Introduction

In Hollis v. Morgan State University, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part a district court’s sweeping grant of summary judgment against a tenure‑track professor who alleged sex discrimination, unequal pay, and retaliation. Dr. Leah P. Hollis, a faculty member in the School of Education and Urban Studies at Morgan State University (MSU), claimed that discriminatory animus and retaliatory motives infected several promotion decisions, that she was paid less than comparable male colleagues, and that the university converted her to at‑will status in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. Her causes of action spanned Title VII, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), the Equal Pay Act, and Maryland’s analogues (MFEPA and the Maryland Equal Pay for Equal Work Act).

The district court had granted summary judgment on all claims. The Fourth Circuit drew several important lines:

• It affirmed that Title VII’s 90‑day filing deadline is a hard procedural bar for discrete acts and cannot be salvaged by Rule 15 “relation‑back” when the later claim arises from “separate occurrences of time and type.”
• It reversed the district court’s error in exporting Title VII’s procedural requirements to Title IX, § 1983, and MFEPA claims.
• On the merits, it held that a jury could find pretext and discriminatory/retaliatory motive based on derogatory remarks by a department chair, shifting rationales, deviations from internal procedures, and comparator and timing evidence.
• It revived Dr. Hollis’s equal‑pay claims, emphasizing the employer’s burden on the “factor other than sex” defense and rejecting the notion that a discriminatory pay gap is immunized merely because it began at hiring.

The panel’s opinion (by Judge Harris, joined by Judges Thacker and Quattlebaum) is accompanied by a notable concurrence from Judge Quattlebaum urging the Supreme Court to clarify or abandon McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment, favoring a straightforward, text‑driven Rule 56 inquiry into whether the whole record could support a finding of intentional discrimination.

Summary of the Judgment

• Affirmed in part: Dr. Hollis’s Title VII sex‑discrimination claims tied to the 2019 and 2020 promotion denials are procedurally barred. The 2019 Title VII claim was untimely (missed the 90‑day filing window after the right‑to‑sue), and the 2020 Title VII claim could not piggyback on an earlier, time‑barred charge.
• Reversed in part: The district court erred in granting summary judgment on:
  • Dr. Hollis’s 2016 sex‑discrimination claim (Title VII, Title IX, § 1983, MFEPA), given evidence a jury could credit as showing pretext and discriminatory motive.
  • Her retaliation claim based on conversion to at‑will status, given temporal proximity and disputed “legitimate” rationales.
  • Her equal‑pay claims (federal and state), given disputes over the employer’s “factor other than sex” defense and pay‑setting discretion after hire.
• Remand: The court sent back the non‑Title VII 2019/2020 claims (Title IX, § 1983, MFEPA) for the district court to consider on the merits, rejecting the lower court’s cross‑statute procedural importation from Title VII.

Analysis

A. Procedural Rulings that Recalibrate the Litigation Map

1) Relation‑Back is Narrow: Discrete Acts Don’t “Relate Back” to Earlier Claims

The court held that Dr. Hollis’s attempt to amend her complaint to include a Title VII claim for the 2019 promotion denial could not “relate back” to her earlier complaint about the 2016 tenure denial. The two claims were “discrete acts” based on different application cycles, standards, and proof, separated in time and type. Under Rule 15(c) and Fourth Circuit precedent, relation‑back requires a tight factual nexus; adding new occurrences will not do. This is a cautionary marker for practitioners: each promotion denial is a separate “occurrence,” and untimely federal‑court filings after an EEOC right‑to‑sue letter will not be salvaged by invoking the original pleading.

2) You Cannot Piggyback a New Claim on a Time‑Barred Charge

The court rejected Dr. Hollis’s attempt to treat her 2020 Title VII claim as falling within the scope of her 2019 EEOC charge when the 2019 charge could not itself support timely litigation (she missed the 90‑day period to sue on that charge). Even if an EEOC investigation might normally sweep in later‑arising claims, those derivative claims cannot proceed if the predicate charge is time‑barred in court.

3) Title VII’s Procedural Rules Do Not Migrate to Title IX, § 1983, or MFEPA

The district court erroneously applied Title VII’s exhaustion and 90‑day filing rules to Dr. Hollis’s parallel Title IX, § 1983 (Equal Protection), and MFEPA claims. The Fourth Circuit made clear that:

• Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement before suit.
• Section 1983 claims are not subject to Title VII’s exhaustion regime.
• MFEPA has its own, distinct state‑law procedural rules and does not incorporate Title VII’s 90‑day federal filing deadline.

This is a significant clarification for plaintiffs with overlapping statutory theories: missing Title VII’s filing deadline does not automatically doom well‑preserved non‑Title VII claims arising from the same facts.

B. Substantive Rulings on Discrimination, Retaliation, and Equal Pay

1) Sex Discrimination (2016 Tenure/Promotion Denial): Why a Jury Must Decide

The court identified multiple strands of evidence that, taken together, could allow a reasonable jury to find that sex discrimination motivated the 2016 denial:

• Derogatory remarks by the department chair: According to a sworn statement from a graduate student, the chair referred to Dr. Hollis as a “reject lesbian,” vowed she would “never receive [the chair’s] blessing” for tenure, and stated that tenure was reserved for her “boys.” Although the chair was not the final decisionmaker in 2016, she played a pivotal role and recommended against promotion after a departmental committee had voted in favor. The district court erred by discarding these remarks once it concluded they were not “direct evidence.” They remained potent circumstantial evidence that should be weighed with the rest of the record.
• Shifting rationales: MSU’s reasons moved from alleged deficiencies in publication venues to a late‑breaking “untimeliness” theory premised on an unexpected reclassification of Dr. Hollis as “at‑will.” Shifting explanations can be classic indicators of pretext.
• Policy deviations and procedural irregularities: The record reflected failures to follow university policy—e.g., no timely school‑level committee review pre‑Dean action; unexplained delay; no notice of non‑renewal; scheduling a fourth year of classes inconsistent with “at‑will” status. Departures from standard procedures can signal improper motives.
• Comparator evidence: There was evidence that at least one male colleague received tenure with a publication record comparable to or thinner than Dr. Hollis’s “unaffiliated, non‑pay‑to‑publish” articles, undercutting the asserted qualification‑based rationale.

The Fourth Circuit emphasized that courts do not second‑guess academic judgments, but plaintiffs are allowed to challenge the credibility of those judgments. On this record, a jury could reject MSU’s stated reasons as pretext and infer that sex discrimination caused the 2016 non‑promotion.

2) Retaliation (Conversion to At‑Will Status)

The court revived Dr. Hollis’s retaliation claims under Title VII, Title IX, and MFEPA. The sequence mattered: within roughly three months of internally circulating and filing an EEOC charge in September 2017, the University announced in December that her original term appointment had never been renewed and that she was “at‑will,” effectively a demotion. Temporal proximity—especially when the adverse action occurs at the “natural decision point” in the employer’s process—can support a causal inference. Because the purported reason for the conversion (non‑renewal) was itself contested and potentially inconsistent with the University’s conduct and policies, a jury could find the stated rationale pretextual and retaliation the but‑for cause.

3) Equal Pay (Federal and Maryland)

The court agreed that Dr. Hollis established a prima facie pay disparity compared to male colleagues. It then focused on two pivotal principles:

• “Factor other than sex” is an affirmative defense with teeth: The employer must prove—not speculate—that gender‑neutral factors actually explained the pay gap. Disputes over whether MSU truly valued community‑college experience as claimed, and whether it consistently weighed comparable credentials, precluded summary judgment under both the federal and Maryland equal‑pay statutes.
• Starting salaries do not immunize later pay disparities: Where an employer exercises discretion post‑hire (through promotions, raises, or merit reviews), continuing pay gaps can be actionable if discriminatory decisions perpetuated or widened the disparity. Because Dr. Hollis’s promotions and a merit raise were allegedly denied for contested reasons, her post‑hire unequal pay theory must go to a jury under both the equal‑pay statutes and as evidence supporting her Title VII/MFEPA pay claims.

Critically, the panel linked the equal‑pay and promotion claims: if discrimination blocked Dr. Hollis’s 2016 promotion, that alone could explain material portions of the ensuing pay gap—another reason summary judgment was improper.

C. Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

• Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co. and Ray v. Roane: Reinforced de novo review and the special care required at summary judgment in motive‑driven employment disputes.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); Grattan v. Burnett; United States v. Pittman; Slayton v. American Express: Clarified that relation‑back requires the same occurrence; discrete promotion cycles separated by “time and type” do not relate back.
• Jones v. Calvert Group; Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland; Fort Bend County v. Davis: Framed the “scope of the EEOC investigation” doctrine and underscored that non‑jurisdictional exhaustion rules still matter when timely asserted; they cannot be used to resurrect late claims in court.
• Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee and Keller v. Prince George’s County: Confirmed no Title VII‑style exhaustion for Title IX; Title VII procedures do not govern § 1983.
• Maryland Code § 20‑1013: Demonstrated MFEPA’s distinct exhaustion regime and the absence of a federal 90‑day filing rule.
• Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck; Westmoreland v. TWC: Established that shifting explanations and falsity of the proffered reason can allow a jury to infer discrimination.
• Village of Arlington Heights; Cowgill v. First Data: Deviations from regular procedures are probative of intent.
• Carter v. Ball; King v. Rumsfeld; Roberts v. Glenn Industrial: Temporal proximity and process‑anchored timing can support causation for retaliation; the analysis is context‑specific.
• Spencer v. Virginia State University: Recited the equal‑pay prima facie standard.
• EEOC v. Maryland Insurance Administration: Demands that employers show their “factor other than sex” defenses actually explained (not could have explained) the disparity, and recognizes the liability risk in discretionary step assignments.
• Adams v. UNC‑Wilmington: Courts avoid second‑guessing academic judgments but permit challenges to the credibility of those judgments when pretext is alleged.

D. Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Results

• Procedural rigor without trans‑statutory borrowing: The court policed Title VII’s 90‑day deadline and narrow relation‑back doctrine while refusing to graft those rules onto Title IX, § 1983, or MFEPA. Precision matters: each statute’s text and framework governs its own procedures.
• All evidence belongs in one analytical pile: The district court erred by discarding the department chair’s statements after labeling them not “direct” evidence. The Fourth Circuit treated them as relevant circumstantial evidence of animus, consistent with mainstream Title VII analysis that the ultimate question is discrimination vel non, proven by any mix of direct and circumstantial proof.
• Pretext indicators carry weight at summary judgment: Shifting justifications, policy deviations, and comparator inconsistencies created genuine disputes of material fact, precluding judgment as a matter of law.
• Timing analysis keyed to the employer’s process: The retaliation holding is notable for framing temporal proximity around the employer’s own decision path, emphasizing that actions taken at the “natural decision point” shortly after protected activity can support causation.
• Equal‑pay burdens enforced: The court applied a rigorous view of the “factor other than sex” defense and recognized that post‑hire discretionary decisions can extend liability, rather than providing safe harbor for initial disparities.

E. Impact: What This Decision Means Going Forward

• For litigants and practitioners:
  • Do not assume amended Title VII claims will relate back. Treat each promotion denial as a discrete act with its own 90‑day clock after the right‑to‑sue letter.
  • Plead parallel claims carefully. If Title VII is time‑barred, Title IX, § 1983, and MFEPA may still be viable; ensure those claims are properly preserved under their own procedural regimes.
  • At summary judgment, present all evidence—remarks, comparators, timing, policy deviations, and rationale‑shifts—in an integrated theory of pretext and causation.
  • On equal pay, be prepared to test whether the employer’s supposed “factors other than sex” truly guided pay decisions, both at hire and in later discretionary adjustments.
• For employers and universities:
  • Ensure promotion and tenure processes faithfully follow written policies. Procedural irregularities are not technicalities; they can be evidence of unlawful motive.
  • Vet and document reasons contemporaneously and consistently. Shifting post hoc justifications will invite a jury trial.
  • Train leaders that derogatory remarks—even by non‑final decisionmakers—can imperil summary judgment if those individuals influence the process.
  • Equal pay compliance requires more than a plausible story; it needs proof that the asserted criteria were actually applied as to the plaintiff, and applied consistently across comparators.
• For Maryland practice:
  • MFEPA’s procedures remain distinct. Do not import federal 90‑day rules. Assess state exhaustion and filing rules independently.
• Broader doctrinal signals:
  • The concurrence adds momentum to a national reconsideration of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment, urging courts to ask the simple Rule 56 question: could a reasonable jury find intentional discrimination on the whole record?
  • Employment cases in higher education are not immune from traditional pretext analysis; courts will not “defer” their way past procedural irregularities or shifting rationales.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Relation‑Back (Rule 15(c)): An amended claim “relates back” to the filing date of the original complaint only if it arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. Separate promotion denials in different years are discrete acts—they do not relate back.
• Title VII’s 90‑Day Rule: After receiving an EEOC right‑to‑sue notice, a plaintiff has 90 days to file the Title VII claim in court. Missing that window typically bars the claim.
• Exhaustion vs. Jurisdiction: Title VII exhaustion is not jurisdictional but is a mandatory claim‑processing rule when timely raised. Its rules do not automatically govern Title IX, § 1983, or MFEPA.
• Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence: Both types can prove discrimination. Remarks that are not “direct” evidence can still be powerful circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of bias, especially when linked to decisionmakers or influencers.
• Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s reason is false or shifting, that procedures were not followed, or that comparators were treated better can support a finding that the stated reason was not the real reason.
• Temporal Proximity: Close timing between protected activity (like filing an EEOC charge) and an adverse action can suggest causation. “Natural decision points” in the employer’s process may amplify the inference.
• Equal Pay—“Factor Other Than Sex”: An affirmative defense; the employer must prove that neutral factors actually explained the pay difference—not merely that they could have.
• Post‑Hire Discretion: If an employer has discretion to adjust pay through raises and promotions, continuing disparities can be actionable even if the gap started earlier.

Conclusion

Hollis v. Morgan State University draws clear procedural and substantive lines. Procedurally, it tightens the use of relation‑back for Title VII claims, refuses to let later claims piggyback on time‑barred EEOC charges, and reaffirms that Title VII’s claim‑processing rules do not govern Title IX, § 1983, or MFEPA. Substantively, it reiterates that derogatory remarks by influential actors, inconsistent explanations, deviations from policy, comparator disparities, and process‑anchored timing can collectively defeat summary judgment on discrimination and retaliation claims. On equal pay, it enforces the employer’s burden to prove neutral factors actually drove pay differences and recognizes liability risk when discretionary post‑hire decisions perpetuate gaps.

The concurrence’s call to revisit McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment will resonate beyond this case. But even under current doctrine, the Fourth Circuit’s message is plain: courts must consider all the evidence together and let juries resolve genuine disputes about motive. For universities and employers, that means recommitting to policy‑faithful, well‑documented, and even‑handed processes—and recognizing that words and process missteps can determine whether a case ends at summary judgment or proceeds to trial.