I. Introduction

This memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, State of West Virginia v. Larry Glenn Wooten, No. 23-398 (Nov. 7, 2025), addresses a narrow but practically important question: how statutory notice failures to a bail bondsman interact with the discretionary remission of a forfeited bond under the multifactor test of State v. Hedrick, 204 W. Va. 547, 514 S.E.2d 397 (1999).

The petitioner, A-Four-Dable Bonding, L.L.C., had posted a $10,000 surety bond to secure the appearance of criminal defendant Larry Glenn Wooten, who was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, second or subsequent offense. After Mr. Wooten failed to appear for a rescheduled pretrial hearing on a Friday, the circuit court issued a bench warrant and later ordered a partial forfeiture of the bond in the amount of $1,000. The bondsman challenged the forfeiture primarily on the ground that it was not notified of the defendant’s failure to appear within twenty-four hours as required by West Virginia Code § 51-10-5a(d), and secondarily on the ground that the circuit court misapplied the Hedrick remission factors.

The Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, reversed the circuit court’s order and directed full remission of the forfeited $1,000. The majority opinion, joined by three members of the Court, holds that the circuit court abused its discretion under Hedrick by (1) overstating the prejudice to the State and the willfulness of the defendant’s nonappearance, (2) undervaluing clear mitigating factors, and crucially (3) failing to treat the untimely statutory notice to the surety, and the resulting loss of an opportunity for statutory exoneration, as a significant factor in the remission analysis.

Two justices (Ewing, J., joined by Bunn, J.) dissented. The dissent emphasizes the mandatory nature of bond forfeiture under Rule 46(e)(1) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, the surety’s independent duty to ensure a defendant’s appearance, and the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard that should govern review of remission decisions under Rule 46(e)(4) and Hedrick.

Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, and thus formally limited in precedential force, Wooten provides substantial guidance on how trial courts must incorporate statutory notice failures into their Hedrick analyses. It effectively elevates timely notice under § 51-10-5a(d) into a potentially decisive factor in determining whether any part of a forfeited bond should be remitted.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The underlying criminal case and bond

On March 1, 2022, following Mr. Wooten’s arrest on a charge of failure to provide accurate information, second or subsequent offense (W. Va. Code § 15‑12‑8(b)), A-Four-Dable Bonding posted a $10,000 surety bond to secure his appearance. In September 2022, he was indicted on one count of failure to register as a sex offender, second or subsequent offense (W. Va. Code § 15‑12‑8(c)), and was released on the same bond.

B. The missed pretrial hearings and bench warrant

A pretrial conference was scheduled for Thursday, December 1, 2022, in Webster County. On November 30, defense counsel sought permission for Mr. Wooten to appear telephonically, explaining that Mr. Wooten lacked transportation from Clarksburg (Harrison County) to Webster Springs (Webster County). The circuit court denied that motion and rescheduled the pretrial for Friday, December 2, at 10:00 a.m.

Mr. Wooten again failed to appear. At approximately 2:00 p.m. that Friday, December 2, the circuit court:

• issued a bench warrant for Mr. Wooten’s arrest;
• ordered the State to notify the bondsman “as required by” W. Va. Code § 51‑10‑5a(d); and
• set a December 16 hearing for the bondsman to “show cause why the bond should not be forfeited.”

Critically, the State did not give notice to the bondsman within twenty-four hours of the Friday nonappearance. Instead, the State left voicemail and electronic notice around 10:00 a.m. on Monday, December 5, approximately sixty-eight hours after issuance of the bench warrant and show-cause order.

Meanwhile, on the morning of December 5, Mr. Wooten voluntarily surrendered himself to the Harrison County Sheriff’s Department. When the bondsman learned of the failure to appear and attempted to act, it discovered there was nothing left to do—Mr. Wooten was already in custody.

C. The surety’s objections and the circuit court’s order

The bondsman promptly responded to the show-cause order, arguing:

• The court (through the State) failed to provide notice within the twenty-four-hour window mandated by W. Va. Code § 51‑10‑5a(d), which states that “[w]hen a bond is to be forfeited, the court is to give notification to the bail bondsman within twenty-four hours of the failure to appear.”
• Because it did not receive timely notice, the bondsman lost the opportunity to apprehend and return Mr. Wooten to custody—a step that would have entitled it to full reimbursement of any forfeiture under W. Va. Code § 62‑1C‑12(b), which provides that a bondsman “shall be reimbursed the full amount of the bond forfeiture … if the bail bondsman returns the defendant to the custody of the court or magistrate, within two years of the forfeiture of the bond.”
• The State suffered no meaningful prejudice: Mr. Wooten voluntarily surrendered on Monday morning, less than three days after the missed hearing, and ultimately pled guilty and was sentenced.

Following briefing and a May 1, 2023 evidentiary hearing, the circuit court rejected the surety’s position. In a May 30, 2023 order the court:

• Held that notice was timely, applying the general time-computation statute, W. Va. Code § 2‑2‑1(d), to the twenty-four-hour requirement of § 51‑10‑5a(d), and treating weekend days as effectively extending the period.
• Found that Mr. Wooten had been “given a day” to correct his missed appearance (the Thursday-to-Friday rescheduling) and failed to do so.
• Found that the State was harmed because Mr. Wooten’s failure to appear delayed the resolution of the case.
• Emphasized the public interest in ensuring that criminal defendants appear as scheduled.
• Concluded there were no mitigating factors; it specifically discounted Mr. Wooten’s transportation difficulties.

The court ordered forfeiture of $1,000 of the $10,000 bond—effectively remitting 90% of the forfeiture. The bondsman appealed.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

A. Standard of review

The Court reaffirmed the governing standard from Hedrick:

• A trial court’s decision whether to remit all or part of a previously forfeited bail bond under Rule 46(e)(4) is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Hedrick, Syl. pt. 1).
• The surety bears the burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing remission (Hedrick, Syl. pt. 2, in part).

B. The majority’s holding

The majority framed the core issue not as whether it should design a bright-line rule for computing the twenty-four-hour notice period under § 51‑10‑5a(d), but as whether the circuit court’s application of the Hedrick factors, in light of the statutory framework, was an abuse of discretion. It held:

• The circuit court’s factual findings and legal conclusions, taken together, left the Supreme Court with a “firm conviction that an error has been committed,” warranting reversal even under deferential review (citing Bing v. Lumber & Things, Inc., 2019 WL 4257089 (W. Va. Sept. 9, 2019), relying on Caruso v. Pearce, 223 W. Va. 544, 678 S.E.2d 50 (2009)).
• The circuit court misweighed the Hedrick factors by:
  • overstating prejudice and delay to the State;
  • failing to treat the short weekend delay and voluntary surrender as substantial mitigating circumstances; and
  • mischaracterizing the defendant’s failure to appear as “willful” in light of credible transportation problems.
• Most significantly, the circuit court failed to consider a critical factor: the undisputed failure to provide the bondsman with notice of the nonappearance within twenty-four hours, as required by § 51‑10‑5a(d). That failure deprived the bondsman of an opportunity to return the defendant promptly and thereby obtain full reimbursement of any forfeiture under § 62‑1C‑12(b).
• This missed factor “decisively tip[ped] the balance away from forfeiture” under the facts of the case, when combined with the weakness of the factors cited by the circuit court in favor of forfeiture.
• Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion in ordering forfeiture of $1,000, and the bondsman was entitled to full remission of that amount under Rule 46(e)(4).

The Court reversed the May 30, 2023 order and remanded for entry of an order remitting the forfeited funds.

C. What the Court explicitly did not decide

The majority stopped short of issuing a bright-line rule about how to compute the twenty-four-hour period in § 51‑10‑5a(d) when a failure to appear occurs on a Friday:

• It acknowledged the bondsman’s strong argument that applying the general time-computation statute, W. Va. Code § 2‑2‑1(d), to the twenty-four-hour notice requirement can produce absurd results by effectively giving absconding defendants a multi-day head start when nonappearance occurs just before a weekend.
• It quoted State ex rel. Morrisey v. Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston, 244 W. Va. 92, 851 S.E.2d 755 (2020), for the principle that courts must avoid statutory constructions that lead to “injustice and absurdity.”
• Nonetheless, the Court found it “unnecessary to establish any bright-line rules” governing the interplay between §§ 51‑10‑5a(d) and 2‑2‑1(d), because reversal was warranted based on the existing Hedrick framework alone.

IV. Analysis

A. The governing legal framework

1. Bail and forfeiture in West Virginia

Under West Virginia law, bail is defined as “security for the appearance of a defendant to answer to a specific criminal charge before any court or magistrate at a specific time or at any time to which the case may be continued.” (W. Va. Code § 62‑1C‑2; quoted by the dissent). The principal purpose of a bail bond is therefore to ensure the defendant’s appearance, as recognized in Hedrick:

“The purpose of the bonds were [sic] to assure [the defendant’s] appearance before the court.” (Hedrick, 204 W. Va. at 557, 514 S.E.2d at 407).

West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(e) governs forfeiture:

• Rule 46(e)(1): If a condition of the bond is breached (e.g., failure to appear), “the circuit court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.” The dissent correctly notes that “shall” is mandatory in court rules (citing In re C.E., 251 W. Va. 342, 913 S.E.2d 366 (2025)), meaning the court has no discretion to avoid declaring a forfeiture once a breach occurs.
• Rule 46(e)(2): The court may set aside a forfeiture “if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture,” on conditions the court may impose.
• Rule 46(e)(4): After judgment of forfeiture, “the court may remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the setting aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2).”

Statutes in Chapter 62 (particularly §§ 62‑1C‑7 through 62‑1C‑13) parallel and supplement these procedural rules. In State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va. 155, 517 S.E.2d 20 (1999), the Court held that the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure are the “paramount authority” governing criminal procedure; inconsistent statutes are presumptively without force or effect. The majority in Wooten does not identify any direct conflict, but both majority and dissent operate within this framework.

2. The Hedrick remission factors

In Hedrick, the Court addressed how a trial court should exercise its discretion under Rule 46(e)(4) when asked to remit (fully or partially) a previously forfeited bond. The Court articulated eight non-exhaustive factors:

(1) willfulness of the defendant’s breach; (2) cost, inconvenience, and prejudice to the government; (3) length of delay and stage of proceedings; (4) appropriateness of the bond amount; (5) participation of the bondsman in rearresting the defendant; (6) whether the surety is professional or a friend/family member; (7) the public interest in securing appearance; and (8) explanations or mitigating factors presented by the defendant. All factors need not be resolved in the State’s favor to justify denial of remission; and “it is for the trial court to determine the weight to be given to each factor.” (Hedrick, Syl. pt. 3).

Later cases, such as Page v. State, No. 15‑0409, 2016 WL 3141572 (W. Va. June 3, 2016) (memorandum decision), emphasize that circuit courts have “extraordinarily broad latitude” in applying the Hedrick factors.

3. Statutory notice and exoneration

Two statutes play a central role in Wooten:

• Notice to bondsmen – W. Va. Code § 51‑10‑5a(d): “When a bond is to be forfeited, the court is to give notification to the bail bondsman within twenty-four hours of the failure to appear.” The purpose, as the majority notes, is to ensure that “time is of the essence” in notifying the bondsman so that, “the sooner the bondsman can begin his or her search, the better the chance of apprehension.”
• Reimbursement / exoneration – W. Va. Code § 62‑1C‑12(b): When a professional bail bondsman’s bond has been forfeited “because of the failure of a defendant to appear,” the bondsman “shall be reimbursed the full amount of the bond forfeiture … if the bail bondsman returns the defendant to the custody of the court or magistrate, within two years of the forfeiture of the bond.”

Section 2‑2‑1(d), the general time-computation statute, provides that in computing any period of time “prescribed by any applicable provision of this code,” the day of the triggering event is excluded, and if the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period extends to the next business day. The circuit court imported this provision to effectively treat the 24-hour requirement as satisfied by notice given on Monday after a Friday default.

The majority questioned this construction, at least as applied in circumstances like these, as potentially producing “absurd” results contrary to legislative intent—e.g., allowing a defendant two full days to flee before the bondsman is even notified.

B. Precedents cited and their influence

1. State v. Hedrick (1999)

Hedrick is the central precedent. There, as here, a professional bondsman sought remission of forfeited bonds after a defendant failed to appear. The Court:

• confirmed abuse-of-discretion review and the surety’s burden (Syl. pts. 1–2);
• articulated the eight-factor remission test (Syl. pt. 3); and
• stressed that sureties have an affirmative “duty to act diligently to assure that [their] bailees conform to the conditions of their bonds in order to avoid forfeiture” (204 W. Va. at 558, 514 S.E.2d at 408).

In Wooten, the majority uses Hedrick as the principal analytic tool. Rather than define the legal effect of violating § 51‑10‑5a(d) in the abstract, the Court folds that violation into the Hedrick framework as an additional, highly weighty factor when deciding whether any portion of a forfeited bond should be remitted.

The dissent also relies heavily on Hedrick, but in a different way: emphasizing that the factors are non-exhaustive and that “it is for the trial court to determine the weight to be given to each of these various factors.” In its view, the majority impermissibly reweighs those factors and exports its own policy preferences into what should be a deferential review.

2. State ex rel. Morrisey v. Diocese of Wheeling-Charleston (2020)

Morrisey provides the interpretive canon that courts should avoid statutory constructions that produce “injustice and absurdity,” even when the literal text might support them (244 W. Va. 92, Syl. pt. 10, in part). In Wooten, this principle is deployed to cast doubt on the State’s reliance on § 2‑2‑1(d) to expand a 24-hour statutory period into nearly three calendar days whenever a failure to appear occurs on a Friday.

While the Court stops short of resolving that conflict, the citation signals skepticism toward reading § 51‑10‑5a(d) as anything other than a strict, short window. Future litigants can expect this canon to be invoked against expansive, weekend-adjusted constructions of time-limited notice obligations designed to enable prompt action.

3. Page v. State (2016) and abuse of discretion

Page (memorandum decision) is cited for the proposition that circuit courts have “extraordinarily broad latitude” in applying the Hedrick factors. The majority acknowledges this breadth, but nonetheless concludes that the circuit court’s weighing in this case crossed the line into abuse of discretion because:

• its key factual premises (extent of prejudice and willfulness) were not supported by the record; and
• it omitted a legally significant factor (statutory notice failure and lost exoneration opportunity).

4. Bing v. Lumber & Things, Inc. and Caruso v. Pearce

Both decisions are cited for the general abuse-of-discretion standard: an appellate court may overturn a discretionary ruling only when left with a “firm conviction that an error has been committed.”

In Wooten, the majority uses this language as a threshold for intervention: although deference is owed, the specific combination of weak State prejudice, credible mitigation, and statutory notice violation produces such a “firm conviction.”

5. Precedents highlighted in the dissent: Wallace, In re C.E., Gribben, and Lacey

The dissent supplements the majority’s case law with several key authorities:

• State v. Wallace, 205 W. Va. 155 (1999): establishes the primacy of the Rules of Criminal Procedure over inconsistent statutes. Justice Ewing suggests the majority should have squarely addressed the interplay between Rule 46(e), § 51‑10‑5a(d), and § 62‑1C‑12(b).
• In re C.E., 251 W. Va. 342, 913 S.E.2d 366 (2025): confirms that “shall” in court rules is mandatory, reinforcing that forfeiture is automatic once a bond condition is breached (Rule 46(e)(1)).
• Gribben v. Kirk, 195 W. Va. 488, 466 S.E.2d 147 (1995): provides a classic articulation of abuse-of-discretion review, under which appellate courts should not disturb a decision unless it reflects a “clear error of judgment or exceeds the bounds of permissible choices.”
• United States v. Lacey, 778 F. Supp. 1137 (D. Kan. 1991) (federal persuasive authority): stands for the proposition that a surety’s liability is not conditioned upon government notice of nonappearance; it is the surety’s contractual duty to monitor its principal’s whereabouts and ensure court appearance.

These authorities underpin the dissent’s view that the majority undervalues the surety’s independent responsibility and overemphasizes the notice failure as a basis for undoing even a modest forfeiture.

C. The Court’s legal reasoning

1. Reframing the dispute: from statutory interpretation to Hedrick balancing

A notable feature of the majority opinion is its conscious decision to avoid resolving the pure statutory question of how to compute “within twenty-four hours” under § 51‑10‑5a(d) when a failure to appear occurs before a weekend. Instead, the Court:

• acknowledges the bondsman’s argument that applying § 2‑2‑1(d) is inconsistent with legislative intent and leads to absurd results;
• invokes the absurdity canon from Morrisey; but
• ultimately treats the statutory notice failure as a powerful equitable consideration within the existing Hedrick balancing framework, rather than as an independently dispositive procedural defect.

This reframing allows the Court to provide clear guidance on how such notice failures must be considered, without rewriting or definitively harmonizing the statutes. The practical effect, however, is to transform timely notice into a quasi-structural factor that can alone drive the outcome when other factors are weak.

2. Applying Hedrick: why the majority found an abuse of discretion

The majority’s application of Hedrick to the facts proceeds factor by factor, with several key conclusions:

• Willfulness of the breach. The circuit court treated Mr. Wooten’s failures to appear as willful. The majority counters that:
  • Transportation difficulties in a rural state with limited public transit are common and can be genuine obstacles;
  • Mr. Wooten attempted to mitigate the problem by seeking to appear telephonically when he could not secure a ride;
  • After learning of the bench warrant, he voluntarily surrendered to authorities without being apprehended.
  Under these circumstances, the majority concludes that labeling the failure to appear as “willful” is not supportable.
• Cost, inconvenience, and prejudice to the government; length of delay. The circuit court posited harm to the State in terms of delay. The majority finds:
  • the delay was minimal (essentially one weekend);
  • no law-enforcement resources were expended to locate or arrest Mr. Wooten (he turned himself in);
  • the case ultimately proceeded to a guilty plea and sentencing, so substantive justice was achieved.
  Thus, any “prejudice” is characterized as nominal, insufficient to justify even a partial forfeiture.
• Public interest in appearance. The circuit court emphasized the obvious truth that public interest favors defendants appearing as scheduled. The majority describes this as axiomatic and observes that merely reciting it “adds nothing of substance” to the nuanced balancing Hedrick requires. Public interest is always present; the question is how that interest should play out in the specific factual context.
• Mitigating factors. The circuit court found “no mitigating factors.” The majority strongly disagrees:
  • Persistent transportation barriers, Mr. Wooten’s attempt to appear telephonically, and his voluntary surrender all point toward mitigation, not aggravation.
  • Given these circumstances, the majority cannot accept the lower court’s characterization of the conduct as fully culpable or unmitigated.
• The omitted factor: untimely notice and lost exoneration opportunity. For the majority, the most significant error was the failure to consider the consequence of the statutory notice violation:
  • Because notice was not given within twenty-four hours, the bondsman was deprived of a practical opportunity to locate and surrender the defendant before he turned himself in.
  • Had the bondsman been notified timely and succeeded in returning Mr. Wooten to custody, § 62‑1C‑12(b) would have entitled it to full reimbursement of the forfeiture.
  • The Court characterizes this as a “significant factor” that “decisively tips the balance away from forfeiture” when other factors favor leniency or are weak.

Aggregating these points, the majority concludes that the circuit court’s decision to maintain a $1,000 forfeiture— despite minimal State prejudice, substantial mitigation, and a clear statutory notice violation—falls outside the permissible range of outcomes contemplated by Hedrick.

3. The dissent’s counter-reasoning

Justice Ewing’s dissent raises two principal objections:

1. Misunderstanding the structure of forfeiture vs. remission vs. exoneration. The dissent emphasizes:
   • Under Rule 46(e)(1), forfeiture is mandatory once a bond condition is breached. The circuit court had no discretion not to forfeit the bond when Mr. Wooten failed to appear.
   • Remission under Rule 46(e)(4) is discretionary and governed by Hedrick; the question is not whether to forfeit, but how much, if any, of the forfeiture to remit.
   • Exoneration (or reimbursement) under § 62‑1C‑12(b) and Rule 46(f) is analytically distinct from remission. The majority, in the dissent’s view, improperly blends these categories by treating the possibility of exoneration (had the bondsman apprehended the defendant) as a reason to alter the remission outcome.
   • Moreover, the dissent questions whether exoneration was properly raised and preserved as an argument below, criticizing the majority for injecting it as a “decisive” factor that the circuit court never had the chance to weigh.
2. Substituting appellate judgment for trial-court discretion. The dissent underscores:
   • The Hedrick factors are non-exhaustive, and it is the trial court’s role to decide their relative weight.
   • The surety bears the burden of showing an abuse of discretion; it is not for the Supreme Court to manufacture new mitigating theories (such as generalized transportation problems) that the surety itself did not rely on.
   • Excusing nonappearance based on lack of transportation risks creating a broad, easily asserted excuse that could undermine enforcement of bond and probation conditions statewide.
   • Given the repeated failures to appear and the essential purpose of bail (ensuring appearance), the circuit court’s decision to remit 90% of the forfeiture while retaining 10% was within the “bounds of permissible choices” contemplated by abuse-of-discretion review.

In sum, the dissent views the majority as recalibrating the entire forfeiture–remission–exoneration structure and diluting the surety’s duty to monitor its bailee, all under the guise of a Hedrick analysis.

D. Impact and likely implications

1. Elevation of statutory notice to a central remission factor

The most important practical takeaway from Wooten is that a court’s failure to ensure timely notice to the bondsman under § 51‑10‑5a(d) is not a mere technicality. Even though the Court does not declare such failure automatically fatal to forfeiture, it:

• characterizes the failure as a “significant factor” that must be considered in Hedrick balancing; and
• demonstrates that, where State prejudice is slight and the defendant’s conduct is partially mitigated, the notice failure can be decisive in requiring full remission.

Practically, this will:

• press trial courts to make explicit findings about notice timing whenever bondsmen seek remission;
• encourage clerks and prosecutors to document that notice has been provided well within the twenty-four-hour window;
• strengthen the negotiating position of bondsmen in remission hearings when notice is even arguably late.

2. Reconsideration of “willfulness” and mitigation

Wooten suggests a somewhat more nuanced approach to “willfulness” in the failure-to-appear context, at least where:

• defendants face genuine logistical obstacles (like rural transportation barriers);
• they make documented efforts to comply (e.g., seeking telephonic appearance); and
• they promptly surrender once they realize the consequences (e.g., learning of a bench warrant).

Trial courts may now be more likely to view such circumstances as mitigating, reducing the “willfulness” factor’s weight in favor of forfeiture. Counsel for defendants and bondsmen can be expected to highlight such facts aggressively.

3. Minimal delay and prejudice as grounds for substantial remission

The decision also reinforces that:

• Short delays—especially where no law-enforcement resources are expended and the prosecution ultimately results in conviction or plea—may provide a strong basis for remitting most or all of a forfeited bond.
• Abstract “harm” in the form of a brief postponement or re-scheduling will not, standing alone, justify substantial forfeiture when measured against the equitable goals of Rule 46(e)(4).

4. Unresolved questions about time computation

Because the majority declined to issue a bright-line rule on the interplay between § 51‑10‑5a(d) and § 2‑2‑1(d), several doctrinal questions remain open:

• Does “within twenty-four hours” in § 51‑10‑5a(d) always mean a strict 24-clock-hour period, regardless of weekends and holidays?
• To what extent—if at all—does the general time-computation statute apply to time frames stated in hours rather than days?
• If a court substantially misses the statutory notice deadline, does that ever invalidate forfeiture itself, or is it always just a heavy factor in remission balancing?

The dissent is correct that this case was an opportunity to address these issues directly. For now, courts and practitioners must infer from the majority’s reasoning that:

• strict, hour-based construction of the 24-hour notice requirement is more consistent with legislative purpose; and
• reliance on § 2‑2‑1(d) to stretch that period over weekends is at least disfavored, if not ultimately impermissible.

5. The surety’s duty and the dissent’s warning

The dissent warns that the majority’s approach risks:

• shifting too much responsibility from bondsmen to the State for monitoring bailees;
• encouraging sureties to claim inadequate notice whenever feasible; and
• normalizing excuses like lack of transportation, potentially undermining the enforcement of bail and probation conditions.

Whether those concerns materialize will depend on how rigorously trial courts scrutinize claimed notice defects and mitigation in future cases. But Wooten unquestionably provides new ammunition for bondsmen to seek generous remission where procedural missteps by the State or courts have impaired their ability to perform.

V. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

1. Bail and bond

• Bail: Security (usually money or a surety bond) posted to ensure a criminal defendant appears in court as required. If the defendant appears as ordered, the bail is returned or obligations are discharged.
• Bail bond: A written promise, typically issued by a professional bonding company (surety), to pay the court a specified sum if the defendant does not appear. The bondsman charges the defendant a non-refundable fee (a percentage of the bond) and assumes the risk of forfeiture.

2. Forfeiture, remission, and exoneration

• Forfeiture: When a defendant violates a bond condition (most commonly by failing to appear), the court is required by Rule 46(e)(1) to declare that the bond amount is forfeited. This converts the bond obligation into a judgment the court can enforce.
• Remission: After a forfeiture judgment, the court may later reduce or cancel (remit) all or part of that forfeited amount under Rule 46(e)(4) if “justice does not require” full enforcement. Remission is discretionary and guided by the Hedrick factors.
• Exoneration / reimbursement: Separately, statutes like W. Va. Code § 62‑1C‑12(b) provide that if a bondsman later returns the defendant to custody within a specified time (two years here), the bondsman is entitled to be reimbursed for the forfeited amount. This is sometimes referred to as exoneration of the bond.

In simple terms: forfeiture is the penalty; remission is the court’s later decision to reduce that penalty; exoneration is the statutory right to get the money back if the bondsman ultimately produces the defendant.

3. Abuse of discretion

“Abuse of discretion” is a deferential standard of appellate review. A higher court will not overturn a trial court’s discretionary decision (like how much of a bond to remit) unless:

• the decision rests on a clear factual or legal error; or
• the outcome falls outside the range of reasonable choices open to the trial court.

In Wooten, the Supreme Court found such an abuse because the circuit court’s reasoning mischaracterized key facts (prejudice, willfulness) and omitted a critical statutory factor (notice failure).

4. Willfulness and mitigating factors

• Willfulness in this context refers to whether the defendant intentionally or recklessly failed to comply with the bond condition (e.g., simply choosing not to show up) versus being prevented by circumstances beyond his control (e.g., a medical emergency, severe weather, or, as argued here, genuine lack of transportation).
• Mitigating factors are circumstances that lessen the blameworthiness of the conduct (such as voluntary surrender, good-faith efforts to appear, or external barriers), and thus support greater remission of a forfeited bond.

5. Statutory notice requirement

Section 51‑10‑5a(d) requires courts to notify the bail bondsman within twenty-four hours when a bond “is to be forfeited” due to a failure to appear. Conceptually:

• This obligation exists to give the bondsman a fighting chance to find the defendant quickly, before the trail goes cold.
• Late notice does not automatically cancel forfeiture, but as Wooten shows, it can be a major reason for the appellate court to require remission.

VI. Conclusion

State v. Wooten occupies a relatively narrow doctrinal space—remission of a modest portion of a forfeited bond in light of a late notice and rapid voluntary surrender. Yet the decision carries broader significance.

Substantively, the majority confirms and refines the Hedrick framework by:

• insisting that statutory notice failures under § 51‑10‑5a(d), and the resulting effect on a bondsman’s ability to seek statutory exoneration, must be treated as important factors in remission analysis;
• emphasizing that minimal delay, lack of State expenditure to recapture a defendant, and voluntary surrender are strong grounds for substantial or total remission; and
• recognizing transportation barriers and good-faith efforts to appear as legitimate mitigating circumstances that can undercut a finding of willful default.

Procedurally, the case illustrates that even under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the Supreme Court will intervene when a remission decision rests on mischaracterized facts and omits legally significant considerations. At the same time, the dissent highlights the risk that such intervention may be seen as substituting appellate judgment for trial-court discretion and diluting the surety’s independent obligations.

For trial courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and the bail industry, the message is clear: when a defendant fails to appear, courts must act quickly to notify the bondsman; they must carefully document and weigh actual prejudice and mitigating circumstances; and they must explicitly integrate statutory notice obligations and exoneration opportunities into the Hedrick calculus. Even in the constrained format of a memorandum decision, Wooten meaningfully reorients the practical law of bond forfeiture remission in West Virginia toward more nuanced, statute-sensitive equity.