The Franklin Principle: Relevance-Bound Evidence Requests and “Some Evidence” Sufficiency in Prison Disciplinary Due-Process Review

1. Introduction

Franklin v. Attorney General for the State of New Mexico (10th Cir., 24 June 2025) concerns a state prisoner’s attempt to challenge a prison disciplinary conviction—loss of 30 days’ good-time credits and 60 days’ visitation—through a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. The petitioner, Bryce Franklin, alleged that he was denied procedural due process when he was (i) barred from submitting written follow-up questions to a witness and (ii) denied access to allegedly exculpatory video footage. He further contended that insufficient evidence supported the disciplinary finding that he forged a prison librarian’s signature on an affidavit used in an unrelated state-court filing. After the federal district court (D.N.M.) denied relief and refused a Certificate of Appealability (COA), Franklin sought appellate review in the Tenth Circuit.

The appellate panel—Judges Federico, Baldock, and Murphy—denied Franklin’s request for a COA and dismissed the appeal, simultaneously granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Although the ruling is formally a non-precedential order, its detailed elaboration on evidentiary relevance in prison disciplinary hearings and the COA threshold for § 2241 petitions creates persuasive guidance that is likely to influence lower courts. This commentary refers to that guidance as “The Franklin Principle.”

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Jurisdictional Gatekeeping: The court reiterated that a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite for appealing § 2241 denials arising from state-court process (Buck v. Davis; Montez v. McKinna). 2. COA Standard: Franklin failed to make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” i.e., jurists of reason would not find the district court’s assessment debatable (Slack v. McDaniel). 3. Due-Process Analysis: • The court accepted as some evidence the combination of (a) the handwritten affidavit in Franklin’s own script, misspelling the librarian’s name, and (b) the librarian’s sworn denial. • Security footage from 24 Jan 2020 was irrelevant because the affidavit’s date was 27 Nov 2019; hence refusal to review that video did not violate due-process rights to present evidence. • Denial of follow-up questions likewise fell within permissible institutional discretion. 4. Mailbox-Rule Allegation: Even assuming Franklin’s objections were untimely, the court excused delay under the “interests of justice,” rendering the contention moot. 5. Disposition: COA denied; appeal dismissed; IFP granted.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100 (2017) – Reinforced the COA as a jurisdictional filter; the panel quoted Buck for the proposition that courts of appeals lack authority to reach merits pre-COA.
• Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2000) – Clarified that state prisoners may proceed under either § 2241 or § 2254; cited to classify Franklin’s mislabeled form as a proper § 2241 petition.
• Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) – Provided the “reasonable jurist” test governing COA determinations applied here.
• Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) – Set the baseline due-process rights in disciplinary hearings; the panel invoked Wolff to remind that the criminal-trial panoply does not apply in prison discipline.
• Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985) – Origin of the “some evidence” standard; adopted by the panel to measure evidentiary sufficiency.
• Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996) – Applied Hill’s standard within the Circuit; cited to reinforce the low evidentiary threshold.
• Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2007) – Demonstrated circumstances where refusal to produce a videotape violates due process. The panel distinguished Howard because Franklin’s requested footage lacked temporal relevance.
• Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005) – Governs the prison mailbox rule; used to evaluate (but ultimately moot) the timeliness of Franklin’s objections.

3.2 Legal Reasoning in Depth

a) Choice of Statute (§ 2241 vs. § 2254): The court accepted the petition under § 2241 because the challenge concerned the execution of the sentence (disciplinary loss of good-time credits) rather than its original validity. This reflects established but occasionally misunderstood procedure.

b) COA Threshold Application: The panel treated Franklin’s notice of appeal and district-court motion as a composite COA request under 10th Cir. R. 22.1(A). It then performed only a “threshold inquiry” (Buck)—not a merits review—and found no debatable constitutional error.

c) Due-Process Elements and the “Franklin Principle”:

• Notice: Uncontested—Franklin received written notice of the charge.
• Opportunity to Present Evidence: Central dispute. The court stressed relevance as an outer limit on evidence production duties. Because the forged affidavit was dated two months earlier than the requested video date, the refusal to obtain the footage was reasonable. The new persuasive principle is that a prisoner’s right to present documentary evidence is limited to material with a demonstrable nexus to the charged misconduct’s time, place, and substance.
• Written Findings: Adequately supplied; the panel recited the officer’s three-point rationale.

Collectively these findings amount to a refined articulation of the “some evidence” test: circumstantial authorship indicia (handwriting match + spelling error) plus direct witness denial suffice to meet minimal due-process standards, even absent physical or digital corroboration.

d) Mailbox Rule and Equitable Tolerance: Even if Franklin failed strict compliance, the Tenth Circuit applied the Casanova v. Ulibarri “interests of justice” exception, signalling flexibility where mail delays are evident.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Relevance-Bound Evidence Requests: Prisons and lower courts now have persuasive authority to deny discovery of evidence whose date or scope demonstrably falls outside the alleged misconduct, without violating due process.
• Circumstantial-Evidence Acceptance: The case shows that handwriting similarities plus a witness’s denial can constitute “some evidence,” reducing the likelihood that inmates will secure federal habeas relief on evidentiary-insufficiency grounds.
• Clarification on COA for § 2241: Reinforces that state prisoners always need a COA, dampening occasional litigant confusion.
• Procedural Grace Regarding Mailbox Rule: Offers an example of courts forgiving minor timeliness lapses when delay is systemic, encouraging equitable analysis rather than rigid dismissal.
• Strategic Litigation Guidance: Prisoners and counsel will likely focus future habeas arguments on evidence directly tied to the incident’s timeframe and on demonstrable due-process deficits beyond mere disagreement with prison fact-finders.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Habeas Corpus (§ 2241 vs. § 2254): A legal mechanism allowing prisoners to challenge unlawful detention. § 2254 targets the state-court judgment; § 2241 targets how the sentence is carried out (e.g., disciplinary sanctions).
• Certificate of Appealability (COA): A gatekeeping certificate that a federal appellate court must issue before hearing a habeas appeal. Requires showing that the underlying constitutional claim is reasonably debatable.
• “Some Evidence” Standard: Minimal evidentiary threshold established in Superintendent v. Hill. Unlike “preponderance” or “beyond a reasonable doubt,” it asks only whether any reliable evidence supports the disciplinary ruling.
• Prison Mailbox Rule: A filing by an incarcerated person is deemed “filed” when delivered to prison officials for mailing, but proof of that date is required (e.g., legal-mail log or sworn declaration).
• In Forma Pauperis (IFP): Permission to proceed without paying court fees due to indigence.

5. Conclusion

Franklin v. Attorney General for the State of New Mexico does not blaze new constitutional territory, yet it crystallizes two practical rules that will resonate in prison-discipline jurisprudence: (1) evidence requests must be tethered to the misconduct’s factual context, and (2) fundamentally minimal yet reliable circumstantial proof can satisfy Hill’s “some evidence” bar. Together, these insights—dubbed the Franklin Principle—provide wardens, disciplinary officers, and courts with clearer guidance on balancing institutional efficiency against prisoners’ due-process rights and will shape strategic considerations in future § 2241 litigation.