Third Circuit Clarifies That Beneficiaries of a Conflicted Tribunal Lack a § 1983 Due-Process Claim Absent Personal Prejudice

Introduction

East Ohio Capital LLC (“East Ohio”) partnered with the Northside Leadership Conference (“NLC”) to redevelop property in Pittsburgh’s Northside. In 2018 the City of Pittsburgh Zoning Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”)—with member Lashawn Burton-Faulk participating despite her simultaneous role at NLC—granted the necessary variances. Two neighborhood residents challenged the decision in state court. On 22 September 2021 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Pascal v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA, held that Burton-Faulk’s non-recusal violated due-process principles and voided the variances. While the ZBA delayed holding a new hearing, East Ohio claimed it suffered mounting economic losses, and in April 2023 filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the ZBA and Burton-Faulk, alleging deprivation of due process and resultant damages. The federal district court dismissed the action as time-barred. On appeal, the Third Circuit examined (1) whether East Ohio sued within Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period, and (2) whether East Ohio, as the putative beneficiary of the conflict, stated a cognizable constitutional injury.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s limitations ruling but nevertheless affirmed dismissal on the merits.
• Statute of limitations. The cause of action accrued—not in 2018 when the conflicted vote occurred—but on 22 September 2021, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision first imposed the alleged economic injury by nullifying the variances. The suit filed on 25 April 2023 was therefore timely.
• Merits. Although Burton-Faulk’s conflict violated the objectors’ due-process rights, East Ohio itself suffered no deprivation of “a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Because § 1983 requires a plaintiff-specific constitutional injury, East Ohio’s claim failed as a matter of law.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Pascal v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA, 259 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2021) – Found conflict of interest and voided variances; framed the due-process violation protecting objectors.
• Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) – Canonical rule that a decision-maker with a direct, personal interest offends due process.
• Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) – Early articulation of procedural-due-process guarantees in administrative hearings.
• Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) – § 1983 plaintiff must show constitutional violation and actual, compensable injury.
• Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009) – Federal accrual rule: clock starts when plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.
• McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521 (3d Cir. 2009) – De-novo review standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Accrual and Timeliness

The panel reiterated that federal law governs accrual in § 1983 cases; the limitation period is borrowed from state law (two years in Pennsylvania). The inquiry asks when the plaintiff had sufficient notice of (i) the constitutional violation and (ii) a concrete injury. East Ohio could not know of its economic injury until the variances were invalidated. Until then, it had enjoyed the permitting benefit and could not claim damages stemming from delay. Consequently, accrual occurred on 22 September 2021, rendering the April 2023 filing timely.

b. Merits – No Personal Deprivation

The Court then addressed whether East Ohio pleaded a substantive claim. Due-process jurisprudence—rooted in Tumey and its progeny—targets procedures that “offer a possible temptation” for bias against a litigant. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pascal protected the objectors, not the applicant. East Ohio was, if anything, the beneficiary of the potential bias; it never faced a tribunal predisposed against it. Section 1983, however, requires that the plaintiff itself be deprived of a federal right. Because East Ohio received the variances and later obtained them anew, the purported due-process irregularity produced no unfairness to it. Without personal prejudice, East Ohio lacked standing to assert the constitutional violation, so its claim failed on the merits.

3. Impact

Practical effects:

• Standing and injury-in-fact: Parties who benefit from a decision tainted by adjudicator bias cannot recast that structural error into a personal due-process claim unless they can show independent prejudice.
• Zoning and land-use litigation: Developers facing conflicted board decisions must distinguish between (i) constitutional violation theories available to objectors and (ii) contractual/tort remedies for project delays.
• Accrual clarity: The decision underscores that the limitations clock in § 1983 actions may not start until downstream appellate rulings convert a procedural irregularity into a monetizable harm.
• Municipal liability strategy: Cities can invoke Tumey-style precedents defensively, arguing lack of prejudice to certain plaintiffs even when conflict is undisputed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• 42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal statute allowing people (or entities) to sue state actors for constitutional violations that cause personal injury.
• Accrual: The legal moment when a claim becomes fully formed, triggering the statute-of-limitations countdown.
• Due Process (Procedural): The constitutional guarantee that government decisions affecting life, liberty, or property follow fair procedures—including an impartial decision-maker.
• Conflict of Interest: A situation where an official’s personal or financial ties create a risk of bias in decision-making.
• Standing / Injury-in-Fact: The requirement that the plaintiff personally suffer (or imminently face) a concrete harm before suing.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in East Ohio Capital LLC v. City of Pittsburgh ZBA sets a dual precedent. First, in the § 1983 context, accrual hinges on when the plaintiff both discovers and experiences actual injury—even if the underlying procedural defect occurred years earlier. Second, and more significantly, the Court clarified that the Due Process Clause does not furnish a cause of action to parties who benefited from a conflicted adjudicator, absent a showing of personal prejudice. Future litigants must therefore tether procedural-due-process claims to individualized harm, and municipalities can rely on this decision to defeat suits by parties whose only grievance is the indirect fallout of a conflict that, at the time, worked in their favor.