Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1) & (a)(2); 83(b). Rule 83(a)(1) permits district courts to adopt local rules consistent with federal statutes and rules. Crucially, Rule 83(a)(2) prohibits enforcing a form requirement “in a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.” Rule 83(b) extends similar authority to judge-specific rules (often via standing orders) but requires consistency with federal law and the Federal Rules. The Fifth Circuit’s decision turns on these provisions: the judge-specific “no footnote citations” rule is a form requirement that, when enforced to disregard filings, caused the party to lose Rule 56 rights—contrary to Rule 83(a)(2)—and conflicted with Rule 56, violating Rule 83(b).
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The rule requires courts to consider “the cited materials” submitted on summary judgment. The district court’s refusal to consider Washington’s “cited materials” because the citations appeared in footnotes violated this duty.
• Macklin v. City of New Orleans, 293 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and Victor F. ex rel. Gene F. v. Pasadena ISD, 793 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). These decisions establish the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing a district court’s administrative handling of a case and enforcement of local rules. The panel applied this standard to hold the district court’s approach an abuse of discretion.
• Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004). Confirms abuse-of-discretion review when a district court refuses to consider additional materials in the summary-judgment context, supporting the panel’s standard-of-review framework.
• Johnson v. United States, 460 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2006), and Powell v. United States, 849 F.2d 1576 (5th Cir. 1988). These cases characterize the ability to seek summary judgment as a “right.” The Washington panel builds on this by recognizing the concomitant right to defend against summary judgment. Denying consideration of a party’s submissions strips those rights.
• Wise v. Wilkie, 955 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2020). Recites the general rule that an appellate court does not consider issues not passed upon below. This undercuts the argument that de novo appellate review can cure the district court’s refusal to consider Washington’s filings.
• In re Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, 100 F.4th 528 (5th Cir. 2024). The notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction over matters involved in the appeal. Thus, the district court’s post-appeal statement that it would have reached the same merits result cannot rehabilitate the summary judgment.
• Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2013); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1996); Burden v. Yates, 644 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). These authorities delineate the range of a district court’s inherent powers and sanctions (including fines, costs, contempt, conditional dismissal, and dismissal), coupled with a caution to exercise “great restraint and caution” and to attempt lesser sanctions likely to achieve compliance before imposing more drastic measures. The panel invoked these principles to show that outright disregard of a party’s filings for a nonwillful formatting lapse was disproportionate and targeted the client rather than counsel.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three interlocking steps grounded in the Federal Rules.

1. Rule 83(a)(2)’s No‑Loss Constraint Applies to Judge‑Specific Form Rules. The standing order’s prohibition on footnote citations is a “requirement of form.” Rule 83(a)(2) forbids enforcing such a requirement “in a way that causes a party to lose any right because of a nonwillful failure to comply.” The panel accepted as undisputed that Washington’s violation was unintentional. By refusing to consider her summary-judgment submissions and evidence because citations appeared in footnotes, the district court caused her to lose Rule 56 rights—both the right to seek summary judgment and the concomitant right to defend against it. That violates Rule 83(a)(2). Because judge-specific rules are subordinate to the Federal Rules, Rule 83(b) also makes clear that a judge’s standing order cannot be applied inconsistently with the federal rules.
2. Rule 56(c)(3) Required Consideration of Washington’s “Cited Materials.” Rule 56(c)(3) obligates courts to consider the “cited materials” the parties present. Those materials were cited—albeit in footnotes. The district court’s refusal to consider them because of their placement contravened the rule’s plain command. That violation of Rule 56 in turn rendered the enforcement of the judge’s standing order inconsistent with the federal rules, again offending Rule 83(b).
3. Appellate De Novo Review Cannot Cure the District Court’s Failure to Consider the Filings; Post‑Appeal Merits Pronouncements Lack Jurisdictional Footing. The panel rejected Edwards’s contention (echoing the district court’s rationale) that no right was lost because the Fifth Circuit reviews summary-judgment orders de novo. De novo review is a standard of review, not a license for the appellate court to decide issues the district court never reached. Wise’s admonition—that appellate courts generally do not consider issues not passed upon below—applies. The district court’s later statement that it would have reached the same merits result could not remedy the problem; after the notice of appeal, jurisdiction over those issues rested with the Fifth Circuit, per In re Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce.

The panel emphasized that district courts possess ample tools to enforce compliance—rejecting nonconforming briefs with a direction to refile promptly, imposing sanctions targeted at counsel, issuing warnings, or, in extraordinary cases, dismissing claims. But those tools must be used with restraint and proportionality. Here, the district court leapt to one of the most drastic options—wholesale disregard of a party’s summary-judgment submissions—despite an undisputedly nonwillful violation. That misstep penalized the client rather than counsel and constituted an abuse of discretion.

Impact and Practical Implications

• Constraints on Enforcing Judge‑Specific Formatting Preferences. District judges may adopt standing orders that channel briefing format—such as discouraging or limiting footnotes. But under Rule 83(a)(2), they cannot enforce those formal preferences in a way that causes a party to lose substantive or procedural rights when the noncompliance is nonwillful. The practical upshot: judges should permit prompt correction or impose proportionate, counsel-focused sanctions rather than disregard filings or enter dispositive rulings based solely on the opposing party’s materials.
• Rule 56 Rights Are Real—and Two‑Sided. The decision underscores that parties possess a right both to seek summary judgment and to defend against it. Stripping consideration of a party’s “cited materials” impairs those rights and risks reversible error.
• “Cited Materials” Means What It Says. Rule 56(c)(3)’s directive to consider “cited materials” does not turn on where within a brief the citation appears. Courts may insist on good briefing practices, but the remedy for formatting missteps is not to ignore what is admittedly cited.
• De Novo Review Is Not a Backstop for Trial‑Level Missteps. Litigants cannot rely on appellate de novo review to salvage a record the district court declined to consider. Appellate courts generally do not take first pass on arguments and evidence never addressed below.
• Jurisdictional Discipline Post‑Appeal. Once an appeal is noticed, district courts are divested of jurisdiction over matters involved in the appeal. Post-appeal statements that the result would be the same cannot rehabilitate a flawed summary-judgment order.
• Sanctions Hierarchy and Client Protection. The panel’s discussion of inherent powers and sanction options reaffirms a “least restrictive means” ethos: if a lesser sanction will likely achieve compliance, it should be tried first. Courts should target counsel for attorney-level mistakes, reserving client-prejudicing measures (like dismissal) for willful or egregious violations and only after warnings or lesser sanctions prove inadequate.
• Unpublished but Persuasive. Although the opinion is unpublished under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, its reasoning crisply applies the text of Rules 83 and 56. District courts within the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi) should expect litigants to invoke this decision as persuasive authority when judge-specific form rules are enforced in rights-depriving ways for nonwillful violations.