Threshold Requirements for Substantive Due-Process Challenges to Post-Custody Property Policies
Commentary on Ted Velleff v. Sheriff of Cook County, 7th Cir., No. 23-2785 (July 9 2025)

Introduction

In Ted Velleff v. Sheriff of Cook County, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted a familiar but recurring dispute: what constitutional limits, if any, does the Fourteenth Amendment place on a county jail’s practice of destroying unclaimed inmate property after a fixed grace period? Ted Velleff, a former Cook County Jail detainee, argued that the Sheriff’s “designate-or-destroy” rule—under which an inmate’s government-issued identification card is discarded if not claimed within 45 days of the inmate’s transfer to state prison—was so arbitrary that it violated substantive due process. The district court denied class certification for lack of numerosity and entered summary judgment for the Sheriff; the Seventh Circuit has now affirmed.

Although the panel issued a non-precedential order under Circuit Rule 32.1, the opinion solidifies and clarifies two doctrinal propositions that will likely guide future litigation:

1. An interference with mere property—untethered to a “deeply rooted” liberty interest—does not ordinarily implicate substantive due process.
2. Before a court even applies deferential rational-basis review, the plaintiff must first plead and prove either (a) the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies or (b) a separate, stand-alone constitutional violation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit (Chief Judge Sykes and Circuit Judges Brennan and Pryor) unanimously:

• Affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on Velleff’s sole surviving substantive due-process claim;
• Held that destruction of an inmate’s identification card after a 45-day grace period does not implicate any fundamental right and therefore triggers, at most, rational-basis review;
• Refused to conduct rational-basis analysis because Velleff failed to satisfy the prerequisite showing that state-law remedies were inadequate or that an independent constitutional violation was present (Lee v. City of Chicago line of cases); and
• Found it unnecessary to revisit the district court’s denial of class certification, as no viable individual claim remained.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is anchored in a trilogy of recent Seventh Circuit decisions:

• Conyers v. City of Chicago, 10 F.4th 704 (7th Cir. 2021) – upheld Chicago’s practice of deeming inventoried property “abandoned” and destroying it after notice; rejected procedural due-process attack.
• Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, 49 F.4th 1124 (7th Cir. 2022) – applied Conyers to a substantive due-process claim; held that property destruction after a retrieval window does not burden a fundamental right.
• Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003) – seminal authority requiring a plaintiff who alleges only a property deprivation to show either (i) an independent constitutional violation, or (ii) the inadequacy of state post-deprivation remedies, before invoking substantive due process.

Older Supreme Court cases also structure the doctrinal landscape: Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (endorsing inventory searches); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (articulating the “deeply-rooted” test for unenumerated rights).

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Nature of the right asserted. The court began by asking whether the challenged policy burdens a “fundamental” right. Velleff conceded, implicitly at least, that no such fundamental right existed by framing his argument in rational-basis terms. The court therefore ruled that ordinary property rights, in this context, do not amount to substantive due-process “liberty” interests.
2. Threshold showing under Lee. Even when a policy burdens only non-fundamental property interests, a plaintiff may still obtain minimal rational-basis review—but only after clearing the threshold established in Lee:
   • Independent constitutional violation? None alleged; procedural due-process claim had been abandoned.
   • Inadequate state remedies? Velleff identified none, despite the availability of established retrieval procedures or tort claims under Illinois law.
   Because neither pathway was satisfied, the court declined to proceed to the merits of rational-basis review at all. This “gatekeeping” step is frequently overlooked by litigants and lower courts; the panel’s explicit reliance on it adds a cautionary note for future plaintiffs.
3. Application to facts. With the doctrinal gate locked, the panel summarily affirmed without addressing whether the Sheriff’s 45-day window was rational—illustrating how potent the threshold requirement can be.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Litigation strategy: Plaintiffs challenging property policies in the Seventh Circuit must now plead either a separate constitutional violation or the unavailability of adequate state remedies; omission is fatal.
• Correctional administration: Jails and prisons can continue to impose time-limited retrieval windows and destruction rules, provided that notice and some procedural options exist; such policies are unlikely to face successful substantive due-process challenges.
• Class actions: Because the panel affirmed dismissal of the individual claim first, the opinion underscores that a live, legally sufficient claim is indispensable before Rule 23 certification issues are even reached.
• Precedential weight: Although designated “Nonprecedential,” the decision is citable under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and will likely be invoked by government defendants to defeat similar claims at the pleading stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive due process: A constitutional doctrine limiting government actions that are so extreme they violate basic liberties, even if procedural safeguards are present. It protects only certain “fundamental” rights.
• Rational-basis review: The most deferential form of judicial scrutiny; a law or policy will be upheld if any conceivable legitimate purpose can justify it.
• Independent constitutional violation: Another, separate breach of the Constitution (e.g., Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure) that, if proved, allows a property-deprivation plaintiff to invoke substantive due process without showing inadequate state remedies.
• Inadequate state remedies: Situations where existing state procedures (such as replevin actions or administrative claims) are ineffective or unavailable to recover the property or obtain damages.
• Nonprecedential disposition: An appellate ruling that, while binding on the parties, is not intended to carry full precedential force; still citable under specific rules.
• Designate-or-destroy policy: Jail practice requiring an inmate to name (designate) a person to retrieve property; failure triggers destruction of the items after a stated period.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Velleff delivers a pointed doctrinal message: when the government’s interference touches only conventional property interests, substantive due process is a narrow and inhospitable avenue. Unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that state remedies are lacking or that a separate constitutional violation exists, federal courts in this Circuit will not even engage in rational-basis review. For correctional officials, the ruling offers assurance that time-limited property-disposition policies, if accompanied by basic notice and retrieval mechanisms, are constitutionally secure. For would-be plaintiffs, the case sharpens the pleading roadmap and underscores the importance of pairing substantive due-process arguments with more robust constitutional or state-law theories.