The Persistence of the San Remo Preclusion Trap: State-Court Judgments Bar Federal Takings Claims

Introduction

In Richard Warner v. City of Marathon (11th Cir. May 27, 2025), plaintiffs—the Estate of Joseph Ardolino II, Joseph Ardolino (the decedent’s son), and co–personal representatives—sought to reopen a federal action under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause after exhausting their claims in Florida state court. The core dispute centered on whether a federal court may entertain a takings claim once a state court has rendered final judgment on that claim, in light of the interplay among three Supreme Court decisions: Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank (1985), San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco (2005), and Knick v. Township of Scott (2019). On appeal from the district court’s denial of a post-judgment motion to reopen and amend, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (the full-faith-and-credit statute) bars federal relitigation of an already-adjudicated state takings claim, effectively perpetuating the so-called “San Remo preclusion trap.”

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to reopen a 2018 dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs’ federal takings claim. Although Knick overruled Williamson County’s requirement that a takings claimant first litigate in state court, it left intact San Remo’s holding that a state court’s final decision on just compensation precludes later federal adjudication under § 1738. Plaintiffs waited until after full state-court loss—and more than four years after Knick—to move for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The court held that (1) plaintiffs’ effort to relitigate their takings claim runs smack into § 1738’s preclusive effect; (2) even if Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) theoretically applied, plaintiffs did not act within a “reasonable time”; and (3) nothing in the law-of-the-case doctrine required reopening. The district court’s exercise of discretion in denying relief was affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

• Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank (1985)
  Required a takings plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before filing a federal suit—i.e., state-court denial of just compensation was a jurisdictional prerequisite.
• San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco (2005)
  Held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 mandates full-faith-and-credit for state takings judgments, so a plaintiff who loses in state court is precluded from federal relitigation of the same claim.
• Knick v. Township of Scott (2019)
  Overruled Williamson County’s state-litigation prerequisite, allowing direct federal filing under § 1983, but expressly preserved San Remo’s preclusive-effect rule.

2. Legal Reasoning

The decision turns on two intertwined principles:

1. Full-Faith-and-Credit Preclusion (28 U.S.C. § 1738). Once a state court has decided a takings claim on the merits, federal courts must give that judgment preclusive effect under § 1738 (San Remo). Plaintiffs here fully litigated—and lost—their inverse condemnation action in Florida court. Under San Remo, reopening the federal case would directly conflict with § 1738’s command.
2. Post-Judgment Relief and Timeliness (Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). A motion to reopen a dismissal without prejudice functions as a Rule 60(b) motion. Although subsections (5) and (6) authorize relief when a change in controlling law or extraordinary circumstances exist, relief must be sought “within a reasonable time.” Plaintiffs waited until January 2023—over three years after Knick and several months after the Florida Supreme Court’s final denial—to move for relief. The Eleventh Circuit found this delay unreasonable.

Plaintiffs’ invocation of the law-of-the-case doctrine also fails: the prior Eleventh Circuit decision merely summarized Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement; it did not address San Remo’s preclusion rule or post-state-court motions to reopen.

3. Impact

Warner v. City of Marathon underscores that Knick’s overruling of Williamson County does not open the floodgates to second bites at the apple in federal court once a state has adjudicated a takings claim. Practitioners must choose carefully between federal and state fora in light of § 1738’s preclusive effect. The decision signals that, moving forward:

• Takings plaintiffs should think twice before litigating in state court if they intend to preserve a federal § 1983 action.
• Courts will deny untimely Rule 60(b) motions that seek to evade res judicata-like effects of state-court decisions under § 1738.
• San Remo remains a critical barrier to federal relitigation of state-precedent takings outcomes, even in the post-Knick landscape.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Takings Clause & Inverse Condemnation: The Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation” when government regulation effectively takes private property. Inverse condemnation is the state-court remedy to claim compensation without formal eminent-domain proceedings.
• Full-Faith-and-Credit (28 U.S.C. § 1738): Federal courts must honor and enforce state-court judgments as though they were their own, giving them the same preclusive effect.
• San Remo Preclusion Trap: Before Knick, Williamson County forced plaintiffs to go to state court first; San Remo then said a state court loss bars a later federal claim—leaving no avenue for federal relief. Knick corrected the first half (no need to file in state court), but kept the second half intact.
• Rule 60(b) Relief: A narrow post-judgment remedy allowing courts—on equitable grounds—to reopen final orders. Must be requested “within a reasonable time” and only for specified, extraordinary circumstances.

Conclusion

Warner v. City of Marathon reaffirms that federal plaintiffs cannot sidestep state-court adjudications of takings claims. Even though Knick eliminated Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement, San Remo’s preclusive-effect rule still stands as a formidable barrier under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision clarity reinforces that once a takings claim has been finally decided in state court, federal courts lack power to reopen or relitigate it—especially when a party delays post-judgment relief beyond a reasonable time. This ruling will guide litigants’ strategic forum choices and preserve the integrity of inter-jurisdictional preclusion principles in takings jurisprudence.