The Davila Rule: Clarifying Vermont Sentence Credits for Absconders Held Out-of-State

Introduction

In Julio Davila v. Nicholas Deml, 2025 VT 39, the Vermont Supreme Court confronted a recurring, but previously unsettled, question: Does an offender who absconded from Vermont furlough earn credit toward the Vermont sentence while sitting in an out-of-state jail on both a Vermont warrant and new local charges? The majority concluded that he does not, thereby establishing what this commentary refers to as the “Davila Rule.”

The case arose after Julio Davila, out on Vermont furlough, disappeared in April 2022. A Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) warrant issued; four months later he was arrested in Massachusetts on that warrant and on fresh Massachusetts charges. Davila remained jailed in Massachusetts for 490 days until the Bay State dismissed its prosecution and released him for transport back to Vermont. The DOC refused to credit those 490 days against his Vermont sentence, prompting Davila to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State; the Supreme Court affirmed (Justice Eaton), with a dissent by Justice Waples joined by Chief Justice Reiber.

Summary of the Judgment

Holding: An absconder receives no Vermont sentence credit for days spent in out-of-state custody on outstanding foreign charges—even after the Vermont warrant is executed—until the foreign sovereign relinquishes primary jurisdiction and the inmate is available for transport to Vermont.
Statutory construction:
- 28 V.S.A. § 808e(c) withholds credit while the warrant is outstanding but does not affirmatively grant credit once the warrant is executed.
- 13 V.S.A. § 7031(c) applies only when the prisoner is “awaiting transportation” to serve a Vermont sentence, a status that requires Vermont to have primary jurisdiction— which did not occur here until Massachusetts released Davila.
Outcome: Davila will not receive credit for the 490 days served in Massachusetts (8/10/22–12/12/23); his Vermont maximum sentence was therefore extended by 616 days (after other adjustments).

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Wesco, Inc. v. Sorrell, 2004 VT 102 – reiterated the “plain meaning” rule of statutory interpretation that guided the majority’s reading of § 808e.
State v. Eldredge, 2006 VT 80, and State v. Bruyette, 2021 VT 43 – emphasized de novo review of statutory language.
Hier v. Slate Valley Unified School District, 2025 VT 2 – provided the modern summary-judgment standard.
Federal “primary jurisdiction” cases (Lanza, Cole, Elwell, Pope, Zerbst, Lugo) – illustrated the longstanding doctrine that the sovereign first to arrest retains custody until it voluntarily yields. The majority used these authorities to define when a prisoner is “awaiting transportation.”
State v. Blondin, 164 Vt. 55 (1995) – addressed parity of credit for indigent defendants; cited by Davila to argue policy considerations, but the court found the argument unpreserved.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Plain meaning of § 808e(c): The statute is phrased negatively (“shall not earn credit … for any days that the warrant is outstanding”). Because the Legislature chose only to bar credit—without simultaneously creating an entitlement once the bar is lifted—the court refused to read an unstated affirmative right into the statute. In effect, silence equals no credit.
Interpretation of § 7031(c) (“awaiting transportation”): The majority imported the federal “primary jurisdiction” doctrine. A prisoner is not “awaiting transportation” to Vermont until Vermont can legally take physical custody. So long as Massachusetts retained charges and refused transfer, Davila was not “available.” Only upon release on recognizance (12/12/23) did he enter § 7031(c) territory.
Policy and preservation: Davila’s equitable plea—credit should not depend on ability to post Massachusetts bail—was deemed waived because it was not raised below. Thus, the court avoided addressing socioeconomic disparities, leaving the question for the Legislature.

C. Impact of the Decision

The Davila Rule introduces clear, statewide guidance on credit calculations when an absconder is held out-of-state:

Vermont does not owe credit until the other jurisdiction relinquishes primary jurisdiction, even if a Vermont warrant has been executed.
DOC administrative practice gains judicial endorsement, limiting potential exposure to large retroactive credits.
Defense counsel must now litigate (or negotiate) extradition and dismissal of foreign charges promptly if sentence credit is essential.
The Legislature may face pressure—highlighted by the dissent—to revisit § 808e(c) and § 7031(c) to address fairness for indigent defendants unable to post out-of-state bail.

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

Furlough: A conditional release from physical incarceration that remains part of the offender’s sentence; DOC supervision continues.
Absconding: Failure to report or remain in contact while on furlough, triggering an arrest warrant under 28 V.S.A. § 808e.
Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine: The sovereign (state or federal) that first arrests a person has the exclusive right to prosecute, sentence, and incarcerate that person until it releases or transfers custody.
Sentence Credit: Statutory mechanism by which days spent in custody are deducted from a sentence. In Vermont, sources include § 726 (furlough), § 808e (absconders), and § 7031 (awaiting transport).
“Awaiting Transportation” (13 V.S.A. § 7031(c)): Applies when the prisoner is physically and legally available for Vermont to collect—i.e., after the foreign jurisdiction relinquishes custody.

Conclusion

Julio Davila v. Nicholas Deml crystallizes Vermont’s approach to sentence credits for absconders apprehended outside the state. By declaring that § 808e(c) merely withholds credit while a warrant is outstanding—and does not automatically resume credit once the warrant is executed—the Supreme Court imposes a bright-line rule: No credit accrues until the offender is free from the other sovereign’s control and is either transported or readily transportable to Vermont.

While the dissent persuasively argues that the statutory text could support immediate credit after arrest, the majority’s reading prevails unless the Legislature intervenes. Practitioners must advise clients that time spent in a foreign jail on new charges will not shorten the Vermont sentence, and should seek speedy resolution of out-of-state matters if credit is a priority. Policy-makers, meanwhile, may revisit the statutes to reconcile fairness concerns for indigent defendants spotlighted, but not resolved, in this decision.