Third Circuit Clarifies Title IX Zone-of-Interests for Non-Student, Non-Employee Plaintiffs

Introduction

In Jennifer Oldham v. Penn State University, 22-2056 (3d Cir. May 29, 2025), the Third Circuit confronted novel questions about standing under Title IX and the choice-of-law rules that apply after a hybrid transfer of venue. The plaintiff, a North Carolina fencing club owner and coach, alleged that a Penn State assistant coach sexually harassed her on a post-tournament flight, that Penn State officials rebuffed her when she reported the misconduct, and that the defendants thereafter orchestrated a broader retaliation campaign within the fencing community. After an initial dismissal for improper venue, the case was transferred to Pennsylvania. The transferee court dismissed all claims, holding (i) Title IX protects only students or employees “within its zone of interests,” and (ii) state-law tort claims were time-barred under Pennsylvania’s choice‐of‐law rules. On appeal, the Third Circuit (Phipps, J.) affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Summary of the Judgment

• Title IX Zone-of-Interests: The court held that Title IX implies a private right of action only for those whose interests fall within the “zone of interests” the statute protects. It rejected a categorical “student‐or‐employee” test, clarifying instead that a plaintiff must allege (1) substantial control by the recipient over the harasser, and (2) substantial control over the context in which the discrimination occurred or manifested.
• Application to Oldham’s Claims: The court found Penn State had substantial control over its assistant coach and some retaliation events that took place on campus or at university‐hosted competitions. Accordingly, Oldham’s Title IX claims for exclusion from those events survived a motion to dismiss. Her claims based solely on the in-flight assault fell outside Title IX’s zone of interests and were dismissed.
• State-Law Tort Claims & Choice of Law: The Third Circuit reaffirmed that when a federal court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims, the forum’s choice‐of‐law rules apply. It distinguished between (a) claims transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (the assistant coach’s claims remained governed by North Carolina’s statutes of limitations), and (b) those cured under § 1406(a) (the head coach, Title IX coordinator and university were subject to Pennsylvania’s shorter statutes). As a result, most tort claims against Penn State, its coaches and Title IX coordinator were time-barred; only the tort claims against the assistant coach survived under North Carolina’s longer limitations period.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) – recognized an implied private cause of action under Title IX.
• Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) – established the “zone of interests” test as a universal limitation on statutory causes of action.
• Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999) – held Title IX liability requires “substantial control” by the school over the harasser and the harassment context.
• Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998) – refined the “actual knowledge” and “deliberate indifference” standards for Title IX school‐official liability.
• Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005) – confirmed Title IX’s private right of action includes retaliation claims and invoked the clear‐statement rule for spending‐clause legislation.
• Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) & Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) – clarified that § 1404(a) venue transfers carry the choice‐of‐law rules of the original forum.
• Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 2007) – held that § 1406(a) transfers adopt the transferee forum’s choice‐of‐law rules.

Legal Reasoning

1. Zone-of-Interests Test Applies to Title IX
   Relying on Cannon’s implied cause of action and Lexmark’s universal application of the zone-of-interests test, the court presumed Title IX claims extend only to plaintiffs whose interests the statute protects. Nothing in Title IX’s text or history indicates Congress intended to exempt it from this limitation.
2. Defining the Zone of Interests Under Title IX
   The Third Circuit distilled two requirements from the Supreme Court’s Title IX precedents:
   • Control over the Offender: The educational institution must exercise “substantial control” over the individual who perpetrates the harassment or retaliation.
   • Control over the Context: The institution must have “substantial control” over the educational program or activity in which the discrimination “occurred or manifested.” This can include on‐campus venues or university‐hosted events where retaliation occurred or had tangible consequences.
   Applying those factors at the pleading stage, the court found Penn State’s control over its assistant coach and over certain tournaments allowed Oldham to pursue Title IX claims for exclusion and retaliation in those contexts—while excluding purely off‐campus, in-flight sexual assault claims.
3. Choice-of-Law After a Hybrid Venue Transfer
   The panel reaffirmed that § 1404(a) transfers carry the original forum’s (North Carolina’s) statute-of-limitations rules, whereas § 1406(a) transfers adopt the transferee forum’s (Pennsylvania’s) rules when curing improper venue. Because Oldham’s case was “partly” cured under each statute, her state‐law tort claims faced two different limitations regimes:
   • Assistant Coach (North Carolina law): North Carolina’s longer statutes (three years for battery, negligence, emotional distress; one year for defamation) applied, saving some of her claims against him.
   • Head Coach, Coordinator & University (Pennsylvania law): Pennsylvania’s shorter statutes (two years for most torts; one year for defamation) applied, dooming nearly all claims for untimeliness.

Impact

• Title IX Litigation: This decision clarifies that non-student, non-employee plaintiffs—such as third-party coaches and administrators—can plead Title IX claims if they demonstrate an institution’s substantial control over both the wrongdoer and the relevant educational environment. It moves beyond a rigid “student-or-employee” test and allows Title IX standing wherever Congress intended to protect participants in federal‐funded educational activities.
• Venue and Choice of Law: Litigants facing hybrid § 1404/§ 1406 transfers must pay close attention to choice-of-law splits. Where part of a suit is cured by § 1406(a) and part is transferred for convenience under § 1404(a), two competing statutes of limitations may apply to identical claims against different defendants.
• State-Law Tort Claims: In multi-state practice, counsel should carefully track where each defendant’s claims were transferred under which statutory subsection to determine the applicable limitations period.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Zone-of-Interests Test

A judicial tool for deciding who may sue under a statute. Courts ask whether the plaintiff’s harm falls within the interests the law was designed to protect.

Substantial Control

A measure of how much authority an educational institution has over (1) the person who commits harassment or retaliation and (2) the place or event where it happens (e.g., on-campus facilities or university-sponsored competitions).

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) vs. § 1406(a)

• § 1404(a): Transfers for the convenience of parties or witnesses—choice of law stays with the original forum.
• § 1406(a): Transfers to cure improper venue—choice of law switches to the new forum.

Lex Fori & Lex Loci Delicti

• Lex Fori: The law of the forum where the case was originally filed (used for statutes of limitations).
• Lex Loci Delicti: The law of the state where the wrong occurred (used for determining substantive tort rules, including claim accrual).

True-Conflict Rule

Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law approach for torts. If two states’ laws conflict, the court applies the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the parties and events.

Conclusion

Oldham v. Penn State University marks a significant advance in Title IX jurisprudence by adopting a flexible, interest-based zone-of-interests test rather than a narrow “student-or-employee” rule. It underscores that any third-party participant in federally funded educational activities may invoke Title IX so long as the institution has substantial control over the wrongdoer and the educational setting where discrimination took place or manifested. The opinion also serves as a cautionary guide on venue transfers and choice-of-law complications when litigants face hybrid transfers under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Lower courts and practitioners should apply these principles carefully to ensure both compliance with Title IX’s protective ambit and proper management of state-law tort claims in multi‐forum disputes.