Third Circuit Clarifies the Scope of Rule 32(i)(1)(C) Notice Obligations:
United States v. Juan Montas

Introduction

United States v. Juan Montas, No. 24-1851 (3d Cir. July 30 2025), presented a narrowly focused but practically significant question: did a district court violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 by relying, at sentencing, on the defendant’s prior federal sentencing transcript and Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) without advance notice to the parties?

The appellant, Juan Montas, a Dominican national, had pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry after deportation. At the 2024 sentencing, the district judge independently reviewed and quoted from materials generated during Montas’s 2017 federal narcotics sentencing—documents that were not included in the 2024 record and had not been flagged beforehand. Defense counsel made no contemporaneous objection; therefore, the issue reached the Court of Appeals under the stringent plain-error standard.

While the Third Circuit affirmed the 34-month sentence, it delivered an important doctrinal clarification: Rule 32(i)(1)(C) — not Rule 32(i)(1)(B) — imposes a broad, pre-hearing disclosure duty whenever a sentencing court intends to rely on materials from any other proceeding, even where those materials concern the same defendant, originate from the same court, and are not confidential under Rule 32(d)(3).

Summary of the Judgment

• Error Identified: The district court erred, clearly and obviously, by failing to provide advance notice that it would rely on the 2017 PSR and sentencing transcript. This contravened Rule 32(i)(1)(C) as interpreted by prior Circuit precedent (Nappi, Reynoso).
• Plain-Error Outcome: Under the four-part Olano framework, prongs one (error) and two (clear/obvious) were satisfied, but the defendant could not establish prejudice (prong three); therefore, relief was denied without reaching prong four.
• Sub-Rule Clarification: The opinion expressly ties the notice duty to subsection (C) (party commentary) rather than subsection (B) (summaries of information excluded from the PSR), resolving conflicting unpublished decisions within the Circuit.
• Disposition: Sentence affirmed.

Analysis

a. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) – Set the four-part test for plain-error review. The court faithfully applied each element, underscoring that unpreserved Rule 32 violations rarely warrant resentencing absent demonstrated prejudice.
• United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2001) – Held that failure to provide notice of reliance on a state PSR violates Rule 32. Montas extends Nappi’s logic to prior federal materials and anchors it in Rule 32(i)(1)(C).
• United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2001) – Required courts to identify with “particularity” any testimonial or other evidence from another proceeding. Montas uses Reynoso to show the district court’s breach of that requirement.
• United States v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2014) – Earlier dicta stating that Rule 32 demands pre-hearing disclosure of relied-upon documents; Montas transforms that dicta into precedential holding.
• Several unpublished Third-Circuit cases (Pena, Basralian, Mark) reflecting confusion over whether subsection (B) or (C) governs; the Court expressly resolves this ambiguity.

b. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Locating the Notice Duty in Rule 32(i)(1)(C)
   • Subsection (C) obliges courts to “allow the parties’ attorneys to comment on the probation officer’s determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence.” • The panel reasoned that external documents on which a judge intends to rely are “other matters,” and fairness dictates advance disclosure so counsel can meaningfully comment.
   • Subsection (B) was deemed inapposite because it targets only confidential material excluded from the PSR under Rule 32(d)(3).
2. Error Was Clear and Obvious
   • The district judge openly acknowledged mid-hearing that he had reviewed the 2017 materials. • Under Nappi and Reynoso such surprise reliance is impermissible; therefore, prongs one and two of Olano were satisfied.
3. No Prejudice Shown
   • Prejudice inquiry asked whether the same sentence would likely have been lower had counsel possessed notice in time to respond. • The panel emphasized counsel actually advanced the very mitigation arguments (family support, marriage, trauma) notwithstanding the lack of notice; the district judge expressly rejected them on the merits. • Because the record did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a lower sentence after full ventilation, prong three failed.

c. Potential Impact of the Decision

1. Procedural Safeguards at Sentencing
District courts within the Third Circuit must now ensure advance identification of all outside materials—including prior federal transcripts and PSRs—whenever those materials will figure in sentencing. Courts can comply by:

• Listing the documents in a pre-sentencing order;
• Circulating them to counsel along with the PSR addendum;
• Allowing time for written objections or supplemental argument.

2. Strategic Considerations for Counsel
Defense attorneys should vigilantly explore potential external records and, if necessary, file pre-sentencing motions requesting disclosure under Rule 32(i)(1)(C). Meanwhile, prosecutors must remain mindful of the court’s disclosure obligations; failing to object to undisclosed materials could complicate appellate defense of a sentence.

3. Clarification on Sub-Rule Distinctions
By definitively anchoring the notice duty in subsection (C), the decision resolves an intra-circuit split and supplies persuasive authority to other circuits grappling with the same textual question. Expect citations to Montas where litigants debate the breadth of Rule 32’s disclosure requirements.

4. Limits of Plain-Error Relief
Even where procedural error is clear, resentencing will not follow unless defendants show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Thus, contemporaneous objections remain critical.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): A confidential report prepared by Probation that details the defendant’s background, offense conduct, criminal history, and recommended guideline calculations. Judges heavily rely on PSRs when crafting sentences.
• Rule 32(i)(1)(B) vs. Rule 32(i)(1)(C):
  • (B) — Requires disclosure or summaries of confidential information excluded from the PSR that the court will consider.
  • (C) — Ensures both sides may comment on any matter relevant to sentencing, implicitly requiring that they first know what those matters are.
• Plain-Error Review: A four-step appellate standard applied when the defendant fails to object in the trial court. Relief requires (1) error; (2) error is clear/obvious; (3) affects substantial rights (prejudice); (4) seriously affects fairness or integrity.
• Prejudice (Olano Prong Three): Not mere possibility of harm, but a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed absent the error. In sentencing, the question is whether the judge would likely have imposed a lesser term.

Conclusion

United States v. Montas contributes a precise but important clarification to federal sentencing procedure. The Third Circuit re-affirmed that Rule 32’s guarantee of adversarial testing extends to all extra-record materials a judge relies on—including the defendant’s own prior federal sentencing documents—and grounded that guarantee squarely in subsection (C). Although the appellant ultimately failed to secure resentencing due to lack of demonstrated prejudice, the precedential value of the decision lies in its prophylactic guidance: district courts must give counsel an opportunity to contest or contextualize outside materials before they shape the sentence. Practitioners within—and likely beyond—the Third Circuit should heed the opinion’s message: timely disclosure and objection are indispensable safeguards of fair sentencing.