Tigre-Agurto v. Bondi: Reinforcing the Nexus Requirement in Crime-Based Asylum Claims and the Standard for Continuances in Removal Proceedings

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date: December 18, 2025
Docket No.: 23-7633 (NAC)
Disposition: Petition for review denied (summary order; non-precedential).

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I. Introduction

This summary order of the Second Circuit in Tigre-Agurto v. Bondi addresses two recurring issues in immigration law:

• When an Immigration Judge (IJ) abuses discretion in denying a continuance to gather additional evidence.
• How the asylum “nexus” requirement applies when the alleged harm arises in a context of generalized criminality—here, robberies in Ecuador—where the applicant claims membership in disability-related particular social groups.

Petitioner Laura Ines Tigre‑Agurto, a native and citizen of Ecuador, applied for asylum and withholding of removal for herself and her children, asserting that she belonged to particular social groups defined by her chronic physical medical conditions and her sons’ relationship to her. She claimed she had been and would be victimized in Ecuador because of those characteristics. An IJ denied her fourth request for a continuance, found no sufficient “nexus” between the harm and a protected ground, and denied asylum and withholding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Second Circuit now denies her petition for review.

Although this is a summary order and expressly non-precedential under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it illustrates:

• How strictly the Court applies the “one central reason” nexus standard to claims arising in settings of ordinary crime.
• How demanding the record-based showing must be to obtain further continuances in removal proceedings, especially in the absence of clearly identified and obtainable evidence.
• How disability-related or health-based social group claims face particular difficulties when the actual persecutor conduct looks indistinguishable from violence motivated by financial gain.

Note: This commentary explains the decision and its implications. It is not legal advice.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Parties and Procedural Background

• Petitioners: Laura Ines Tigre‑Agurto and her children, Angel Daniel Avesicha‑Tigre and J.A.A., all Ecuadorian nationals.
• Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States (sued in her official capacity).

An IJ denied:

• Tigre‑Agurto’s motion for a fourth continuance of her removal proceedings, and
• Her applications for:
  • Asylum,
  • Withholding of removal, and
  • Relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. In doing so, the BIA:

• Relied only on two IJ findings regarding asylum/withholding:
  • Lack of nexus between the harm and a protected ground, and
  • A finding that internal relocation within Ecuador was feasible.
• Found that Tigre‑Agurto had waived her CAT claim by not adequately raising it on appeal to the BIA.

The Second Circuit, reviewing the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA (i.e., considering only the grounds the BIA adopted), denies the petition. It:

• Upholds the denial of the continuance.
• Affirms the denial of asylum and withholding solely on the nexus ground, declining to reach the alternative relocation basis.
• Declines to address CAT relief because it was waived before the BIA and abandoned in the Court of Appeals.

B. Core Holdings

1. Denial of Continuance: No abuse of discretion. The IJ reasonably concluded there was no identified, obtainable evidence that required more time and that prior representations by counsel suggested any needed documents were already available or in the mail.
2. Asylum/Withholding – Nexus: Even assuming that the proposed disability-related particular social groups were legally cognizable, substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that Tigre‑Agurto failed to show that her alleged persecutors targeted her (or would target her) “on account of” membership in those groups, as opposed to general criminal motives (robbery/financial gain).
3. CAT Claim: Not considered because Tigre‑Agurto did not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that she had waived CAT by failing to argue it on appeal. This constitutes abandonment under Second Circuit precedent.

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III. Analysis

A. Procedural and Substantive Framework

The Court sets the analytical framework by:

• Reviewing the IJ’s decision “as modified” by the BIA, per Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005). This means:
  • Only those portions of the IJ’s reasoning adopted (or at least relied upon) by the BIA are reviewable.
  • If the BIA relies on a subset of the IJ’s reasoning (here, nexus and relocation), the Court ignores any IJ rationales the BIA did not adopt.
• Emphasizing the doctrine from INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976): courts and agencies are not required to resolve issues unnecessary to the result. Consequently, once the Court concludes that the lack of nexus is dispositive, it declines to address relocation.

The result is a tightly focused opinion:

• On the procedural side: the propriety of denying a fourth continuance.
• On the substantive side: the nexus element of asylum/withholding in the context of general criminal violence.

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B. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676 (2d Cir. 2023) – Abandonment/Waiver on Appeal

The Court cites Debique to explain why it does not address the CAT claim at all:

• In Debique, the Second Circuit held that issues not adequately argued in an appellant’s brief are deemed abandoned.
• The Court reiterates that:

  "[W]e consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant's brief, and an appellant's failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes abandonment."

Role here: This establishes that because Tigre‑Agurto did not challenge the BIA’s conclusion that she waived CAT relief, the Court treats the CAT claim as abandoned at the judicial-review stage. This is procedural but significant: it underscores the importance of fully briefing every claim a litigant wants reviewed.

2. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2005) – Scope of Review

This case explains the “IJ decision as modified by the BIA” standard:

• Circuit courts review the IJ’s decision only to the extent the BIA adopts or relies on it.
• Where the BIA does not adopt certain rationales, those portions are effectively out of the case for purposes of judicial review.

Role here: It allows the Second Circuit to:

• Ignore IJ rationales that the BIA did not adopt (e.g., it is not required to consider every IJ finding once the BIA narrows the basis for its affirmance).
• Focus on:
  • The denial of the continuance, and
  • The lack of nexus to a protected ground.

3. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976) – Necessity of Findings

The Supreme Court in Bagamasbad held:

"As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach."

Role here:

• Having concluded that the lack of nexus is dispositive, the Second Circuit:
  • Holds that the BIA did not have to reach all alternative grounds relied on by the IJ.
  • Declines to address the internal relocation issue, because the nexus failure already resolves the case.

4. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2014) – Particular Social Group & Nexus

In Paloka, the Second Circuit clarified that for a particular social group (PSG)-based asylum claim, the applicant must show:

• (1) a cognizable particular social group, and
• (2) a nexus between persecution and membership in that PSG.

Role here:

• The Court relies on Paloka to state that both elements must be met.
• However, in this case the Court explicitly assumes arguendo that the proposed social groups could be cognizable and resolves the case on nexus alone.
• This is a common judicial technique: rather than definitively ruling whether the PSG definition is valid, the Court skips to a dispositive element (nexus) that the applicant clearly fails.

5. Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2006) – Abuse of Discretion in Continuances

Morgan sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denials of continuances:

• An IJ “may grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown” (8 C.F.R. § 1003.29).
• An IJ abuses discretion if:
  1. The decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or
  2. The decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.

Role here:

• The Court uses Morgan to frame its review of the IJ’s refusal to grant a fourth continuance.
• Applying that standard, the Court holds the denial was well within the range of permissible decisions, especially given the lack of specificity about what additional evidence was expected and whether it was obtainable.

6. Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009) – Standard of Review (Substantial Evidence / De Novo)

Yanqin Weng clarifies:

• Factual findings are reviewed under the “substantial evidence” standard.
• Questions of law are reviewed de novo (meaning, with no deference).

Role here:

• The Court recites this standard before addressing immigration fact findings.
• It then applies the substantial evidence standard to the BIA’s factual findings regarding the nexus requirement.

7. Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540 (2d Cir. 2005) & INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) – Nexus and Persecutor’s Motive

Both cases focus on motive:

• Yueqing Zhang held that an asylum applicant must show, through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor's motive in inflicting harm arises from a protected ground.
• Elias‑Zacarias stressed that because the statute makes motive critical, the applicant must provide some evidence (direct or circumstantial) of that motive.

Role here:

• The Court relies on these precedents to reject Tigre‑Agurto’s nexus argument because:
  • No robber or aggressor ever referenced her medical conditions.
• Thus, on this record, the only logical motive shown is economic—ordinary crime—not persecution on account of a protected ground.

8. Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. 2022) – “One Central Reason” and Crime-Based Harm

Quituizaca is crucial to the nexus analysis:

• The Court there held that the “one central reason” standard applies not only to asylum but also to withholding of removal.
• It reaffirmed that a protected ground cannot be merely “incidental or tangential” to another (non-protected) reason for harm.
• In Quituizaca, the petitioner was robbed on a bus. The Court found no testimony that the robbers acted based on a protected ground; their motive was theft.

Role here:

• The Court analogizes Tigre‑Agurto’s experience—being robbed, approached, or watched in a crime-ridden environment—to Quituizaca.
• Like the petitioner in Quituizaca, Tigre‑Agurto offers no evidence that her medical condition (or her sons’ relationship to her) was a central reason for harm, as opposed to generalized criminal targeting.
• This strongly supports the conclusion that the PSG, even if cognizable, did not motivate the harm in the required sense.

9. Ucelo‑Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) – Economic Crime vs. Social Group Persecution

In Ucelo‑Gomez, the Second Circuit observed:

"When the harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a 'particular social group.'"

Role here:

• The Court uses this case to emphasize that being a victim of ordinary, economically motivated crime—even if widespread or severe—does not, without more, equal persecution “on account of” a protected ground.
• The evidence that robberies are common in Ecuador and not specifically focused on people with chronic medical conditions fits squarely within Ucelo‑Gomez.

10. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1999) – Random Violence and General Crime Conditions

In Melgar de Torres, the Court concluded that “random violence” and “general crime conditions” do not constitute grounds for asylum.

Role here:

• This decision is cited as part of the line of cases distinguishing:
  • Persecution on account of a protected characteristic, from
  • Living in a dangerous country or being subject to ordinary street crime.

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C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Denial of the Fourth Continuance

The IJ had already granted multiple continuances. Tigre‑Agurto requested a fourth to obtain additional evidence. She later argued that the IJ:

• Mischaracterized counsel’s statements as suggesting that the needed evidence had already been obtained and merely needed to be mailed from Ecuador.
• Failed to appreciate that further time was necessary to secure medical records and other documents.

The Court, applying Morgan and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29, finds:

• The record supports the IJ’s characterization:
  • The motion for continuance did not identify what specific evidence had not been received.
  • It did not describe any mail delay or concrete logistical problem.
  • There was no articulated timeline or method by which additional evidence would realistically be obtained.
• Tigre‑Agurto’s own testimony contradicted the idea that more time would produce meaningful evidence:
  • She stated that the Ecuadorian Social Security Office refused to provide her medical records.
  • This suggests that additional time would not change their refusal.
• Without a clear identification of what evidence is missing, how it could be obtained, and why it matters, the request lacks the “good cause” that § 1003.29 requires.

Accordingly, the Court holds there was:

• No legal or factual error in the IJ’s analysis, and
• No abuse of discretion, as the denial is well “within the range of permissible decisions.”

2. Asylum and Withholding of Removal – Nexus Analysis

The statutory and regulatory framework:

• Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (asylum) and § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding), the applicant must show that:
  • Race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
  • “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting [her].”
• Under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b) (asylum) and 1208.16(b) (withholding), she must show past persecution or a well-founded fear (or, for withholding, a “clear probability”) of future persecution on such grounds.
• Quituizaca extends the “one central reason” standard to withholding.

Tigre‑Agurto proposed two particular social groups:

1. “Ecuadorian women with chronic physical medical conditions.”
2. “Teenage children of Ecuadorian women with chronic physical medical conditions.”

The Court expressly assumes (without deciding) that these groups might be cognizable PSGs. It then turns to nexus:

• Did the alleged persecutors target her on account of her membership in these groups, or for some other reason?

Key evidentiary points:

• None of the individuals who robbed or approached her:
  • Made any comments about her chronic medical conditions.
  • Suggested they singled her out because she was ill, disabled, or otherwise physically vulnerable in that specific way.
• Those who actually spoke to her:
  • Demanded money or property.
  • Otherwise behaved like common thieves motivated by financial gain.
• Some incidents involved people who simply stole money or stared at her, without any indication of motive tied to a protected characteristic.
• Critically, she herself admitted that robbery is common in Ecuador and that “everyone is targeted regardless of physical condition.”

Applying the nexus standards from Yueqing Zhang, Elias‑Zacarias, Quituizaca, and Ucelo‑Gomez, the Court concludes:

• At most, the evidence demonstrates ordinary criminality—motivated by financial gain.
• There is no direct or circumstantial evidence that any robber:
  • knew or cared about her chronic conditions, or
  • saw her sons as targets because of their mother’s medical status.
• Her membership in the proposed PSGs, if cognizable, is at best:
  • Incidental or tangential to the criminals’ motive.
  • Not “one central reason” for the harm, as required by statute and by Quituizaca.
• No reasonable adjudicator would be compelled by the record to find otherwise, meaning substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding of no nexus.

Because nexus is an essential element of both asylum and withholding, failure to establish it is dispositive. The Court therefore affirms the denial of both forms of relief on this ground alone.

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D. Impact and Broader Significance

Although this is a non-precedential summary order, it is consistent with and reinforces existing Second Circuit doctrine. Its implications include:

1. Crime-Based Claims and Disability-Related Social Groups

The decision is especially relevant for:

• Applicants arguing that their disability or chronic health condition makes them targets of crime or abuse in their home countries.
• Claims framed as PSGs such as:
  • “Persons with chronic medical conditions in [Country X],”
  • “Women with disabilities in [Country X],”
  • “Children of disabled parents,” etc.

The Court signals that:

• Such PSGs may be theoretically arguable (the Court did not reject them on cognizability grounds), but
• The critical hurdle is showing that:
  • Criminals actually target such persons because of those characteristics,
  • Not merely because they happen to be available victims in a high-crime environment.

For future disability-based claims to succeed, applicants will likely need:

• More direct evidence of discriminatory or exploitative intent (e.g., insults or threats referencing disability; patterns of targeting disabled persons).
• Robust country-conditions evidence indicating that criminals or persecutors systematically target disabled individuals qua disabled individuals.

2. General Criminality vs. Persecution

The opinion reinforces a well‑established, but often misunderstood, principle: generalized crime and violence—even if severe and pervasive—do not, by themselves, constitute persecution on account of a protected ground.

The Court’s line of authority—from Melgar de Torres to Ucelo‑Gomez to Quituizaca and now this case—makes it clear that:

• Being a victim of robbery, extortion, or random violence does not suffice for asylum/withholding unless the applicant can link that harm to a protected ground with competent evidence of motive.
• Vague notions that some individuals (e.g., women, the disabled, the wealthy) are more “vulnerable” in a high-crime environment will not meet the “one central reason” test unless the record shows that perpetrators select them because of that vulnerability (and that vulnerability aligns with one of the statutory grounds).

3. Litigation Strategy: Continuances and Record Building

The continuance portion has practical consequences for immigration practice:

• Repeated continuance requests—especially a fourth or later—face high skepticism, particularly if:
  • They do not specify exactly what documents are needed,
  • They fail to explain how and when those documents will be obtained, or
  • The applicant’s own testimony suggests that the documents are unavailable (e.g., a government agency has refused to produce them).
• Practitioners should:
  • Be precise and detailed in motions for continuance (identify evidence, its relevance, the method and timeline of acquisition, and prior attempts to obtain it).
  • Consider alternative forms of evidence (e.g., affidavits, expert opinions, alternative medical records) if some records are unattainable.
  • Anticipate that IJs and reviewing courts will look for signs of diligence vs. delay.

4. Appellate Waiver and Preservation of Claims

The reference to Debique v. Garland underscores how easily a claim can be lost on appeal:

• A failure to raise, brief, and argue a claim before the BIA (and later before the Court of Appeals) typically results in waiver or abandonment.
• Here, Tigre‑Agurto’s CAT claim is functionally out of the case because she did not contest the BIA’s waiver finding.

For litigants and counsel:

• Every form of relief (asylum, withholding, CAT, etc.) must be:
  • Specifically discussed in briefs,
  • Supported by argument and, where applicable, citations to the record and law.
• Silence or bare mention is typically not enough to avoid a finding of abandonment.

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IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical immigration and appellate concepts. This section simplifies them.

1. Asylum vs. Withholding of Removal vs. CAT

• Asylum:
  • Discretionary relief.
  • Requires showing past persecution or a well‑founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group).
  • Lower standard of proof than withholding: a “reasonable possibility” of persecution is enough.
• Withholding of removal:
  • Mandatory (if eligibility is met); the government must not remove the person to a country where the standard is met.
  • Higher evidentiary standard than asylum: the applicant must show a “clear probability” (more likely than not) of persecution on account of a protected ground.
  • Now subject to the same “one central reason” nexus standard as asylum in the Second Circuit (Quituizaca).
• CAT (Convention Against Torture):
  • Protects against return to a country where the person is more likely than not to be subjected to torture.
  • Does not require a protected ground (i.e., no need to show motive tied to race, religion, etc.).
  • Requires showing that the torture would be inflicted by (or with the acquiescence of) a public official.

2. “Nexus” and “One Central Reason”

• Nexus:
  • Legal term for the connection between the harm and a protected ground.
  • The applicant must show the persecutor’s motive: that the protected ground was a reason—now “one central reason”—for the persecution.
• “One central reason” standard:
  • The protected ground need not be the only reason for harm, but it must be a central reason.
  • A motive that is incidental, tangential, or subordinate to non‑protected motives (like pure criminal profit) is not enough.

3. Particular Social Group (PSG)

A “particular social group” is one of the five protected grounds in asylum and withholding law. Though the concept is complex, generally a PSG must:

• Involve a group of persons who share a common, immutable characteristic (something they cannot change or should not be required to change).
• Be socially distinct in the society in question (recognizable as a distinct group by that society).
• Be defined with particularity (clear boundaries, not overly general or amorphous).

In this case, the Court did not decide whether:

• “Ecuadorian women with chronic physical medical conditions,”
• “Teenage children of Ecuadorian women with chronic physical medical conditions”

are valid PSGs, but assumed they might be for the sake of the analysis.

4. “Substantial Evidence” Review

When courts review factual findings by administrative agencies (like the BIA), they use the “substantial evidence” standard:

• The agency’s findings are considered conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a different conclusion (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)).
• This is a highly deferential standard; the question is not whether the court might have reached a different conclusion, but whether it must do so.

In Tigre‑Agurto, the Court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s view that the harm was economically motivated crime, not persecution based on a protected ground.

5. Abuse of Discretion

An IJ’s denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under Morgan, an IJ abuses discretion when:

• He/she relies on incorrect legal principles or clearly erroneous facts, or
• The decision is outside the “range of permissible decisions.”

This, too, is deferential: as long as the decision is reasonable and grounded in the record, the Court will not overturn it simply because another IJ might have decided differently.

6. Summary Orders and Non-Precedential Status

The Court explicitly notes that this is a summary order:

• Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1:
  • Summary orders filed on or after January 1, 2007 may be cited.
  • However, they do not have precedential effect.
  • They may be considered persuasive but are not binding on future panels.

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V. Conclusion

Tigre‑Agurto v. Bondi exemplifies two core themes in contemporary asylum and removal jurisprudence in the Second Circuit:

1. Stringent Application of the Nexus Requirement in Crime-Driven Contexts.
   Even where an applicant may belong to a potentially cognizable particular social group—such as individuals with chronic medical conditions or their children—courts demand concrete evidence that harm is inflicted “on account of” that status. When the record instead shows:
   • Ubiquitous criminality, and
   • Harm consistent with indiscriminate theft or violence,
   the claim fails for lack of nexus. This case fits comfortably in the established line of Second Circuit cases rejecting attempts to recast generalized violence or common crime as persecution on a protected ground without clear proof of motive.
2. Deference to IJ Case-Management Decisions Absent Clear Prejudice or Error.
   The decision also re‑affirms that repeated requests for continuances must be supported by concrete, record-based showings of:
   • What evidence is being sought,
   • Why it is material, and
   • How and when it can realistically be obtained.
   Where, as here, the applicant’s own testimony suggests certain records are unavailable and the motion does not meaningfully detail what additional evidence might be forthcoming, denial of a further continuance is within the IJ’s permissible discretion.

Finally, the opinion underscores the importance of:

• Preserving all claims (including CAT) through proper briefing at the BIA and appellate levels.
• Developing a detailed evidentiary record that addresses not only the fact of harm, but also the motivations and patterns behind it, especially in cases involving alleged persecution in high-crime settings.

While not binding precedent, Tigre‑Agurto provides a clear and concise illustration of how the Second Circuit continues to interpret and apply the “one central reason” nexus requirement, particularly in the challenging intersection between disability, vulnerability, and generalized criminal violence in asylum and withholding claims.