The “Otherwise-Applicable Guideline Range” Doctrine:
United States v. Daniel Stewart (7th Cir. 2025)

Introduction

In United States v. Daniel Stewart, the Seventh Circuit tackled a thorny question in federal sentencing: when a defendant qualifies as a career offender and is also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), how must a court compute the “otherwise applicable guideline range” required by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2)? The answer turned on the validity of Application Note 3(C) to § 4B1.1, which instructs judges to return to § 4B1.1(b)’s default calculation once the § 924(c) count is set aside.

Daniel Stewart, once sentenced to life plus five years, obtained a resentencing after changes in the interpretation of his prior convictions. On resentencing he received 360 months’ imprisonment—60 months below the 420-months-to-life advisory range adopted by the district court. Stewart argued that the range should have been 360-to-life because, in his view, the Application Note improperly combined subsections (b) and (c) and contradicted the text of the Guideline.

The Seventh Circuit unanimously rejected Stewart’s arguments, endorsing the Sentencing Commission’s commentary, clarifying the scope of the “except as provided” clause, and reaffirming that Stinson v. United States deference remains intact after Kisor v. Wilkie. The decision cements what this commentary labels the “Otherwise-Applicable Guideline Range Doctrine.”

Summary of the Judgment

• Career-Offender Calculation. The court held that Application Note 3(C) correctly directs judges, when applying § 4B1.1(c)(2) to a defendant who still qualifies as a career offender even after ignoring § 924(c), to calculate the “otherwise applicable guideline range” by returning to § 4B1.1(b).
• Standard of Review. Because Stewart failed to object contemporaneously, review was for plain error. None was found.
• Rehabilitation Argument. The district court properly considered—but was not required to fully credit—Stewart’s post-sentencing rehabilitation; Pepper v. United States confers broad discretion, not a mandate.
• Explanation of Money-Laundering Sentences. Aggregate sentencing principles permit courts to explain the total package without parsing every count; the district court’s rationale sufficed under Dean v. United States.
• Holding. The 360-month sentence was affirmed in all respects.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) – authorizes “controlling weight” for Guideline commentary unless it violates the Constitution, a statute, or is inconsistent with the Guideline text.
• Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019) – narrowed Auer deference but did not disturb Stinson; the panel reaffirmed this circuit’s view that Kisor stops short of overruling Stinson.
• Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty., 583 U.S. 416 (2018) & Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1 (2020) – interpretive guidance on “except as provided” clauses, used to rebut Stewart’s argument that use of subsection (b) was forbidden once subsection (c) was triggered.
• Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) – allows courts at resentencing to consider post-sentencing rehabilitation.
• Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017) – endorses aggregate or “package” sentencing.
• Seventh Circuit cases: White, Truett, Nitzkin, Baldwin, Wood, Martin.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Textual Analysis of § 4B1.1.
The Guideline has three moving parts:

1. Subsection (a): Definition of “career offender.”
2. Subsection (b): Default offense-level table and Criminal History Category VI.
3. Subsection (c): Special rules when one of the convictions is § 924(c) (or § 929(a)).

The dispute centered on § 4B1.1(c)(2)(A)’s phrase “otherwise applicable guideline range.” Stewart argued that “otherwise applicable” must always exclude career-offender status; the Application Note says otherwise when the defendant still meets the career-offender definition without the § 924(c) count.

b. Deference to the Commentary.
Under Stinson the commentary is binding unless plainly erroneous. The panel found the Note a perfectly reasonable reconciliation of subsections (b) and (c): ignoring the § 924(c) count does not erase the career-offender status derived from the remaining drug or violence count, so subsection (b) supplies the baseline. The court also highlighted Atlantic Richfield’s clarification that an “except as provided” clause removes conflict but does not shrink the unaffected provision’s domain.

c. Plain-Error Review. Even if there were doubt, Stewart could not show that any error was “plain” or affected his substantial rights because the adopted range overlapped the sentence actually imposed (360 months).

d. Rehabilitation & Sentencing Disparities.
The district court weighed Stewart’s extensive prison programming and absence of infractions but concluded that a steep reduction would create unwarranted disparities. Pepper holds this balancing is within the judge’s discretion.

e. Aggregate Sentencing Rationale.
Consistent with Dean, increases on Counts 5–6 required no granular explanation once the overall sentence was justified.

3. Impact of the Decision

• Reinforced Authority of Application Notes. Post-Kisor challenges to Guideline commentary continue to face an uphill climb in the Seventh Circuit.
• Clarified Calculation Protocol. District courts now have unequivocal guidance: when applying § 4B1.1(c)(2) they must (i) strip § 924(c) counts, (ii) ask whether the defendant remains a career offender, and (iii) if yes, return to subsection (b) to compute the comparator range.
• Potential Circuit Split. Other circuits have hinted, but not definitely ruled, that the phrase “otherwise applicable guideline range” may exclude career-offender enhancements. If disagreement crystallises, Stewart could become a vehicle for Supreme Court review.
• Plea & Sentencing Strategy. Defense counsel must preserve objections to Guideline commentary despite existing precedent; failure will invite plain-error barriers as in Stewart.
• Rehabilitation Arguments. The decision underscores that Pepper opens the door but does not guarantee substantial variances; defendants should aim for documented, exceptional progress to sway district courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Career Offender (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). A sentencing status that greatly boosts the advisory range for defendants aged 18+ who commit a drug-trafficking or violent felony and have two prior similar felonies.
• § 924(c) Conviction. Federal crime of possessing or using a firearm during a drug-trafficking or violent offense; it imposes a mandatory minimum consecutive sentence (commonly five years).
• Application Notes. Official commentary published by the Sentencing Commission, treated as authoritative unless it conflicts with higher law.
• “Otherwise Applicable Guideline Range.” A term used in § 4B1.1(c)(2) asking courts to compute what the sentencing range would be after excluding the § 924(c) count but before adding its mandatory 60 months.
• Plain Error Review. Appellate standard applied when no timely objection was raised. The appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is clear or obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
• Package (Aggregate) Sentencing. Viewing all counts together to craft a single overall punishment; individual count adjustments that do not alter the bottom-line term generally require less explanation.

Conclusion

United States v. Stewart crystallizes a crucial sentencing rule: when subsection (c) of the career-offender Guideline applies but the defendant is still a career offender after discounting § 924(c), the court must calculate the comparator range by referencing subsection (b). The Seventh Circuit’s emphatic deference to Application Note 3(C) both preserves national uniformity and signals that the Guidelines’ commentary remains powerful even in the post-Kisor era.

Practitioners should heed three takeaways:

1. Object early to preserve de novo review on commentary challenges.
2. Frame post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence realistically; judges retain broad discretion.
3. Recognize that calculation missteps—if unpreserved—will be difficult to unwind on appeal.

Whether other circuits align with or diverge from Stewart will determine if the Supreme Court is asked once again to clarify the intersection of Guideline text and commentary. For now, in the Seventh Circuit, the “Otherwise-Applicable Guideline Range” doctrine is settled law.