The Forward-Relation Doctrine Extended: No Second Notice Required After Reopening Appeal Time under 28 U.S.C. §2107(c)

Introduction

Parrish v. United States (605 U.S. ___ (2025)) is the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement on the interplay between statutory deadlines for civil appeals and the procedural safety valves Congress and the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide to mitigate those deadlines’ harshness. The decision resolves a deepening circuit split by clarifying that, when a district court reopens the time to appeal under 28 U.S.C. §2107(c), an appellant who has already filed an otherwise-adequate notice of appeal before the reopening order need not file a second, duplicative notice. The original notice “relates forward” to the date of the reopening and vests the court of appeals with jurisdiction.

The case originates from the long-running civil rights litigation of Donte Parrish, a federal inmate who spent 23 months in segregated confinement following a prison homicide, was ultimately exonerated administratively, and then sought damages in federal court. The district court dismissed his suit; administrative mishaps delayed Parrish’s receipt of the judgment; and the resulting “late-but-early” notice of appeal precipitated a procedural puzzle that traveled all the way to the Supreme Court.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Sotomayor, writing for a six-justice majority, held:

Section 2107(c) authorizes district courts to reopen the time to appeal for 14 days when a party did not timely receive notice of the judgment.
A notice of appeal filed after the original appeal window but before a reopening order is not void; it is merely premature.
Under long-standing common-law and rule-based “relation-forward” principles, such a premature notice automatically ripens on the date of the reopening order; no second notice is jurisdictionally required.
The Fourth Circuit’s contrary rule—dismissing Parrish’s appeal for lack of a second notice—was reversed and the case remanded.

Justice Jackson (joined by Justice Thomas) concurred in the judgment, contending that ordinary docketing practice, rather than the relation-forward doctrine, sufficed to deem the original filing effective once the district court granted reopening. Justice Gorsuch dissented, arguing the Court should have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted and left the matter to the Rules Committee.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)
Confirmed that statutory notice-of-appeal deadlines are jurisdictional. Bowles’ rigidity underscored the importance of the §2107(c) safety valve but did not address premature filings. Parrish relies on Bowles only for the premise that Congress alone sets jurisdictional limits.
FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269 (1991)
Recognized that notices filed after a bench ruling but before entry of judgment ripen automatically—an early form of the relation-forward doctrine that the Court extends today.
Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001); Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992)
Emphasized function over form: if a filing gives clear notice of intent to appeal, technical flaws should not defeat jurisdiction. These cases supplied the majority’s animating principle.
Astoria Fed. S.&L. Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991)
Reaffirmed that Congress legislates against common-law procedural backgrounds unless it clearly says otherwise. The majority used Astoria to justify importing the relation-forward principle into §2107(c).
Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594 U.S. 559 (2021)
Cited for the interpretive canon that silence in a statute typically preserves established common-law doctrines rather than abrogating them.
Lower-court authority: Winters v. Taskila (6th Cir.) and United States v. Withers (9th Cir.) had already adopted the no-second-notice view, while the Fourth Circuit in the decision below had demanded a second notice, creating the circuit split the Court resolved.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Statutory Text and Structure.
Section 2107(c) prescribes only two jurisdictionally relevant facts: (1) that a reopening order may issue; and (2) that a 14-day period thereafter is “the period” for filing. The statute is silent on the effect of a pre-reopening notice. Under Astoria, that silence allows incorporation of established common-law procedural norms.
Common-Law Relation-Forward Principle.
Dating back to Ex parte Roberts (1873) and Luckenbach (1926), the Court has treated premature but otherwise sufficient notices of appeal as effective upon the occurrence of the event that makes the appeal possible. Congress reenacted §2107 without disrupting that tradition, signaling tacit approval.
Policy and Functional Considerations.
The notice of appeal’s sole function is to convey intent. Requiring incarcerated or pro se litigants to file a duplicate notice within a brief reopened window—often shorter than mail delays—creates a procedural trap antithetical to Rule 1’s mandate for “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolutions.
Harmony with the Federal Rules.
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(4) already codify relation-forward for other varieties of premature notices. Nothing in Rule 4(a)(6)—the reopening rule—expressly disallows it, so the default principle fills the gap. The Court rejected any negative-implication argument.
Rejection of Counterarguments.
The majority dismissed the Fourth Circuit’s view that one document cannot serve dual purposes, citing Smith and Slack v. McDaniel for the proposition that single filings often serve multiple procedural roles.

C. Impact of the Decision

National Uniformity. The opinion eliminates the previous split, ensuring that litigants nationwide receive the same treatment regarding premature notices in reopened appeals.
Reduced Procedural Traps. Especially for prisoners and pro se parties, the decision removes a technical hurdle that frequently doomed appeals despite meritorious underlying claims.
Guidance for Courts and Clerks. District clerks may now safely transmit premature notices along with reopening orders without waiting for (or demanding) second notices.
Rule-making Implications. Although Justice Gorsuch preferred to leave the matter to the Advisory Committee, the Court’s clarification may narrow the issues under study and inform future amendments to Rule 4(a)(6).
Broader Doctrine. By reaffirming relation-forward, the Court signals continued receptivity to pragmatic, anti-forfeiture doctrines that preserve access to appellate review absent prejudice.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Notice of Appeal. A short document—often one page—saying “I appeal.” Filing it on time gives appellate courts jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional Deadline. A time limit set by Congress that courts cannot waive. Missing it normally ends the case, no matter how compelling the equities.
Premature vs. Late Filing. A “late” notice is filed after a valid window has closed; a “premature” notice is filed before the window opens. Parrish’s notice was late as to the original 60-day window but premature as to the reopened 14-day window.
Relation-Forward Doctrine. A procedural rule that treats a premature notice as filed on the first day it could properly have been filed, preventing forfeiture.
Reopening vs. Extension. An extension enlarges the original deadline; reopening creates a new window after the deadline has fully expired, usually because the party never received notice of the judgment.
§2107(c) Motion to Reopen. A statutory request to a district court to activate the 14-day fresh-start period when notice of the judgment was delayed.
Slip Opinion. The Court’s initial, unofficial publication of its decision; subject to later revision before appearing in the United States Reports.

Conclusion

Parrish cements the principle that substance prevails over formalism in appellate jurisdiction where Congress has not expressly commanded otherwise. By holding that a single, timely-received but premature notice of appeal suffices after a §2107(c) reopening order, the Court reinforces longstanding common-law leniency, aligns the circuits, and protects litigants—especially those least able to navigate procedural mazes—from losing their day in appellate court due to “empty paper shuffling.” In the broader legal landscape, the decision signals the Court’s commitment to rational, equitable procedure and invites lower courts to interpret procedural rules in a manner that advances, rather than obstructs, decisions on the merits.