The Milam Materiality Doctrine: Non-Prejudicial Discovery Errors Cannot Justify Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea

Introduction

United States v. David Milam, Nos. 23-4527/28/29 (4th Cir. 2025), presented the Fourth Circuit with a trio of intertwined appeals arising out of David Milam’s guilty pleas to firearms, drug-distribution, and assault-on-federal-officers charges. At the core of Milam’s challenge was an inadvertent government scanning error that produced an incomplete copy of the search-warrant affidavit in discovery. Milam argued that this omission invalidated two of his earlier guilty pleas and, at sentencing, contested both the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and the substantive reasonableness of the 300-month aggregate sentence.

The Fourth Circuit, in a unanimous published opinion by Judge Niemeyer, affirmed across the board. In doing so it articulated a materiality-centric standard for when discovery lapses may constitute a “fair and just reason” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) for withdrawing a plea, and it clarified that a district court may revisit acceptance-of-responsibility credits when post-plea conduct undermines the defendant’s contrition—even if the government’s formal objection is untimely under Rule 32(f).

Summary of the Judgment

Plea-Withdrawal Motion: The incomplete affidavit was immaterial; Milam failed to show a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea had he possessed the full document. Therefore, no “fair and just reason” existed to set aside the pleas.
Acceptance of Responsibility: Post-plea drug dealing and assaultive conduct in jail extinguished any entitlement to a § 3E1.1 reduction. The district court’s decision to entertain the government’s belated objection was proper.
Substantive Reasonableness: A 300-month downward-variant sentence (60 months below the low end of the advisory range) was well within the district court’s discretion given Milam’s leadership role, violent gang affiliation, and continued criminal conduct.
Disposition: Judgment of the district court affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Garrett, 141 F.4th 96 (4th Cir. 2025): Reiterated that governmental misconduct must be material to the decision to plead guilty. Milam sought to import Garrett’s “material influence” language, but the court found no material influence here.
United States v. Mayberry, 125 F.4th 132 (4th Cir. 2025): Requires a showing that counsel’s error “made a material difference” in the plea decision. Guided the court’s rejection of Milam’s ineffective-assistance component.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1991): Six-factor test for plea withdrawal. The court heavily applied factors one (knowing/voluntary) and four (close assistance of counsel).
United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 2012): A district court may implicitly find “good cause” to consider late objections to the PSR. Anchored the decision to hear the government’s tardy challenge to acceptance-of-responsibility.
United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993): Continuing criminal conduct post-plea justifies denial of § 3E1.1 credit—direct precedent for Milam.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970): A plea is not involuntary merely because the defendant misjudged the strength of the government’s case.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Sets the standard for challenging facial validity of search-warrant affidavits; the Fourth Circuit found Milam’s hypothetical Franks claim speculative.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. The “Milam Materiality Doctrine.” The Fourth Circuit crystallised a rule: an inadvertent discovery error will justify plea withdrawal only if it is material—that is, if there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have refused to plead guilty had the information been correctly disclosed. Key components:

The omitted pages actually strengthened probable cause by describing an additional vehicle stop; therefore, their absence could only have encouraged (not discouraged) Milam’s decision to plead.
Evidentiary hearings confirmed counsel advised Milam about possible suppression motions, but Milam strategically chose a quick plea to forestall further investigation and harsher exposure.
Speculative Franks challenges, unsupported by proffers, cannot establish materiality.

b. Competent Counsel Factor. Applying Mayberry, the court held that failing to notice a non-material omission does not equate to ineffective assistance because it made no difference to the plea calculus.

c. Acceptance of Responsibility. Section 3E1.1 hinges on post-plea contrition. Ongoing drug distribution and violence in custody are incompatible with acceptance. Rule 32’s 14-day objection period may be relaxed for good cause, and the absence of defense objection signified consent to reopening the issue.

d. Substantive Reasonableness. A below-Guidelines sentence received the appellate presumption of reasonableness. The district court thoughtfully balanced mitigating factors (work history, family bonds) against aggravators (leadership in a violent gang, large-scale narcotics, post-plea misconduct) and gave a detailed § 3553(a) explanation.

3. Likely Impact on Future Litigation

Plea-Withdrawal Litigation: Defendants confronting inadvertent discovery lapses must now satisfy the Milam materiality threshold—showing a plausible suppression or trial strategy realistically foregone because of the lapse. Mere speculation or evidence that helps the prosecution will not suffice.
Rule 32 Timing Objections: The decision underscores that unobjected-to late challenges to the PSR can be heard if good cause exists, particularly where new defendant misconduct surfaces.
Acceptance-of-Responsibility Dynamics: Post-plea conduct remains a pivotal factor. Milam reinforces Kidd’s lesson that ongoing crime wipes out § 3E1.1 credits, and it signals that plea agreements cannot contractually “lock in” the reduction.
Strategic Plea Advice: Defense counsel must document the advice given about potential suppression motions; courts will rely on those records to evaluate voluntariness disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(d)(2)(B) – “Fair & Just Reason”: After a court accepts a guilty plea, a defendant may withdraw it only if there’s a good reason that calls the plea’s fairness into doubt—e.g., newly discovered evidence, coercion, or significant legal error.
Materiality (Plea Context): Information is “material” if knowing it would likely have changed the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.
Franks Hearing: A special hearing where a defendant can challenge a search warrant by showing the affiant knowingly lied or recklessly disregarded the truth, and that the falsehood was essential to probable cause.
Acceptance of Responsibility (§ 3E1.1): A Sentencing Guidelines provision allowing up to a 3-level reduction when the defendant clearly demonstrates genuine remorse and cessation of criminal conduct.
Implicit “Good Cause” Under Rule 32: Even if a party misses the 14-day PSR objection deadline, the judge can still hear the issue if there’s a sound reason—often emerging facts or absent prejudice to the other side.

Conclusion

United States v. Milam establishes a pragmatic approach to post-plea discovery mishaps: only prejudicial, outcome-determinative errors justify undoing a solemn guilty plea. By tying materiality to a reasonable probability of a different decision—and by affirming district-court latitude to revisit acceptance-of-responsibility where a defendant’s conduct belies contrition—the Fourth Circuit has fortified both the finality of pleas and the integrity of sentencing. Practitioners should anticipate heightened scrutiny of the actual impact of any claimed discovery error and ensure that post-plea behavior aligns with claimed acceptance of responsibility. Milam’s “materiality doctrine” will likely reverberate throughout future Rule 11 litigation and sentencing practice within the Fourth Circuit and beyond.