The Presence-Membership Test: Fifth Circuit Upholds Mass-Warrant Sufficiency Post-Twin Peaks

Introduction

Barnhart v. Stroman is the latest—and likely last—chapter in the spate of civil-rights suits flowing from the notorious 2015 Twin Peaks biker-gang shoot-out in Waco, Texas. The plaintiff, Jade Barnhart, widow and estate representative of Cossacks member Bryan Harper, alleged multiple Fourth Amendment violations after Harper’s mass arrest on the day of the melee. Her lawsuit targeted Waco officials, detectives, and prosecutors, claiming (1) a facially deficient fill-in-the-name affidavit (Malley claim), (2) deliberate or reckless misstatements/omissions (Franks claim), and (3) absence of a neutral and detached magistrate (Coolidge claim), plus derivative conspiracy, supervisory, and municipal liability theories.

After two trips to the district court and one prior remand from the Fifth Circuit in light of Wilson v. Stroman, the district court again dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). On 5 August 2025, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, crystallising a new practical rule: If a mass-arrest affidavit truthfully alleges that the arrestee (i) is a member or associate of a group engaged in the violent incident, (ii) was physically present, and (iii) displayed identifying symbols, the affidavit clears both Malley and Franks hurdles.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Malley Claim – The affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” as to make belief in probable cause objectively unreasonable. 2. Franks Claim – Omitted facts (Harper did not brandish a weapon and crawled away) were immaterial to probable cause for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity (EIOCA) under Texas law. 3. Neutral Magistrate Claim – Justice of the Peace Peterson’s prior law-enforcement career and limited scene visit did not destroy neutrality. 4. Derivative Claims – With no underlying constitutional violation, conspiracy, supervisory, and municipal liability claims collapsed. 5. Result – District-court dismissal affirmed; no plausible Fourth Amendment violation stated.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) – Officer liability exists if an affidavit is so defective that probable cause is plainly absent.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) – Suppression (and §1983 liability) attaches if officers deliberately/recklessly include falsehoods or omit material facts essential to probable cause.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) & Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) – Warrants must be issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate.”
Wilson v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202 (5th Cir. 2022) – Earlier Twin Peaks appeal clarifying Malley/Franks analyses and narrowing the independent-intermediary doctrine.
Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270 (5th Cir. 2021) – Found the same form affidavit insufficient for plaintiffs who were not gang members, not present, or not wearing colors.
Otto v. State, 95 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) – EIOCA’s “overt act” element includes non-violent supportive conduct.
United States v. McKeever, 906 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1990) & United States v. Duncan, 420 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1970) – Prior law-enforcement service or scene visits do not alone vitiate magistrate neutrality.

The court juxtaposed Terwilliger and Wilson to show that what doomed those plaintiffs (lack of membership/presence/symbols) is precisely what saves the affidavit against Harper. By incorporating Otto, the panel underscored that Texas EIOCA does not require a violent act by every conspirator—association or aid suffices—rendering the omitted weapon-brandishing fact immaterial.

Legal Reasoning

Malley Framework Applied
The panel accepted all affidavit assertions as true and asked whether, under “a reasonable officer” standard, probable cause existed. Because Harper was (a) a Cossacks member, (b) on-scene during the violence, and (c) displaying club insignia—facts the complaint conceded—the universal affidavit met the low bar of probable cause for EIOCA. No “official belief” could be labelled unreasonable.
Franks Materiality Inquiry
Even assuming defendants omitted Harper’s non-aggressive conduct, Texas law allowed non-violent overt acts. Thus, the “corrected” affidavit would still establish probable cause. Without materiality, the Franks claim withers at the pleading stage.
Neutral Magistrate Allegation
The neutrality requirement focuses on detachment from the prosecution’s competitive enterprise. Prior policing experience or a mere scene walk-through, standing alone, lacks the “severance and disengagement” deficit condemned in Coolidge. The complaint’s naked assertion of deeper involvement was conclusory and therefore disregarded under Twombly/Iqbal.
Collapse of Derivative Theories
Section 1983 conspiracy, bystander, supervisory, and municipal liability all hinge on an underlying constitutional injury. With none found, each dependent claim was properly dismissed.

Impact

The opinion, though unpublished, cements a practical three-pronged “Presence-Membership Test” for mass-arrest affidavits in group-violence contexts within the Fifth Circuit:

If the suspect (1) belongs to, (2) is present with, and (3) displays the insignia of a group plausibly engaged in organized criminal activity at the scene, a boilerplate affidavit survives Malley and Franks scrutiny absent contrary membership or presence facts.

For Law-Enforcement: Affidavit templates rooted in group membership, scene presence, and outward identifiers remain viable when individualized facts align.
For Civil-Rights Litigants: Plaintiffs must plead non-membership, non-presence, lack of identification, or other material exculpatory facts; mere non-violence is insufficient for EIOCA arrests.
For Prosecutors & Magistrates: Prior professional overlap or limited investigative exposure will not, without more, impugn neutrality—narrowing Coolidge challenges.
For Future Twin Peaks Litigation: The opinion likely shutters remaining suits by participants conceding membership and presence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause – A practical, non-technical probability that a crime was committed; not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Malley Claim – Suing an officer for presenting an affidavit so obviously deficient that no reasonable officer would rely on it.
Franks Claim – Challenging a warrant because officers lied or intentionally omitted key facts that would have changed the magistrate’s mind.
EIOCA (Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity) – Texas analogue to federal RICO; liability attaches if any group member commits an overt act and the defendant aided, encouraged, or associated with the criminal purpose.
Neutral and Detached Magistrate – A decision-maker who is not part of law enforcement’s investigative team and has no personal stake in the pursuit of evidence.
Independent Intermediary Doctrine – A later indictment by a grand jury can insulate officers from false-arrest claims unless the indictment was tainted by officer misconduct. Modified by Wilson within the Twin Peaks saga.

Conclusion

Barnhart v. Stroman synthesises five years of Twin Peaks litigation into a concise doctrinal holding: group membership, presence, and insignia yield probable cause for mass EIOCA arrests, rendering boilerplate affidavits constitutionally sound unless plaintiffs can plead contrary material facts. The decision clarifies the scope of Malley and Franks in collective-violence settings, narrows challenges to magistrate neutrality, and signals to law-enforcement that carefully drafted yet generic affidavits remain defensible when applied to factually qualifying arrestees. In the broader Fourth Amendment landscape, the case underscores the fine but clear line between over-broad “dragnet” arrests and permissible mass arrests predicated on concrete associative facts. Plaintiffs who cannot negate those associative predicates at the pleading stage will find the courthouse doors closed.