Timeliness Alone Does Not Compel Substitution: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Adequate Inquiry and “Total Breakdown” Standard for Denying New Counsel at Sentencing

Introduction

In United States v. Joshua Sammy Steadman (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025) (nonprecedential), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of an indigent defendant’s motions to substitute appointed counsel during sentencing proceedings. The appeal centered on whether the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by refusing to appoint new counsel when Steadman and his attorney disagreed over objecting to the Presentence Report’s (PSR) attribution of “actual” methamphetamine rather than a mixture—a distinction that significantly affects guideline calculations.

The case involved two sentencing hearings. At the first, the court continued proceedings after Steadman raised concerns about communication and counsel’s refusal to object to the “actual methamphetamine” quantity (a fact stipulated in the plea agreement). At the reconvened hearing, the court interpreted Steadman’s objection as a request for a downward variance based on the perceived harshness of “actual methamphetamine” guidelines relative to mixtures. Neither Steadman nor counsel corrected the court’s understanding, and the court denied the substitution motion. Steadman received a within-Guidelines sentence of 168 months and appealed the denial of new counsel.

The panel, applying deferential review and the Sixth Circuit’s established four-factor framework for substitution-of-counsel motions, held that only the timeliness factor favored Steadman. The court concluded that the district judge conducted an adequate inquiry, no “total lack of communication” existed, and the interests-of-justice factor was neutral. The court also acknowledged, but did not decide, whether Steadman’s appellate waiver barred this appeal, opting instead to resolve the case on the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standard and framework: Denials of motions to substitute counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion under a four-factor test (timeliness; adequacy of the court’s inquiry; whether conflict caused a total communication breakdown preventing an adequate defense; and the balance with the public interest in prompt and efficient justice).
• Factor outcomes:
  • Timeliness: Favored Steadman—both requests closely followed the emergence of his concerns.
  • Adequacy of inquiry: Weighed against Steadman—the district court invited explanation, facilitated off-the-record discussions, and obtained on-the-record confirmations that the attorney-client relationship remained workable.
  • Communication breakdown: Weighed against Steadman—the record showed ongoing communication and advocacy; disagreements and imperfect communication fell short of a “complete breakdown.”
  • Interests of justice: Neutral—substitution would have required another last-minute continuance and new counsel would have been less familiar; proceedings had already been continued once.
• Conflict-of-interest/IAC theory: The panel declined to decide whether counsel had a conflict tied to the plea stipulation, noting the record was underdeveloped. Any such ineffective-assistance or conflict-of-interest claim was left for potential collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the plea agreement permitted.
• Appellate waiver: The court sidestepped whether the plea’s appellate waiver barred this appeal, affirming on the merits consistent with prior practice.
• Disposition: Affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying substitution.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Williams, 176 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001):

  These cases collectively establish the abuse-of-discretion standard and the four-part test governing motions to substitute counsel: (1) timeliness; (2) adequacy of the court’s inquiry; (3) whether the conflict caused a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense; and (4) the balance with the public interest in efficient proceedings. The panel expressly adopted this framework and walked factor-by-factor through it.

• United States v. Hudson, No. 21-4126, 2023 WL 1463701 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023); Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2008):

  Hudson emphasizes that the district court must not conduct a “cursory” inquiry; it must make explicit findings or at least build a record indicating the basis for denying substitution. The panel relied on Hudson and Benitez to conclude the district court did more than enough: it questioned Steadman directly, allowed consultations with counsel, and confirmed that the relationship was not “irretrievably broken,” supporting the exercise of discretion.

• United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Marrero, 651 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009):

  These cases define the court’s duty to inquire: defendants must get a fair chance to explain perceived conflicts. Iles also supports a district court’s reliance on counsel’s representations and the defendant’s assent in concluding that problems were solved. The panel noted Steadman and counsel repeatedly affirmed their ability to proceed without further correction, validating the district court’s interpretation and denying substitution.

• United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2007):

  These cases underscore that dissatisfaction or imperfect communication is insufficient; the standard is a “complete communication breakdown” preventing an adequate defense. The panel found the record reflected continued communication and advocacy, which defeated Steadman’s claim under this factor.

• United States v. Evans, 406 F. App’x 946 (6th Cir. 2011):

  Cited to show timeliness—Steadman’s requests followed quickly after his concerns crystallized, satisfying factor (1).

• United States v. DeBruler, 788 F. App’x 1010 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Saldivar-Trujillo, 380 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2004):

  These cases further confirm that ongoing exchanges and representation negate a claim of “total lack of communication.” The panel invoked them to show the record fell short of the high bar for substitution.

• United States v. Whitfield, 259 F. App’x 830 (6th Cir. 2008); Vasquez, 560 F.3d at 467:

  When substitution would require a last-minute continuance, denials receive “extraordinary deference.” The panel applied this consideration within factor (4)’s balancing analysis, particularly because sentencing had already been continued once.

• United States v. Collado-Rivera, 759 F. App’x 455 (6th Cir. 2019); United States v. Derringer, 844 F. App’x 802 (6th Cir. 2021):

  Both cases inform a nuanced factor (4) analysis: even where delay might be modest, last-minute substitutions can still undermine efficient administration of justice. The panel treated the factor as neutral given the competition between efficiency and fairness considerations.

• United States v. Ross, 454 F. App’x 453 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016):

  These decisions support the court’s choice to affirm on the merits without resolving the scope or enforceability of an appellate waiver. The panel followed that path here.

• United States v. Detloff, 794 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cooper, 642 F. App’x 514 (6th Cir. 2016):

  Both counsel the deferral of ineffective-assistance and conflict-of-interest claims to § 2255 where the record is insufficient. The panel applied that approach to Steadman’s conflict theory.

Legal Reasoning

• Appellate waiver sidestep:

  Although Steadman’s plea agreement included an appellate waiver, the panel declined to decide whether it barred this Sixth Amendment claim. Instead, it affirmed on the merits, consistent with Ross and Caruthers. This preserves for another day whether a denial-of-substitution claim is an appeal of the “conviction(s) or sentence” within typical waiver formulations.

• Factor (1): Timeliness:

  Both requests were promptly made relative to when the disputes emerged: the first at the outset of the initial sentencing hearing and the second (pro se) about a week after counsel confirmed he would not object to the PSR’s “actual methamphetamine” finding due to the plea stipulation.

• Factor (2): Adequacy of the court’s inquiry:

  The district court invited Steadman to articulate the problem, confirmed the nature of the disagreement (objection to “actual methamphetamine” amount versus a variance request), allowed off-the-record attorney-client discussions, and asked whether additional time was needed. At the second hearing, the court again sought clarification and proposed proceeding if it considered what it understood to be the objection (a variance based on the harshness differential between “actual” and “mixture”). Critically, when the court stated its understanding on the record, Steadman explicitly agreed (“Yes, the harshness, yeah”), and neither he nor counsel corrected the court despite several opportunities. This record enabled the court to reasonably conclude that the perceived conflict had been resolved and that the parties chose to proceed, satisfying the duty to inquire.

• Factor (3): Total breakdown versus mere dissatisfaction:

  Steadman and counsel had been communicating before, during, and after the first hearing; both represented a willingness to continue working together; counsel advocated for Steadman at sentencing; and Steadman’s pro se filing itself reflected ongoing exchanges. Disagreement over a strategic choice—here, whether to object to a PSR finding that mirrored a plea stipulation—does not establish the required “complete communication breakdown” or inability to mount an adequate defense. The panel therefore found no “good cause” for substitution on this record.

• Factor (4): Interests of justice:

  Substituting counsel would have required another last-minute continuance where sentencing had already been continued once. The panel noted the “extraordinary deference” owed to denials that avert such delays and observed that appointed counsel had represented Steadman for almost a year and was familiar with the case, weighing against substitution’s efficiency. Still, the panel acknowledged the gravity of the meth-purity issue and treated the factor as neutral overall.

• Conflict-of-interest/IAC allegation:

  Steadman posited that counsel’s refusal to challenge the “actual” meth attribution reflected counsel’s self-protection against ineffective-assistance exposure from the plea phase. The panel viewed the record as too uncertain: counsel also said they had reviewed the plea agreement line-by-line; at the change-of-plea hearing, Steadman confirmed he had discussed and agreed with the factual basis—including purity. As the district court made no findings on this theory (it was not squarely raised as a basis for substitution), the panel deferred any such claim to collateral review, which the plea agreement allowed under § 2255.

Impact and Practical Significance

• For district judges:
  • What suffices for an “adequate inquiry” is clarified: ask open-ended questions, allow defendant to explain the conflict in his own words, facilitate attorney-client consultation, confirm on the record whether the relationship is workable, and solicit corrections if the court’s understanding is mistaken. This record-building shields the ruling on appeal.
  • If the defendant and counsel affirm ability to proceed and do not correct the court’s restatement of the dispute, the court may reasonably conclude the conflict is resolved.
• For defense counsel and defendants:
  • Timeliness helps but is not dispositive. The key is demonstrating a “total communication breakdown” that prevents an adequate defense. Mere strategic disagreement (e.g., whether to object to a PSR finding anchored in a plea stipulation) usually will not suffice.
  • Record clarity is critical. If the court misunderstands the nature of the defendant’s objection (variance request versus factual objection to PSR), counsel must correct the record. Silence can be treated as acquiescence.
  • Where a plea agreement stipulates drug purity or quantity, counsel may reasonably decline to object to congruent PSR findings absent a basis to challenge the plea’s factual stipulations. If counsel’s advice or performance around that stipulation is at issue, that is typically a § 2255 question, not a ground for immediate substitution at sentencing without more.
• Appellate practice and waivers:
  • The panel again affirmed on the merits without deciding whether the appellate waiver barred the appeal, preserving a recurring ambiguity: when, if ever, a substitution-of-counsel challenge to sentencing falls outside standard appeal waivers. Practitioners should brief both waiver scope and merits.
• Substantive sentencing context:
  • The opinion recognizes the substantial guideline consequences of “actual methamphetamine” versus “mixture,” but reinforces that the severity of the consequence alone does not establish “good cause” for new counsel. Defendants must either (a) create record grounds to contest the factual stipulation or (b) pursue variance arguments transparently and on the record.
• Collateral review preserved:
  • The panel’s express reservation of conflict-of-interest/IAC issues for § 2255 maintains a path for defendants to develop a factual record on counsel’s plea-stage advice or conflicts not apparent from the sentencing record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Abuse of discretion:

  A highly deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether the appellate court would have ruled differently, but whether the district court’s decision fell outside the range of reasonable choices given the record and governing law.

• Motion to substitute counsel versus right to counsel of choice:

  Indigent defendants have a right to effective counsel, not necessarily to counsel of their choosing. To replace appointed counsel, a defendant must show “good cause,” often requiring a “total breakdown” in communication that prevents an adequate defense.

• Adequacy of inquiry:

  When a defendant asks for new counsel, the judge must investigate by allowing the defendant to explain his concerns on the record and by probing whether the relationship is salvageable. A thorough, patient on-the-record inquiry usually satisfies this duty.

• “Total lack of communication”:

  A high bar. It means the attorney-client relationship has broken down so completely that the lawyer cannot provide an adequate defense. Disagreements over strategy or sporadic communication problems typically do not meet this standard.

• Variance versus objection to PSR:

  An objection challenges the PSR’s factual findings or guideline calculations. A variance asks the court to impose a sentence outside the advisory guideline range based on the statutory sentencing factors (e.g., policy disagreements or case-specific equities). In this case, the court understood Steadman to be requesting a variance due to the guideline’s “harshness” for “actual” meth; neither he nor counsel corrected that understanding.

• “Actual methamphetamine” versus “mixture”:

  Federal sentencing treats pure methamphetamine (“actual”) far more severely than a mixture containing methamphetamine. Which one applies can dramatically alter the guideline range.

• Appellate waivers and merits-first resolution:

  Many plea agreements include waivers of the right to appeal. Appellate courts sometimes affirm on the merits without deciding whether a waiver applies, especially when the result would be the same either way.

• § 2255 collateral review for ineffective assistance or conflicts:

  Claims that require developing facts outside the existing record—such as counsel’s advice during plea bargaining or an undisclosed conflict—are usually raised via a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not on direct appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Steadman reinforces well-settled but often contested terrain: timeliness alone does not compel substitution of appointed counsel at sentencing. The opinion clarifies that a district court’s duty of inquiry is satisfied by a deliberate, on-the-record exploration that invites the defendant’s explanation, permits consultation, and secures confirmation that the relationship is functional—or not. Absent a “total lack of communication” preventing an adequate defense, and particularly where substitution would cause last-minute delay, denial is unlikely to be an abuse of discretion.

The court’s treatment of related issues is also instructive. It declined to interpret the plea’s appellate waiver, preferring to affirm on the merits; it emphasized that disagreements over strategy—especially when anchored in a plea stipulation—do not themselves justify new counsel; and it preserved for § 2255 any conflict-of-interest or ineffective-assistance claims tied to plea-stage advice or the meth-purity stipulation. Even as a nonprecedential decision, Steadman provides a practical blueprint for district courts and litigants: build a careful record, be precise about the nature of objections versus variances, and distinguish immediate substitution claims from collateral ineffectiveness claims that demand fuller factual development.