The “Dent Doctrine” – When the Indictment Rules the Trial: South Carolina Supreme Court bars constructive amendment of child-sex indictments

The “Dent Doctrine” – When the Indictment Rules the Trial:
South Carolina Supreme Court bars constructive amendment of child-sex indictments

1. Introduction

In State v. Charles Dent, Opinion No. 28289 (July 16, 2025), the Supreme Court of South Carolina revisits a foundational element of Anglo-American criminal procedure – the constitutional function of the indictment. Confronted with conflicting evidence, two townhouses, multiple uncharged sex acts and a jury instruction that strayed from the charging language, the Court distilled a simple but powerful principle: where the State makes the strategic choice to charge a specific act within a broader statutory offense, both court and prosecution are bound by that choice at every stage of trial.

The decision partially overturns Charles Dent’s conviction for first-degree Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor (CSCM), while leaving untouched two convictions for disseminating obscene material to a minor. More broadly, the Court articulates what practitioners are already calling the “Dent Doctrine”, a precedent that re-energises South Carolina’s jurisprudence on material variance and constructive amendment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • Affirmed: Two convictions for dissemination of obscene material to a minor.
  • Reversed: Conviction for CSCM 1st degree (indictment alleged fellatio at House 2).
  • Key holdings:
    • The trial court erred in refusing a directed verdict where the State produced no evidence of the sexual battery alleged in the indictment.
    • The court likewise erred in giving a jury charge that expanded the indictment from fellatio to any sexual battery (digital penetration, cunnilingus, etc.).
    • A variance that enlarges an indictment’s theory of liability is a due-process violation requiring reversal, irrespective of the heinousness of the allegations.
    • An appellate panel need not be identical on remand so long as a quorum of three judges handles the case from re-docketing through opinion.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. Bailey v. State, 392 S.C. 422 (2011)
    “A material variance between charge and proof entitles the defendant to a directed verdict.”

    Bailey involved homicide-by-child-abuse where the indictment alleged abuse but the jury was instructed on neglect. The Court granted post-conviction relief, calling the mismatch a constructive amendment. Dent’s majority opinion lifts the Bailey rule out of the PCR context and places it squarely in ordinary direct appeals: if the State elects a narrow theory (fellatio), it must prove that theory and nothing else.

  2. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Indictments & Informations §§ 246, 256

    Adopted to underscore national consensus: a conviction cannot stand where the prosecution’s proof is “outside the indictment, by which the theory of criminal liability is narrowed.” The Court uses these sections to emphasise that the principle is rooted in due process, not mere pleading niceties.

  3. State v. Evans, 322 S.C. 78 (1996)
    Cited for the proposition that a material variance mandates a directed verdict.
  4. Quorum cases – Anderson County v. Preston, 427 S.C. 529 (2019); State v. McMillian, 349 S.C. 17 (2002)
    These cases define what constitutes a valid panel of the Court of Appeals; used to reject Dent’s procedural argument about panel composition.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Chief Justice Kittredge’s opinion follows a linear path:

  1. Identify the Charging Language. Each CSCM indictment charged a “sexual battery… to wit: fellatio.” This ended the legal inquiry into what theory was available; the prosecution itself narrowed the statutory universe.
  2. Examine the Trial Record for Proof of Fellatio at House 2. The sole testimonial reference located fellatio at House 1. No witness, document, or forensic artifact suggested fellatio at House 2. Result: zero evidence on a mandatory element.
  3. Apply the Directed-Verdict Standard. Because reasonable jurors must rely on evidence, and none exists, the Court holds the trial judge should have granted Dent’s motion.
  4. Treat the Jury Charge as a Constructive Amendment. By instructing on digital penetration & cunnilingus, the trial court “impermissibly enlarged the indictment,” mirroring the error in Bailey.
  5. Harmless-Error Evaluation. The Court implicitly finds structural error – a type not subject to harmless analysis – because the jury may have convicted based on unindicted acts.
  6. Segregate the Remaining Counts. The dissemination charges were properly alleged and supported by evidence; the variance problem did not infect them.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

  • Tactical Charging Decisions. Prosecutors must now weigh the convenience of a narrow indictment against the risk of acquittal if corroboration later proves thin. Expect broader or alternative-count charging in CSCM and other multi-mode offenses.
  • Jury-Instruction Scrutiny. Trial judges will face immediate defense objections whenever instructions deviate from the precise indictment wording. Pattern charges may require pre-trial tailoring.
  • Appellate Litigation. Dent supplies a direct-appeal template: (1) quote the indictment; (2) quote the evidence; (3) identify mismatch; (4) request reversal. We should anticipate more appeals, not limited to sex crimes, invoking Dent.
  • Grand Jury & Plea Negotiations. Defense counsel will highlight the opinion at the grand-jury stage to insist on clarity, and at plea negotiations to resist “constructive plea amendments.”
  • Training & Policy Memoranda. Solicitors’ offices will likely circulate memos reminding line prosecutors to avoid “to-wit” language that inadvertently narrows the indictment.
  • Constitutional Emphasis. By repeatedly tying the rule to “the weight of the government… and the citizen’s due-process rights”, the Court raises the bar for legislative attempts to loosen indictment requirements.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Indictment: A formal written accusation approved by a grand jury alleging that a person committed a crime. It frames the trial: only what is charged can be tried.
  • Material Variance: A difference between the crime as charged and the crime as proved. If the difference involves an element that the jury must find, the conviction cannot stand.
  • Constructive Amendment: A special type of variance that occurs when the trial court or prosecution, through evidence or jury instruction, effectively changes the indictment’s theory after the grand jury has spoken.
  • Directed Verdict of Acquittal: A ruling by the judge, usually at the close of the State’s case, that the evidence is legally insufficient for the jury to convict on a particular charge.
  • Sexual Battery (S.C. Code § 16-3-651(h)): Statutory term that encompasses several acts (intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, digital penetration, etc.). CSCM 1st degree (§ 16-3-655(A)(1)) is proved by showing any one of those acts committed against a child under 11 – unless the indictment narrows it.
  • Quorum in Appellate Panels: The minimum number of judges required to decide a case. Under § 14-8-80(d) three Court-of-Appeals judges constitute a quorum.

5. Conclusion

State v. Dent forcefully re-asserts the sovereign’s burden to charge precisely and prove exactly what it charges. By collapsing the conviction when the prosecution strayed from “fellatio at House 2” to “any sexual battery at either house,” the South Carolina Supreme Court delivers a textbook illustration of due process in action.

For prosecutors, Dent is both a caution and a guide: elect broad language or multi-count indictments where the evidence may evolve. For defense lawyers, it sharpens a trial-strategy blade: pin the State to its indictment, object early to variance, and stand ready with a directed-verdict motion. For trial judges, it is a reminder that the jury charge must mirror, not modify, the indictment. And for the law itself, Dent cements South Carolina’s commitment to the fundamental premise that “indictments matter.”

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina

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