The Gardner-Alfred Doctrine: Second Circuit Defines When Courts May Resolve Religious-Accommodation Claims at Summary Judgment and Upholds Robust Discovery-Sanctions Powers

Introduction

In Gardner-Alfred v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, No. 23-7544 (2d Cir. Aug. 11 2025) the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed two recurring—and often thorny—questions in civil-rights litigation:

When may a trial court grant summary judgment on claims that an employer failed to accommodate an employee’s religious opposition to a Covid-19 vaccination requirement?
What sanctions are appropriate when parties and counsel willfully flout discovery obligations?

The plaintiffs, Lori Gardner-Alfred and Jeanette Diaz, long-time executive assistants, alleged that the New York Federal Reserve violated Title VII, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the First Amendment by denying them religious exemptions from an employee vaccine mandate and terminating their employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the Bank on all federal claims and imposed monetary and evidentiary sanctions for repeated discovery misconduct. On appeal, the Second Circuit:

Affirmed summary judgment against Gardner-Alfred after finding her evidence of sincere belief “wholly contradictory, incomplete, and incredible.”
Vacated summary judgment against Diaz, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed both as to sincerity and religious burden.
Affirmed the imposition of adverse-inference instructions and approximately $54,000 in fee-shifting sanctions for willful discovery violations.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court, per Judge Lynch (joined by Judges Nardini and Lee), fashioned a two-part holding that now guides trial courts within the Circuit:

The “Gardner-Alfred test” for summary judgment in religious-accommodation cases.
• Where plaintiffs offer at least minimally coherent testimony and “some” extrinsic evidence supporting sincerity or religious burden, credibility questions belong to the jury (Diaz).
• However, trial courts may grant summary judgment if a plaintiff’s own account is “so wholly contradictory and unbelievable” that no rational trier of fact could credit it (Gardner-Alfred).
Discovery-sanctions calibration. District courts retain broad discretion to impose fees and adverse inferences when parties act in bad faith, and they need not exhaust milder sanctions first where lesser measures would not cure prejudice or deter misconduct.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984) – The Court borrowed Patrick’s admonition that sincerity is usually a factual question not suitable for summary judgment when supported by any plausible evidence.
Int’l Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981) – Provided the framework for evaluating “good faith” religious expression and distinguishing genuine conscience from fraud.
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) – Reaffirmed that courts may not second-guess the content or “correctness” of religious doctrine; applied here to reject the district court’s objective assessment that mRNA vaccines were not “produced with” fetal cell lines.
Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996) – Cited to caution courts against deeming a belief non-burdened simply because the belief might rest on scientific error; objective validity is irrelevant to subjective burden.
Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2005) – Used to justify summary judgment where a plaintiff’s testimony is “so replete with inconsistencies and improbabilities” that no reasonable juror could credit it (applied to Gardner-Alfred).
Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, 624 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) – Underpinned the Court’s deferential abuse-of-discretion review of discovery sanctions.

2. Legal Reasoning

a. Sincerity Inquiry

The Court refined how trial courts should navigate sincerity disputes at summary judgment:

Step 1 – Evidence Spectrum. Where plaintiffs rely “almost exclusively” on their own testimony, courts examine consistency, detail, and corroboration.
Step 2 – The “Sham” Threshold. If contradictions are “inescapable and unequivocal” (Bentley/Jeffreys), testimony can be disregarded as a matter of law.
Step 3 – Mixed Motives Permitted. Co-existence of secular and religious motivations does not negate sincerity; the relevant question is whether religion is one bona fide driver (Diaz).

b. Religious Burden Analysis

The panel emphasized two principles:

No Doctrinal Narrowing. Courts must accept a claimant’s own articulation of her belief and cannot “rewrite” it scientifically or theologically to avoid conflict with a challenged policy.
No Objective-Truth Inquiry. A belief may be factually mistaken (e.g., vaccine ingredients) yet still religiously sincere; burden is gauged subjectively.

c. Discovery Sanctions

Applying Rules 16(f), 26(g), 37(b) & (c), the Court approved a two-prong sanction: (1) fee shifting of $53,808, with $2,400 assessed solely against counsel, and (2) three adverse-inference instructions regarding withheld documents. Key factors:

Willfulness and bad faith, illustrated by shifting explanations, untimely “document dumps,” and violation of explicit court orders.
Prejudice to the Federal Reserve, which expended resources piecing together withheld evidence.
Deterrence; lesser sanctions would insufficiently protect judicial integrity.

3. Potential Impact

Litigation Posture in Vaccine-Mandate Cases. Employers should expect jury trials when employees present even modest evidence of religious objection. Defendants can still prevail on summary judgment where plaintiffs’ narratives collapse under their own weight, but courts must articulate “Gardner-Alfred factors” (contradictions, corroboration, documentary support).
Discovery Conduct. The decision warns litigants that adverse inferences and substantial fee awards remain live options—even before dispositive motions—when parties “stonewall” discovery.
First Amendment & RFRA Doctrine. The panel’s insistence that courts may not evaluate factual correctness of religious views bolsters religious-liberty jurisprudence, echoing Kennedy v. Bremerton and reinforcing scrutiny of employer mandates.
Title VII Mixed-Motive Framework. A plaintiff need not prove her religious belief is the sole basis for objecting; the presence of secular concerns does not doom accommodation claims—an important clarification for future litigation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sincerity (Legal Sense): Not about theological correctness. The court asks: “Is the claimant honestly motivated by religious conviction, or is she faking for non-religious gain?”
Burden on Religion: A law burdens religion when it forces a person to do something her faith forbids (e.g., accept a vaccine she believes is morally tainted) or penalizes her for refusing.
Summary Judgment: A procedural device that ends a case before trial if no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Courts must view evidence in the non-movant’s favor and cannot weigh credibility.
Adverse-Inference Instruction: At trial, jurors are told they may assume missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the party that failed to produce it. A powerful remedy for discovery abuse.
Rule 26(g) Sanctions: Requires attorneys to certify that discovery responses are complete and correct. Violations can trigger cost-shifting against counsel personally.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s opinion establishes a pragmatic, two-track roadmap for trial courts confronting religious-accommodation disputes:

“Gardner-Alfred pathway”—Summary judgment remains available when a plaintiff’s own account is hopelessly contradictory and unsupported.
“Diaz pathway”—Where plaintiffs present coherent testimony and any corroboration, disputes over sincerity and burden must be tried to a jury; courts may not re-cast beliefs or weigh credibility at summary judgment.

Coupled with an emphatic endorsement of robust, proportional discovery sanctions, the decision will reverberate beyond Covid-19 disputes, influencing cases on Sabbath observance, grooming practices, and other faith-based workplace conflicts. Practitioners must now align their litigation strategy with the Gardner-Alfred Doctrine: marshal congruent evidence early, avoid discovery shortcuts, and prepare for the possibility that sincerity—when genuinely contested—belongs to the conscience of the jury, not the pen of the judge.