Torres v. Rubio: § 1503(a) Citizenship Suits Are De Novo and Not Bound by Passport “Primary/Secondary Evidence” Regulations

Introduction

In Torres v. Rubio, No. 24-40685 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a bench-trial judgment denying a declaratory judgment of birthright citizenship under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The case arose after the State Department refused to issue a passport to Juan Manuel Torres, concluding he had not demonstrated U.S. birth by a preponderance of the evidence. At the heart of the dispute were conflicting records—a Texas birth certificate signed by a midwife later convicted for fraudulent registrations and multiple Mexican records (civil birth, baptismal, vaccination) listing Matamoros, Mexico as the place of birth—as well as a 1995 sworn statement by Torres’s mother to immigration officials that her son was born in Mexico and that a midwife had been paid to obtain a Texas birth certificate.

On appeal, Torres challenged the district court’s weighing of the evidence, including the evidentiary value of the Texas birth certificate, the credibility of the midwife’s testimony, and the district court’s reliance on his mother’s 1995 confession. The Fifth Circuit, applying clear-error review to the bench-trial findings, rejected each challenge. Most notably, the court clarified that district courts adjudicating § 1503(a) actions conduct a de novo determination of citizenship status and are not bound by the State Department’s passport regulations distinguishing “primary” versus “secondary” evidence. The court also reiterated that there is no per se legal rule that a first-recorded birth record is more credible than a later one, and it emphasized the appellate deference owed to trial-level credibility determinations.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment after a two-day bench trial that Torres failed to prove U.S. birth by a preponderance of the evidence. Three holdings drive the affirmance:

Section 1503(a) actions are independent, de novo judicial proceedings. District courts are not bound by State Department passport regulations (such as 22 C.F.R. § 51.42’s “primary evidence” framework) and may consider any competent evidence relevant to place of birth. Even within the regulatory framework, 22 C.F.R. § 51.45 empowers the Department to require additional evidence beyond a birth certificate.
There is no legal presumption that an earlier-filed birth certificate necessarily outweighs a later-filed record; factfinders may evaluate all the circumstances. The district court did not err in considering the Mexico birth certificate and other records notwithstanding the prior Texas registration.
Credibility determinations—here, crediting the midwife’s testimony and the mother’s 1995 written statement over trial testimony—are entitled to heightened deference on appeal. The district court’s account was plausible in light of the entire record, so there was no clear error.

Factual and Procedural Background

Torres applied for a U.S. passport in 2017, submitting a Texas birth certificate purportedly issued for his birth in San Benito, Texas on March 29, 1994. The Department requested additional evidence; Torres provided a Mexican civil birth certificate and baptismal certificate listing Matamoros, Mexico as his birthplace. The Department denied the passport in 2021.

In a § 1503(a) suit, Torres called his parents and the midwife, Elisa Meade, at a 2024 bench trial. His parents described a spontaneous encounter at a bus station leading to an emergency home birth in San Benito attended by a midwife who then delivered a Texas birth certificate days later. The mother’s 1995 interaction with immigration officials produced a written statement (which she signed) admitting a Matamoros birth and a midwife payment; she later claimed coercion. Meade testified she never delivered a baby alone, did not conduct emergency pick-ups, had a 1996 conviction for false Texas birth registrations, and signed a 1997 affidavit that she filed a false birth certificate for Torres.

The documentary record included the Texas birth certificate (favorable to U.S. birth) and the Mexican birth certificate, baptismal certificate, and vaccination records (all listing Matamoros). The district court found the parents’ narrative “difficult to accept,” concluded Meade’s affidavit stripped the Texas certificate of probative weight, credited the 1995 statement, and held that Torres did not carry his burden of proof. Torres appealed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985): Establishes robust deference to trial court credibility determinations and factual findings under the clear-error standard. The Fifth Circuit quoted Anderson’s core rule that appellate courts may not reweigh evidence if the trial court’s account is plausible.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6): Findings of fact from bench trials “must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,” with due regard for the trial court’s opportunity to assess witness credibility.
Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2000): Bench-trial standard of review—clear error for fact-finding, de novo for legal issues.
Guzman v. Hacienda Records & Recording Studio, Inc., 808 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes the “great deference” owed to district court factual findings.
Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 95 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996): Clarifies when challenges to weight-of-evidence are reviewed for clear error rather than as legal errors; applied here to treat Torres’s evidentiary-weight arguments as clear-error challenges.
De Vargas v. Brownell, 251 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1958): Places the burden on the § 1503(a) plaintiff to prove citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence; also notes the caution with which “interested” witness testimony should be received.
Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1985), and Mathin v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2015): Persuasive authorities confirming that § 1503(a) actions are independent de novo determinations, not administrative-review proceedings bound by agency regulations.
Martinez v. Secretary of State, 652 F. App’x 758 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam): Rejects the notion that a state birth certificate creates a presumption of citizenship in § 1503 litigation; cited here to support considering additional “secondary” evidence even where a birth certificate exists.
Salinas Moya v. Limon, 793 F. App’x 296 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam): Holds there is no rule that older evidence is automatically more credible than newer evidence; supports the district court’s decision to weigh a later Mexican birth certificate alongside an earlier Texas record.
Garcia v. Kerry, 557 F. App’x 304 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam): Affirms discrediting a mother’s testimony resting on “unlikely coincidences,” paralleling the trial court’s skepticism of the parents’ narrative here.
22 C.F.R. § 51.42 and § 51.45: State Department passport regulations distinguishing “primary” and “secondary” evidence (birth certificates vs. other records) and authorizing the Department to require any additional evidence deemed necessary. The panel explained these regulations do not bind district courts in § 1503(a) cases; even so, § 51.45 undermines any argument that submission of a birth certificate precludes review of other evidence.

Legal Reasoning

The panel organized its analysis around three appellate challenges—each resolved under clear-error review because they attacked the trial court’s weighing of evidence and credibility rather than asserting a legal misinterpretation.

1) The Texas Birth Certificate and the “Primary vs. Secondary” Evidence Argument

Torres argued the district court gave insufficient weight to his Texas birth certificate because, under passport regulations, it is “primary evidence” and should eclipse “secondary” evidence like baptismal or school records. The Fifth Circuit rejected this for two reasons:

De novo adjudication: A § 1503(a) action is an independent judicial determination of nationality status, not an administrative-review proceeding. As such, State Department evidentiary regulations do not constrain the kinds of evidence that a district court may consider. The court relied on Richards (9th Cir.) and Mathin (7th Cir.).
Even within the regulatory framework, § 51.45 expressly allows the Department to demand additional evidence beyond a birth certificate; thus, the idea that “secondary” evidence is off-limits when a birth certificate exists is incorrect. The Eleventh Circuit’s Martinez supports this reading and rejects a presumption of citizenship from a state birth certificate in § 1503 litigation.

The Fifth Circuit also emphasized that there is no legal rule privileging the first-recorded birth certificate over a later-recorded foreign certificate; citing Salinas Moya, the court reiterated that “older” is not automatically “more credible.” The district court thus acted within its discretion to consider and weigh the Mexican records—especially given independent reasons to discount the Texas certificate (the midwife’s 1996 conviction and 1997 affidavit admitting a false registration for Torres).

2) The Midwife’s Testimony and Credibility

Torres challenged the weight accorded to the midwife’s testimony because of her age, a passing reference to occasional forgetfulness, and minor inconsistencies (e.g., costs she associated with registering births). The Fifth Circuit emphasized the heightened deference due to trial-level credibility assessments (Anderson; Rule 52(a)(6)). The claimed inconsistencies did not undermine the trial court’s credibility finding, particularly in light of the midwife’s conviction and her 1997 affidavit acknowledging a false birth certificate for Torres—documentary anchors that significantly eroded the probative value of the Texas record. The panel found no clear error in crediting her testimony and affidavit.

3) The Mother’s 1995 Statement and Claims of Coercion

Torres argued that his mother’s 1995 statement to immigration officials (admitting a Mexican birth and a payment to a midwife) was involuntary and should not have been credited. The Fifth Circuit again deferred to the district court’s factual findings and credibility calls:

The trial court reasonably found the parents’ account “difficult to accept” because it turned on a string of unlikely coincidences and was contradicted by documentary records listing Matamoros as the birthplace.
The court found no persuasive reason why an immigration officer would fabricate the 1995 statement, especially since the mother signed a document containing the admission.
The mother was an “interested” witness in her son’s § 1503(a) case, justifying caution in assessing her trial testimony (De Vargas).

On this record, the district court’s decision to credit the 1995 statement over trial testimony alleging coercion was plausible and therefore insulated from reversal under clear-error review.

Impact and Implications

Although unpublished and thus non-precedential under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5, Torres v. Rubio carries significant persuasive weight and offers practical guidance for § 1503(a) litigation in the Fifth Circuit and beyond.

De novo means de novo: District courts are not bound by the State Department’s passport evidentiary taxonomy. Litigants cannot rely on 22 C.F.R. § 51.42 to prevent consideration of other records, nor to create a presumption from a state birth certificate. Courts may weigh all probative evidence.
No automatic priority to first-filed birth records: The panel reaffirms that chronology alone does not decide authenticity or credibility. Later-filed foreign records can be persuasive, particularly where corroborated by related records (baptismal, vaccination) and where independent factors undermine the earlier domestic record.
Trial credibility calls are decisive: Because § 1503 cases are fact-intensive and often turn on witness credibility and documentary nuance, the clear-error standard provides a significant buffer on appeal. Parties must build the best possible record at trial; appellate courts will not reweigh evidence if the trial court’s narrative is plausible.
Midwife-registered Texas certificates require corroboration: Where there is evidence of registration irregularities or fraud (e.g., prior convictions, sworn affidavits), courts may substantially discount a Texas birth certificate without erring. Litigants should marshal independent corroboration (e.g., contemporaneous medical, hospital, or third-party records; non-interested witnesses).

Practice Pointers for § 1503(a) Litigants

Do not assume a state birth certificate will end the inquiry. Be prepared to present corroborating evidence consistent with U.S. birth (medical, school, and third-party affidavits; contemporaneous photographs or hospital discharge records; border-crossing logs; tax or benefit records linked to newborn care).
Anticipate and address foreign records. If contrary foreign birth or church records exist, proactively explain or rebut them with context and documentation.
Prepare for credibility challenges. Interested witnesses (parents, close family) face heightened scrutiny. Where possible, include disinterested witnesses and contemporaneous documents.
If alleging coercion of prior statements, develop a robust factual record: details of the setting, witnesses, translation issues, contemporaneous objections, and any documentation to support the coercion claim. Absent such support, trial courts may credit signed statements over later recantations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a): A federal statute allowing a person in the U.S. who has been denied a right or privilege as a U.S. national (e.g., a passport) to file a civil suit for a declaratory judgment that he or she is a U.S. national. The district court decides citizenship status anew (de novo).
Preponderance of the Evidence: The plaintiff’s burden in § 1503(a) suits. It means “more likely than not”—a greater than 50% likelihood that the claim (U.S. birth) is true.
De Novo Determination vs. Agency Review: In § 1503, the court does not review the agency’s decision under administrative law standards; it independently determines the fact of citizenship. Agency regulations do not bind the court’s evidentiary analysis.
Clear Error Standard (Appellate Review): On appeal from a bench trial, factual findings stand unless the appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Credibility findings get “even greater” deference.
“Primary” vs. “Secondary” Evidence (Passport Regulations): For passport processing, the State Department treats a birth certificate as primary evidence, and other records (church, school, medical) as secondary. In § 1503 litigation, courts are not bound by this scheme and may consider all probative evidence.
Interested Witness: A witness with a personal stake in the case’s outcome (e.g., a parent in a child’s citizenship suit). Courts scrutinize such testimony carefully when it conflicts with other evidence.
Affidavit: A sworn written statement. In this case, the midwife’s 1997 affidavit admitting she filed a false birth certificate for Torres was central to the court’s evaluation of the Texas record.

What the Court Did Not Decide

No categorical rule on the weight of any given document: The court did not adopt a universal hierarchy among birth records; it endorsed case-by-case weighing.
No evidentiary exclusion of “secondary” materials: The court did not limit the admissibility of secondary evidence when a birth certificate exists.
No holding that a mother’s post hoc coercion claim can never succeed: The ruling is record-specific; stronger evidence of coercion might change the outcome in a different case.

Conclusion

Torres v. Rubio underscores three controlling themes in § 1503(a) litigation: the district court’s de novo authority unconstrained by passport regulations; the absence of any formal presumption favoring earlier-recorded birth certificates; and the powerful deference appellate courts accord to trial-level credibility assessments. The decision aligns the Fifth Circuit’s approach with sister-circuit authority (Richards, Mathin, Martinez) and reinforces that § 1503 cases are intensely fact-driven. For litigants, the message is clear: success turns on building a comprehensive, coherent evidentiary record at trial—one that can withstand rigorous credibility scrutiny and that does not rely on a single documentary keystone when countervailing records and sworn admissions exist.

Case: Torres v. Rubio, No. 24-40685 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2025) (unpublished)

Panel: Chief Judge Elrod; Judges Clement and Haynes. Opinion by Judge Edith Brown Clement.

Disposition: Affirmed.

Publication Status: Not designated for publication under 5th Cir. R. 47.5 (persuasive, not binding precedent).