The Stelly Clarification: One-Year Prescriptive Period Governs § 1981 Failure-to-Promote Actions Involving “New and Distinct” Internal Promotions

1. Introduction

In Stelly v. Department of Public Safety, No. 24-30550 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed two recurring questions in employment-discrimination litigation:

What statute of limitations applies to a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim alleging failure to promote?
How does a Title VII plaintiff rebut an employer’s stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting the plaintiff?

Plaintiff–appellant John R. Stelly, II, a white Louisiana State Police lieutenant, claimed that racial bias prevented his promotion to captain on 31 occasions between 2008 and 2021. He sued the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of State Police (“LSP”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed the § 1981 claim as untimely and later granted summary judgment to the LSP on the Title VII claim. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in all respects.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Section 1981 Claim: The court held that Stelly’s § 1981 failure-to-promote claim was subject to Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period because the captain position would have created a “new and distinct relationship” with the employer. His suit, filed more than a year after the challenged promotions, was time-barred.
Title VII Claim: Applying the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court agreed that Stelly failed to raise a triable fact issue on pretext or mixed motive. The LSP articulated legitimate reasons—division-specific experience and interview performance—for choosing two minority officers (Robert Burns II and Saleem El-Amin) over Stelly. Plaintiff’s evidence (test scores, seniority, awards, and self-generated statistics) did not undermine those explanations.
Disposition: Affirmed. No promotion-related recovery for Stelly under either statute.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) – established the “new and distinct relationship” test for § 1981 promotion cases predating the 1991 amendment.
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) – held that claims made possible only by the 1991 amendments are governed by § 1658’s four-year period; otherwise, state personal-injury limits apply.
Police Ass’n of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159 (5th Cir. 1996) – applied the “new and distinct” concept to police promotions within Louisiana.
Autry v. Fort Bend ISD, 704 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) – provided the burden-shifting framework for the Title VII analysis.
Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 693 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1982) – reiterated that selecting a better-qualified applicant is a legitimate reason.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133 (2000) – clarified an employer’s light burden of production at stage two of McDonnell-Douglas.

By synthesizing these cases, the panel cemented a rule: when an internal promotion in Louisiana state service carries substantially different duties, compensation, or supervisory authority, a § 1981 challenge is treated as pre-1991 and thus governed by the one-year tort prescriptive period.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Statute of Limitations on § 1981 Claim

Step 1 – Identify Whether the Claim Could Have Been Brought Pre-1991: Under Patterson, refusal to enter a “new and distinct” employment relationship already fell within § 1981. A captaincy—higher pay, command authority, new division—meets that test.
Step 2 – Select the Limitations Period: Since the claim was actionable pre-1991, the court applied the state’s one-year limitations period (La. Civ. Code art. 3492) as assumed in Johnson v. Crown Enterprises, 398 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2005).
Step 3 – Apply to Facts: The operative adverse actions (promotions granted July 9, 2021) occurred more than a year before suit was filed (2023). Therefore, the claim is time-barred.

(b) Title VII Failure-to-Promote Analysis

Prima Facie Case: The district court assumed Stelly satisfied it (he was not promoted and non-white officers were).
Employer’s Legitimate Reasons: LSP emphasized each promotee’s long-term, division-specific experience and superior interview performance.
Rebuttal Stage: Stelly offered (i) higher exam scores, (ii) more tenure, (iii) self-authored statistics, (iv) mixed-motive theory, and (v) a declaration praising his interview. The court found these insufficient because:
- Exam scores/time-in-grade were not used in the final promotion stage; Stelly provided no evidence of departure from practice.
- Statistics were methodologically flawed (selective time frame, aggregated panels, omitted data unfavorable to plaintiff).
- No evidence suggested race was a motivating factor, even in part.
- The praising declaration came from a non-decision-maker and addressed a different vacancy.

Because no reasonable jury could find pretext or mixed motive, summary judgment was appropriate.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Statute-of-Limitations Clarity: Plaintiffs challenging internal promotions within the Fifth Circuit—especially within Louisiana’s civil-service framework—must file § 1981 actions within one year if the sought-after rank entails materially different responsibilities or pay.
Strategic Litigation Choices: Claimants may increasingly rely on Title VII (with its longer 300-day EEOC charge window) rather than § 1981, or they must sue quickly.
Employer Defense Playbook: Employers can defeat Title VII claims by documenting position-specific qualifications and interview feedback, then demonstrating consistency in applying those criteria.
Statistical Evidence Scrutiny: Courts will closely examine methodology; self-prepared statistics by a party-plaintiff are unlikely to survive Daubert-style reliability analysis.
Mixed-Motive Limits: The ruling underscores that a mixed-motive instruction requires actual evidence that protected status weighed in the decision. Mere disagreement with evaluative criteria is insufficient.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 1981 vs. Title VII
– § 1981 prohibits race discrimination in making and enforcing contracts; no administrative exhaustion, but limitations periods vary.
– Title VII covers broader employment discrimination; requires timely charge with EEOC (300 days in deferral states) and provides different remedies.
“New and Distinct Relationship”
If the promotion dramatically changes duties, pay, or status, it is akin to making a new employment contract. Rejection of such a promotion is actionable under the pre-1991 version of § 1981.
McDonnell-Douglas Framework
A three-step burden-shifting method: (1) plaintiff’s prima facie showing; (2) employer’s legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff’s proof that the reason is pretext or that discrimination was another motive.
Mixed-Motive Theory
Plaintiff may prevail by showing protected status was one of multiple motives. Requires evidence of dual motives, not just disagreement with evaluation.
Prescriptive vs. Limitation Period
Louisiana uses “prescription” where common-law jurisdictions say “statute of limitations.” Both denote the time in which a suit must be filed.

5. Conclusion

Stelly v. Department of Public Safety reinforces two doctrinal pillars:

A failure-to-promote action under § 1981 is subject to the forum state’s personal-injury limitations period—one year in Louisiana—when the promotion would have formed a “new and distinct” employment relationship.
Under Title VII, plaintiffs must do more than quarrel with an employer’s judgment; they must produce evidence that race actually played a role. Absent credible proof of pretext or mixed motives, courts will not second-guess an employer’s selection of a better-qualified candidate.

The decision provides valuable guidance for litigants and employers alike, emphasizing prompt filing of § 1981 claims, rigorous statistical methodology, and the importance of concrete evidence linking adverse decisions to race. In the Fifth Circuit, the “Stelly Clarification” now stands as the roadmap for assessing limitations periods and evidentiary burdens in internal-promotion discrimination suits.