The Selma Press-Conference Immunity Rule:
Alabama Supreme Court Extends Peace-Officer and State-Agent Immunity to Post-Arrest Media Communications

Introduction

In Ex parte Devon McGuire and Spencer Collier, the Supreme Court of Alabama confronted a multi-faceted civil action arising from the arrest of civil-rights attorney and activist Faya Rose Touré in Selma. Touré sued Officer Devon McGuire, Chief of Police Spencer Collier, and the City of Selma for an array of torts, including false arrest, assault and battery, invasion of privacy, wantonness, abuse of process, and defamation. The City obtained summary judgment, but the trial court allowed the claims against McGuire and Collier to proceed. Via a petition for writ of mandamus, McGuire and Collier asked the Supreme Court to direct the trial court to grant them summary judgment on grounds of peace-officer immunity (§ 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975) and the broader doctrine of State-agent immunity as articulated in Ex parte Cranman.

The Court granted the petition and, significantly, held that these immunities also shield a police chief’s post-arrest press conference and release of a mug shot—communications alleged to be defamatory—from civil liability absent a showing of malice or constitutional violation. This marks the first explicit recognition in Alabama that discretionary media communications by law-enforcement executives fall within State-agent immunity.

Summary of the Judgment

• The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to enter summary judgment for McGuire and Collier on all claims.
• McGuire’s investigatory actions, traffic stop, and arrest of Touré were deemed discretionary law-enforcement functions cloaked by peace-officer and State-agent immunity.
• Chief Collier’s supervisory decisions—including holding a press conference and releasing Touré’s mug shot—were likewise discretionary administrative functions protected under Cranman category (2).
• Touré failed to present “substantial evidence” establishing either (a) a constitutional/statutory violation or (b) conduct that was willful, malicious, fraudulent, in bad faith, beyond authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of law. Thus, no Cranman exception applied.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)
   Provided the modern restatement of State-agent immunity, dividing protected activities into categories and delineating two narrow exceptions. The Court faithfully applied categories (2) and (4), then tested for the Cranman exceptions.
2. Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282 (Ala. 2012)
   Reaffirmed that peace-officer immunity is evaluated through the Cranman prism. The Court here quoted it to anchor both McGuire’s arrest and Collier’s departmental decisions within the covered categories.
3. Ex parte Harris, 216 So. 3d 1201 (Ala. 2016)
   Clarified that an officer acting with “arguable probable cause” cannot be said to act in bad faith, thereby preserving immunity. The Court imported the Harris standard to foreclose Touré’s claims of malice related to the arrest.
4. Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2006)
   Expanded Cranman’s category (4) to encompass statutory peace-officer immunity. Hollis served as the doctrinal bridge for synthesizing § 6-5-338 with state-agent immunity.
5. Additional cases—Downing v. City of Dothan, Swan v. City of Hueytown, Ex parte Duvall, etc.—reinforced that arrest decisions are inherently discretionary and thus presumptively immune.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Step 1 – Prima facie showing of immunity.
   The petitioners demonstrated that:
   • McGuire was performing a discretionary law-enforcement function—initiating a stop, investigating suspected theft, and effectuating an arrest.
   • Collier was exercising judgment in supervising personnel and communicating with the public, an administrative act under Cranman category (2)(d).
2. Step 2 – Allocation of burden.
   Once immunity was established, the burden shifted to Touré to produce “substantial evidence” that a Cranman exception applied. The Court emphasized that conjecture or personal belief is insufficient.
3. Step 3 – Evaluation of exceptions.
   • Constitutional/Law Violation Exception. Touré’s First-Amendment argument—that she had a constitutional right to remove political signs—was unsupported by authority and, crucially, did not implicate the officers’ discretionary choices.
   • Bad-Faith / Malice Exception. The Court found “arguable probable cause” for both theft and eluding, defeating claims of bad faith. Likewise, no evidence showed that Collier’s press statements were knowingly false or recklessly disregarded the truth.
4. Step 4 – Application to Individual Claims.
   Each tort (false arrest, assault, wantonness, abuse of process, defamation, etc.) was mapped to conduct lying within the protected discretionary functions. Lacking an exception, immunity attached across the board.

C. Impact of the Judgment

• Media-Relations Immunity. This is the first Alabama decision squarely holding that a police chief’s discretionary communication with the press about an arrest enjoys State-agent immunity, absent proof of malice. Expect future defendants to cite the “Selma Press-Conference Immunity Rule” to dismiss defamation suits arising from official press releases.
• Expanded “Arguable Probable Cause” Shield. By tying the absence of malice to the presence of at least arguable probable cause, the Court makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to pierce immunity unless they can show a manifest lack of probable cause.
• Narrowing of Local-Ordinance Defenses. The Court implicitly held that a citizen’s subjective belief in the legality of her conduct, or existence of a municipal ordinance, does not undermine an officer’s arguable probable cause for arrest under state criminal statutes.
• Strategic Litigation Dynamics. Plaintiffs will likely shift focus from state-law torts to federal § 1983 claims, where qualified immunity—though formidable—has different contours and where First-Amendment retaliation claims may be more viable.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Peace-Officer Immunity (§ 6-5-338)

An Alabama statute that protects municipal police officers from personal civil liability when performing discretionary duties within their official scope.

State-Agent Immunity (Cranman)

A judicial doctrine shielding state employees—including city officers—from suit for acts done while exercising judgment in specified governmental functions, unless one of two narrow exceptions applies.

Discretionary vs. Ministerial Acts

Discretionary: Decisions requiring personal judgment (e.g., whether to arrest, how to allocate police resources). Ministerial: Routine tasks with no room for personal choice (e.g., following a set checklist). Immunity normally protects discretionary acts.

Arguable Probable Cause

A lower threshold than actual probable cause. If reasonable officers could disagree on whether probable cause exists, the officer is protected—even if a court later finds no actual probable cause.

Mandamus

An extraordinary appellate remedy ordering a lower court to perform a duty—here, to enter summary judgment for the defendants.

Conclusion

Ex parte McGuire and Collier cements the broad reach of Alabama’s peace-officer and State-agent immunity doctrines. By holding that both the on-scene arrest actions and the post-arrest media communications of law-enforcement officials are discretionary functions immune from tort liability, the Court establishes a powerful precedent. Plaintiffs alleging wrongdoing must now overcome not only the formidable “arguable probable cause” hurdle but must also marshal concrete evidence of constitutional violations or malice. In practical terms, the decision insulates Alabama police chiefs’ policy-level press dealings from routine defamation suits and signals continued judicial deference to law-enforcement discretion unless egregious misconduct is squarely proven.