The Temple Clarification on Cross-Jurisdiction Brady Obligations

Introduction

In G. Temple v. State, 2025 MT 185, the Supreme Court of Montana addressed whether a state prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose impeachment material under Brady v. Maryland extends to information possessed exclusively by a federal prosecutor who is not formally involved in the state case. Gary Temple, convicted of felony drug distribution, sought post-conviction relief after discovering that a federal prosecutor had moved — post-trial — to reduce a key state witness’s sentence for her cooperation. Temple alleged violations of Brady and Napue, arguing that the State suppressed material evidence and failed to correct false testimony.

The decision sets an important precedent for Montana: absent a demonstrable joint investigation or agency relationship, knowledge held by federal prosecutors will not be imputed to state prosecutors for Brady purposes. The Court also re-emphasised the materiality requirement, finding that any nondisclosure did not undermine confidence in the verdict given corroborative evidence from multiple witnesses.

Summary of the Judgment

Claims Raised: (1) Suppression of impeachment evidence (Brady); (2) use of false testimony (Napue); (3) nondisclosure of witness benefit before sentencing.
Key Holding: The State did not violate its Brady/Napue obligations because (i) the federal Rule 35(b) motion was not in the actual or constructive possession of the State, and (ii) even if an expectation of benefit existed, it was immaterial in light of overwhelming corroborative evidence.
Standard Articulated: Cross-jurisdiction constructive knowledge may be imputed only where (a) federal and state authorities acted as a “team” in a joint investigation, or (b) the State otherwise had ready access to the information. On the facts, that threshold was not met.
Outcome: District court’s denial of post-conviction relief affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The Court conducted an extensive tour of Supreme Court and Montana precedent:

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) – foundational duty to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) – knowledge within a single prosecutorial office is imputed to the whole office.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) – nondisclosure of inducements that could impeach witnesses.
Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385 (2016) – expectation of sentence reduction is impeaching and must be disclosed.
United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006) – factors for imputing knowledge across jurisdictions (joint investigation, control, ready access).
Montana cases: State v. Severson (2024), McGarvey v. State (2014), Gollehon v. State (1999), Ilk (2018), Main (2024), among others.

These authorities collectively shaped the Court’s framework: identify favourable evidence, decide whether it was suppressed, and determine materiality — all while clarifying when “constructive possession” reaches across sovereign lines.

2. Legal Reasoning

Favourable Evidence. The Court accepted that an expectation of a Rule 35(b) sentence reduction would constitute impeaching material.
→ Potential benefit = motive to testify => subject to Brady.
Suppression / Constructive Possession.
- No proof the county prosecutor knew about the anticipated federal benefit.
- Federal AUSA was separate; sealed Rule 35(b) motion not shared.
- Applying Risha factors, the Court found no joint investigation, no agency control, and no “ready access.” The mere presence of a federal attorney at an interview and routine witness transport coordination were insufficient.
- Hence, knowledge could not be imputed to the State.
Materiality.
- Six other witnesses (two purchasers, one associate, and three officers) independently corroborated distribution acts.
- Jury already knew witness Ferguson had received state immunity; an additional potential federal benefit unlikely to sway the verdict.
- Therefore, nondisclosure did not create a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.
Napue Claim. Even assuming Ferguson’s “no deal” statement was technically false, the prosecution did not know or have reason to know, and the testimony was immaterial for the same reasons outlined above.

3. Impact of the Judgment

The decision establishes a pragmatic, structured approach for Montana courts faced with cross-jurisdiction Brady issues:

Clarifies Duty Boundaries. State prosecutors are not automatically charged with scouring sealed federal dockets; they must, however, inquire where evidence of a joint endeavour exists.
Encourages Inter-Agency Protocols. The Court echoes Giglio’s call for institutional safeguards — suggesting offices develop checklists or liaison systems when using witnesses under another sovereign’s control.
Raises Defense Awareness. Defense counsel should independently probe for federal-state cooperation when a witness faces pending federal matters.
Materiality Emphasis. Reinforces that even proven suppression will not yield relief absent a plausible effect on the outcome.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Brady Duty: The constitutional obligation (rooted in due process) requiring prosecutors to hand over any evidence that could help the defendant, either by negating guilt or by undermining a witness’s credibility.
Impeachment Evidence: Information that can be used to challenge a witness’s truthfulness, reliability, or motive (e.g., promises of leniency, payments, prior inconsistent statements).
Constructive Possession / Knowledge: The legal fiction that treats information known by certain government agents as known by the prosecutor, even if she personally lacks actual awareness.
Joint Investigation: A coordinated effort where state and federal (or multiple) agencies share resources, personnel, and strategy toward a common prosecution goal. Joint status can trigger broader disclosure duties.
Rule 35(b) Motion (Federal): A post-sentencing request by prosecutors asking a federal judge to reduce a defendant’s sentence because he or she provided “substantial assistance” in another investigation or prosecution.
Materiality Standard: Suppressed evidence is “material” only if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result — i.e., enough doubt to undermine confidence in the verdict.

Conclusion

Temple cements a cautious boundary around the scope of a Montana prosecutor’s Brady duty when evidence resides exclusively in federal hands. The Court adopted the Third Circuit’s Risha framework, demanding proof of joint action or control before imputing knowledge, and underscored that materiality remains the decisive hurdle. Going forward, Montana trial courts and litigants must evaluate inter-agency relationships at the outset of a case: are the sovereigns functioning as a team, or are they merely passing in the night? Where the answer is the latter, the onus shifts to the defense to pursue federal avenues directly, while the prosecution must still avoid any affirmative misrepresentations. Ultimately, Temple balances the integrity of the fact-finding process with practical limits on a prosecutor’s reach, offering a clear — though not absolute — rule for cross-jurisdiction evidence disclosure.