The “Infliction Rule”: Georgia Supreme Court Clarifies Venue in Felony-Murder Prosecutions
A Comprehensive Commentary on Lewis v. State, S25A0023 (Ga. June 26 2025)

Introduction

Aaron Lewis was indicted in Gwinnett County, Georgia, on multiple counts of felony murder after two individuals overdosed on fentanyl-laced heroin he allegedly sold in neighboring DeKalb County. Lewis filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss four felony-murder counts, arguing that venue—i.e., the county in which the State may constitutionally try him—was improper in Gwinnett because the drug sales occurred elsewhere. The trial court, relying on Georgia Supreme Court precedent in Eubanks v. State, held venue proper in Gwinnett on the theory that the victims’ foreseeable ingestion and deaths completed the crime there.

On interlocutory review, the Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously vacated that ruling. The Court drew a sharp line between (1) evidentiary sufficiency/proximate-cause analysis under Eubanks and (2) the distinct constitutional and statutory requirements governing venue. By doing so, the Court articulated what this commentary calls the “Infliction Rule”: for criminal homicide—including felony murder—venue lies in the county where the defendant’s conduct inflicted the fatal cause, not merely where death became foreseeable or ultimately occurred.

Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The trial court’s venue ruling is vacated. Reliance on Eubanks’ proximate-cause test was legally erroneous because Eubanks addressed sufficiency of the evidence, not venue. Venue must be analyzed solely under the Georgia Constitution (Art. VI, § II, ¶ VI) and OCGA § 17-2-2(c).
• Rule Announced: In felony-murder prosecutions, the State must allege and ultimately prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “the cause of death was inflicted” in the county of prosecution. Foreseeability or aftermath in a different county is irrelevant to venue.
• Disposition: Case remanded for the trial court to reconsider Lewis’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 5, 6 consistent with the correct venue framework.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563 (2023) – Determined whether evidence was constitutionally sufficient to sustain a felony-murder conviction where a developmentally disabled victim was exposed to heroin. The Lewis trial court imported Eubanks’ “reasonably foreseeable consequence” language into a venue inquiry. The Supreme Court clarifies that Eubanks never construed OCGA § 17-2-2(c); therefore, it cannot control venue analysis.
• OCGA § 17-2-2(c) – The governing statute for homicide venue. The Court re-centers the discussion on the phrase “county in which the cause of death was inflicted.”
• Hernandez v. State, 304 Ga. 895 (2019) – Reaffirms that venue is a jurisdictional fact and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
• Leverette; Armstrong; Conley – Earlier cases requiring venue be pled in the indictment and subject to pre-trial demurrer or motion to dismiss.
• McKinney v. State, 282 Ga. 230 (2007) & State v. Stubbs, 365 Ga. App. 630 (2022) – Confirm tribunals may entertain venue challenges pre-trial.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court employed textual, constitutional, and historical analysis:

1. Textual Focus on “Inflicted.” Dictionaries contemporaneous with the 1968 enactment of § 17-2-2(c) define “inflict” as actively imposing or laying on harm. Thus, the statute points to the defendant’s conduct, not the downstream effects of that conduct.
2. Constitutional Harmony. Article VI mandates trial “in the county where the crime was committed.” Reading “inflicted” to mean the locus of the defendant’s direct act aligns the statute with the Constitution and avoids expansion of venue beyond its textual limits.
3. Rejection of Foreseeability. Proximate cause may suffice for liability, but venue is a separate, fact-specific jurisdictional element. The foreseeability of ingestion in a second county does not relocate venue away from the county where the defendant completed the predicate felony.
4. Indictment-Focused Review. On a demurrer/motion to dismiss, courts may look only to the four corners of the indictment absent factual stipulations. The Lewis indictment places all alleged sales in DeKalb; it alleges no conduct by Lewis in Gwinnett. Thus, as pleaded, Gwinnett cannot be the county of infliction.

3. Practical & Doctrinal Impact

• Tighter Drafting Requirements. Prosecutors must now specify in the indictment—and later prove—acts constituting “infliction” in the chosen venue. Bare references to where death occurred will not suffice.
• Limits on Multi-County Drug Death Prosecutions. When drugs are sold in one county and consumed in another, felony murder may have to be prosecuted where the sale occurred unless the State can allege additional conduct constituting infliction in the death county (e.g., ingestion facilitation, administration, continued control).
• Renewed Significance of General Demurrers. Defense counsel may more aggressively challenge indictments pre-trial, knowing courts must examine venue allegations without resort to foreseeability.
• Legislative Signal. Two concurring opinions (Warren, Bethel) invite the General Assembly to consider specialized statutes for drug-induced homicide and clearer venue rules for trans-county crimes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Felony Murder: A homicide that occurs during the perpetration of a felony, regardless of intent to kill.
• Venue: The geographic location where a criminal case must be tried. In Georgia, venue is both constitutional and jurisdictional; if the State fails to allege or prove it, acquittal is mandated.
• OCGA § 17-2-2(c): Georgia’s specialized venue statute for homicide, focusing on where the “cause of death was inflicted.”
• General Demurrer: A pre-trial motion attacking an indictment’s legal sufficiency on its face.
• Proximate Cause vs. Infliction: Proximate cause asks whether harm was a foreseeable result of conduct (liability question). Infliction asks where the defendant performed the act that directly imposed the fatal harm (venue question).
• Interlocutory Appeal: Appeal taken before final judgment, typically when a trial court certifies an immediate legal question requiring higher-court resolution.

Conclusion

Lewis v. State carves out an important procedural safeguard: venue in homicide cases hinges on where the defendant acted, not where the victim ultimately died nor where death was foreseeable. By disentangling venue from proximate cause, the Supreme Court fortifies constitutional guarantees and provides clearer marching orders to trial courts and prosecutors. The decision will likely redirect many drug-related homicide prosecutions to the county of sale and spur careful re-examination of indictment language statewide. Whether the General Assembly chooses to craft new statutory tools for cross-county drug-induced deaths remains to be seen, but for now, the “Infliction Rule” stands as Georgia’s latest word on where felony-murder cases must be tried.