The Equivalence of Unsworn Declarations and Affidavits: A New Standard for Summary Judgment in Debt Collection Cases

Introduction

In the case of CB1, d/b/a CBB COLLECTIONS v. Hove, the Supreme Court of Montana addressed two pivotal issues that have far‐reaching implications for debt collection litigation in the state. The primary focus was whether an unsworn written declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is equivalent to an affidavit and whether such evidence, when improperly formatted, should preclude summary judgment. The dispute arose from a scenario where Katelyn and Ira Hove, the appellants, contested charges related to alleged intensive care unit (ICU) billing during Katelyn Hove’s hospitalization. The case also involved a third-party defendant, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Montana, adding another layer of complexity. Essentially, the central legal controversy revolved around whether technical deficiencies in the format of the Hoves’ declaration should lead to dismissal of material factual disputes.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision which had granted summary judgment in favor of CB1, the debt-collection agency. The Court held that a declaration executed under § 1-6-105, MCA, is, in fact, equivalent to an affidavit, provided it contains the necessary elements such as a date, place, signature, and the statement declaring its veracity under penalty of perjury. Further, despite minor deficiencies in Hove’s declaration—specifically the absence of a precise day in the date—the declaration still established genuine issues of material fact regarding the contested ICU charges. This genuine dispute, particularly Hove’s assertion that she never spent time in the ICU, was sufficient to preclude summary judgment and mandate a trial on the merits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Judgment draws heavily on established Montana case law and statutory interpretation to support its conclusions. Key precedents include:

NELSON v. DRISCOLL, 285 Mont. 355 – This case provided criteria for when a court may alter or amend a judgment, emphasizing a strict review of the form and admissibility of evidence. The District Court’s reliance on these criteria was scrutinized and ultimately found lacking when a genuine material dispute was evident.
In re T. W., 2006 MT 153 and HOWARD v. ST. JAMES COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, 2006 MT 23 – These cases reaffirm the principle that district courts possess broad discretion in evidentiary rulings and in precluding hearsay, which was central to analyzing the admissibility of the declaration and associated evidence.
Lawrence v. Pasha, 2023 MT 150 – The standard that summary judgment can only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact was reinforced herein. The Court emphasized that even material disputes arising from unverified or hearsay evidence can create sufficient doubt to preclude summary judgment.

These cases collectively influenced the Court’s determination that technical imperfections in the declaration should not override its substantial evidentiary value when genuine disputes exist.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s decision rested on a two-pronged analysis:

Equivalence of Declarations and Affidavits: The Court meticulously analyzed § 1-6-105, MCA, along with § 1-1-203, MCA. It clarified that unsworn declarations submitted under penalty of perjury possess the same legal force as traditional sworn affidavits. Even though the declaration in question lacked a specific day in its date, the material facts it conveyed were supported by Hove’s personal knowledge and thus met the statutory requirement.
Genuine Issue of Material Fact: The Hoves’ contention that they were billed for ICU services they did not receive created a conflicting set of facts in dispute with CB1’s evidence. The Court noted that such a discrepancy, even if embedded in part within hearsay, still constituted a material factual dispute sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The reliance on personal knowledge statements within the declaration underscored the consistency and credibility of the Hoves’ version of events.

Fundamentally, the Court reaffirmed that the purpose of a declaration is not solely procedural; its evidentiary value, especially when arising from personal knowledge, can be critical in resolving material disputes.

Impact

This Judgment sets an important precedent in Montana legal practice. By affirming that unsworn declarations are equivalent to affidavits provided they include the necessary statutory elements, the ruling potentially broadens the range of admissible evidence in summary judgment motions. Future parties, especially in debt collection cases, may rely on declarations as a valid substitute for sworn affidavits, particularly when minor formatting deficiencies do not undermine the substance of the evidence.

Additionally, the decision underscores that genuine disputes over material facts—such as billing discrepancies related to medical services—must be carefully scrutinized, even when evidence may be partially inadmissible as hearsay. This encourages litigants to address factual inconsistencies with robust evidence rather than relying solely on procedural technicalities to obtain summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Some of the legal terminologies and concepts discussed in the Judgment have broader implications for case strategy:

Unsworn Declaration vs. Affidavit: Typically, affidavits are sworn before a notary or court official. However, a declaration made under penalty of perjury, even if unsworn, carries the same legal weight. This interpretation ensures that the emphasis is on the substance and truthfulness of the statements rather than the formality of the swearing process.
Summary Judgment Standard: This is a legal procedure used to decide a case without a full trial when there is no dispute over the essential facts. The Court’s analysis emphasizes that even small factual discrepancies, if they pertain to crucial issues (such as a claim of never having been in the ICU), are enough to necessitate a trial.

Conclusion

In summary, the Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in CB1, d/b/a CBB COLLECTIONS v. Hove introduces a significant legal principle: an unsworn declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is equivalent to a sworn affidavit provided it meets the proper formal criteria. Furthermore, the decision highlights that even when some attachments or portions of the evidence are not entirely verified, personal knowledge testimony that creates genuine factual disputes is sufficient to deny summary judgment. This outcome reinforces the necessity for a complete and substantive factual record prior to issuing summary judgments, thereby ensuring that litigants have a fair chance to present their case at trial.

The ruling will likely influence future procedural arguments and evidentiary requirements, particularly in debt collection and medical billing disputes. Legal practitioners should note the balance between technical precision and substantive evidence, recognizing that courts are inclined to allow trials when material factual disputes are present.