Third Circuit Endorses the “Integral Use of Fire” Standard for 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) in Insurance-Fraud Schemes: United States v. Randolph

Decision: United States v. Lashaumba O. Randolph, No. 24-1613 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2025) (not precedential)

Panel: Shwartz, Matey, and Scirica, JJ.; Opinion by Judge Shwartz

Disposition: Conviction affirmed

Key Holding (non-precedential): A defendant “uses fire” to commit a federal felony within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) where the fire is an integral means of executing the predicate crime—in this case, wire fraud via a staged loss for an insurance claim. Intent to employ fire or to aid/induce its use suffices; the Government need not prove the defendant personally lit the fire.

Note: Although this decision is designated as not precedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, it provides persuasive guidance and aligns the Third Circuit with the multi-circuit consensus on § 844(h)(1).

Introduction

This appeal arises from a bench-trial conviction of Lashaumba O. Randolph for multiple counts of wire fraud and for using fire to commit wire fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1). Randolph challenged only his § 844(h)(1) conviction related to a Chevrolet Camaro he claimed to own and had insured, which later burned in an intentionally set fire. The central appellate issue was statutory: whether the Government presented sufficient evidence that Randolph “used” fire to commit wire fraud within the meaning of § 844(h)(1).

The case concerns a staged-loss insurance scheme: the Camaro was stolen property that Randolph represented as his own; he took steps to position the vehicle (tow, storage, repair shop), remained unresponsive to authorize repairs, the car was then intentionally burned, and only thereafter did he file a claim for the car’s value. The same night, two other vehicles tied to him (an Acura MDX and a Cadillac Escalade) also burned in intentionally set fires. The District Court concluded that fire was integral to the fraud and convicted Randolph. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the conclusion that Randolph intentionally “used” fire—by employing it, or aiding/causing its use—as a core instrumentality of the wire fraud scheme.

Summary of the Opinion

Statutory focus: 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1) imposes a mandatory ten-year sentence for any person who “uses fire” to commit a federal felony, here, wire fraud under § 1343.
Interpretive approach: Because “use” is undefined in § 844(h)(1), the court applied its ordinary meaning, using contemporaneous dictionaries from the time Congress added “uses fire” to § 844(h)(1) in the Anti-Arson Act of 1982.
Standard gleaned from sister circuits: A person “uses” fire within § 844(h)(1) when fire is an integral part of executing the predicate felony, including when fire is used to create the appearance of a legitimate, insurable loss for an insurance fraud scheme.
Application to facts: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational factfinder could conclude that Randolph intentionally used or induced the use of fire to destroy the Camaro as a means to facilitate his fraudulent claim. The same-night, multi-vehicle arsons and Randolph’s conduct and statements were “too strong to be dismissed as mere coincidences.”
Outcome: Sufficient evidence supported the § 844(h)(1) conviction; the judgment was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

1. Statutory and Doctrinal Framework

Section 844(h)(1) makes it a federal offense to “use[] fire or an explosive to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,” carrying a mandatory ten-year sentence consecutive to the sentence for the underlying felony. The Government’s burden is twofold: prove the underlying felony (here, wire fraud) and prove that the defendant intentionally used fire—or aided/caused its use—to commit that felony. The opinion recognizes aiding-and-abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2, so the defendant need not be the arsonist; intentional facilitation suffices.

Randolph did not challenge his wire fraud conviction on appeal. His sole argument was that fire was not “used” to commit the fraud. The court therefore focused on the meaning of “use” and the sufficiency of evidence connecting the fire to the commission of the wire fraud.

2. Precedents and Authorities Cited

United States v. Husmann, 765 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2014): Establishes that undefined statutory terms are construed by their ordinary meaning. The court relied on this textual approach to interpret “use.”
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2008): Approves consulting legal and general dictionaries to ascertain ordinary meaning.
United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341 (3d Cir. 2022): When construing statutory language, consult dictionaries contemporaneous with the statute’s enactment. Here, “uses fire” was added by the Anti-Arson Act of 1982; the panel accordingly referenced early-1980s dictionaries.
United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492 (1st Cir. 1997): Defines “use” as “[t]o convert to one’s service,” “to employ,” or “to avail oneself of,” all supporting a functional, purposive understanding of “use.”
United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2003): Upholds instructions requiring the jury to find that the defendant “intentionally used fire to commit a federal felony,” reinforcing an intent-based standard for § 844(h)(1).
United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2013): Holds that a bank robber “used” fire by setting a fire to distract law enforcement, because the fire was an integral part of the robbery plan. This “integral-to-the-offense” lens is central to the Randolph court’s analysis.
United States v. Zendeli, 180 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 1999): Determines that burning property to create the appearance of a legitimate insured loss is a “use” of fire under § 844(h)(1) when it constitutes the means of executing the insurance fraud.
United States v. Ihmoud, 454 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 2006), and United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2007): Both align with Zendeli in staged-loss insurance fraud contexts, treating intentional burning as a qualifying “use” of fire.
United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam): Endorses the inference that a dense pattern of circumstances can be “too strong to be dismissed as mere coincidences,” an evidentiary principle the panel uses to evaluate the circumstantial proof.
United States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95 (3d Cir. 2020): States the deferential standard of review for sufficiency challenges—viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the Government to determine whether any rational factfinder could convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020): Confirms plenary review for questions of statutory interpretation, though Randolph turns primarily on sufficiency with a statutory gloss.

3. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Textual meaning of “use.” The panel applied ordinary-meaning textualism, anchored to 1982 dictionaries, to interpret “use” as “to employ,” “to make use of,” or to cause something “to serve for a purpose.” Under this ordinary meaning, a defendant “uses” fire when he deploys fire as a tool to advance a criminal objective.

Adoption of the “integral use” standard. Drawing on Desposito, Zendeli, Ihmoud, and McAuliffe, the court embraced the prevailing view that § 844(h)(1) is satisfied where fire is integral to the commission of the predicate felony. That principle applies broadly: fire need not be the final act of the scheme; it suffices that the fire is a purposeful means to accomplish the scheme’s objective (e.g., creating an insurable loss or distracting responders during a robbery).

Aiding-and-abetting liability. The court reiterated that liability under § 844(h)(1) attaches where the defendant intentionally uses, aids, or causes the use of fire to commit the felony. Direct proof that the defendant personally lit the fire is unnecessary if the totality of circumstances supports a reasonable inference that he orchestrated or induced the arson as part of the plan.

Evidence application. The panel cataloged several facts that, taken together, supported the inference that Randolph intentionally used fire as an instrument of fraud:

He claimed ownership of a stolen Camaro and insured it—positioning himself to profit from a payout.
He appeared at the scene when the Camaro was found damaged; he arranged its tow to a yard and then to a repair shop, but then ignored the shop’s repair authorization attempts—suggesting he did not intend to repair the car.
The Camaro later burned in an intentionally set fire at the repair shop; Randolph filed an insurance claim only after the fire, seeking the vehicle’s value, which would maximize recovery.
He was evasive with both police and the insurer; his statement that Denise Linnen had crashed the car was contradicted by Linnen’s testimony.
On the same night the Camaro was found, an Acura MDX and a Cadillac Escalade tied to the scheme also burned in intentional fires, including at the same shop—corroborating a coordinated plan rather than coincidence.
A witness described a person known as “Black” (associated with intentional car crashes) driving the Camaro on interstate trips associated with the scheme, and connected Randolph to the convoy.

Against the deferential sufficiency standard, this mosaic supported the inference that the fires were engineered as part of the fraudulent plan. The court quoted Allard in concluding that these connections were too strong to be mere coincidences.

4. Impact and Implications

Convergence with other circuits. Although not precedential, Randolph meaningfully aligns the Third Circuit with the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in recognizing that § 844(h)(1) reaches staged-loss insurance frauds where fire is an instrumental part of the scheme. This reduces uncertainty for district courts within the Third Circuit and signals that “use of fire” covers more than classic arson; it extends to any purposeful deployment of fire integral to the crime.

Mens rea clarity. The opinion reinforces that intent matters. The Government must show the defendant intentionally used, aided, or caused the use of fire to commit the felony. Negligent or accidental fires are outside § 844(h)(1). This tracks Colvin’s requirement that the jury (or judge) find intentional use.

Proof through circumstantial evidence. Randolph underlines that staged-loss cases can be proven circumstantially. Patterns of coordinated fires, timing of insurance claims, evasive statements, contradictions, and the defendant’s logistical control over the property can collectively establish intentional “use” of fire.

Charging and sentencing stakes. Section 844(h)(1) imposes a mandatory consecutive ten-year sentence. Post-Randolph, prosecutors in the Third Circuit are likely to rely more on § 844(h)(1) for staged-loss insurance frauds with arson components. Defense counsel should address the functional nexus between fire and the wire fraud, contesting whether the fire was truly integral or intentionally employed.

Jury instruction guidance. Even though Randolph followed a bench trial, the opinion’s embrace of an intent-based, integral-use standard, consistent with Colvin, provides a template for jury instructions: the Government must prove the defendant intentionally used, aided, or caused fire, and that the fire was an instrumentality of committing the predicate felony.

No requirement of success. The court implicitly recognizes, consistent with wire fraud doctrine, that a scheme need not succeed. Although Randolph’s claim was denied for failing to cooperate with the insurer, the wire fraud was complete with wires in furtherance of the scheme, and the use of fire can satisfy § 844(h)(1) even if the insurer never pays.

Complex Concepts Simplified

What does “uses fire” mean under § 844(h)(1)? It means employing fire on purpose as a tool to commit a federal felony. Think of fire as the instrument that makes the crime work—such as burning a car to make it look like a total loss for an insurance payout.
What is “integral to the offense”? The fire must be functionally tied to executing the crime, not incidental or accidental. If the fraud depends on the fire to create an insurable loss or to facilitate the scheme, it is integral.
Do you have to be the arsonist? No. Under aiding-and-abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2), you are liable if you intentionally cause or encourage someone else to set the fire as part of the crime.
How is this proven? Often through circumstantial evidence—timing of fires, patterns across multiple vehicles, inconsistent or evasive statements, and the defendant’s actions around towing, storage, repairs, and claim filing.
Does the fraud have to succeed? No. Wire fraud punishes the scheme and the use of wires in furtherance of that scheme. A denied claim does not defeat the charge, so long as the wires and the scheme are proven.
What is the penalty? A mandatory 10-year sentence added to the sentence for the underlying felony, served consecutively.

Key Precedent Themes Applied

Text and ordinary meaning govern: Husmann and Geiser support using ordinary meaning, clarified with contemporaneous dictionaries per Adair. “Use” means to employ or avail oneself of, fit for the purpose at hand.
Functional nexus requirement: Desposito and Zendeli provide the “integral use” framework—fire must be a functional tool for the crime (e.g., staged insurance loss or diversion during a robbery).
Intentionality: Colvin emphasizes an intent requirement; Randolph tracks that understanding, even in a bench-trial posture.
Circumstantial proof is enough: Allard and Hendrickson guide the evaluation of circumstantial evidence under a deferential sufficiency review.

Practice Pointers

For prosecutors:
- Develop the temporal and functional connection between the fire and the scheme (e.g., claim timing, repair authorizations ignored, coordinated fires, and identical M.O.s across vehicles).
- Use communications (texts/emails/calls) to show planning or awareness that fire would be used to maximize the payout.
- Consider § 2 aiding-and-abetting and the “integral use” test in jury instructions.
For defense counsel:
- Undermine the “integral” nexus by showing the scheme could (and did) proceed independently of the fire, or that the fire was accidental or unrelated to the wires used.
- Highlight gaps linking the defendant to the arsonist and challenge the inference of intentionality, especially where third parties are involved.
- Exploit inconsistencies in motive (e.g., if a repair was genuinely contemplated or authorized) and emphasize the absence of direct arson evidence.
For insurers and investigators:
- Track claim timing relative to fire events, repair-shop interactions, and prior losses involving the same claimant.
- Coordinate with law enforcement on patterns of staged losses and shared venues or participants (e.g., repeated use of the same repair facility).

Conclusion

United States v. Randolph clarifies—albeit non-precedentially within the Third Circuit—that “use of fire” under § 844(h)(1) encompasses the intentional, instrumental deployment of fire to commit a federal felony, including staged-loss insurance frauds. By adopting a plain-meaning, contemporaneous-dictionary approach and aligning with sister circuits’ “integral use” framework, the court affirms that liability may be established through circumstantial evidence showing that arson was the means by which the defendant sought to create a legitimate-seeming loss and thereby execute a wire fraud scheme.

The ruling’s significance is twofold. Substantively, it reinforces that § 844(h)(1) is not limited to classic arson or property crimes but extends to any felony where fire is a purposeful tool of commission. Procedurally, it underscores that sufficiency review is deferential and that patterns of coordinated events can justify strong inferences of intentional “use” even without direct evidence of who lit the match. Randolph thus offers a coherent, practical template for evaluating staged-loss prosecutions in federal court and signals a continued convergence of appellate doctrine on the scope of § 844(h)(1)’s “use of fire” provision.