The Immutable-Conviction-Date Rule for Automatic Disbarment
Commentary on Matter of Trubitsky, 2025 NY Slip Op 02649 (1st Dept.)

Introduction

Matter of Trubitsky presents a straightforward but legally significant dispute about timing: when exactly does an attorney’s automatic disbarment take effect after a felony conviction? The respondent, Marina Trubitsky, was already under an interim suspension (March 26 2020) for failing to cooperate with an investigation. After pleading guilty in 2024 to grand larceny in the second degree, she was automatically disbarred under Judiciary Law §90(4). Nevertheless, she asked the Appellate Division, First Department, to declare her disbarment effective nunc pro tunc to the earlier suspension date, thereby shortening the minimum waiting period for any future reinstatement.

The Attorney Grievance Committee (“AGC”) opposed the request, arguing that §90(4) makes disbarment self-executing on the date of conviction and that the court’s prior jurisprudence leaves no room to shift that date backward. The court agreed, cementing what this commentary calls the “Immutable-Conviction-Date Rule.”

Summary of the Judgment

• The court granted the AGC’s motion to strike Trubitsky’s name from the roll of attorneys.
• Disbarment is effective nunc pro tunc to September 18 2024, the exact day of her felony conviction.
• The request to backdate disbarment to the 2020 interim suspension was denied as “not legally permissible.”
• Respondent must comply with the strictures governing disbarred attorneys, return any court-issued secure pass, and desist from all legal practice.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The court’s reasoning is steeped in prior First Department decisions:

• Matter of Hanlon, 180 A.D.3d 51 (2019) & Matter of Brosius, 138 A.D.3d 216 (2016) – confirmed that a New York felony triggers automatic disbarment.
• Matter of Carlebach, 163 A.D.3d 192 (2018); Matter of Wilson, 141 A.D.3d 11 (2016); Matter of Bernstein, 78 A.D.3d 94 (2010) – each refused to manipulate the statutory disbarment date.
• Matter of Merker, 140 A.D.3d 1 (2016); Matter of Olewuenyi, 139 A.D.3d 25 (2016); Matter of Zichettello, 12 A.D.3d 128 (2004) – the older “prospective-date” cases respondent relied on; the court distinguished them because they dealt with forward-shifting disbarment where attorneys hid convictions.
• Recent triad: Matter of Reich, 206 A.D.3d 22 (2022); Matter of Sterling, 205 A.D.3d 201 (2022); Matter of Ahern, 205 A.D.3d 196 (2022) – clarified that concealment does not alter the statutory rule; these cases supplied the immediate doctrinal springboard for today’s holding.

2. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Mandate. Judiciary Law §90(4)(a) declares that any person … who shall be convicted of a felony … shall upon such conviction cease to be an attorney. The phrase “upon such conviction” leaves the Court with no discretionary leeway.
2. Self-Executing Nature. Disbarment occurs ipso facto, independent of any court order. The striking of the name from the roll is a ministerial confirmation, not the operative event.
3. Consistency and Administrative Clarity. Allowing back-dating would undermine uniform record-keeping, complicate reinstatement computations, and create incentives for strategic litigation by suspended attorneys.
4. Distinguishing “Serious Crime” Suspension. Respondent’s cited cases (e.g., Etheridge, Donziger) dealt with misconduct not classified as automatic-disbarment felonies; hence the court could exercise equitable discretion there—discretion that §90(4) forecloses in felony matters.

3. Impact on Future Cases and Legal Practice

• Uniform Timeline for Reinstatement. Because reinstatement petitions require a seven-year waiting period (22 NYCRR 1240.16[a]), the decision blocks any attempt to short-circuit that period through creative dating.
• Guidance for Practitioners. The message is clear: once convicted, the date is frozen; neither timely self-reporting nor prior suspensions will move it.
• Administrative Efficiency. Grievance Committees need not litigate “effective date” quarrels; they can simply attach a certificate of conviction.
• Ethics Landscape. By reinforcing the self-executing rule, the court strengthens public confidence in the bar’s disciplinary integrity and deters tactical maneuvering.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Automatic Disbarment: A statutory mechanism where disbarment occurs instantly when a triggering event (here, a felony conviction) happens, without needing a formal disciplinary hearing.
• Nunc pro tunc: Latin for “now for then.” A judicial act that retroactively applies a ruling to an earlier date.
• Interim Suspension: A temporary suspension imposed while an investigation or proceeding is pending; it does not by itself count as disbarment.
• Serious Crime vs. Felony in §90(4): A “serious crime” (Judiciary Law §90[4][d]) authorizes suspension and further proceedings; an enumerated “felony” (id. §90[4][e]) triggers automatic disbarment.
• Self-Executing: A legal consequence that operates automatically once specified facts exist, requiring no additional judicial action.

Conclusion

Matter of Trubitsky does not blaze an entirely new trail, but it consolidates and crystalizes a line of authority into a single, highly transparent rule: the effective date of automatic disbarment under Judiciary Law §90(4) is the calendar date of the felony conviction—full stop. Whether an attorney was already suspended, whether the conviction was promptly reported, or whether years have elapsed since the misconduct makes no difference. By reaffirming this principle, the First Department enhances predictability in attorney discipline, fortifies the deterrent value of automatic disbarment, and closes the window on tactical efforts to manipulate reinstatement eligibility. Future attorneys confronting similar circumstances now face an unambiguous, immutable benchmark: the day the guilty plea is entered or the jury returns a verdict is the day their license legally ends.