The Illusion of APA Work-Arounds: Quezada Palacios v. Bondi and the Second Circuit’s Re-affirmation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s Jurisdictional Bar

1. Introduction

Kevin Donely Quezada Palacios (“Quezada”), a Salvadoran national who entered the United States illegally as a child, sought to convert his Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) into lawful permanent residence. He obtained SIJS in February 2020 but had married seven months earlier—an act that legally disqualified him from SIJS under the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(2). When U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) discovered the marriage, it (1) revoked the I-360 SIJS approval under 8 U.S.C. § 1155 and (2) denied Quezada’s I-485 adjustment-of-status application under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Quezada sued in the Eastern District of New York, arguing principally that § 204.11(b)(2) was invalid rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and violated his religious-freedom rights. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 12(b)(1), citing the jurisdiction-stripping language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)-(D). In a non-precedential Summary Order, the Second Circuit (Judges Kearse, Leval, and Sullivan) affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
• It held that USCIS’s revocation of SIJS under § 1155 and denial of adjustment under § 1255 are quintessentially discretionary and therefore unreviewable by district courts pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
• Characterizing the suit as an APA “rule-making” challenge did not alter the real nature of the relief sought—review of discretionary decisions.
• Constitutional and statutory claims must be raised, if at all, in a petition for review of a final removal order per § 1252(a)(2)(D); the district court therefore also lacked jurisdiction over those claims.
• The court deemed undeveloped APA procedural arguments forfeited.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6 (2024) – Supreme Court labeled § 1155 “a quintessential grant of discretion.” The panel leaned on Bouarfa to underscore that revocation decisions fall squarely under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) – Established that § 1252(a)(2)(B) broadly bars judicial review of “any judgment” regarding discretionary relief, including factual findings. Quezada’s attempt to parse “rule-making” from “discretion” ran afoul of Patel’s expansive reading.
• Suqin Xia v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 85 (2d Cir. 2025) – Second Circuit precedent confirming that a denial under § 1255 is a “judgment” unreviewable by district courts. The panel explicitly relied on Xia for the adjustment-of-status portion of the appeal.
• Nouritajer v. Jaddou, 18 F.4th 85 (2d Cir. 2021) – Provided the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(1) dismissals and foreshadowed that only Courts of Appeals, via petitions for review, can hear constitutional claims tied to removal proceedings.
• Shabaj v. Holder, 718 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2013) – Clarified procedural route for constitutional questions; cited to deny district-court jurisdiction.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Identify the true nature of the suit. Despite APA rhetoric, the prayer for relief demanded re-approval of SIJS and adjustment of status—classic challenges to discretionary acts.
2. Apply § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to SIJS revocation. Because § 1155 vests the Secretary with authority to revoke “at any time, for what she deems good and sufficient cause,” the court labeled the revocation unreviewable.
3. Apply § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to adjustment denial. Section 1255 decisions are explicitly insulated from judicial review; the panel followed Xia to bar district-court oversight.
4. Reject constitutional and APA claims in district court. Under § 1252(a)(2)(D) only a Court of Appeals—on a petition for review of a removal order—may hear those claims. Because Quezada was not in removal proceedings, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit (at this posture) had jurisdiction.
5. Forfeiture doctrine. The court found Quezada’s undeveloped APA procedural attack waived under established Second Circuit waiver rules.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• No district-court back door via the APA. Immigrants (and creative counsel) cannot repackage revocation or adjustment disputes as rule-making challenges to evade § 1252(a)(2)(B).
• Clarifies SIJS litigation posture. Beneficiaries whose SIJS is revoked must litigate defensively—typically in removal proceedings—and not affirmatively file in district court.
• Re-emphasizes Bouarfa and Patel. District courts will likely dismiss a broader range of immigration disputes at the jurisdictional threshold, accelerating appeals directly to circuit courts (if and when a removal order issues).
• Regulatory stability of § 204.11(b)(2). The marriage bar for SIJS survives yet another challenge, solidifying agency reliance on the regulation.
• Religious-freedom claims constrained. Litigants must raise RFRA or First-Amendment arguments within removal-order petitions, not via freestanding district-court complaints.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• SIJS – Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A humanitarian pathway for abused, abandoned, or neglected non-citizens under 21 who are declared dependent on a U.S. juvenile court. Must be unmarried at filing and adjudication (8 C.F.R. § 204.11).
• Adjustment of Status (Form I-485): Procedure allowing certain non-citizens already in the U.S. to become lawful permanent residents without leaving the country. Governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1255 and fully discretionary.
• § 1155 Revocation: The Secretary of Homeland Security’s power to revoke an approved immigrant petition “at any time” for “good and sufficient cause.”
• § 1252(a)(2)(B) Jurisdictional Bar: Strips courts (including Courts of Appeals, except as noted) of jurisdiction to review “any judgment” regarding discretionary immigration relief.
• APA (Administrative Procedure Act): Federal statute allowing judicial review of agency action, except when another statute (here, § 1252) precludes review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law.
• Petition for Review: The statutory vehicle by which the Courts of Appeals review final orders of removal and associated “constitutional claims or questions of law” under § 1252(a)(2)(D).

5. Conclusion

Quezada Palacios v. Bondi reaffirms the formidable shield that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) places around discretionary immigration decisions. The Second Circuit refused to allow an APA “rule-making” label to pierce that shield, underscoring that courts must look to the real relief sought. The order also clarifies procedural channels: constitutional and statutory challenges to revocation or adjustment must travel with a petition for review of a removal order—not via a district-court detour. Practitioners representing SIJS beneficiaries or other humanitarian applicants must therefore prepare to litigate only after removal proceedings commence, or to seek relief through lobbying Congress or DHS for regulatory change, rather than through direct district-court suits. In the broader immigration-law landscape, Quezada consolidates Bouarfa, Patel, and Xia into a cohesive line: discretion plus § 1252 equals no district-court jurisdiction—no matter how artfully the complaint is drafted.