prevent.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the judgment and expressly declined to recognize the admission rule, reasoning in part that a gross‑negligence claim and request for exemplary damages rendered the rule inapplicable. Justice Wilson’s lengthy dissent advocated adopting the admission rule and applying it to bar the derivative negligence claims here.

On review, the Supreme Court of Texas reverses on an antecedent tort‑law question and renders judgment for Werner. Because that holding eliminates all liability as a matter of law, the Court does not (and need not) decide the admission‑rule question. Justice Young writes separately to:

• Clarify the non‑precedential status of the court of appeals’ rejection of the admission rule;
• Explain and defend the admission rule as sound doctrine that Texas is likely to adopt in a future case;
• Highlight the special problem of a “gross negligence” / exemplary‑damages exception to the rule; and
• Signal to lower courts and litigants how these issues should be framed and approached going forward.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision and the Concurrence

A. The Court’s Disposition

As Justice Young explains at the outset, the Supreme Court’s majority resolves the case by answering an “antecedent tort-law question”: it holds that “tort liability may not be imposed as a matter of law.” That conclusion is dispositive. Once the Court determines that no one can be held liable in negligence on the facts as a matter of law, all subsidiary issues—including the admission rule and the viability of derivative corporate‑negligence claims—become academic.

Crucially, the Court’s decision to render judgment (rather than remand) “wipes the slate clean” with respect to the court of appeals’ extended discussion of the admission rule. That discussion, Justice Young stresses, “is no longer a precedent even in that court.” The lower courts are thus free to approach the admission‑rule issue “in the normal course” in future cases, unbound by the Fourteenth Court’s prior rejection of the rule.

B. Justice Young’s Concurring Opinion

Justice Young, joined by Justice Huddle, agrees with the Court’s resolution of the case on tort‑liability grounds. He writes separately because:

• The admission rule was extensively briefed by the parties and amici, and heavily analyzed by the en banc court of appeals.
• In his view, the court of appeals’ majority rationale for rejecting the rule is “seriously flawed.”
• He believes this case almost provided the right vehicle to settle the admission‑rule question and wants to lay analytic groundwork for when that question reaches the Court squarely.

While explicitly “leav[ing] open all possible outcomes in future cases,” Justice Young makes clear his current inclination:

• He finds Justice Wilson’s dissent in the court of appeals “highly convincing” and “scholarly.”
• Absent equally compelling arguments to the contrary in a future case, he is “inclined to vote to adopt the admission rule” and to apply it as the Wilson dissent describes.

The concurrence therefore operates as a detailed, influential roadmap for the likely future of Texas law on the admission rule, even though it does not itself establish binding precedent on that issue.

III. The Admission Rule: Concept, Rationale, and Application in this Case

A. What Is the Admission Rule?

The “admission rule” arises when:

1. An employee allegedly commits a tort within the course and scope of employment; and
2. The employer affirmatively admits or stipulates that the employee was acting in the course and scope at the time, and therefore that the employer is vicariously liable under respondeat superior for any negligence found by the jury.

In that procedural posture, the admission rule—as articulated in other jurisdictions and in Texas intermediate courts—provides that:

When the employer admits vicarious liability for the employee’s negligence, derivative theories of corporate negligence (such as negligent hiring, training, supervision, or entrustment) that are tied to the same underlying employee negligence and the same injury should not be submitted to the jury, and evidence solely relevant to those derivative theories should not be admitted.

Justice Young emphasizes a key conceptual point: assuming such corporate‑negligence theories are valid at all, they are derivative of the employee’s negligence—i.e., they require a predicate finding that the employee was negligent in the underlying tort. Once that predicate finding is made and the employer has already admitted it will “answer for” the employee’s negligence, nothing further is required to hold the employer liable for compensatory damages. Submitting redundant corporate‑negligence theories adds no recovery but introduces complexity and prejudice.

He captures the rule’s animating common‑sense intuition this way: when an employer admits course‑and‑scope and respondeat superior liability, “the admission rule requires the plaintiff to accept ‘yes’ for an answer.”

B. The Rationale: Efficiency and Integrity of the Jury’s Verdict

The concurrence identifies two principal reasons supporting the admission rule:

1. Judicial administration and efficiency

Allowing derivative corporate‑negligence claims despite a binding admission of vicarious liability leads to “needless[] proliferat[ion]” of pretrial and trial proceedings:

• Extensive discovery into hiring files, training protocols, supervision structures, and corporate policies;
• Expert testimony on industry practices and safety culture; and
• Lengthy trial presentations on matters that do not change the amount of compensatory damages.

If the employer already concedes it is fully responsible for whatever negligence the jury finds for the employee, this additional litigation is, in Justice Young’s words, “pointless—or worse.”

2. Risk of unfair prejudice and distortion of liability

The “worse” is prejudice that undermines the integrity of the verdict:

“Admitting evidence of the employer's hiring, training, or supervision practices, if formally irrelevant, not only jeopardizes efficiency but also threatens the integrity of the results. The damages are what they are; the extent of the injuries is what it is. If the employer accepts full responsibility, inflaming a jury by admitting evidence of alleged negligence of multiple employees other than the driver risks inflating damages beyond their actual amount or distorting the attribution of liability (or both).”

Thus, beyond cost and complexity, Justice Young is concerned that a jury’s emotional reaction to corporate conduct remote in time and place from the accident can skew both:

• The compensation awarded; and
• The apportionment of responsibility among the involved actors.

C. Illustration from the Jury’s Fault Apportionment

Justice Young points to the actual apportionment of fault in this case as “a prime example of the very confusion the admission rule aims to prevent.”

The jury was asked to apportion responsibility in two different ways:

1. Between the two drivers only. In a question limited to Werner’s driver (Ali) and the other driver (Salinas), the jury assigned:
   • 45% fault to Werner’s driver;
   • 55% fault to Salinas.
2. Including a separate corporate‑negligence claim against Werner. A later question asked the jury to consider alleged negligent hiring, training, and supervision by Werner, instructing them to consider alleged negligence of “employees other than the driver,” involving acts “quite remote from the accident in time and place.” The jury then assigned:
   • 70% fault to Werner (on the corporate‑negligence theories);
   • 14% fault to Werner’s driver; and
   • 16% fault to Salinas.

Because Werner had admitted respondeat superior liability, the 14% assigned to its driver is effectively also Werner’s responsibility. Thus, the net allocation—84% to Werner (70% + 14%) and 16% to Salinas—was nearly double Werner’s responsibility compared to the drivers‑only question (where Werner’s driver had only 45% compared to Salinas’s 55%).

To Justice Young, this stark shift confirms the risk that derivative corporate‑negligence claims—tethered to the same injury and layered atop an admission of vicarious liability—distort the jury’s comparative‑fault allocation in a manner unmoored from the accident itself.

D. The Admission Rule’s Status in Texas Courts of Appeals

Although the Supreme Court has not yet definitively adopted the admission rule, Justice Young notes that Texas intermediate courts have “generally taken it as a given” that when only ordinary negligence is alleged, respondeat superior and negligent entrustment are “mutually exclusive theories of recovery.” He cites at least six courts of appeals recognizing this doctrine:

• Atlantic Indus., Inc. v. Blair, 457 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 482 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. 2016);
• Rosell v. Central West Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied);
• Arrington’s Estate v. Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
• Frasier v. Pierce, 398 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1965, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
• Luvual v. Henke & Pillot, 366 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.);
• Patterson v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 349 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

Separately, he notes that one court of appeals has applied the admission rule with an exception for gross negligence (Arrington’s Estate) while another has applied the rule without such an exception (Rodgers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

These cases reflect that, at least in ordinary‑negligence contexts, Texas appellate courts have long functioned on the assumption that once vicarious liability is established or conceded, derivative corporate‑negligence theories do not provide a separate compensatory‑damages pathway.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. McHaffie v. Bunch and Other Jurisdictions

Justice Young anchors the admission rule in well‑regarded authority from other jurisdictions, most prominently the Missouri Supreme Court’s influential decision in McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995). There, once the motor carrier admitted that the driver was its agent acting within the scope of employment, the court held:

“[O]nce the agency relationship was admitted, it was error to permit a separate assessment of fault [as] to [the] defendant . . . based upon the ‘negligent entrustment’ or ‘negligent hiring’ theories of liability. It was also error to admit evidence on those theories.”

McHaffie captures the core logic: in an ordinary negligence case where the damages are fully accounted for by vicarious liability, direct corporate‑negligence theories are redundant and prejudicial.

B. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05

The concurrence cites the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05, reporter’s note b (2006), which observes that:

“[I]n at least some jurisdictions, if an employer stipulates that an employee acted within the scope of employment in committing a tort, the employer is not subject to liability for derivative claims like negligent hiring or supervision.”

This Restatement commentary confirms that the admission rule is not an idiosyncratic or fringe doctrine; rather, it is an acknowledged feature of agency law in a number of American jurisdictions.

C. Restatement (First) of Torts § 909 and Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards

The most complex part of the concurrence concerns a possible gross negligence exception to the admission rule, tied to exemplary (punitive) damages. Here Justice Young relies on Hammerly Oaks, Inc. v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1997), which in turn adopts the standard of Restatement (First) of Torts § 909 (1939).

Under Hammerly Oaks, punitive damages can be imposed on an employer/principal for an employee’s act only if one of the following is shown:

1. The principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
2. The agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
3. The agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
4. The employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.

These criteria underscore that corporate culpability for punitive‑damages purposes focuses on the company’s own mental state, policies, and decisions—not merely the employee’s negligence. Evidence of hiring, training, and supervision practices can thus be highly relevant to whether punitive damages are warranted against the employer, even when it has admitted vicarious liability.

D. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.003

Justice Young briefly references Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 41.003, which strictly governs exemplary damages. That statute:

• Restricts exemplary damages to cases involving malice, fraud, or gross negligence; and
• Requires clear and convincing evidence of such conduct.

The concurrence uses § 41.003 to emphasize that Texas law already imposes a “onerous” burden before a plaintiff may obtain punitive damages. Against that backdrop, it would make little sense to allow plaintiffs to bypass the admission rule merely by pleading “gross negligence” without a serious evidentiary showing that gross negligence is genuinely in play.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning on the Admission Rule and Gross Negligence

A. Why the Supreme Court Did Not Decide the Admission Rule Here

Justice Young is clear that, given the majority’s resolution of the case on a threshold tort‑law question, there is “no opportunity to resolve the admission‑rule issue here.” Once the Court decides that tort liability cannot be imposed as a matter of law:

• All questions regarding the form of the jury charge become moot.
• The validity or scope of derivative corporate‑negligence claims is irrelevant.
• Any error in submitting such claims (or in failing to apply the admission rule) can no longer affect the outcome.

As a result, the admission rule remains an open question for the Texas Supreme Court, and the concurrence serves as persuasive but non‑binding analysis.

B. Mutual Exclusivity of Respondeat Superior and Derivative Corporate Negligence (in Ordinary Negligence Cases)

Justice Young’s reasoning starts from a crucial premise:

“Assuming that claims like negligent entrustment, training, hiring, and supervision are proper in the first place, they are derivative in the sense that they cannot succeed on their own but require a predicate finding of negligence by the employee.”

From this, he concludes:

• If the employee is not negligent, derivative corporate‑negligence claims fail as a matter of law.
• If the employee is negligent, and the employer has already admitted vicarious liability, the plaintiffs need nothing more to recover full compensatory damages from the employer.

In that situation, respondeat superior and negligent entrustment (and similar corporate‑negligence theories) are “mutually exclusive theories of recovery” for ordinary negligence—they both lead to the same recovery (full compensatory damages from the employer). Continuing to litigate both is duplicative and invites prejudice.

C. The Gross‑Negligence/Exemplary‑Damages Exception

The most difficult and consequential question is whether the admission rule should yield when the plaintiff alleges gross negligence and seeks exemplary damages against the employer. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that it does: in its view, because the Blakes pleaded gross negligence, the admission rule—if it existed—would not apply “regardless” of whether the court recognized it.

Justice Young unpacks the logic behind such an exception:

• Ordinary negligence yields only compensatory damages, which are fully satisfied by vicarious liability once admitted.
• Gross negligence, however, opens the door to punitive (exemplary) damages against the employer.
• Evidence about the employer’s hiring, training, supervision, and ratification is often directly relevant to whether the employer acted with the required mental state for punitive damages.

In other words, what is “superfluous” when only compensatory damages are at issue may not be superfluous once exemplary damages are in play.

1. Justice Wilson’s approach: evidence vs. allegations

Justice Wilson’s dissent in the court of appeals, which Justice Young endorses, draws a sharp line: it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege gross negligence; there must be legally sufficient evidence of gross negligence before an exception to the admission rule is triggered. The dissent warns:

“If an injured party only needs to allege gross negligence, malice, or fraud and seek exemplary damages to avoid application of the Admission Rule, many injured parties may avoid the Admission Rule by so pleading.”

That is, if pleading gross negligence automatically neutralizes the admission rule, the rule becomes a nullity: every plaintiff can circumvent it by inserting boilerplate gross‑negligence allegations, regardless of their merit.

2. Justice Young’s view: a “rigorous showing” must be required

Justice Young agrees that a mere allegation of gross negligence is insufficient to bypass the admission rule. He stresses:

“Given that the only basis for disregarding the admission rule is to proceed to punitive damages, and given that our State's law imposes onerous burdens before punitive damages are even available, it is hard to imagine that the admission rule would yield up its benefits with only a formulaic incantation that gross negligence is alleged.”

He continues:

“Instead, I would be surprised if the law required anything less than a rigorous showing that a jury genuinely could find gross negligence that in turn could support punitive damages.”

Thus, in Justice Young’s envisioned framework:

• The admission rule would be the default rule when an employer admits vicarious liability.
• An exception might exist for gross‑negligence / exemplary‑damages claims.
• But trial courts should require a serious, evidence‑based threshold showing before allowing that exception to override the rule.

He offers a strong remedial warning: if a trial court allows a gross‑negligence claim to defeat the admission rule based only on weak allegations, and that claim later proves legally insufficient, he would be “inclined to remand for a new trial on that ground—wholly aside from anything else in the case.” In other words, erroneously bypassing the admission rule via an insubstantial gross‑negligence allegation is, in his view, reversible error.

D. Open Questions and Deliberate Restraint

Justice Young explicitly notes that further complexities remain unresolved, including:

• Whether derivative‑negligence claims are available at all in some configurations;
• How to define with precision which claims are truly “derivative” of employee negligence and which are genuinely “independent”; and
• The quantum and quality of evidence necessary to establish derivative claims or to justify submitting a gross‑negligence claim to the jury.

He chooses not to “dive further into the weeds,” preferring to rely on Justice Wilson’s “scholarly dissent” and to allow litigants in future cases to “grapple with that analysis” when the admission rule comes squarely before the Texas Supreme Court.

VI. Impact and Implications for Future Texas Litigation

A. Immediate Doctrinal Effect

Because the Court decided the case on a threshold tort‑law ground, the concurrence does not create binding Supreme Court precedent on the admission rule. However, it has several important immediate effects:

1. Vacating the precedential force of the Fourteenth Court’s rejection of the admission rule.
   Justice Young emphasizes that the Supreme Court’s decision “wipes the slate clean” on the admission‑rule discussion in 672 S.W.3d 554. That discussion is no longer precedential authority, even within the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. Future panels are free to reconsider the issue without being bound by their en banc court’s prior rationale.
2. Elevating Justice Wilson’s dissent as a de facto reference point.
   By calling the dissent “highly convincing” and “presumptively correct,” and by expressly advising future litigants to engage that analysis, Justice Young effectively positions the Wilson dissent—and its articulation of the admission rule—as the leading blueprint for how the Supreme Court may eventually resolve the issue.
3. Sending clear guidance to trial courts.
   Although non‑binding, the concurrence strongly encourages trial courts to:
   • Guard against bypassing the admission rule based on bare gross‑negligence allegations; and
   • Exercise “discernment and prudence” to avoid prejudice and serious legal error when admitting corporate‑negligence evidence once vicarious liability is admitted.

B. Practical Effects on Pleadings, Discovery, and Trial Strategy

The concurrence will likely influence litigation behavior even before any formal adoption of the admission rule:

• Plaintiffs’ strategy.
  Plaintiffs will need to anticipate:
  • Stronger defense motions in limine and for partial summary judgment or directed verdict on derivative corporate‑negligence claims once vicarious liability is admitted;
  • Closer scrutiny of gross‑negligence allegations: they will be expected to proffer concrete evidence early on to justify bypassing the admission rule; and
  • An increased likelihood that bare, boilerplate gross‑negligence pleadings will be rejected as insufficient to open the door to expansive corporate‑conduct evidence.
• Defense strategy.
  Defendants—especially institutional defendants like motor carriers, hospitals, and large employers—gain a clearer roadmap:
  • They can selectively admit course‑and‑scope employment to invoke the admission rule and seek to bar redundant corporate‑negligence theories;
  • They can argue that derivative claims should be stricken or not submitted to the jury absent a well‑supported gross‑negligence claim; and
  • They can rely on Justice Young’s warning that misuse of a gross‑negligence allegation to inject prejudicial corporate‑evidence is itself reversible error.

C. Anticipated Future Supreme Court Resolution

Justice Young’s concurrence signals a strong likelihood that, in an appropriate future case where:

• The underlying tort‑liability issue is clearly established;
• The employer admits course and scope; and
• The admission‑rule issue is cleanly preserved and outcome‑determinative;

the Texas Supreme Court will:

• Formally adopt some version of the admission rule, aligning Texas with jurisdictions like Missouri (McHaffie) and with the Restatement; and
• Address, with greater precision, the contours of any gross‑negligence / exemplary‑damages exception, likely imposing a robust evidentiary threshold as advocated here.

In the meantime, the concurrence effectively places a “thumb on the scale” in favor of the admission rule in the ongoing jurisprudential conversation, while preserving the Court’s flexibility to refine or adjust its scope in a later case.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Respondeat Superior and “Course and Scope of Employment”

Respondeat superior is a doctrine of vicarious liability: an employer is responsible for the torts of its employee committed:

• While the employee is acting within the “course and scope” of employment; and
• In furtherance of the employer’s business.

When an employer admits that its employee was acting in the course and scope at the relevant time, the employer concedes that:

• If the jury finds the employee negligent, the employer will automatically be liable for that negligence.
• The plaintiff does not need to prove any separate wrongdoing by the employer to obtain full compensatory damages from the employer.

B. Derivative Corporate‑Negligence Theories

Common “derivative” corporate‑negligence theories include:

• Negligent hiring: The employer unreasonably hired someone unfit or dangerous for the job.
• Negligent training: The employer failed to provide adequate training to the employee.
• Negligent supervision: The employer failed to supervise or monitor the employee properly.
• Negligent entrustment: The employer entrusted a vehicle or dangerous instrumentality to someone it knew or should have known was likely to use it in a way that posed an unreasonable risk of harm.

These claims are “derivative” in the sense that:

• They all require that the employee actually committed a tort (e.g., drove negligently and caused the accident); and
• They do not create a second injury or separate compensatory damages—the underlying accident is still the source of all compensatory damages.

For that reason, when vicarious liability is admitted, they often do no more than duplicate what respondeat superior already provides.

C. Gross Negligence and Exemplary (Punitive) Damages

Gross negligence in Texas is more than ordinary carelessness; it involves:

• An extreme degree of risk, and
• Subjective awareness by the defendant of that risk, coupled with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.

Exemplary damages (often called punitive damages) are intended not just to compensate the plaintiff, but to punish and deter particularly egregious conduct such as gross negligence, malice, or fraud. Texas law limits exemplary damages and requires clear and convincing evidence before they can be awarded.

The potential gross‑negligence exception to the admission rule exists because:

• Proof of the employee’s negligence (sufficient for compensatory damages) does not by itself justify punitive damages against the employer; and
• Punitive damages against the employer turn on the employer’s own culpable mental state—which often requires evidence about hiring, training, supervision, and ratification.

D. Directed Verdict, Rendition, and Remand

A motion for directed verdict is a request at trial that the judge take an issue away from the jury because, as a matter of law, there is no legally sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the opposing party.

In this case, Werner moved for a directed verdict arguing that, in light of its course‑and‑scope admission, derivative negligence claims should not go to the jury under the admission rule. The trial court denied that motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.

At the appellate level:

• Rendition occurs when the appellate court holds that the prevailing party below is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and enters the judgment the trial court should have rendered.
• Remand returns the case to the trial court for further proceedings (e.g., a new trial or additional fact‑finding) consistent with the appellate opinion.

The Supreme Court here rendered judgment for Werner on the underlying tort‑liability issue, which, in turn, mooted the admission‑rule questions.

VIII. Conclusion

Justice Young’s concurrence in Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Blake does not itself establish binding Texas Supreme Court precedent on the admission rule, but it significantly reshapes the landscape in which that question will next be litigated.

First, by emphasizing that the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ rejection of the admission rule has no remaining precedential value, the concurrence “wipes the slate clean” and reopens the issue for fresh consideration by all Texas courts of appeals. Second, by endorsing Justice Wilson’s dissent as “highly convincing” and “presumptively correct,” it effectively elevates that dissent’s analytical framework as the leading candidate for eventual adoption by the Supreme Court.

Substantively, the concurrence powerfully articulates the logic of the admission rule:

• Where an employer admits vicarious liability for its employee’s negligence, derivative corporate‑negligence theories tied to the same injury add no compensatory‑damages benefit and risk substantial prejudice and confusion.
• Such theories should therefore not be submitted to the jury, nor should evidence be admitted solely to support them—unless a rigorously supported gross‑negligence claim justifying exemplary damages against the employer is genuinely at issue.

Finally, the concurrence underscores that mere pleading of gross negligence is insufficient to bypass the admission rule. Trial courts should require a solid evidentiary basis before allowing derivative corporate‑negligence theories to proceed in the face of a vicarious‑liability admission. Misapplication of that standard, Justice Young suggests, may warrant a new trial even apart from other issues.

In these ways, the opinion provides a detailed, forward‑looking blueprint for Texas law on employer liability, vicarious responsibility, and the proper management of complex negligence litigation. When the Supreme Court of Texas eventually addresses the admission rule directly, this concurrence—and the analysis it endorses—will likely play a central role in shaping the governing doctrine.

Opinion filed: June 27, 2025.