Torrez: No Probable-Cause Element for Warrant-Based Blood or Urine Test Refusal under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2)

Introduction

In State of Minnesota v. Samuel Alejondro Torrez, 21 N.W.3d 467 (Minn. 2025), the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved a recurring question in impaired-driving prosecutions: when a defendant is charged with refusing a chemical test of blood or urine “as required by a search warrant” under Minnesota Statutes § 169A.20, subdivision 2(2), must the State prove to the jury that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired?

The Court answered no. Chief Justice Hudson, writing for the Court, held that the plain text of § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (Clause 2(2)) contains no such element. Accordingly, the district court did not err by declining to instruct the jury that probable cause to suspect impaired driving is an element of the refusal offense in warrant-based blood/urine cases. The decision delineates a clear statutory distinction between breath-test refusal (which incorporates a probable-cause requirement by cross-reference) and warrant-based blood/urine test refusal (which does not).

Parties: The State of Minnesota (respondent) prosecuted Torrez (appellant) for first-degree test refusal (blood or urine) and driving after cancellation as inimical to public safety. The court of appeals affirmed the test-refusal conviction; the Supreme Court granted review on the single legal issue concerning the jury instruction and statutory elements.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) does not require the State to prove that law enforcement had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired. Unlike the breath-test refusal provision (§ 169A.20, subd. 2(1)), which expressly incorporates § 169A.51 and thus its probable-cause predicate, Clause 2(2) references only the warrant statutes (§§ 171.177 and 626.04–.18) and omits any reference to § 169A.51. The Court concluded that this omission was intentional and dispositive. Probable cause remains a constitutional prerequisite to issuance of the search warrant, but it is not an element for the jury in a Clause 2(2) refusal prosecution.

Case Background

On July 14, 2020, Crookston police stopped Torrez after a “rolling domestic” report. Officers observed signs of stimulant impairment, administered field sobriety tests, and arrested Torrez for DWI and driving after license cancellation. A judge issued a search warrant for a blood or urine sample. At the station, officers presented the warrant, advised Torrez that refusal is a crime, and requested a sample; Torrez refused.

The State charged Torrez with first-degree test refusal (blood or urine) under § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), enhanced based on prior incidents, and with gross misdemeanor driving after cancellation. Before trial, Torrez requested a jury instruction that included, as an element, that the officer had probable cause to believe he was driving while impaired. The district court declined and instructed the jury without a probable-cause element. The jury convicted on both counts. The court of appeals affirmed the test-refusal conviction, reasoning that probable cause supporting the warrant had already been judicially determined. The Supreme Court granted review limited to whether Clause 2(2) contains a probable-cause element.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Informed the Decision

State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 2015) and State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 2001): These cases supplied the framework for reviewing jury instructions—whether, considered as a whole, they correctly state the law and include all essential elements.
Schwanke v. Minn. Dep’t of Admin., 851 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. 2014); State v. Moore, 10 N.W.3d 676 (Minn. 2024); Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2023); State v. Hayes, 826 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. 2013): These cases guided the Court’s statutory-interpretation methodology—ascertaining legislative intent, focusing on plain meaning when unambiguous, and applying de novo review.
State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. 2011): Prior to the 2017 amendments, Koppi interpreted the (then-unified) test-refusal statute as incorporating § 169A.51’s probable-cause requirement. The Court reaffirmed that this analysis continues to apply to breath-test refusal after 2017 because § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) expressly cross-references § 169A.51.
State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2021): The Court relied on Schwartz’s principle that when the Legislature includes specific language (e.g., a knowledge requirement) in one subdivision but omits it in another, courts should treat the omission as intentional and not judicially insert it elsewhere.
State v. Fugalli, 967 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 2021) and State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2011): These cases reinforced plain-language application and the canon against surplusage.
State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 2023): The Court acknowledged the propriety of reading contemporaneously enacted provisions together, but concluded that even read in tandem, the statutes at issue did not support importing a probable-cause element into Clause 2(2).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016); Johnson v. State, 956 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2021); State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224 (Minn. 2016): These authorities frame the constitutional backdrop that led to Minnesota’s 2017 legislative revisions, distinguishing breath tests (warrantless permissible as search incident to arrest) from blood/urine tests (generally requiring a warrant), and clarifying that refusal can be criminalized when a warrant or exception is present.

Statutory Framework and Legislative History

Prior to 2017, § 169A.20, subd. 2, criminalized refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood, breath, or urine under § 169A.51 or § 169A.52 without distinguishing test types. After Birchfield, the Legislature split test-refusal into two parts:

Clause 2(1) (breath): “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test … of the person’s breath under section 169A.51 … or 169A.52.” By expressly invoking § 169A.51, it carries § 169A.51, subd. 1(b)’s requirement that an officer must have probable cause to believe the person was driving while impaired.
Clause 2(2) (blood/urine): “It is a crime for any person to refuse to submit to a chemical test … of the person’s blood or urine as required by a search warrant under sections 171.177 and 626.04 to 626.18.” Notably, it omits any reference to § 169A.51.

In the same 2017 session, the Legislature added § 169A.51, subd. 3(a): “Notwithstanding any contrary provisions in sections 169A.51 to 169A.53, a blood or urine test may be conducted only pursuant to a search warrant or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. In addition, blood and urine tests may be conducted only as provided in sections 169A.51 to 169A.53 and 171.177.”

Torrez argued that the “in addition” sentence imports § 169A.51’s probable-cause predicate into all blood/urine testing contexts, including criminal refusal under Clause 2(2). The Court rejected that reading, emphasizing the Legislature’s deliberate choice to reference § 169A.51 in the breath-refusal clause but not in the blood/urine-refusal clause.

Legal Reasoning and Canons Applied

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three steps:

Plain meaning controls: Clause 2(2) is silent on probable cause and does not reference § 169A.51. Its language stands in contrast to Clause 2(1), which expressly references § 169A.51 and thus adopts its probable-cause requirement. Because the Legislature “knew how” to incorporate a probable-cause predicate and chose not to do so in Clause 2(2), courts should not add one.
Contemporaneous enactments do not alter Clause 2(2)’s plain text: Even reading § 169A.51, subd. 3(a) alongside Clause 2(2) (per Beganovic) does not justify importing a jury-trial probable-cause element. The “in addition” sentence does not refer to criminal test-refusal under § 169A.20; and, structurally, § 169A.51 resides in the Administrative Provisions governing civil license revocations, not criminal elements.
Canons reinforce the conclusion: Under Schwartz and General Mills (cited for the negative-implication principle), selective inclusion of language in one part of a statute coupled with omission in another indicates intent. Under Randolph, the Court avoided reading § 169A.51, subd. 3(a) as surplusage by recognizing its role in administrative processes, while declining to extend it beyond the text’s scope into Clause 2(2).

The Court therefore held that probable cause to suspect impaired driving is not an element of the crime of refusing a warrant-based blood or urine test. Whether the warrant was supported by probable cause remains a judicial question addressed through pretrial suppression procedures; it is not a factual element for the jury.

Relationship Between Criminal and Administrative Provisions

A key structural move in the opinion is the separation between criminal provisions (Chapter 169A.20) and administrative provisions (Chapter 169A.51). The Court explained:

Section 169A.20 defines criminal offenses and their elements. Clause 2(2) identifies refusal of a blood/urine test “as required by a search warrant” as the gravamen of the offense.
Section 169A.51 governs chemical testing procedures for administrative purposes (e.g., license revocation), and § 169A.51, subd. 3(a)’s “in addition” sentence fits within that administrative framework. It does not, by its text, define criminal elements for Clause 2(2).

This structural understanding defeats the argument that § 169A.51, subd. 3(a) must be read to impose a jury-trial probable-cause element in Clause 2(2) prosecutions.

What the State Must Prove in Clause 2(2) Prosecutions After Torrez

Torrez clarifies only what is not required: the State need not prove to the jury that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired. The opinion’s logic and the statutory text indicate that, in a Clause 2(2) case, the prosecution’s trial burden focuses on facts such as:

That a search warrant requiring a chemical test of the defendant’s blood or urine existed and applied to the defendant;
That officers requested the sample pursuant to that warrant (in accordance with §§ 171.177 and 626.04–.18); and
That the defendant refused to submit to the test.

Any challenge to whether the warrant was validly issued (including whether it was supported by probable cause) is resolved by the court via pretrial motion practice and suppression remedies, not by adding a probable-cause element to the jury instructions.

Impact and Practical Implications

For Prosecutors

Streamlined trial proof in Clause 2(2) cases: Prosecutors need not present evidence to persuade the jury that officers had probable cause to suspect impairment. The trial focus narrows to the existence of the warrant, the demand for a blood/urine sample pursuant to it, and the defendant’s refusal.
Pretrial litigation remains critical: The constitutionality and validity of the warrant (including probable cause and particularity) remain fertile grounds for defense motions. Prosecutors must be prepared to defend the warrant at suppression hearings.
Jury instructions: Pattern instructions that included a probable-cause element for test refusal should be revised or tailored to reflect Torrez for blood/urine under warrant, while preserving Koppi’s rule for breath-test refusals under Clause 2(1).

For Defense Counsel

Shift to pretrial suppression: The principal avenue to contest probable cause is via motion to suppress the warrant and its fruits. If the warrant falls, a Clause 2(2) refusal premised on that warrant may become untenable because the statute criminalizes refusal “as required by a search warrant.”
Refusal disputes: Fact-driven defenses remain available—e.g., whether the conduct was a “refusal,” whether the request was properly made pursuant to the warrant, compliance impossibility, ambiguity, or confusion.
Distinguish test type: Breath-test refusal prosecutions (Clause 2(1)) still implicate § 169A.51, including probable cause as an element; blood/urine refusal under a warrant does not. Defense strategy should tailor arguments accordingly.

For Law Enforcement

Emphasize warrant quality: Because probable cause is vetted by a judge and not re-tried to a jury, meticulous warrant applications are essential. Deficiencies will be resolved at suppression, not cured at trial.
Advisory and documentation: Clear advisement that refusal is a separate crime and careful documentation of the refusal are central to trial proof.

Systemic Effects

Clarifies legislative design: Torrez cements Minnesota’s post-Birchfield bifurcation—breath-test refusal tracks § 169A.51 and its probable-cause predicate; warrant-based blood/urine refusal tracks the warrant statutes without importing § 169A.51 as a criminal element.
Model instructions and training: CRIMJIG provisions and training materials should be updated to remove a probable-cause element from Clause 2(2) instructions while retaining it for Clause 2(1).
Plea and trial dynamics: By removing a jury element, the decision may reduce contested jury issues in Clause 2(2) trials and shift litigation to pretrial motions practice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Element of the offense vs. constitutional predicate: An “element” is a fact the State must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A “constitutional predicate” (like probable cause for a warrant) is a legal precondition assessed by a judge pretrial; it is not necessarily something the jury decides.
Probable cause: A reasonable, common-sense belief, based on facts, that a crime has been committed. For warrants, judges determine probable cause to search or seize. Torrez holds that, in Clause 2(2) prosecutions, the jury does not re-decide whether probable cause existed.
Breath vs. blood/urine testing post-Birchfield: Breath tests can often be obtained without a warrant incident to a valid DWI arrest; blood and urine tests typically require a warrant or a recognized exception. Minnesota’s 2017 statutes reflect that constitutional distinction.
Plain-meaning and omission canons: When the Legislature uses certain words in one clause but omits them in another, courts presume the omission is intentional. This is why a probable-cause requirement appears in Clause 2(1) (via § 169A.51) but not in Clause 2(2).
Administrative vs. criminal provisions: Sections in § 169A.51 govern administrative processes (like license revocation) and do not necessarily define criminal elements unless expressly incorporated into a criminal statute.

Conclusion

State v. Torrez establishes a clear rule: in prosecutions for refusing a blood or urine test “as required by a search warrant” under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2), the State is not required to prove to the jury that the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was driving while impaired. The probable-cause question is addressed at the warrant stage by the court; it is not a jury element.

The opinion reinforces Minnesota’s post-Birchfield statutory scheme separating breath-test refusal (which incorporates § 169A.51 and its probable-cause requirement) from warrant-based blood/urine refusal (which does not). By adhering to plain language and legislative structure, the Court provides clarity for charging, instructing juries, and litigating suppression issues. Going forward, Clause 2(2) trials should center on the existence of a valid warrant demand and the fact of refusal, while contested probable-cause questions will be resolved by judges in pretrial proceedings.

The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.