Title IX-Style Investigations Are Not Adverse Employment Actions Absent Material Change; “Honest Belief” and Comparator Rigor Defeat § 1981 Pretext Claims — Saud v. DePaul University (7th Cir. 2025)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date: October 8, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges St. Eve (author), Jackson-Akiwumi, and Lee

Docket No.: 25-1034

Introduction

This appeal arises from DePaul University’s decisions not to hire Laith Saud as an adjunct in Fall 2017 and to deem him ineligible for future employment following a second internal investigation (by DePaul’s Office of Institutional Diversity and Equity, “OIDE”) finding that he sexually harassed a student, C.M. Saud, an Arab American former term faculty member, alleged DePaul violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by discriminating against him on the basis of race.

The Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment to DePaul, concluding the University articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons and that Saud failed to show pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, addressing several recurring doctrines in private employment discrimination cases involving academic institutions: the adverse action requirement, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the “honest-belief” rule in pretext analysis, comparator rigor (including same decisionmaker and materially similar circumstances), and “cat’s paw” liability.

Key issues included whether: (1) DePaul’s shifting or multiple rationales suggested pretext; (2) alleged comparators were sufficiently similar; (3) the internal Title IX-style investigation itself constituted an adverse action; (4) the Dean’s reliance on OIDE’s findings satisfied the honest-belief rule; and (5) alleged bias by the Title IX coordinator (via a cat’s paw theory) could be imputed to the Dean.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed summary judgment for DePaul on Saud’s § 1981 claim. It held:

DePaul’s non-hire decision for Fall 2017 rested on legitimate, non-discriminatory grounds—C.M.’s newly filed lawsuit, two additional reports of potential misconduct, low projected enrollments, and an above-range compensation request. Saud failed to show these reasons were pretext for racial discrimination.
DePaul’s later decision deeming Saud ineligible for future employment followed OIDE’s second investigation concluding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he sexually harassed C.M. Sexual misconduct is a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for adverse action; Saud presented no evidence that the final decisionmaker (the Dean) did not honestly believe the basis for the sanction.
The court rejected comparator arguments (regarding colleagues David Lysik and Joseph Suglia) for lack of material similarity and, in Suglia’s case, because he received essentially the same sanction and was disciplined by a different decisionmaker.
The investigation itself did not constitute an adverse employment action; the court considered investigation-related arguments as part of pretext analysis rather than as a standalone harm.
The cat’s paw theory failed because there was no evidence the OIDE investigator (Tamburro) was biased.

In line with Comcast and Seventh Circuit precedent, the court reiterated that § 1981 requires but-for causation and that the totality of the evidence must permit a reasonable inference that race caused the adverse action. On this record, no reasonable juror could find that Saud would have been treated differently “if he had a different ethnicity, and everything else remained the same.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Section 1981 Standard: Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020) anchors the but-for causation requirement for § 1981. The panel framed causation accordingly and aligned § 1981 analysis with Title VII standards (see Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 625 (7th Cir. 2024); Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022)).
Global Evidence Review: Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) requires courts to consider the whole record, not silo evidence by method of proof. The court explicitly used this lens to assess whether the record would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude race caused the decisions.
Burden-Shifting: McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) provided the familiar framework. The court, citing overlap between prima facie and pretext inquiries (Barnes v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 946 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2020); Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579, 587 (7th Cir. 2025)), proceeded directly to pretext once DePaul offered non-discriminatory reasons.
Pretext as “a lie” and the Honest-Belief Rule: The court emphasized that pretext means a phony reason, not error or poor judgment (Napier v. Orchard Sch. Found., 137 F.4th 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2025); Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2024); Cunningham v. Austin, 125 F.4th 783, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2025)). The panel relied on Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2013) and Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 435 (7th Cir. 2022) to focus on the decisionmaker’s honest belief, not the correctness of the decision.
Adverse Action: In rejecting the investigation as a standalone adverse action, the panel cited Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024) and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) to require a disadvantageous change in employment terms or conditions. The court treated investigative steps as part of context for pretext, not as an adverse action per se in this record.
Comparators: The opinion applied the Seventh Circuit’s exacting comparator standard: same supervisor, same standards, and materially similar conduct without confounding differences (Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012); Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 810 (7th Cir. 2025); Gamble, 106 F.4th at 626). It also invoked the same-decisionmaker principle (Mourning v. Ternes Packaging, Ind., Inc., 868 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2017)).
Multiple Reasons Are Not “Shifting” Reasons: Providing additional reasons later does not establish pretext absent genuine contradictions (Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 881 (7th Cir. 2016); Schuster v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 327 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2003); Sweet v. Town of Bargersville, 18 F.4th 273, 280 (7th Cir. 2021); Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 577 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Speculation and Internal Procedures: The court rejected arguments grounded in speculation (Ennin v. CNH Indus. Am., LLC, 878 F.3d 590, 597 (7th Cir. 2017)) and required proof of binding procedures to infer impropriety from deviations (Everett v. Cook County, 655 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2011)).
Legitimacy of Sexual Misconduct as a Basis: The panel recognized sexual misconduct findings as legitimate grounds for adverse action (Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 506–07 (7th Cir. 2014); Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 861 (2010)). It also noted that failing to investigate sexual harassment may itself create legal risk (C.S. v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 34 F.4th 536, 544–45 (7th Cir. 2022)).
Cat’s Paw: Liability requires evidence that a biased subordinate used the decisionmaker as a conduit for discriminatory action (Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 726 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2013)). Absent proof of the subordinate’s bias, the theory fails.
Generalized Bias Evidence: General allegations of institutional bias do not undercut specific, proffered justifications without concrete linkage (Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 942 F.3d 839, 858 (7th Cir. 2019); Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Legal Reasoning Applied

Framework and Causation

The court reviewed summary judgment de novo and, consistent with McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz, focused on whether a reasonable juror could conclude race was the but-for cause of the adverse actions in light of all the evidence. Because DePaul articulated multiple non-discriminatory reasons, the court bypassed a granular prima facie analysis and proceeded to pretext.

Adverse Action 1: Decision Not to Hire as Adjunct (Fall 2017)

DePaul’s articulated reasons were:

C.M.’s civil lawsuit with serious allegations;
two additional reports of potential misconduct;
low projected enrollment in Saud’s courses; and
Saud’s compensation request exceeding the department’s authority.

Saud’s pretext arguments failed for several reasons:

Comparator (Lysik) not materially similar: Saud admitted to sex with C.M.; the 2014 anonymous online allegations against Lysik were unsubstantiated, and no accuser was identified. Critically, the non-hire decision occurred after C.M. sued, which had no analogue in the Lysik situation. These differences were material.
“Shifting reasons” argument unavailing: The chair’s initial communication (enrollment and pay) and later testimony (adding lawsuit and other reports) were not inconsistent; an employer may cite multiple, cumulative reasons without proving pretext.
Context undermined selective process arguments: The chair’s not forwarding Saud’s compensation request did not undercut the proffered reasons given the supervening lawsuit and additional reports; a failure to elevate the pay request was not, in context, evidence of a lie.
Speculation about “STAFF” listings: Saud offered no evidence that listing courses as “STAFF” violated a binding policy or caused low enrollment; conjecture could not support pretext.
Self-protection theory insufficient: The chair’s concern about being “thrown under the bus” did not evidence prohibited animus, particularly racial animus. The testimony, in context, reinforced his belief in the non-discriminatory reasons.

Bottom line: No reasonable juror could conclude that, but for Saud’s race, DePaul would have hired him as an adjunct amid the lawsuit and other factors.

Adverse Action 2: Deeming Saud Ineligible for Future Employment

DePaul relied on OIDE’s second investigation (triggered by new information in the lawsuit) finding sexual harassment by a preponderance of the evidence based on inconsistencies between Saud’s initial interview and his verified answer in the civil case. The court held this justification satisfied the honest-belief rule:

Legitimate rationale: Sexual misconduct is a non-discriminatory, legitimate ground for discipline.
Honest belief by the final decisionmaker (Dean): Saud offered no evidence that the Dean did not honestly believe OIDE’s finding or the propriety of the sanction. The inquiry targets honesty, not objective correctness, fairness, or procedural perfection.
Comparator (Suglia) failed: Suglia, a white professor, was also deemed ineligible for future employment after an OIDE finding; he was not treated more favorably. Moreover, a different decisionmaker (his department chair) issued his sanction, defeating comparator parity under the same-decisionmaker principle.
Institutional bias theory lacked evidentiary linkage: References to a campus event Saud hosted and a “Campus Watch” article did not connect to race-based decisionmaking by relevant actors; generalized bias claims were too scant and disjointed to impugn the specific actions at issue.
Cat’s paw theory failed: Without evidence that the OIDE investigator was biased, her finding could not be imputed to the Dean as discriminatory animus. The fact that OIDE initially cleared Saud but later found a violation upon new evidence supported, rather than undermined, the investigator’s neutrality and the Dean’s honest reliance.

Impact and Significance

University investigations and employment decisions: The decision reinforces that private universities may rely on outcomes of internal Title IX-style investigations as legitimate, non-discriminatory bases for adverse employment actions, provided the final decisionmaker honestly believes the findings.
Investigation ≠ adverse action: Absent a material change to employment terms or conditions, an internal investigation itself will not be treated as an adverse action; plaintiffs should frame investigation-related arguments in pretext terms or show concrete harms.
Comparator rigor tightened by context: Comparator arguments are fragile in misconduct cases, especially where accuser availability, evidentiary posture (e.g., a filed civil complaint), and decisionmaker identity diverge. The same-decisionmaker requirement remains a powerful filter.
Multiple reasons are not “shifts”: Employers may articulate cumulative reasons over time without inviting an inference of pretext, absent genuine contradictions.
Speculation and procedural quibbles insufficient: Plaintiffs must marshal evidence of binding procedures and concrete causal links; conjecture about course listings or administrative mechanics will not bridge the pretext gap.
Cat’s paw requires proof of bias: Merely disagreeing with an investigator’s judgment or pointing to a later-changed conclusion is not “bias.” Evidence must show discriminatory motive by the subordinate.
But-for causation remains dispositive under § 1981: The opinion reiterates that plaintiffs must tie adverse actions to race as a but-for cause; generalized bias narratives untethered to the specific decision and decisionmaker will not survive summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 1981: A federal statute that prohibits race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts, including private employment. Plaintiffs must prove race was the but-for cause of the adverse action.
Adverse Employment Action: An employer decision that materially and disadvantageously changes the terms or conditions of employment (e.g., firing, demotion, significant pay cut). An investigation, without more, typically is not an adverse action.
McDonnell Douglas Framework: A burden-shifting method. After a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason; the burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that reason is pretextual (a lie).
Pretext: Not mere error or poor judgment; it is a false reason offered to hide discrimination. Courts focus on whether the employer honestly believed the reason, not whether it was wise or correct.
Honest-Belief Rule: If the decisionmaker honestly believed the proffered reason, the court will not second-guess the decision, even if it seems unfair or mistaken.
Comparator: Another employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class who is similarly situated in all material respects (same supervisor/decisionmaker, same standards, similar conduct), used to show disparate treatment.
Cat’s Paw Liability: A theory where a biased subordinate, lacking final authority, manipulates the formal decisionmaker into taking adverse action. Requires proof that the subordinate acted with discriminatory animus that proximately caused the decision.
Title IX-Style Investigation: Internal university process (here, via OIDE) assessing allegations like sexual harassment under institutional policies. Such findings can supply legitimate grounds for employment actions if honestly relied upon.
Ortiz “Holistic” Approach: Courts evaluate the entire record to decide whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination caused the adverse action, not merely whether each evidentiary piece independently proves the case.

Conclusion

Saud v. DePaul University underscores a set of practical and doctrinal guardrails in § 1981 employment litigation against private universities:

Internal sexual misconduct findings, and even the emergence of serious allegations through civil litigation, are legitimate, non-discriminatory bases for adverse action when honestly relied upon by the final decisionmaker.
Absent a concrete change to the terms or conditions of employment, an investigation itself is not an adverse action; its role in the case is to be assessed through pretext and causation lenses.
Comparator evidence is scrutinized for material similarity, including the same decisionmaker and similar evidentiary posture; superficial parallels will not suffice.
Allegations of “shifting reasons,” speculative procedural irregularities, or generalized institutional bias cannot substitute for proof that race was the but-for cause of the challenged decisions.

The opinion thus reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on honest-belief pretext analysis, rigorous comparator standards, and Ortiz’s holistic review, providing clear guidance for universities and litigants navigating the intersection of internal misconduct processes and federal anti-discrimination law.