Third Circuit clarifies de novo review of Rule 60(d)(1) dismissals and reaffirms broad transactional claim preclusion in serial fee litigation

Case: Law Offices of Bruce J. Chasan, LLC v. John Pierce
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Panel: Judges Matey, Freeman (author), and Roth
Date: August 25, 2025
Note: Not precedential (I.O.P. 5.7)

Introduction

This appeal is the third iteration of a fee dispute between attorney Bruce J. Chasan and lawyers affiliated with the former Pierce Bainbridge firm arising out of the representation of client Lenwood Hamilton in a videogame litigation. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Chasan’s latest complaint in full, holding that:

When a district court dismisses a Rule 60(d)(1) “independent action” as inadequately pleaded under Rule 12(b)(6), appellate review is de novo; and
Claim preclusion (res judicata) bars Chasan’s renewed contract and tort theories because they arise from the same nucleus of operative fact as his earlier cases, regardless of new legal labels, later-discovered details, or law-firm name changes.

Although non-precedential, the opinion provides useful guidance on (i) the interaction between the mandate rule and Rule 60(d)(1) independent actions alleging post-judgment fraud, (ii) the stringent pleading and materiality demands for such independent actions, and (iii) the breadth of transactional claim preclusion in serial litigation over the same dispute.

Background and Procedural History

Key facts and chronology:

2017: Chasan undertakes Hamilton’s videogame lawsuit under a contingency agreement; Hamilton is responsible for costs and agrees to pay Chasan an hourly quantum meruit if he terminates Chasan before the case ends.
2018: Hamilton cannot fund costs; Chasan brings in the Pierce Bainbridge firm as co-counsel and financier. Hamilton then terminates Chasan and retains Pierce Bainbridge. Chasan values his pre-termination services at over $300,000.
Settlement talks fail. Chasan sues the Pierce-affiliated parties to enforce an unsigned settlement draft (Chasan I). The district court dismisses for lack of an enforceable contract; the Third Circuit affirms, rejecting an effort to “manufacture” assent from exchanged, unaccepted drafts. See 792 F. App’x 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2019).
2019–2020: Hamilton loses at trial and on appeal in the videogame case.
2020–2021: Chasan files a second suit sounding in tortious interference and unjust enrichment (Chasan II). The district court dismisses: claim preclusion bars the interference theory and unjust enrichment fails because the Pierce firm, working on contingency, obtained no benefit from Hamilton’s ultimate loss. No appeal is taken.
2021: After calls with Hamilton, Chasan seeks Rule 60(b) relief to reopen Chasan I; the district court denies and the Third Circuit affirms (2022).
2023: Chasan files a third suit (Chasan III) asserting eight counts, including two “equitable actions” (recast on appeal as Rule 60(d)(1) independent actions) to vacate the prior judgments for fraud, plus six state-law claims (contract enforcement, torts, and conspiracy).

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the entire complaint:

Counts I–II (Rule 60(d)(1) independent actions): Reviewed de novo because the district court dismissed them under Rule 12(b)(6). The new allegations (that the Pierce firm misrepresented Hamilton’s authority to sue Chasan for malpractice and Hamilton’s desire to terminate Chasan) would not have altered the outcomes in Chasan I or II. They do not cure Chasan I’s fundamental defect—no enforceable settlement—and they do not disturb Chasan II’s legal conclusions. The district court had jurisdiction to entertain these independent actions because they relied on post-mandate evidence and did not seek to alter matters that could have been raised earlier in the appeals.
Counts III–VIII (state-law claims): Barred by claim preclusion. Count III attempts to re-enforce the very settlement rejected in Chasan I; Count IV (tortious interference) could have been raised in Chasan I; Counts V–VIII (fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting) are simply new legal theories tied to the same underlying events—Hamilton’s switch of counsel and the 2018 settlement discussions. Law-firm name changes and mergers do not avoid privity.
Filing injunction: Denied at this time, though the court’s disposition underscores the limits of repetitive litigation.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005): Establishes that when a Rule 60(d) independent action is dismissed for failure to state a claim, appellate review is de novo, and emphasizes the “narrow criteria for relief.” The panel relies on Herring to reject appellees’ abuse-of-discretion standard and to frame the exacting scrutiny required.
Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2018): Provides the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard applied to the Rule 60(d)(1) counts.
Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2011): Cited by appellees for abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 60(d) motions; distinguished due to the posture here—a 12(b)(6) dismissal—bringing Herring’s de novo review into play.
Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1982): Recognizes that district courts may not contravene a mandate based on evidence that could have been raised earlier. The panel distinguishes Seese and finds jurisdiction because Chasan’s Rule 60(d)(1) counts rest on post-mandate evidence not addressed on prior appeal.
In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2017): Notes federal courts’ inherent power to vacate a fraudulently obtained judgment, supporting the district court’s jurisdiction to consider independent actions alleging fraud.
Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 819 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2016): Applied for de novo review on the jurisdictional question raised by appellees; the panel concludes jurisdiction existed for the Rule 60(d)(1) claims.
Duhaney v. Attorney General, 621 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2010): Articulates the three-part test for claim preclusion (final judgment, same parties/privity, same cause of action). The panel applies it to bar Counts III–VIII.
Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1991): Supplies the “essential similarity of the underlying events” test for determining whether two suits share the same cause of action. Used to show that the new suit repeats the same transactional nucleus.
Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1988): Clarifies that new legal theories do not create a new cause of action for claim-preclusion purposes. The panel relies on Gregory to bar the fraud and conspiracy counts notwithstanding their different labels.
Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U.S. 405 (2020): Reaffirms that claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have been raised earlier, even if not actually litigated. The panel uses Lucky Brand to show Count IV (tortious interference) was available in Chasan I.
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 105 F.4th 67 (3d Cir. 2024): Confirms the de novo standard for dismissals based on claim preclusion.
Law Offices of Bruce J. Chasan, LLC v. Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht, LLP, 792 F. App’x 195 (3d Cir. 2019): The earlier Chasan I affirmance that there was no enforceable settlement agreement under Pennsylvania law; this prior holding forecloses the renewed specific-performance theory.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Standards of Review and Jurisdiction

The court first resolves two threshold issues: the standard of review and jurisdiction. Invoking Herring, the panel applies de novo review to the dismissal of Rule 60(d)(1) independent actions when the district court’s disposition is under Rule 12(b)(6). This is distinct from cases where relief is denied on discretionary grounds after an evidentiary assessment, which might warrant abuse-of-discretion review.

On jurisdiction, appellees argued that the district court could not revisit matters intertwined with prior Third Circuit mandates. Relying on Seese, the court recognizes that a district court may not alter an appellate mandate based on evidence that could have been raised earlier; but because Chasan’s fraud allegations rested on evidence discovered after the first mandate and not addressed in the second appeal, the district court retained jurisdiction to consider the independent actions. Bressman confirms the courts’ inherent power to vacate fraudulently obtained judgments in such narrow circumstances.

2) Rule 60(d)(1) Independent Actions: Narrow Relief, Materiality Required

Chasan’s independent actions alleged the Pierce parties misrepresented (i) Hamilton’s authorization to pursue malpractice against Chasan and (ii) Hamilton’s desire to terminate Chasan. Accepting the allegations as true, the court held they were immaterial to the dispositive defects underpinning the prior judgments:

Chasan I: The absence of an enforceable settlement agreement doomed the first suit. The alleged misrepresentations—even if proven—would not create assent or fill missing essential terms. Thus, they could not justify vacatur of that judgment.
Chasan II: The district court dismissed tortious interference on claim-preclusion grounds and rejected unjust enrichment because the Pierce firm received no benefit from the failed contingency case. The new allegations have no bearing on either legal rationale. Moreover, Chasan did not appeal Chasan II, foreclosing review now.

The upshot: independent actions must do more than allege post-judgment misconduct; they must identify fraud that, if credited, would undermine the integrity or outcome of the prior judgment itself. Allegations that do not cure the antecedent legal defects fail at the pleading stage.

3) Claim Preclusion: One Transaction, All Theories

For Counts III–VIII, the panel applies transactional claim preclusion under Duhaney and Lubrizol:

Final judgments: Chasan I (affirmed) and Chasan II (not appealed) constitute final judgments on the merits or support preclusion by barring re-litigation of available claims.
Same parties or privies: Despite firm name changes and mergers, the cases involve the same adversaries or their privies.
Same cause of action: The “essential similarity” test focuses on the transactional nucleus—Hamilton’s termination of Chasan, the Pierce firm’s entry, and the 2018 settlement communications. New facts gleaned from 2021 calls do not change that nucleus.

Specific applications:

Count III (specific performance of settlement): Identical to Chasan I. Precluded.
Count IV (tortious interference): Even if Chasan II’s preclusion dismissal does not bar it, Chasan I does. Under Lucky Brand, claims that could have been raised must be brought in the first action; Chasan admits he chose not to assert tortious interference in Chasan I.
Counts V–VIII (fraud, conspiracy, aiding/abetting): New labels do not create new causes of action under Gregory. They spring from the same events and are precluded.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

Strategic consolidation of claims: Litigants must present all available theories tied to a single transaction in the first lawsuit. Electing a “simpler” theory (e.g., contract) to the exclusion of concurrent tort claims risks forfeiture of the latter under claim preclusion.
Rule 60(d)(1) is exceptional—and exacting: Independent actions survive only where alleged fraud, discovered post-judgment, would have mattered to the outcome. New details that leave the original legal defect untouched will not justify reopening.
Mandate rule and post-mandate evidence: District courts retain jurisdiction to consider independent actions grounded in genuinely new, post-mandate evidence that was not and could not have been addressed on appeal. But jurisdiction does not guarantee relief; materiality to the judgment remains key.
Privity despite organizational changes: Law-firm mergers, rebrandings, and successor entities will rarely defeat the “same parties or privies” element where the same actors and interests are implicated across suits.
Unjust enrichment in contingency arrangements: Where the successor firm takes the client on contingency and loses, there is no benefit to retain; unjust enrichment will typically fail on the “benefit” element.
Settlement drafts are not settlements: Unaccepted offers, exchange of drafts, or partial agreements seldom establish enforceable contracts absent clear mutual assent on essential terms. Attempting to “piece together” an agreement from rejected offers will falter.
Vexatious-litigation guardrails: While the court denied a filing injunction here, this disposition signals that repetitive suits over the same events are disfavored and may, in different circumstances, trigger sanctions or filing restrictions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Claim preclusion (res judicata): If a prior case produced a final judgment between the same parties (or their privies) about the same underlying events, you cannot sue again over those events using different legal theories or newly discovered details that do not alter the core transaction.
Privity: Two entities are in privity when their legal interests and roles are sufficiently aligned—such as predecessor/successor law firms or affiliated entities—so that a judgment against one can bind the other for preclusion purposes.
Rule 60(d)(1) independent action: A narrow, extraordinary pathway to set aside a prior judgment for fraud or similar inequity when traditional motions are unavailable or inadequate, usually requiring post-judgment facts and demonstrating a serious injustice tied to the judgment itself.
Mandate rule: After an appellate court issues its mandate, the district court cannot revise matters the mandate resolved. However, it may consider truly new issues or evidence arising after the mandate, including in independent actions alleging fraud.
De novo vs. abuse-of-discretion review: De novo means the appellate court re-examines legal conclusions from scratch (used here for 12(b)(6) dismissals and preclusion). Abuse-of-discretion defers to the trial court’s judgment unless clearly unreasonable (more common for discretionary post-judgment rulings).
Specific performance: A contract remedy compelling a party to perform its contractual promise. It is unavailable if no binding contract exists.
Unjust enrichment: An equitable claim requiring proof that the defendant received and retained a benefit unjustly. If the defendant received no benefit (e.g., lost a contingency case), the claim fails.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision, while non-precedential, provides clear guidance at two junctures where litigants commonly stumble. First, a Rule 60(d)(1) independent action dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo, but the bar for relief is high: newly discovered fraud must be material to the original judgment’s outcome. Second, transactional claim preclusion is broad. Parties must bring all available claims and theories arising from a single course of events in the first suit, or risk being foreclosed—even if they later learn additional details or reframe their legal theories. The court’s rejection of a filing injunction underscores judicial restraint, but the affirmance serves as a firm reminder that serial efforts to relitigate a settled dispute will not be entertained.